

THE POLAND OF PILSUDSKI

1914-1936

By the same Author

POLAND, 1914-1931

Demy 8vo

With Illustrations and a Map

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THE LIFE OF ARCHBISHOP

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MARSHAL PILSUDSKI

ROBERT MACHRAY

THE POLAND OF
PILSUDSKI

INCORPORATING "POLAND, 1914-1931"
MUCH CONDENSED, AND CARRYING
ON THE HISTORY OF POLAND
TILL MID-JULY 1936

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P R E F A C E

SINCE *Poland, 1914-1931*, was published the political aspect of Europe has changed enormously, if not totally, the most significant feature being the successful challenge to "Versailles mentality" by Germany. In 1931 France was the most heavily-armed Power, and she was supported by Poland and the Little Entente. German rearmament was not a serious factor, and high politics were still governed, notwithstanding some protests, by the Treaty of Versailles and the related treaties constituting the "New Europe" which came out of the World War. The League of Nations, under the Covenant, was still considered the sure shield of peace, despite the non-adherence of the United States and the opposition of Soviet Russia. In 1936 it is plain that the colossal rearmament of Germany has altered all political values. The invalidation of the Versailles Treaty proceeds apace under the unrelenting pressure of Herr Hitler. The League is discredited; the victory of Signor Mussolini over it and Abyssinia, with the dropping of the sanctions, has demonstrated alike its impotence and the strength of Italy, whose collaboration with Germany gives added weight to both in forming a Central European Block. No longer isolated and now formidably armed, Soviet Russia plays on the other side a considerable part in Europe through pacts of mutual assistance with France and Czechoslovakia, but is held in check in Asia by Japan. Poland cannot but be profoundly affected by the changed situation—and this all the more because of the death of Marshal Pilsudski in 1935. For years he had controlled her policy abroad, as well as at home, and his disappearance from the scene suggested the end of a period in Polish history. The question arose of his successor or successors, a question of cardinal importance, and not to Poland alone. The answer was given in the summer of 1936, General Rydz-Smigly becoming quasi-dictator, with the consent of the President.

Five most eventful years had passed since my book on Poland appeared; during them much of special interest had taken place in the internal affairs of that country, as, for instance, the establish-

ment of a new Constitution and Parliamentary system. As never before, Poland during that period made good her place of vital consequence in the *ensemble* of Europe. In the story of these years there was plenty of matter for a biggish book, but after anxious consideration I came to the conclusion that it would be better, as giving a longer perspective, to incorporate the pith and substance of *Poland, 1914-1931*, in a new volume, which would cover the whole ground since the restoration of the State. There was, moreover the splendid life-work and tremendous personality of Pilsudski to impart to it a natural unity from start to finish. Hence, then, *The Poland of Pilsudski*. Chapters I to X (with an addition to Chapter X bringing it to the end of 1931) reproduce in the present book, in a much condensed form, Chapters I to IX of the other book. Chapters XI, XII and XIII are entirely new, the narrative being continued till well into 1936—a year and two months after the passing of the Marshal, but with his spirit still actively inspiring his people under leaders of his own choosing. Chapters I and II are introductory, and outline the aims, plans and acts of the Polish patriots, with Pilsudski the principal figure, in their quest of independence to November 1918, when he became Chief of the State. The present republic dates officially from "Armistice Day," November 11, 1918, and its subsequent history falls of itself into two parts, the division being made by the Marshal's *coup d'état* in May 1926. Chapters III to VII deal with the first, and Chapters VIII to XIII with the second.

Pilsudski was Chief of the State from November 1918 to December 1922, and during that time the new republic was organized and consolidated, and its frontiers fixed. These were remarkable achievements in view of the chaotic conditions in which it came into being, and possible only after the crushing defeat by the Marshal of Soviet Russia in 1920 and the subsequent Peace of Riga. Military alliances with France and Rumania followed. German hostility was shown in Danzig and propaganda respecting the "Corridor," but was not really formidable, as Germany was weak. Practically the Poles were a unit on foreign policy, but were far from being so in domestic affairs. A Constitution was passed by the Seym or Parliament after much disputa-

tion, as party spirit was bitter, with Pilsudski himself its focus. The Right opposed and the Left supported him; the attitude of the Centre varied; and changes of Governments were frequent. The financial and economic situation of the country was difficult, owing to the devastation caused by the wars, the lack of capital, and an unstable currency. Yet, in spite of everything, Poland made headway as a State. In accordance with the Constitution Pilsudski quitted office; Narutowicz, a friend, was elected President, a blow to the Right, but a few days afterwards he was assassinated by a Nationalist fanatic; Wojciechowski, also a friend of Pilsudski, was elected in his place. But in May 1923 a Government of the Right and Centre, under the Populist Witos, came into office; Pilsudski disliked it so much that he resigned the posts of Chief of the General Staff and President of the Superior War Council which he had held after ceasing to be Chief of the State, and announced his retirement into private life.

From that time to the Marshal's *coup d'état* the chief feature in Polish history was the increasing difficulty of the financial situation, with a heavy fall in the zloty, the currency unit, in July 1925. Depression set in throughout the country and continued into 1926. There was a "crisis of confidence," political as well as financial, because many Poles had ceased to believe in their Parliament on account of its impotence through the intensity of party strife and the corrupt practices that had been brought to light. Poland was on the verge of bankruptcy, and many eyes turned to Pilsudski, who intervened effectively through the "Event of May." Wojciechowski resigned; the Marshal was elected to the Presidency, but declined to accept it, and on June 1, 1926, Moscicki, his nominee, was elected President, by a considerable majority over the candidate of the Right. A new Government was formed, with Pilsudski Minister of War, a position he combined with that of Chief of the Army as its Inspector-General. He held those posts till his death. He was also Prime Minister from October 1926 to June 1928, and again from August to December 1930, his occupancy of the Premiership for both periods corresponding with acute stages in the struggle between the régime and the Opposition which centred in the Parliament.

This struggle resulted in the organization of the Marshal's supporters in the "Non-party Block of Co-operation with the Government," which after General Elections in 1928 and 1930 obtained a clear majority in the Parliament, though insufficient to pass a new Constitution, one of Pilsudski's principal objectives. Meanwhile the régime had been fortified by the financial and economic recovery of the country, manifested by the flotation of a large Stabilization Loan, the development of Gdynia, Poland's new port on the Baltic, and the great success of the National Exposition at Poznan. But in 1929 the long-protracted world economic depression was setting in; the fall in the price of wheat and other cereals told heavily against Poland, nearly 70 per cent agricultural, and began another financial and economic crisis, the effects of which still continue to embarrass her.

In external affairs the régime was successful. In July 1932 Poland came to terms with Soviet Russia by signing with her a non-aggression pact, valid for three years, renouncing war as an instrument of national policy. Throughout that year, as in 1931, German propaganda was persistently hostile to Poland, and Danzig gave trouble. Polish policy was indicated by the strong line taken by Pilsudski against Germany in the Danzig "Cruiser Affair" in June 1932. The victory of Germany in the controversy over "Equality" in the second half of 1932 did not further the peace of Europe, as her demands for revision of the Versailles Treaty became more clamorous than ever, and Hitler's accession to power in 1933 did not tend to modify them. German antagonism to Poland became more and more pronounced, and the "Westerplatte Affair" in March, Danzig again being involved, and Pilsudski taking again a determined stand against Germany, suggested almost inevitable war, but the danger was obviated, to the surprise of Europe, by the complete *volte-face* of German policy, Pilsudski and Hitler signing a non-aggression pact, valid for ten years, early in 1934. In May of that year the non-aggression pact with the Soviet was extended to December 31, 1945. As Colonel Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, pointed out, "Our foreign policy is the application to international problems of the realist and constructive thought of Marshal Pilsudski."

This pact with Germany aroused a great deal of comment and speculation, not always favourable to Poland; it had a distinctly bad reception in France, despite the fact that it clearly stated that it in no wise changed any of Poland's previous commitments, including, of course, her alliance with France. A coolness had been growing between Poland and France before the signing of the pact, and Mussolini's proposed Four-Power Pact did not decrease it; Poland contended that that pact transformed the four Powers into a Directory of Europe, a thing to which she could not agree. Further, she strongly objected to the proposed Eastern Pact promoted by Litvinoff and Barthou. This gave additional umbrage to France, but Poland stood her ground. While proclaiming her fidelity to the alliance with France, she maintained the justice of her attitude. In the end her opposition to this pact virtually killed it. In 1934-35 it was obvious that Poland had become a Great State, to be reckoned with accordingly. In 1935 Europe was thrown into a turmoil by Hitler's revelation of the vast rearmament programme of Germany; Poland took it calmly, and stated that her policy was unchanged; the non-aggression pacts with Soviet Russia and Germany, and the alliance with France, were its foundations, the pacts establishing peace in Eastern Europe and the alliance making for general security. Pilsudski, who had directed foreign policy during the régime, died on May 12, 1935, and Poland was plunged into mourning. It was soon evident, however, that his death implied no alteration in Polish foreign policy.

In internal policy Pilsudski's constant aim was to unify the Poles and to imbue them with the patriotic ideal of all working together for the honour, power and glory of their country. Teacher as well as leader of his people, he sought to replace "partyism," with the President a mere figurehead, by the "spirit of the team" under a strong executive. The Constitution set up in the first years of the restored State greatly restricted the powers of the President; the Government was entrusted to the party-ridden Seym, the Senate being a cipher. The failure of the Seym produced the *coup d'état*, and the Constitution was amended by giving more power to the President and less to the Seym, though

Pilsudski thought a more thorough reform necessary. The régime tried to work with the Seym, but found it impossible. For several years the Government Block promoted plans for a new Constitution in accordance with the Marshal's views of what Poland needed, but success was achieved only in April 1935, two or three weeks before he died. The new Constitution is so largely a distinctively Polish product that it is almost impossible to compare it with other Constitutions having a different history and environment. No doubt its passing into law was a great satisfaction to the dying Marshal; it remains his chief legacy to Poland in the domestic sphere. The continued financial and economic crisis must have weighed upon him, but he was neither a financier nor an economist: the régime did what it could, but Poland was held in chains by the world depression like other States, though she stood up to it better than most.

In the history of our time Marshal Pilsudski is and will always be one of its greatest men. Of the innumerable tributes paid to him after his death perhaps the most fitting, because in brief compass the most complete, was that sent by King George V of England to President Moscicki, for it spoke of the "great qualities of" Pilsudski's "leadership, both as soldier and statesman," which were "devoted so unsparingly to his country's service." Pilsudski was indeed a soldier of genius and a great statesman too.

Headed "Poland after Pilsudski," the last chapter of this book gives an account of what occurred after the Marshal's passing up to the time when General Rydz-Smigly, by the wish of President Moscicki, was recognized as Pilsudski's successor; in all, about fourteen months. These saw a General Election under the new Constitution and its dependent Electoral Laws, and the assembly of a new Parliament under a new Government, concentrating its efforts on solving the national financial and economic crisis, rather than on political affairs. A feature was the dissolution of the Government Block. During those months Poland played a full part in international affairs, justifying her claim to be considered a bulwark of Western civilization and a powerful factor making for the equilibrium of Europe and the peace of the world.

This book, as did the former, aims at presenting a consecutive

record, in chronological order as far as possible, of the day-to-day drama, political, financial and economic, of the restored State, with Pilsudski as the central figure, the whole treated from a sympathetic but not a propagandist point of view. My material has been derived from many sources, and carefully collated; a list of the books, magazines, pamphlets and newspapers to which I am indebted is given in the Bibliography at the end of the volume; the important and highly informative works of Dyboski and Smogorzewski were particularly helpful. I have had much kind assistance and advice from friends and others in Poland and elsewhere, for which I am most grateful, but they are too numerous for individual mention, yet I must not omit to name my Warsaw secretary, Mlle. Anna Klochowicz, for her invaluable research work.

In the spelling of proper nouns Polish usage has been followed throughout the book, except as regards Christian names, as, for example, Ladislas, and of names of cities, rivers and so on, as Warsaw, Cracow, Vilna, the Vistula, which have standardized English forms. The Index not only contains short biographical notes in supplement of the narrative, but gives the pronunciation of some Polish names. In not a few Polish words the collocation of consonants seems to be intimidating, but is less so if it is kept in mind that *cż* stands for tch, *sż* for sh, and *szczż* for shtch, while *rz* is the same as the French *j*, the Polish *j* equalling y or i, *c* represents ts, and *u* is oo: thus *Zbrucz* is pronounced Zbrootch; *Orsza*, Orsha; *Szczara*, Shtchara; *Mozyrz*, Mosich; *Pollock*, Polotsk; and *Bug*, Boog. The termination *in* is pronounced een, e.g. *Lublin* becomes Loobleen. To simplify the Polish spelling the Polish accents have been omitted and the crossed Polish *l* replaced by the ordinary letter. In such words as Stanislawow the *w* is given as *v* in the text, as that is how the letter is sounded; so Novogrodek, Suvalki, etc.

Footnotes have been avoided altogether, references being provided in the body of the narrative. The general omission of personal titles, except in quotations, implies no discourtesy or disrespect, as it was made solely to save space.

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THE POLAND OF PILSUDSKI

1914-1936

CHAPTER I

ACTIVISTS AND PASSIVISTS

1914-1915

1

WHEN the World War broke out in 1914 the darkest hour in the long captivity of Poland appeared to be reached. The culmination of the national tragedy seemed to come when more than a million Poles were mobilized on opposite sides by the belligerent Powers. Unfortunate conscripts, they were compelled—the ultimate horror and degradation—to mutilate and kill each other, on what had been their own territory, by command of those who had riven it from them. At the moment upwards of twenty million Poles were subjects of the Russian, Austrian and German Empires: twelve millions in Russian Poland, five millions in Austrian Poland, and the rest in German Poland, as these regions were widely, if not generally, designated. On August 1, Germany, and on August 6, 1914, Austria, declared war on Russia. Henceforth to the close of the gigantic conflict, so far as Russia was concerned, the Russian Poles were arrayed against the Austrian and German Poles on the battlefields of the Eastern Front. It was inevitable that, as the main theatre of their participation in the grim struggle would be on that front, Polish lands would be exposed to devastation and ruinous losses, and Polish people endure suffering and misery.

POLAND ALMOST FORGOTTEN

In anything like normal circumstances the blackness of the prospect in its almost insupportable pathos might well have appealed to universal human sympathy. But the circumstances were far from normal. France and England, with Russia, were

engaged in a life-and-death struggle with the Central Powers. France, to whom the Poles had looked for help in some of their insurrections against their oppressors, knew them better than did England; but France, as the ally of Russia, the worst oppressor of Poland and the holder of two-thirds of her ancient territories, was no longer interested in the Polish Question. Interest in it had become very dim everywhere—except among the Poles. As an international issue it had had no place in European political history since the ruthless suppression of the insurrection of 1863 had shocked diplomatists into making emphatic though unavailing protests against Russian barbarity.

For a time this tide of feeling in favour of Poland persisted with some strength, but it slacked, ebbed and eventually disappeared. New political orientations consequent on the defeat of France and the rise of the German Empire in 1870–71 changed the situation. The permanent elimination of Poland from the political framework of Europe was, or appeared to be, accepted tacitly or openly on all hands. Practically the Polish Question—the Liberation of Poland—sank out of sight and out of mind as other and more exigent national questions pressed into view. When the World War began very few people in Western Europe ever gave Poland a thought.

POLAND NOT DEAD

The partitioning Powers had succeeded in erasing Poland from the map, but had signally failed to obliterate Polish nationalism. The Polish people remained a national unity in language and literature, traditions and religion, despite the dismemberment of their country and the protracted efforts of its despoilers to Russify or Germanize it. In brief, they were what they were—Poles, forming a Nation compacted together and distinguished from other nations by the thousand years of its history, whether in the day of glory or the night of eclipse.

In 1795 the last vestiges of the independence of Poland had been swept away by the three hostile Powers, but the captivity they imposed gave in the end striking witness to the indestructible vitality of the Polish race, which, notwithstanding oppression,

often of the cruellest character, increased and multiplied. In 1914 there were nearly thrice as many Poles on their native soil as there had been in 1795. Not all the results of the Captivity were bad; some, in fact, could be accounted positive gains. They varied in the three partitioned areas in accordance with the type of Government each had over it, and the political and economic opportunities each presented to the Poles.

THE THREE PARTITIONED AREAS AND THEIR POLITICS

The general progress of Parliamentarism, if not of democracy, throughout Europe had given the Poles a political standing, not ineffective in Austrian Poland, but largely illusory in Russian Poland and German Poland. From the first area the Poles in 1914 held 106 seats out of 516 in the Reichsrat at Vienna, and were a power within the Austrian Empire; from the second they had 12 representatives from the Congress Kingdom and three from the *Kresy* or eastern borderlands in the Duma at Petrograd; and from the third they had 17 members in the Reichstag at Berlin. In neither Duma nor Reichstag had the Poles much influence.

Under Russia the Poles profited enormously from the rise and rapid growth of their industries and commerce. Russian Poland became the main supplier of all Russia. Under Austria the Poles in Galicia had by 1867 obtained self-government, as well as a representation in the Reichsrat which increased as time went on till the Polish vote became one of its most important elements. On the other hand, Austrian Poland was little developed economically. Under Germany the Polish struggle took the form of a protracted fight for the possession of land, and in the course of it the Poles learned by method and discipline to turn against the Germans the economic weapons with which they were to have been conquered. The Poles added to their holdings, and German Poland was in an excellent state from the economic point of view.

Of the three partitioned areas, Austrian Poland was the most advanced politically, but Russian Poland and German Poland were better off economically. In Russian Poland industrial and commercial prosperity conduced to the spread of a spirit of realism or opportunism among many Russian Poles. In Austrian

Poland the Austrian Poles were more or less content with things as they were. In German Poland, there also prevailed a practical view of politics. Owing to the particular circumstances of each area, certain differences of mentality developed among the Poles. It would have been unnatural if in the passing of four or five generations of Poles in captivity under three different systems of Government, with their individual policies, codes of laws, educational methods and other distinctive apparatus of life, those quasi-psychological differences had not appeared in the three sections into which Poland was divided. Yet the racial unity, the sense and the urge of it, remained the supreme factor.

QUESTION OF LIBERATION

Liberation was the aim common to the Poles, but there was much diversity of opinion among them, not only respecting the means or method by which it was to be attained, but also regarding the kind of liberation—partial or complete—to be achieved. The two main currents in which Polish political thought flowed were described during the War as *Activist* and *Passivist* respectively; Revolutionary and Opportunist or Realist were the names previously given them, the method of the Activists being the revolution, which was in the line of the Polish romantic tradition, while the Passivists, recalling how all former Polish insurrections had failed disastrously, frowned on resort to armed intervention, and accepting the realities of the situation, sought to obtain a better political position by gradual steps or as occasion served.

In all three sections of Poland it was the Socialists who were the revolutionaries; they advocated and adopted insurrection as the means for procuring liberation. In 1892 the Polish Socialist Party—*Polska Partja Socjalistyczna*, hence known as the P.P.S.—was formed at a Paris Congress from delegates of all the Polish Socialist groups. In the following year it established itself in Warsaw, and in the forefront of its programme was the struggle for a democratic and independent Polish Republic.

In 1894 the Polish League, founded secretly in 1886, was reorganized as the National League in Warsaw. It combated the ideology of the Socialists, and from it sprang the Polish National

Democratic Party, which was constituted in 1897 as a legal organization, a fact in itself significant of the party having nothing to do with the insurrectionary spirit. The National Democrats had with them the bulk of educated Polish opinion. Their immediate objective was autonomy—partial not complete independence.

THE LEADERS—PILSUDSKI

The two main currents of Polish politics were associated with and directed by great leaders. Poland was fortunate in having among her sons four men of outstanding ability and character. One was indubitably a man of genius and, as events proved, the greatest of them all: Joseph Pilsudski. The others were men of talent and force. Foremost among them was Roman Dmowski, the chief of the National Democrats. Next came Ladislas Leopold Jaworski, a Professor of Cracow, and the head of the Conservative Poles in Austria. The fourth was Ignace Daszynski, the leader of the Polish Socialists in Austrian Poland; he presided over the Socialist delegation from all Poland at the Brussels Socialist Congress in 1891. In the following year Pilsudski made the acquaintance of Dmowski at Warsaw, but was not attracted by the programme of the National Democrats. He decided to throw in his lot with the Socialists in Russian Poland for the reason that they were insurrectionists, most of them being prepared to fight to the death like himself for the Liberation of Poland.

At a meeting of the Polish Socialist Party held near Vilna in 1893 Pilsudski was recognized as one of the leaders of the Socialist movement. In time all the Polish Socialists fell into line behind him. While the World War was running its terrific course Pilsudski came to be regarded as incarnating one of the main currents of Polish political thought, and Dmowski stood out as the typical representative of the other. An antagonism developed between them which had a profound influence on subsequent events.

A ROMANCE OF HISTORY

The life of Joseph Pilsudski must be considered one of the most romantic in history. An idealist, a romantic himself in mind, but a realist in practice, he believed in the virtue of arms and the

policy of the *fait accompli*. The advice once given by himself to his friends to be romantic or idealist in aims, but practical as regarded the means of realizing them, was in some sort a summary of the man. Descended from the princely Lithuanian family of Ginet, he was born on December 5, 1867, at Zulow, in the neighbourhood of Vilna (Wilno), his parents being Joseph Pilsudski, who tried to farm his property and exploit other economic projects in a scientific manner, but lost money in the effort, and Maria Pilsudska, *née* Billewicz, who had brought her husband the estate on which they lived. The father was remarkable for the determination with which he carried out his schemes despite repeated failures, the mother for her devotion to her family of six sons and four daughters, in whose hearts she instilled love of Poland and hatred of Russia, the oppressor.

The boy Joseph came into the world four years after the insurrection of 1863, and his early years were deeply shadowed by the terrible sufferings of the Poles because of that abortive attempt. In one of his books, *Walka rewolucyjna w zaborze rosyjskim* (The Revolutionary Struggle in Russian Poland), he stated that ten years after the insurrection the dread memory of the tribunals of the Russian Muravieff, known as the Hangman from the numerous executions of Poles he ordered, was still so vivid that Polish people trembled at the sight of a Russian official.

Fire devastated Zulow in 1874, and the family moved to Vilna, where Joseph went to school; the Gymnasium he attended was staffed by Russians, who had nothing but contempt and derision for all things Polish. Nearing manhood he studied medicine at the University of Kharkoff, and there he met several Russian revolutionaries. After a year at Kharkoff he returned to Vilna. In 1887 he was arrested on a charge of being involved in an anti-Tsarist plot, and was sentenced to five years in Siberia. He went back to Vilna in 1892.

PILSUDSKI AND THE SOCIALISTS

Pilsudski's return from Siberia coincided with the formation of the Polish Socialist Party. He had become a Socialist, or rather had adopted Socialism as a means to an end; its chief attraction

for him was that it was insurrectionary. In his book, *Rok 1863* (The Year 1863), he said the evil results of the insurrection of that year on Polish life led many to the view that insurrection was of little practical value, and all attempts at it should be discouraged. Pilsudski held a very different opinion. The Polish Socialists in 1893 decided to publish secretly a paper, and the job was assigned to Pilsudski. The first number of this journal, called *Robotnik* (The Worker), was printed in secret in June 1894 at Lipniszki, near Oszmiana. Pilsudski was its editor-in-chief, principal printer and most active distributor.

In the following year the *Robotnik* was transferred to Vilna, where Pilsudski had the assistance of Stanislas Wojciechowski, a future President of Poland. Pilsudski married about this time, and his wife greatly helped him with the paper. In 1896 the Pilsudskis removed to Lodz, taking with them the printing-press. The *Robotnik* had a circulation of 2,000 copies; it consisted of a small sheet of twelve pages, and a fortnight of hard work was needed for its preparation. The Russian authorities tried to suppress it, but did not succeed till February 1900, when they found the printing-press in Pilsudski's house. The Pilsudskis were arrested, and he was thrown into the horrible Tenth Pavilion of the Citadel of Warsaw, from which there was believed to be no escape. It looked as if Pilsudski was doomed, but he feigned insanity so successfully that he was sent to a military hospital in Petrograd whence, with the aid of a member of the staff who was secretly a Polish Socialist, he made good his escape. After a time he reached Kieff, where the *Robotnik* was then published, and finally he went to Cracow. During his journeys he had been joined by his wife, who had been set free by the Russian police, and they passed several months together in Cracow.

PILSUDSKI'S FIRST MOVES

Towards the close of 1901 Pilsudski went to London, then the Mecca of political exiles. The meeting-place of the Poles was a poor little house, 7 Beaumont Square, Mile End, and most of them lived in the direst poverty, but they had managed to publish a paper called *Przedswit* (The Dawn) for some years; it was in its

pages, about 1895, that the principles of the new Polish revolutionary movement were first formulated. In the spring of 1902 Pilsudski was back again in Cracow; during the next two years his influence on the masses waxed stronger and stronger, and he became the acknowledged head of the whole revolutionary movement.

Japan went to war with Russia in February 1904. Like the other nationalities within the Russian Empire the Poles were mobilized, and Pilsudski turned his attention to the prospect of stopping or retarding their mobilization, but found very little support among the National Democrats and others whom he approached in Russian Poland, into which he fearlessly ventured repeatedly. His next move was to go to Japan (whither he was accompanied by Titus Filipowicz, afterwards Polish Ambassador at Washington) in the hope of obtaining assistance from her Government for an insurrection in Poland; he also proposed to the Japanese an attack by the Poles on the Russian rear in Europe. In Tokyo he met Dmowski, the leader of the National Democrats, and the strong personal antagonism of these two men was accentuated when Dmowski told the Japanese that Pilsudski's plan was incapable of realization. Pilsudski left for Cracow; Dmowski went back to Warsaw.

THE LEADERS—DMOWSKI

Born in Warsaw in 1864, Roman Dmowski came of a noble family which was no longer connected with the land, his father being a fairly successful road contractor. Dmowski graduated at the University of Warsaw in natural history; he specialized in biology, and his political outlook was influenced by his thorough education as a naturalist. While at the university he joined a students' club which at the start had nationalistic and socially radical tendencies, but developed into two distinct organizations, attached respectively to the National Democrat and Polish Socialist Parties. His political activity began in 1886. In 1891 he organized a political demonstration on the occasion of the centenary of the Third of May Constitution, and consequently was compelled to leave the country.



M. DMOWSKI

On his return to Warsaw after several years' residence in Paris, he was arrested and deported to Dorpat, but escaped and went to Galicia four years later. In Lwow he began the publication of the *Przeglad Wszechpolski* (The All-Polish Review), and issued other Polish propaganda works which were printed on tissue paper and thus easily smuggled into that area. His first political work, *Mysli Nowoczesnego Polaka* (Ideas of a Modern Pole), appeared in 1902, and propounded the principles of his realistic philosophy; the book was popular with the rising generation of Poles, and for a time was their political Bible.

PILSUDSKI STRIKES

Pilsudski recurred in Cracow to his scheme of preventing mobilization in Russian Poland, and aided by the Socialists staged an armed demonstration in Warsaw as a protest against it; a fight ensued with Russian troops, and there were casualties on both sides. The affair was significant of the insurrectionary spirit once more openly at work among the Poles. Pilsudski took advantage of the confused situation in 1905–6 to organize his first fighting corps, the *Organizacja Bojowa*, to strike at the Russians. Detachments of Cossacks were attacked, posts were raided, Polish prisoners were rescued, and mail trains were "held up" and despoiled to provide funds for the movement of Pilsudski, who often risked his life in bringing off these audacious *coups*, in one of which, at Bezdany, he relieved the Russian Government of over two million roubles, or about £200,000.

When the 1905 Revolution came to an end these ventures soon ceased, and Pilsudski was obliged to take refuge in Austrian Poland again. In 1906 the Central Committee of the Polish Socialist Party decided to dissolve his organization, notwithstanding his objections as well as those of Daszyński and others. Meanwhile the Duma, a sort of popular Lower House, with the Council of the Empire as an Upper House, had been formed in Russia. The first Duma had 442 members, of whom the Congress Kingdom supplied 34, all National Democrats; the Polish Socialists boycotted the elections. That Duma (1906) had a very brief life, and new elections were held in 1907, but the second Duma

also existed for only a short time, the Electoral Law was changed, and the Polish representation materially reduced, though remaining National Democrat. In the Council of the Empire the Polish representatives belonged mainly to the Realist Party, which in a sense was more pro-Russian than the National Democrat Party as its guiding principle was to make the best of things, and not indulge in impossible dreams, even of autonomy.

DMOWSKI AND THE DUMA

Dmowski represented Warsaw in the second and third Dumas at Petrograd. In the Duma he asserted that the Congress Kingdom was entitled to autonomy under the rights given to it by the Congress of Vienna; but he made this claim with moderation. He supported the Russian Government respecting the contingents demanded for the army, and he and the other Polish deputies voted for them, but in his speech he maintained that Russia required a strong army so as to be completely independent of foreign Powers, and this statement brought down on him the wrath of the Russian Germanophils, who perfectly understood that he had Germany in mind when referring to "foreign Powers." It was then that Stolypin, Russian Prime Minister, but with German sympathies, retaliated by reducing the number of Polish deputies in the next Duma by nearly two-thirds. Dmowski, however, remained a strong partisan of Russia against Germany. In his book, *Niemcy, Rosja a kwestja polska* (Germany, Russia and the Polish Question), published at Lwow (Lemberg or Leopol) in 1908, and simultaneously in Russian at Petrograd, he maintained that if the Polish nation was menaced with the loss of its existence in the future, the threat would not come from Russia, but from Germany.

PILSUDSKI'S PLANS

In the meantime Pilsudski was making fresh plans in Austrian Poland for a military organization in accordance with his views for liberating Poland. In 1908 at his request Casimir Sosnkowski, one of his intimates and afterwards one of his generals, founded a secret military society called *Zwiazek Walki Czynnej* (Union for

Active Struggle). This was the year of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Dual Monarchy, an international crisis being the immediate result, with Russia, France and England aligned against the Central Powers. In 1909 Pilsudski, asked what was to be done if war broke out among these Empires, replied that he and his followers must fight against Russia.

In 1910 the Union for Active Struggle became the *Związek Strzelecki* (Union of Riflemen's Clubs), and unlike the other was a legally constituted body. In opposition to these riflemen, Democrat Poles organized the *Drużyny Strzeleckie* (Riflemen's Clubs), but this association agreed with Pilsudski on fighting for Austria if she went to war with Russia. Some suspicion in Austrian military circles of Pilsudski's good faith was laid to rest when he took part with his riflemen in a review of troops in Vienna; he was permitted to drill his men without interference.

Pilsudski was anything but genuinely Austrophil, as so many Austrian Poles were. Their leader, Jaworski, basing himself on the truth that Austria alone of the partitioning Powers did not oppress the Poles, believed and taught that it was through her that the Poles would realize their national aspirations. His policy, as compared with that of Dmowski, appeared the better founded—Russia was still the oppressor of the Poles, whereas Austria had long ceased to be so.

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In 1912 the Liberation movement under Pilsudski made a further advance by the constitution of another organization, the *Komisja Tymczasowa Skonfederowanych Stronnictw Niepodległościowych* (The Provisional Commission of the Confederated Independentist Parties), which grouped together the partisans of Pilsudski in Austrian Poland and the secret organizations of the Socialists and others in Russian Poland. The movement took on the name of Independentist. It grew so rapidly, especially in Galicia, that the National Democrats to counteract its appeal created rival organizations. In December 1912, the Independentists issued a statement of policy which was addressed to the Poles of the three

sections, and said: "So long as Austria-Hungary in her own interest will fight Russia, she is our ally. Her victory will benefit us, because the overthrow of Russia in the course of the war which is about to come will be our gain. But we shall not forget that it is above all the cause of Poland that we are defending."

As against the Independentist statement Dmowski, at a meeting of the National Democrats in Cracow, read a paper in which he tried to show that an anti-Russian orientation was not a Polish national orientation at all; the *status quo* was likely, he maintained, to yield far better results. The two chief schools of Polish political thought now stood out as (1) *Russophil*, with Dmowski in front, and (2) *Independentist*, with Pilsudski leading and Jaworski collaborating, though what Jaworski and the Cracow Conservatives sought was the union of Russian Poland with Austrian Poland under the Habsburg dynasty.

THE AMERICAN POLES

The antagonism between the two main Polish schools did not diminish as time went on. Both had their affiliations and propagandists abroad working against each other, especially in the United States, in which resided upwards of three million Poles, a considerable number of whom had been settled in that country for one, two or even three generations. Kosciuszko and Pulaski had been prominent figures in the War for American Independence. During the Polish insurrection of 1831 committees were formed in America to raise funds for the Poles, and after its suppression many Poles went to the United States. There was a fresh wave of Polish emigration after the troubles of 1848, and again after the insurrection of 1863.

The Poles became good American citizens, but they had their own societies and clubs of one kind and another, and about eighty papers and periodicals in their own language, a few of which were the organs of political groups. One of these, the Polish National Alliance, formed in Philadelphia in 1880, had its origin in an attempt to preserve the nationalism of Polish Americans. Another of these societies of a political cast was the Alliance of Polish Socialists. Its membership was very much smaller than

that of the National Alliance; it was a branch of the Polish Socialist Party, and recognized Pilsudski's leadership. In 1912 the Independentists started a fund called the *Skarb Wojskowy* (Army Treasury) at Zakopane, in Galicia. Subscriptions came freely from the American Poles for months, and then slowed down owing to unfavourable representations by Pilsudski's opponents at home and in the United States.

PILSUDSKI'S RIFLEMEN

Pilsudski's "army" was growing; in 1913 there were nearly two hundred groups of his Riflemen in Galicia against half as many of the other Riflemen. In the beginning of 1914 Pilsudski went to Paris to inspect a body of his Riflemen formed there, and he put his plans before some prominent men of the Left in France, but failed to make much impression on them. He made, however, a memorable declaration in a lecture in the hall of the French Geographical Society on February 21. He claimed the military movement in Poland to have the special importance of bringing once more the Polish Question into the international forum. Since 1904 the world had seen, he said, various conflicts settled by armed force. "The sword alone," he added, "decides the destinies of nations. A people which shuts its eyes to this fact would irretrievably compromise its future. We must not be that people."

THE WORLD WAR STARTS

Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia on July 28, 1914—the war which developed into that "universal war for the liberation of the peoples," for which Mickiewicz, the great Polish national poet, had besought Almighty God, in the *Litanie des Pèlerins polonais*, "by the wounds, tears and sufferings of all the slaves, exiles and pilgrims of Poland." Pilsudski was on the watch, and on the very day that Austria declared war the Provisional Committee of the Independentist Parties issued at Cracow a proclamation addressed to the Polish nation appealing to it to enter into the war against Russia. Germany declared war on Russia on August 1st, but Austria did not do so till August 6th.

PILSUDSKI OCCUPIES KIELCE

He could have put into action 4,000 men, but the Austrians hesitated, and time passed. On August 5 the rival corps of Riflemen were united, and Pilsudski formed his first fighting troops into a company composed of 98 *strzelcy* and 74 *druzyniacy*, armed with Mannlicher repeating rifles. With this small force he crossed the frontier between Austrian and Russian Poland in the early hours of August 6, and occupied the town of Kielce, about 75 miles north-east of Cracow and well into Russian Poland. Pilsudski made an effort to organize the civil power in the district, Miechow, which he held, but this state of things did not last long, as the Austrian authorities put an end to it. They had made a different plan of campaign for Pilsudski, and they decided that he must either dissolve his corps of Riflemen or permit them to be joined up with the Austrian *Landsturm* and take the same oath as the Austrian reservists. "If they force me to do that," said Pilsudski to Daszynski, whom he had appointed assistant military commissary, "nothing will be left but for me to shoot myself."

Events took another turn, for on August 16 there was created at Cracow a new body called the *Naczelnny Komitet Narodowy* (Supreme National Committee) which protected Pilsudski and his Legion, as his force was called, from the Austrians. The raid on Kielce appealed to the imagination of many Poles who felt that there was once more a Polish Army, small though it was, in the field against the oppressor. The name Legion, too, had a magic of its own, as it recalled the valour of the Polish Legions that fought under Poniatowski for Napoleon and under Pulaski for American Independence. The fame of Pilsudski was magnified among the Polish masses, and the foundations laid of that devotion of his soldiers he was never to lose. He returned to Cracow on August 20, and on hearing from Daszynski what the Supreme National Committee was doing, said to him that his life was saved.

The Supreme National Committee unanimously decided to fight against Russia, and to organize the Legions under the Austrian High Command; it began negotiations at once with the

Austrian Government respecting them. On August 22 Pilsudski told his men that he had recognized the Committee, and in the beginning of September 5,000 legionaries at Cracow and Kielce took the oath demanded by the Austrian military authorities, but he was not altogether satisfied. The Committee had requested Austria to give guarantees of a national character to the Legions, but all that it got was that on August 27 the Archduke Frederick, the Austrian Commander-in-Chief, ordered two Austrian generals of Polish origin to form two Polish Legions for the duration of the War, without badge or national flag, though Polish was to be the language of command. The Archduke further prescribed: "The groups of volunteer Light Infantry soldiers at present in the Kingdom of Poland (Congress Poland) under the command of M. Pilsudski are enrolled as the first Regiment of the First Legion."

POLISH MILITARY ORGANIZATION

Pilsudski now formed a new body in secret, the *Polska Organizacja Wojskowa* (Polish Military Organization), whose activity was at first limited to that part of Russian Poland still in the possession of Russia.

The headquarters of the Supreme National Committee moved from Cracow, which was now too close to the front, to Vienna.

Two months previously the Russophils had broken away from the Committee for various reasons, among them being their opposition to any accommodation with the Germans, a stand that lost nothing from the fact of the victorious Russian advance in Galicia. This secession of the Russophils might be said to clear the air, so far as Polish politics in Austrian Poland were concerned. The Independentists of Pilsudski and the Austrophils, including the Cracow Conservatives and others, practically formed a single camp to which the name of Activist was given. On December 31, 1914, the Austrian Government gave permission to the Supreme National Committee to pursue its policy in that part of Russian Poland occupied by Austrian forces, and to enlist recruits in it for the Legions.

RUSSIAN POLAND

In Russian Poland most of the Poles cast in their lot with Russia when the War broke out. In Petrograd on August 8, 1914, Mey-sztowicz, a Polish member of the Council of the Empire, and Jaronski, a Polish deputy in the Duma, declared that the Poles would repel the *Drang nach Osten* of the Prussians, in the hope that the shedding of their blood, and their endurance of sufferings in the struggle, for them a fratricidal one, would lead to the unification of the Polish nation of the three partitions. This language swelled into a mighty chorus of rejoicing when on August 14 the Grand Duke Nicholas, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian armies, issued from Petrograd the following proclamation:

Poles! The hour has sounded when the sacred dream of your fathers and forefathers can come true. A century and a half has passed since the living flesh of Poland was torn in pieces, but her soul is not dead. It lives in the hope that the hour will come in which resuscitated Poland will reconcile herself fraternally with Great Russia. The Russian troops bring to you the happy news of that reconciliation. May the frontiers disappear that divide the Polish people, thus making of them a unity under the sceptre of the Emperor of Russia! Under that sceptre Poland will be born again, free in religion, in language, and in self-government (autonomy). Russia expects from you equal consideration for the rights of the nationalities with which history has linked you. Great Russia comes to meet you with open heart and brotherly hand. She is convinced that the sword which struck the enemy at Grünwald (Tannenberg) is not yet rusted. From the shores of the Pacific to the Northern seas the Russian regiments are advancing. It is the dawn of a new life for you. May there shine resplendent in that dawn the sign of the Cross, the symbol of the Passion and the Resurrection of peoples!

This manifesto, taken at its face value by most Poles in Russian Poland, aroused the greatest enthusiasm. On August 17 the *Gazeta Warszawska* (Warsaw Gazette) showed the general acceptance with which it met when it published the declaration that had been made in response by four of the Polish political parties in Russia. The declaration said:

The representatives of the undersigned political parties assembled on August 16, 1914, in Warsaw welcome the proclamation of His Imperial Highness, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, as an act of cardinal historical importance, and believe firmly that after the end of the War the promises expressed in the Proclamation will be fully realized,



M. DASZYNSKI

that the dreams of our fathers and forefathers will come true, that the body of Poland torn in pieces a hundred and fifty years ago will join together, and that the frontiers that now separate the Polish nation will disappear. The blood shed by Poland's sons in the common fight against Germany will at the same time be a sacrifice on the altar of resurrected Poland.

NATIONAL DEMOCRAT PARTY
POLISH PROGRESSIVE PARTY
REALIST POLITICS PARTY
POLISH PROGRESSIVE UNION

DMOWSKI'S SUCCESS

What a triumph for the policy of Dmowski! The manifesto expressly promised self-government to the Poles within the framework of the Russian Empire, with the free practice of their religion—Roman Catholicism, not Russian Orthodoxy—and their own language, which had so long been proscribed. The Realists, who had hitherto been opposed to the National Democrats, now associated themselves with them, as did the two other parties of the Right in Russian Poland. The proclamation went far beyond their expectations, and far beyond anything suggested to the Poles in the proclamations of the Austro-German High Command after the outbreak of the War and on the penetration of Russian Poland by some of their troops. The effect intended was produced; most of the Russian Poles lined up under the Russian flag.

Russian Poles were now told to place no reliance on the promises made by the High Command of the enemy respecting great privileges and liberties in the future. They were also told, however, to discredit Polish organizations in the enemy country: "Everybody," said the *Gazeta Warszawska*, "who affirms that Austria, with the help of Germany, wants to reconstruct a Free Poland is simply a blind dreamer." By that time it was known in Warsaw that Pilsudski with his first legionaries was in Kielce, and later that the Supreme National Committee had been formed at Cracow. A voice was heard here and there in Russian Poland bewailing the divergences of view among the Poles, and urging them to unity. Thus the *Kurjer Poranny* (Morning Courier) said on August 25, 1914: "The Polish family must endeavour to attain unity of opinion on the most important questions of the future of

the nation. There ought to be no place for such sad affairs as that of Kielce."

A standing Polish Delegation in Petrograd, the business of which was to watch all developments in Russia connected with the Polish Question, was formed to tell the Russians everything about Poland and the Poles, and above all to make it clear that the Grand Duke's proclamation opened the problem of Poland to the fullest extent. The delegation had six members, three from the Duma and three from the Council of the Empire. On September 17, 1914, Balicki and Jaronski, both National Democrats, submitted to the Russian Staff a proposal for the organization of a Polish Legion, but it was not well received at first. A month later, however, permission was given for the formation of a company of Polish "partisans."

The fortune of war was favouring the Russians; though they lost heavily in their campaign in East Prussia, they achieved a series of remarkable successes in Galicia, Lwow being occupied on September 4, 1914; three months later their advance threatened Cracow and most of Galicia was overrun. During the fighting the First Brigade of Pilsudski's Legions played a distinguished part, notably at Krzywoploty in November and at Lowczowek in the following month, but it had to share the Austrian withdrawal. In October the Russians threw back the Germans from before Warsaw, and forced them to retire towards the frontiers of Silesia; Russian cavalry entered Silesia and cut the Posen-Cracow railway. There seemed to be ample confirmation of the soundness of the policy of the Russophils; the weakness of Austria appeared convincingly demonstrated and the prospects of the Austrophils correspondingly poor.

POLISH NATIONAL COMMITTEE

On November 25, 1914, the *Komitet Narodowy Polski* (Polish National Committee) was founded in Warsaw by the Russophils, its aim being the "political organization of the Nation"; its most prominent member was Dmowski. Among other things, it took up the question of a Polish Legion with the Russian Army, induced the Command of the South-West Front to transform the partisans

into a Legion, as a part of the regular forces of Russia, and opened recruiting offices for it in various towns throughout the country. The depot of this Legion was at a place called Pulawy, and from this the corps came to be known as the Pulawy Legion. But before the end of the year the military situation had changed somewhat. The Germans struck at the Russian right flank and took Lodz; the Russians on the south were pressed back from Cracow, and in the centre again had to retire towards Warsaw, after heavy and prolonged fighting; bloody battles took place before Warsaw, and it was not till well into the new year that the Germans were worsted and forced back, but not so far as before. The position in the field was inconclusive, and gave about equal encouragement to the supporters of the Austrian and of the Russian solutions of the Polish Question.

But the Russian solution was already prejudiced. In December 1914, Maklakoff, the Russian Minister of the Interior, issued a confidential circular to the Governors-General of Russian Poland in which he stated that the proclamation of the Grand Duke did not apply to the "country of the Vistula," but referred only to Polish territories not included in the Russian Empire. There was to be no change in the Congress Kingdom. An even more striking warning of Russia's intentions was given when on March 30, 1915, the Russian Government decided to separate the province of Chelm from the Congress Kingdom, an action against which every Pole could not but protest.

During the winter a swaying contest continued in the Carpathians, but the capture on March 22, 1915, of the Austrian fortress of Przemysl, which had been besieged for months, was an undoubted success for Russia; it was, however, about the last of great importance she was to achieve. In the beginning of May 1915 the tremendous Austro-German offensive began on the Dunajec, in the south-west of Galicia, which drove the Russians out of almost the whole of Austrian Poland within a few weeks, and Hindenburg's armies pressed on towards Warsaw from the north and west. The Russophils were in evil case; it remained to be seen whether, with the turn of the tide, the Austrophils with the Independentists were in any better.

WESTERN OPINION

France and England paid little attention to Poland during the first months of the War. As Russia was their ally, both the French and English, when they thought of her at all, in Russian terms, both greeted with approval the proclamation of the Grand Duke and found it difficult to understand what was going on in Austria-Hungary and Poland. On September 25, 1914, *The Times* published a remarkable article, "from a Correspondent," which bore the head "Tragedy of Poland; A War of Liberation; Value of Polish Loyalty." The writer of this article strongly supported the Russian solution of the Polish Question; he lamented the blindness of the Austrian Poles, and stated that the Kingdom of Poland (Congress Poland) remained loyal.

This article was a fair specimen of articles on Poland in Western countries. In reply to a question, Sir Edward Grey (Viscount Grey of Fallodon), Foreign Secretary, stated in the House of Commons on March 2, 1915, that the British Government was in sympathy with the Grand Duke's proclamation. Polish politics found scarcely any expression in England; there was more in France, where seven thousand Poles had enlisted in her army, 2,000 volunteering in the first days of August 1914. The United States was in a position totally different from that of France and England, as it did not enter into the War till 1917, and at first its people did not greatly concern themselves with the political aspect of Polish affairs, though they soon began to feel their humanitarian appeal.

RELIEF FUNDS

Polish-American societies took the lead in raising funds for Polish relief, and in 1915 the Polish Central Relief Committee, with Paderewski at its head, was formed in America to combine and direct their activities. In January of that year Paderewski and Sienkiewicz, the great novelist, established at Vevey in Switzerland the *Comité Général du Secours pour les Victimes de la Guerre en Pologne*, and the big American committee associated itself with this organization. Better informed than the French and English

respecting the actual conditions in Poland, the American citizens contributed quickly and handsomely to the relief funds.

Cardinal Gasparri, Secretary of State of the Holy See, on April 9, 1915, wrote a letter, on behalf of the Pope, to Mgr. Sapieha, the Prince-Bishop of Cracow, inviting the Polish episcopate to address an appeal to the universal Catholic Church for Poland in her "lamentable situation." And with the letter went a contribution from His Holiness of 25,000 crowns. In August 1915, the Archbishops of Posen (Poznan), Lwow, Warsaw and Cracow made the suggested appeal.

PADEREWSKI'S APPEAL TO ENGLAND

An appeal to the English people was certain of success; it was made doubly certain by a letter from Paderewski in *The Times* towards the end of March 1915, under the heading "A Plea for Poland." An important and influential body was soon established in London as "The Great Britain to Poland and Galicia Committee"; by July 31, 1915, it had raised and remitted to Poland £45,000.

An indirect result of the various appeals for relief was that a larger share of public attention was given to Poland than for many years before in the West. That the Polish Question might again become international was even hinted when an organization claiming to represent several millions of Poles petitioned President Wilson at Washington in the spring of 1915 to work for a free and independent Poland, and Wilson replied that he "deeply sympathized with Poland."

CHAPTER II

THE AUSTRO-GERMAN KINGDOM OF POLAND

1915-1918

1

IN the summer of 1915 the colossal success of Mackensen's offensive in Galicia, with the reoccupation of Lwow by the Austrians on June 22, and Hindenburg's drives at Warsaw, which the Russians were compelled to evacuate on August 5, brought about a fresh development in Polish affairs.

The Russian solution of the Polish Question, which had come into prominence with the prosperous campaign of the Grand Duke Nicholas in Galicia during the preceding autumn and winter, dropped into the background.

Dmowski and other members of the National Committee founded in November 1914, withdrew from Warsaw, and established themselves temporarily in Petrograd. In July 1915, the Central Powers offered peace on favourable terms to Russia, who declined to accept it on any terms, and thereafter suffered the most tremendous losses. The prospect for Russia, as for the Polish Russophils or Ententophils (*Orientacja Koalicyjna*), was undeniably bleak. Early in the winter of that year, Dmowski transferred his energies to London, and started intensive propaganda work.

The situation did not give to the Austrophils more satisfaction than it did to the Russophils. Soon after the opening of Mackensen's campaign the Supreme National Committee returned from Vienna to Cracow, and three days after the fall of Warsaw issued a proclamation in which it said that while the Poles must continue to fight Russia, they must make it clear that their aim in the War was the establishment of a Polish State. The Congress Kingdom would now, it declared, have to play the most important rôle. "We recognize that," said the Committee, "and we await the moment when Warsaw, the heart of Poland, will guide the

Nation." But no sooner was the proclamation published in the Polish papers than the Austrian authorities retaliated by placing them under the severest censorship.

A plea by the Committee addressed to Austria for the establishment of a Polish State in union with Austria-Hungary had been refused some three weeks before by Burian, Foreign Minister of the Dual Monarchy. Vienna could do nothing without Berlin, and as a definitive agreement favourable to Austria was lacking, the hopes of the Austrophils were vain. One Pole saw this clearly—Pilsudski. He and the Independentists had been collaborating with the Austrophils, though not without recurring dissensions regarding recruiting for the Legions in the occupied parts of Russian Poland; Pilsudski wished this recruiting stopped, but in this was opposed by Sikorski, the head of the Military Department of the Supreme National Committee, who thought that a million recruits for the Austrian Army could be got from the Congress Kingdom, an estimate that did not escape the notice of the German High Command.

PILSUDSKI DENOUNCES GERMANY

As soon as Pilsudski heard of the proclamation of the Supreme National Committee, and knew that it was sending some of its members to Warsaw, he immediately decided to go there. Leaving the front secretly, he arrived in Warsaw on August 15, 1915. Next day he attended a meeting in the flat of Sliwinski, among those present being Thugutt, Michael Sokolnicki, and other leading men of the Polish Left in the Congress Kingdom. Pilsudski spoke on the situation, dwelling chiefly on the differences between himself and the Supreme National Committee, the lack of good faith on the part of the Central Powers on the Polish Question, and the undesirability of getting fresh recruits in such circumstances for the Legions as contrary to the interests of the Nation.

In *Wspomnienia Legionowe* (Recollections of the Legions), a work presenting a history of the force, B. Wieniawa-Dlugoszowski stated that Pilsudski's remarks were received with amazement by the others, one of whom said to him: "If we

do what you wish we will simply be playing the game of the Russophils!"

"To-day," Pilsudski replied, "the Germans have taken the place of the Russians in Poland. We must resist the Germans. I do not see why we should not enter into relations with the Russophils." That this largeness of view should bewilder his friends was not surprising; it was entirely new to them to think of co-operating with the Russophils; the idea did show something, however, of the stature of Pilsudski, his grasp of essentials and width of vision. But no *détente* took place between the Independentists and the Russophils. By request of the German authorities Pilsudski soon quitted Warsaw. At Otwock he received Kasprzycki, the new head of the secret Polish Military Organization created during the previous year for action in Russian Poland. Having arranged to oppose the Germans covertly he returned to the front.

About a fortnight before, Bethmann-Hollweg, German Chancellor, had nothing more definite to promise Poland than the "dawn of an evolution which should for ever efface the ancient rivalry between Germans and Poles." In September 1915 the Independentists published at Warsaw a statement, which omitted mention of the Supreme National Committee, but proclaimed the great qualities of the Legions, and the high esteem in which Commandant Joseph Pilsudski was held.

POLAND PARTITIONED AGAIN

Next the Central Powers made a new partition of Poland, Germany taking the northerly part of the Congress Kingdom occupied by her troops, Warsaw being fixed on as the seat of its government, and Austria the southerly part occupied by her troops, with Lublin as its centre. This division of territory was confirmed by a Convention signed on December 14, 1915, at Teschen (Cieszyn), by Austria and Germany. General von Beseler was German Governor-General at Warsaw, and General von Kuk Austrian Governor-General at Lublin.

Representations made by Pilsudski and others to the Supreme National Committee were without effect, and the growing differ-

ences between it and the Independentists were stressed by the creation at Warsaw on December 18, 1915, of a new organization called the *Centralny Komitet Narodowy* (Central National Committee), two of its best-known members being Sliwinski and Thugutt, but a rupture did not take place till later, and the Committee's propaganda for recruiting went on. Attention was focused on the Legions. Of these there were two brigades in the field co-operating with the Austrian forces; the first was commanded by Pilsudski, and the second by Joseph Haller, who, after serving for fifteen years as an officer of the Austrian Army, had resigned his commission in 1914, and taken an active part in organizing the Legions. A third brigade was formed towards the end of 1915, under the command first of Grzesicki and then of Roja. The first brigade operated in Galicia, the second in the Carpathians and the Bukovina, but it was the former, under Pilsudski's leadership, that was prominent in Polish or Austro-German eyes. In November 1915 the three brigades came together in Volhynia as a single force under General Puchalski, an Austrian of Polish descent. The total strength of the Legions was approximately 12,000 men—8,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry and 3,000 artillery with 36 guns—in the beginning of 1916.

DISCONTENT OF THE LEGIONS

The legionaries murmured that they were being treated, not as Polish, but as Austrian soldiers: "more and more," wrote one of them, "we are becoming Austrian troops," and this, so contrary to all their hopes, created an ever-growing discontent among them, especially in the First Brigade, in which, however, confidence was felt that Pilsudski would win in the end. The absolute trust they put in their leader was demonstrated by officers and men, each according to his rank giving a fixed proportion of his monthly pay to him for political objects, according to his discretion, which was never questioned.

As for Pilsudski himself, he swung between loyalty to his military oath to the Austrian authorities and his loyalty to Poland as a patriot. In July 1916, the moment came in which he took the final decision, and until then he fought on at the head of his

brigade, which with the two other brigades distinguished itself when the Russians under Brusiloff resumed the offensive.

On March 25, 1916, the Central National Committee, as a distinctively Pilsudskist organization, addressed an ultimatum to the Supreme National Committee at Cracow. It said that in the Congress Kingdom the view was fairly general that the Polish Question would be resolved at Berlin, perhaps even without the slightest reference to Vienna. It drew attention to the military merits and achievements of Pilsudski, and demanded why it was that the chief command of the Legions had not been given to him. Failing his appointment, the only thing left would be to dissolve the Legions.

The Austrophils of Cracow made no direct reply, and the split became complete between them and the Independentists.

POLISH QUESTION INTERESTS THE WORLD

Meanwhile the Polish Question was beginning to interest the world. A motion tabled towards the end of 1915 in the Italian Parliament, "expressed the most ardent wishes that the very noble Polish nation, which had been for centuries an important factor in civilization, defending Europe from Tartar and Turkish invasions, and destined in the future to fill a great rôle in the stabilization of peace, should be reconstituted as a unity in a free and independent State." A few days later Bonar Law, Colonial Minister in the Coalition Government of Great Britain, referred obliquely to the Polish Question when in his remarks on peace terms he asked: "Is there any member of this House (of Commons) who believes for a moment that Germany will restore Alsace to France, or will restore Poland to the nationality to which she belongs, unless she (Germany) is beaten?"

GERMAN VIEWS

Germany was doing something to please the Poles, for she reopened the University of Warsaw and also established a Polish polytechnic in the capital. In the Reichstag Bethmann-Hollweg took credit for both acts—which were denounced by Sazonoff as traps for the Poles; he also spoke against the idea of creating a

Polish Army in the Congress Kingdom, and reaffirmed Russia's desire to unify Poland and recognize her autonomy. Well in accordance with Russian diplomatic methods secret instructions were sent, within a fortnight after this speech, to Izvolsky, Russian Ambassador at Paris, that the Polish Question was to be excluded from international discussion, and he was to place every obstacle in the way of putting the future of Poland under the control or guarantee of the Powers.

Shortly before, Dmowski, abandoning his programme of an autonomous Poland within the Russian Empire, presented a memorandum to Izvolsky in which he maintained that Poland must be an independent State, and he sent a copy to each of the Allied Governments. Its conclusion was: "The interest of all nations threatened by the power of Germany demands that the now divided Polish territories shall be united in one State, which ought to have the possibility of the free organization of its national forces in order to oppose them to the growing German menace."

BRITISH VIEWS

In April 1916, Bethmann-Hollweg said in the Reichstag that in entering the War neither Austria nor Germany had any intention of reopening the Polish Question, but the "fate of battles" had put it once more on the carpet, and that Germany and Austria would solve it; he did not say what precise form the solution would take. In reply Asquith, British Prime Minister, dealing with the Chancellor's claim that Germany would insist in the peace terms on giving the various races the chance of "free evolution, along the lines of their mother tongue and of national individuality," said that he supposed this principle was to be applied on approved Prussian lines to Poland as well as Belgium.

FRENCH VIEWS

In France a growing concern was manifested for Poland. In May 1916, a French mission, headed by Viviani and Albert Thomas, arrived in Petrograd, and one of its objects was to obtain from the Russian Government definite proposals in favour of Poland; but it was warned that even the most discreet appearance of inter-

vention on the part of France would be a positive danger to the Franco-Russian Alliance. Sazonoff adopted a different tone in an interview he gave to the Petrograd correspondent of *The Times* on May 27, when he stated that the Poles would receive a "just and equitable autonomy in the greatest degree adjusted to their future life," and might look forward to the "dawn of a new era." It would have been more to the point if he had mentioned something done by his Government to relieve the distress of the Poles, upwards of a million in number, who had been forcibly evacuated into Russia by the Grand Duke Nicholas before his retirement from Warsaw. This compulsory exodus was one of the most agonizing features of the Russian retreat; many of these Poles perished miserably in the interior of Russia.

The plight of the Poles had been bad in 1914-15, but was infinitely worse in 1915-16, in Russian Poland, which had been devastated, in imitation of the tactics that had baffled Napoleon, by the Russians. Famine stalked the countryside, and was not relieved by the Germans, who, on the contrary, were accused, in the Allied Press, of "taking food out of starving Poland." The Germans denied the allegation, but in *Ludendorff's Own Story*, that general said: "Naturally, we continued to make . . . use of the country for the prosecution of the War." As naturally, the Allies objected to the importation of supplies into Poland by outside agencies except on terms to which the Germans would not agree. Thus the noble activities of Hoover and the Relief Commission were defeated. Private efforts continued and did much good.

POLISH PROPAGANDA IN ENGLAND

All these relief activities directed attention to the Polish Question, and more was heard of its possible solution in the re-creation of an independent State of Poland, not only in the United States, but also among the Allies, where propaganda in this sense was at work. Other Poles, besides Dmowski, vigorously promoted the Polish cause in London. A Polish Information Committee was formed by Casimir Proszynski a few weeks after the beginning of the War. The aim of the committee was to help in the release of

Poles interned in England; it was held that Poles taken prisoners while fighting in the armies of the belligerents were not enemies of the Allies, and if set free would be eager to fight against the Central Powers which had partitioned Poland. The committee received a great impetus when August Zaleski, a representative of the Activists, and afterwards Polish Foreign Minister, arrived in London early in 1915.

A graduate of the University of London through its School of Economics, he knew England well and spoke English perfectly. Soon he gathered round him a number of capable men, the most prominent being Dr. Rajchman, in after years Chief of the Hygiene Department of the League of Nations. In 1915-16 a weekly news sheet called the *Polish News* was published for the purpose of giving the British Press important information about the position of Poland in the War. In conjunction with J. C. Witenberg, Zaleski also started the *Polish Review*, a quarterly edited by J. H. Harley, but this was rather later—1917-18; it had a very large sale in the United States, being read, according to letters received, by various Americans, the most notable being President Wilson himself. In addition to their Press campaign Zaleski and his friends held many public meetings on behalf of the cause.

PILSUDSKI RESIGNS LEGION LEADERSHIP

The Austro-Germans at last came to an agreement respecting Congress Poland. Before that took place Pilsudski resigned from the Legions. Nearly a year had elapsed since the Central Powers had driven the Russians out of Warsaw and Russian Poland, and unrest increased from day to day among the legionaries, who were deeply disturbed because no definite decision regarding the Polish Question had been reached by these Powers. It looked as if nothing was to be done, and as a marked protest, Pilsudski resigned his position as chief of the First Brigade on July 25, 1916.

Writing to Daszynski, he said that his struggle with his conscience was settled; he must be loyal to Poland, not to Austria, as matters stood. His resignation was not accepted at once by the Austrian High Command. On August 6, the second anniversary

of the entry into Russian Poland of the first legionaries, Pilsudski issued an order of the day to his troops which read: "Two years have passed since the day so dear to our hearts when the forgotten flag of the Polish Army flew once more over Polish soil and proclaimed a fresh struggle for the fatherland. . . . The fate of the fatherland is still in doubt. But I permit myself to wish, for you and for me, that my order of the day on the next anniversary may be read to free Polish soldiers on the free soil of Poland." The "Council of Colonels," composed of Pilsudski, Haller and Roja, the respective chiefs of the three brigades, and Sosnkowski, chief of the Staff of the First Brigade, sent a memorandum to the Supreme National Committee, Cracow, declaring that the Legions must be regarded as a "Polish Army fighting and dying for the freedom of Poland," and requesting it to ensure that the Command of the Legions must be "distinct, Polish and responsible solely to Polish citizens and its own Government."

At the moment the Legions headed by Szeptycki, who had succeeded Puchalski, formed part of the forces under Bernhardi in the army group commanded by Lissingen, and the Germans watched the actions of Pilsudski with great suspicion. They forced the Austrians to accept his resignation, which they did on September 27, 1916. Meanwhile the Austrian Command, yielding to the dissatisfaction in the Legions, had a week before sought to quiet it by transforming them into the *Polnische Hilfskorps* (Polish Auxiliary Corps) as a portion of the Austrian *Landsturm*, but under its own flag. The news of Pilsudski's resignation, now become effective, made them furious; in sympathy with the man who was the moral, if not the actual, head of them all, they demanded *en masse* to be permitted to lay down their arms and withdraw. On October 6 the Legions retired from the front and were stationed at Baranowicze.

Pilsudski went to live at Cracow, where Jaworski urged him to become once more the inspiration of the Legions, whose soldiers saw in him the "symbol of the struggle for independence." Pilsudski did not respond, and the Central National Committee at Warsaw launched a bitter attack on Jaworski's Supreme National Committee. The Legions were approaching disintegration, but

their hopes revived when the Central Powers proclaimed the "Kingdom of Poland" on November 5, 1916.

CENTRAL POWERS NEED MORE MEN

The determining reason for the announcement was that Germany and Austria needed more men in the field, and thought they could get them in Poland by this concession. The proclamation of the Kingdom was followed immediately by an invitation to the Poles to enroll themselves in the "Polish Army," as it was styled, by Beseler and Kuk. In the highest quarters in Germany and Austria opinion had been far from unanimous regarding the creation of any Kingdom at all, but what Ludendorff termed "ineluctable necessity," referring to the shortage of men increasingly felt by the German High Command, gained the day. In July Beseler had urged Berlin to establish a Polish State under German control, and estimated that 800,000 recruits would be induced thereby to join the armies of the Central Powers. This was a sufficient argument, and on August 12, Bethmann-Hollweg and Burian signed at Vienna a secret protocol, the terms of which were:

1. Poland to become an independent hereditary kingdom;
2. Rectification of frontiers in favour of Germany;
3. Exclusion of the Government of Suvalki from the Kingdom;
4. No independent foreign policy for the Kingdom;
5. Its army to be under Germany;
6. No part of German or Austrian Poland to be included.

Under this agreement the Austrian solution of the Polish Question went by the board. Beseler sent for Brudzinski, Rector of Warsaw University, and a foremost member of the League of the Polish State, the Austrophil organization in the Congress Kingdom. With him were other prominent Poles of the same political school, and they were asked by Beseler to elaborate a memorandum expressing the wishes of the Polish people. This memorandum was presented to Bethmann-Hollweg in Berlin on October 28, and was taken two days later to Vienna and handed to Burian. Its chief statement was: "Though it is true that we are not the

authorized representatives of Poland, we yet feel that we have the right to express in its name its unquenchable desire for the re-establishment of an independent Polish State. The circumstances brought about by the War demand an immediate proclamation by the Central Powers in which the fact is recognized that Poland is independent, with their full support."

In reply the German Chancellor stated that the Central Powers had resolved "to establish a Polish State, governed by a King and having a national army—a State bound to them especially from the military point of view." Its frontiers, he said, could be settled only after the conclusion of peace.

REACTIONS TO AUSTRO-GERMAN PLAN

Dmowski and other Poles living in the Entente countries and in Switzerland issued a declaration that they considered the Austro-German proclamation "a new sanction of the partitions" and the project of the Central Powers for raising a Polish Army "a terrible disaster" for the fatherland. In Petrograd the Polish deputies in the Duma said that it was necessary for Russia and the Allies to announce their decision to unify all the Polish territories and erect them into an autonomous state. On November 15, 1916, the Russian Government reiterated its intention to create a unified Poland on the basis of autonomy under the Russian sceptre. The Governments of the other Allies expressed their appreciation.

The Central Powers went on with the raising of a "Polish Army." But there was singularly little response on the part of the Poles. Pilsudski was quietly reviewing the situation; the most he did was to tell the legionaries to "become soldiers again," but he did not encourage a general enlistment of Poles.

POLISH COUNCIL OF STATE FORMED

Beseler formulated a scheme for the creation of a Council of State and a Diet, and this was published as an Order by Beseler and Kuk on December 6. On January 14, 1917, a provisional State Council was inaugurated in the Royal Castle at Warsaw. It consisted of 25 members whose names had been approved by the

German and Austrian sovereigns; among the number was Pilsudski, who was appointed head of the Military Commission set up by the Council. On the ground that the Council of State had taken over the Legions, the Supreme National Committee voted its own dissolution on January 29; but it lingered on, in the shape of a sub-committee of liquidation, till October 1917.

The Germans originally charged this committee with organizing enlistment stations, but it had failed them; they had less reason for trusting Pilsudski, and instead of permitting him and his Military Commission to recruit for the Polish Army, they started the *Abteilung für Polnische Wehrmacht* (Department of Armed Polish Forces). The question of the Polish Army was the subject of constant debate in the Council of State for weeks. In March the Germans demanded that it should adopt a special form of oath for the Polish Army, binding it to "fidelity in arms with the German and Austrian armies." Here was the old stumbling-block for the Poles; neither Pilsudski nor his Legions had any intention of taking that oath.

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTIONS

While the Germans were trying to raise a Polish Army, one of the outstanding events in modern history occurred: the Russian Revolution of March 1917, with the disappearance of the Tsarist regime on the establishment of a provisional Government at Petrograd on March 16. Only one other event—the Russian Revolution of November 1917—gave a wider horizon to the Polish Question. On December 25, 1916, the Tsar had again announced that the constitution of a free Poland, made up of the three areas that had been partitioned, was a war aim of Russia. But as late as March 11, 1917, Briand, in a note to Izvolsky, admitted that it was understood by France that Russia had absolute liberty to fix at her own pleasure her frontiers.

One of the first things done by the new Russian Government was to notify the other Allies and neutrals that it would respect the international engagements of the fallen dynasty. On March 28, 1917, it instituted a commission, with Lednicki as chairman, for liquidating affairs in Russian Poland, and on the following

day issued the memorable proclamation in which it stated that Free Russia considered the creation of an independent and unified Polish State, attached to Russia by a free military union, as a sure pledge of a durable peace and a solid rampart against the pressure of the Germanic Powers on the Slav peoples.

EFFECT ON POLISH QUESTION

On April 6 the Council of State at Warsaw hastened to express its gratification that the new Government of Russia recognized the independence of Poland. The French, British and Italian Governments applauded the Russian action; there was an idea that the proclamation had been inspired by England; what was more certain was that it owed a great deal to the Polish political groups in Petrograd and, most of all, to Lednicki, who drafted it in collaboration with Milyukoff, Russian Foreign Minister. In London Dmowski seized the opportunity to present a memorandum to Balfour, British Foreign Secretary, in which he maintained that as there was now no chance of a Russian solution of the Polish Question, and as the aim of the War was to reduce power to limits allowing the re-establishment of European equilibrium, an independent Poland was a necessity. He pointed out that this Poland must be certain of economic independence, with an outlet to the sea, if it was to take its proper place in Europe; it should consist of Galicia and Teschen from Austria, of Russian Poland, and of German Poland including Danzig.

In America the proclamation had a tremendous repercussion as was to be expected seeing that Wilson, on January 22, 1917, had in a speech adumbrated the proposals afterwards embodied in his Fourteen Points, and had specifically referred to Poland: "Statesmen everywhere are agreed," he said, "that there should be a united, independent and autonomous Poland."

Early in April, 1917, the Council of State found itself in a precarious position, because it was practically impotent through German interference or indifference; the economic situation was

bad both in the capital and at Lodz. The Council sent a request to Beseler for definite action respecting the Polish Army, and the handing over of the administration of justice and public instruction, as well as a share in regulating the food supplies of the country. But it got no satisfaction. On April 10 the Austrian Emperor, Charles (Francis Joseph, his predecessor, died on November 21, 1916), placed the Polish Auxiliary Corps (the Legions) under the orders of Beseler, who told the legionaries that they would form the basis of the Polish Army to be raised without delay.

The Council hesitated to comply with his demand that it should issue a call to arms, agreed to do so, and finally, moved by Pilsudski's urgent remonstrances, refused to publish the call. But the Council felt it had been over-bold, and when on May 1 Pilsudski proposed to his colleagues that they should offer their resignation in a body, the majority declined. As he could reach no agreement with the Council on recruiting, Beseler established enlistment centres of his own in the middle of May, but with little success.

PILSUDSKI RESIGNS FROM COUNCIL OF STATE

Matters were brought to a climax in the Council of State when, on July 2, Pilsudski and three other members resigned. In a letter Pilsudski said: "Up till now all attempts to form a Polish Army have had one characteristic trait in common, namely, the Central Powers have always endeavoured to exclude the intervention of any Polish organization. First, the Legions were incorporated in the Austrian Army; at present, according to the official text, they are associated with the German Army. The right to make decisions in this matter is therefore in alien hands. Such a state of things has given us a fictitious army, Austrian yesterday, German to-day. If the Central Powers have acted in this way in a spirit of benevolence, they are mistaken in supposing that it is possible to form a Polish Army after that fashion. Since the Council of State, a Polish institution, can have no legal influence on the formation of a Polish Army, I, as representing that army, can no longer remain at my post in the Council."

Left to itself the Council adopted the oath required by Beseler and asked the Legions to take it, but Pilsudski secretly instructed them not to do so. Out of 6,000 belonging to Russian Poland 5,200 obeyed Pilsudski; they were immediately arrested by the Germans, disarmed and interned. The 800 who took the oath were transported to Ostrow, where the Germans were trying to organize a *Polnische Wehrmacht*; they contrived to get 1,373 "volunteers." The Legions consisted of 14,000 men; of the 8,000 who belonged to Austrian Poland, 3,000 were incorporated in Austrian regiments on the Italian Front, and the remaining 5,000 were reconstituted as the *Polnische Hilfskorps*, and, under Zie-linski, sent to fight in the Bukovina.

PILSUDSKI ARRESTED

Pilsudski was arrested by the Germans on the night of July 21-2, 1917, and imprisoned in Magdeburg; his friend Sosnkowski was arrested at the same time and later was also imprisoned with him in the same fortress. In Warsaw, Lodz and other centres the Germans arrested some members of Pilsudski's Polish Military Organization, which after some months of open action had again become a secret body in June; before his arrest, and in anticipation of it, he had handed over its command to another soldier friend, Rydz-Smigly; it was to prove its usefulness in the following year. Again Pilsudski's career seemed to come to an abrupt close, but he had at least made it certain that Germany was not to find in Poland the *Menschenmaterial* she needed so much. On August 25 the Council of State resigned. In September the Central Powers were ready with a new political device for the Kingdom.

The field of effort for Polish independence was occupied more and more by the Poles abroad—in London, Paris, Switzerland and America, the men most in view being Dmowski in Europe and Paderewski in the United States. But the hands of the Allies were still tied to Russia. The creation of a Polish Army in France by Poincaré's decree at Paris on June 4, 1917, was a notable triumph for Dmowski and the National Democrats, as it was associated distinctly with the *restoration* of the Polish State.

Dmowski felt he could act more freely after the Russian proclamation of March 29, and on August 15, 1917, he became chairman of the Polish National Committee in Paris.

PULAWY AND OTHER LEGIONS

Pilsudski's Legions were not the only Polish Legions. The Pulawy Legion had fought valorously against the Germans in 1915; in the autumn of that year its strength had fallen from 30 officers and 1,500 men to 3 officers and 118 men, and it was reconstituted. Later the Russian authorities sanctioned the formation of a brigade of Polish infantry, which afterwards was given the status of a division. It was estimated that there were serving in the Russian armies upwards of 600,000 Poles, with 20,000 officers, of whom 119 were generals. Kerensky was induced to authorize the creation of a Polish Army corps in July. Its elements were got together at Minsk, and its command was given to Dowbor-Musnicki, who at the Battle of Lodz in 1914 had proved himself one of Russia's best generals. A second Polish corps was organized in the Ukraine under Michaelis, a general who had commanded a Russian corps on the South-Western Front. The Russian Revolution of November 1917 made abortive these and other Polish efforts in Russia to collaborate with the Entente against the Central Powers.

POLISH NATIONAL COMMITTEE RECOGNIZED

In Western Europe Dmowski now played the leading role. In July 1917, he submitted to Balfour a lengthy memorandum entitled "Problems of Central and Eastern Europe"; it dwelt largely on the frontiers proper to the new free Poland he envisaged. From August 1917, onward into 1918, when Dmowski visited America, Paris was the chief centre of his activities. The Polish National Committee was recognized on September 20, 1917, by the French Government as an "official Polish organization," and Great Britain, Italy and the United States followed suit by December 1917. Besides Dmowski, who was its president, the committee consisted of Maurice Zamoyski, vice-president; Joseph Wielowieyski, secretary-general and head of its military

section; M. Seyda, head of the Press section; J. Rozwadowski, head of the publishing department; E. Piltz, delegate to the French Government; L. Sobanski, delegate at London; C. Skirmunt, delegate at Rome; F. Fronczak, representing the American Poles; and Paderewski, delegate at Washington.

Dmowski devoted much time to the formation of the Polish Army in France. In Paris he met Benesh, the greatest protagonist of the Czechs next to Masaryk, and other leaders of the strong and increasing movement for the destruction of the Dual Monarchy; at first there were opposition and misunderstandings, but these were removed by the Russian Revolutions, and Dmowski co-operated with the Czechs and Yugoslavs.

It was not until 1918 that the diplomatists of the Allies abandoned the hope of detaching Austria-Hungary from Germany and committed themselves to her destruction. Before that came about Poland was treated as a counter for bargaining in the peace negotiations in 1917 associated with the Emperor Charles.

The Polish "National Department of Chicago" adhered to the Committee of Dmowski; Paderewski brought the committee to the notice of Lansing, American Secretary of State, and this led to its recognition. The Union of Polish Falcons (Sokols) voted at Pittsburg on April 4, 1917, for the formation of an "Army of Kosciuszko" to "fight by the side of the United States for the liberty and independence of Poland." Recruiting for this force was affected by the Compulsory Service Law which Congress passed; about 100,000 American Poles served in the American armies. A Franco-Polish military mission, connected with the Polish Army in France, arrived in the United States towards the end of August, and together with the Chicago National Department launched a great recruiting campaign among the Poles who were outside the "draft." Newton, American Secretary of War, gave it official countenance. About 20,000 men volunteered.

POLISH REGENCY COUNCIL

Another stage in the short life of the Austro-German Kingdom of Poland was reached on October 14, 1917, when the Emperors William and Charles appointed a Regency Council for the Kingdom con-

sisting of Kakowski, Archbishop of Warsaw (afterwards Cardinal), Prince Z. Lubomirski, Mayor of Warsaw, and Ostrowski, a country gentleman. The new Council was solemnly inaugurated by Divine Service in St. John's Cathedral, Warsaw. But difficulties soon developed; the Regents suggested A. Tarnowski as Prime Minister, and Beseler vetoed his appointment, but approved Kucharzewski, their second choice. From the former Council the new administration inherited the Departments of Justice and Education already organized. The Department of the Interior was reconstructed.

RUSSIA ELIMINATED FROM THE WAR

November 1917 was a month pregnant with happy fate for Poland, though that issue was utterly unexpected by all alike then and for many weeks later. The Russian Revolution of that month under Lenin led to the practical elimination of Russia not only from the War but from contacts with the Allied and Associated Powers, who thus were freed from taking her into account in their policies.

The Bolsheviks wanted peace, and Trotsky proposed on November 28, 1917, a general armistice. The Allies made no response, but the Central Powers did, and an armistice was arranged at Brest-Litovsk on December 15 for the Eastern Front. Negotiations commenced between the Austro-Germans, the Bolsheviks and the delegates of the Central Council (Rada) of the Ukraine, which on November 20 had constituted a Ukraine Republic, comprising the Governments of Kieff, Podolia, Volhynia, and five others in South-Western Russia. Early in January 1918, the republic proclaimed its absolute independence. The Bolsheviks protested against the participation of the Ukrainians in the Conference, and withdrew from it on that and other grounds, with the result that the Ukraine obtained a peace treaty on February 9, 1918, which also gave it Chelm—to the great indignation of the Poles. The Central Powers had declined to allow the Regency of the Kingdom to be represented at Brest-Litovsk. The Regency Council publicly protested against the cession of Chelm, and the Kucharzewski Ministry resigned in

disgust on February 11. Poles denounced the treaty in the Reichstag, and the Polish Club in the Reichsrat withdrew its support from the Austrian Government. In the Bukovina Haller, in command of the infantry of the *Polnische Hilfskorps*, threw off his allegiance to Austria, and after severe fighting and considerable losses succeeded in crossing the frontier with 4,800 men.

A short sharp campaign by the Germans soon brought the Bolsheviks to terms, and peace was concluded on March 3. Russia was definitely out of the War.

THE FOURTEEN POINTS

On January 8, 1918, Wilson, in a message to Congress, had enunciated his Fourteen Points, the Thirteenth being: "An independent Polish State should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant." Three days previously Lloyd George had stated "that an independent Poland, comprising all those genuinely Polish elements who desire to form a part of it, is an urgent necessity for the stability of Western Europe." These statements showed a great advance in Western opinion regarding the Polish Question.

POLISH LEGIONS ATTACKED

While the second Russian Revolution of 1917 was passing through its initial stages the Bolsheviks tried to Sovietize the Polish forces in Russia, and failing in that attacked them. When Dowbor-Musnicki attempted to concentrate his scattered forces at Bobrujsk they were set upon in detail and lost heavily. With 20,000 men he had to fight not only the Bolsheviks but the Germans, and finding himself nearly surrounded he signed a "convention of neutrality" with the Germans, who invited his corps to fight on the French front, the upshot being the disarmament and demobilization of his troops on May 21.

The other considerable Polish corps—that under Michaelis in the Ukraine, with headquarters at Kieff—moved westward to the

Dnieper under pressure of the Bolsheviks, and was presently joined by Haller and his men after their break with Austria, the total strength of this small army being 15,000 effectives. They concentrated at Kanioff, some 140 miles from Kieff, with Haller in command, Michaelis, obeying an order of the Regency Council, having withdrawn with a fourth of the troops. On May 10 Haller was attacked by the Austro-Germans, and waged a magnificent but hopeless fight for four days—till the exhaustion of his supplies of food and munitions compelled a parley. Most of the Poles, including Haller himself, contrived to escape, but the rest were disarmed. Haller reached Moscow whence he went on to the Murman Coast, and for a short time co-operated with Poole, Commander of the North Russian Expeditionary Force. In response to a request of the Polish National Committee he embarked for France on July 2, 1918.

A third Polish force operated in the Kuban district, and a fourth in Siberia, but they were of relatively small importance.

NEW POLISH COUNCIL OF STATE

A week before the resignation of the Kucharzewski Ministry the Regency Council had promulgated a law creating a sort of Parliament called the Council of State. It was composed of 55 elected members, and 43 nominated by the Regency Council, besides 12 "persons of importance"—in all, 110 members. The elections were held on February 27. A provisional Cabinet composed of functionaries was headed by Ponikowski, who had been Minister of Education in the Kucharzewski Government. On April 5 a new Government was formed with Steczkowski as Premier. The official journal stated that the Government would concern itself with the question of the frontiers, the creation of a Polish Army, and the consolidation generally of the Kingdom as a State. It also spoke of measures for the recovery of industry and the increase of agricultural production.

About this time—May 1918—the Emperors William and Charles decided to return to the Austrian solution of the Polish Question, but with a rectification of the frontiers of the Congress Kingdom in favour of Germany to satisfy the demands of

Ludendorff, who in July following proposed to settle 300,000 German families and expel a similar number of Polish families from the territory to be annexed for his strategic requirements. About three months earlier the Poles in the Congress of the Oppressed Nationalities of Austria-Hungary at Rome—April 1918—had read the situation clearly when they declared Germany the chief enemy of Poland, whose fate depended entirely on the result of the war against Germany.

ALLIES DECLARE FOR POLAND

Clemenceau, Lloyd George and Orlando met at Versailles on June 3, 1918, and by request of the Polish National Committee made this statement: "The creation of a united and independent Polish State, with free access to the sea, constitutes one of the conditions for a just and durable peace and the rule of right in Europe." Under German pressure the Steczkowski Government on June 12 publicly declared that, unmoved by what had been said at Versailles, it would pursue a policy of collaboration with the Central Powers.

The opening of the Council of State had been postponed several times, but it did meet on June 22, and 98 members took part in its first session. The Council met fourteen times, and most of its discussions revealed such hostility to the Austro-Germans that the German Commissary intervened and represented to the Regency Council and Steczkowski that the Council of State must not become a focus of agitation against the Central Powers. The final session was held on July 31; the Council was to meet again in September; but the German armies were then retreating on the Western Front, and the political no less than the military situation was becoming totally changed.

POLISH ARMY IN FRANCE

Dmowski's work for the Polish Army in France had met with great success. On June 22, 1918, in the presence of numerous Frenchmen and Poles, among them being Pichon, French Foreign Minister, and Dmowski himself, the First Division of this army took the oath of service and received from the hands of Poincaré

flags presented by the municipalities of Paris, Verdun, Nancy and Belfort.

The First Regiment of this Polish Army was sent to the front, and greatly distinguished itself on July 15 when Germany launched an offensive in Champagne.

RECOGNIZED BY THE ALLIES

When Dmowski went to the United States, where he joined hands with Paderewski, work in Paris was continued by Zamyski, acting chairman of the National Committee, who on September 28 signed an agreement with the French Government which stipulated, among other things, that the Polish armed forces formed an autonomous, allied and belligerent army, under the supreme political authority of the Polish National Committee, and with a Commander-in-Chief nominated by that Committee. General Haller was given the post. On October 11 Balfour recognized the Polish Army as autonomous, allied and co-belligerent in a letter addressed to Sobanski, delegate of the Committee in London. Sonnino, Italian Foreign Minister, informed Skirmunt, delegate of the Committee at Rome, that the Italian Government recognized the Polish troops fighting on the side of the Allies as autonomous, allied and belligerent. Lansing, American Secretary of State, wrote to the same effect to Dmowski, then in Washington. This fourfold recognition enabled Poland to take part in the Paris Peace Conference as an allied and belligerent Power. Tremendous propaganda work for Poland had been done in 1917-18 in England and America. In October 1917 Great Britain had recognized as an official Polish organization the branch in London of the National Committee, with Sobanski as its head. To some extent its activities clashed with those of Zaleski's organization, but both groups had the support of distinguished English people.

REGENCY COUNCIL PROCLAIMS POLISH INDEPENDENCE

During August and September 1918 the Government of the Kingdom of Poland was thrown into a severe crisis by attempts made to commit the Kingdom to the German solution of the Polish Question. On August 31 the Steczkowski Ministry re-

signed. Owing to the postponement of the reopening of the Council of State the crisis continued unabated, but on September 22 Kucharzewski came again into office. Six days later the Polish deputies in the Reichsrat broke away definitively from Austria; towards the end of October these deputies formed a "Committee of liquidation of Polish affairs" in the Dual Monarchy.

Bulgaria capitulated on September 29—which among other consequences made Prince Max of Baden German Chancellor. On October 5 he began negotiations for peace on the basis of the Fourteen Points.

In the Kingdom the impression caused by Max's move was reflected in a proclamation issued by the Regency Council and the Kucharzewski Government on October 7, 1918, dissolving the Council of State and calling for the appointment of a Government of "concentration," but great difficulty was experienced in constituting it. On October 22 Swiezynski formed a Cabinet representing the three sections of Poland; the Ministry of War was reserved for Pilsudski, still in prison at Magdeburg. After a few hectic days, in which this Ministry proclaimed Poland a Republic on November 3, it was dismissed by the Regents, and replaced by a provisional administration of functionaries, headed by Wroblewski, Under-Secretary of State, afterwards Polish Minister in London and later president of the Bank of Poland.

The World War entered its final stage. Turkey was granted an armistice as October closed, and Austria-Hungary went out of the War on November 3. On November 7 Daszynski proclaimed at Lublin a provisional government of the workers. Four days later Germany was given an armistice, and the War was over. Russia, Austria-Hungary and Germany had crashed; the fall of the three Empires opened the way at last for the Liberation of Poland.

In Warsaw there was at first great confusion. On November 10 the Regents tried to form a Government, but it never governed. Next day at seven in the morning Pilsudski, released from Magdeburg by the German Revolution, arrived at the Central Station of the capital, where he was met by Prince Z. Lubomirski, who explained the situation to him. Warsaw crowds received Pil-

sudski with enthusiasm. Later on the same day the Regency Council, under Lubomirski's guidance, placed in his hands the supreme command of the Polish armies. This was not enough. On November 14 the Regency Council resigned, and in a public announcement transferred its full powers to Pilsudski till the formation of a National Government. The Man and the Hour had come.

CHAPTER III
THE NEW POLISH REPUBLIC
1918-1919

1

THE work Pilsudski had to do in the making of the new Polish Republic might well have daunted and defeated a spirit and a heart less strong and courageous than his own. Virtually a new State had to be created out of chaos. If, on the one hand, he had the foundations laid by the Regency Council in the shape of certain Departments, a civil service, and a small armed force in Warsaw, he had, on the other, an empty Treasury, a country with its industries and agriculture in ruins, the enemy still within its borders, and in the East the menace of Bolshevism. Besides, he had to take into account the National Committee in Paris and the fact that the Poles were otherwise sharply divided politically, with himself the focus of their strife.

PILSUDSKI'S PROBLEMS

Before the first partition in 1772 the Polish Republic had an area of 740,000 square kilometres, with well-defined, recognized frontiers. The Republic which emerged from the World War dated officially from November 11, 1918, but it could scarcely be said to have definite frontiers. The State consisted, first, of the two Governor-Generalships of Warsaw and Lublin that had formed the Austro-German Kingdom of Poland; secondly, of Galicia; and thirdly, of Teschen. German armies were still strong in the Warsaw area, and their disarmament and evacuation had to be faced. In the Lublin area the Austrians had been disarmed and its government transferred to the Poles without resistance, but in Lublin Daszynski had set up his Socialist Republic, in itself a challenge to all Conservative Poles.

Galicia had been taken over from Austria, effectively in its Western half, with Cracow as its centre, but doubtfully in its

Eastern half, with Lwow as its chief town, for its possession was contested by the local Ukrainians—or Ruthenians, as the Poles designated them. On November 11 the larger part of Eastern Galicia was in the hands of the Ukrainians, thanks to Austrian and German connivance; during the night of October 31—November 1, 1918, they seized Lwow. A Ukrainian National Council proclaimed "The People's Republic of the Western Ukraine," and its territory extended westward in Galicia to the San. Lwow, however, was a thoroughly Polish city, and its relief was another problem that had to be dealt with quickly. Teschen was also in dispute, but a provisional arrangement had been made by the Poles and the Czechoslovaks, and at least temporarily there was peace in that ancient duchy.

As for the wider solution of the Polish Question, German Poland was still legally German. Nothing was settled respecting the *Kresy* or Eastern borderlands, where there were German armies.

CREATES POLISH ARMY

Pilsudski conceived that his most pressing duty was the creation of a Polish Army. On November 17, 1918, he requested Foch to send to Poland the "Polish Army in France," but received no reply. Pilsudski made the best of what lay to his hand: the remnants of the Legions; the *Polnische Wehrmacht*; Polish officers and men who had served in the Austrian, Russian or German armies; and, above all, his Polish Military Organization, which, after his incarceration at Magdeburg, had been commanded by Rydz-Smigly, who used it to raid Austro-German communications in 1918, and afterwards to disarm the Austrians; it now provided Pilsudski with upwards of 10,000 men.

To disarm and evacuate the Germans without clashes was essential. Revolution in Germany had found an echo among these troops, who numbered 80,000 men, 30,000 being stationed in Warsaw. Beseler, the German Governor-General, disappeared and his staff dissolved. The Soldiers' Councils the men set up disregarded their officers, and sought to fraternize with the Poles, who had begun to disarm them the day before the arrival of

Pilsudski. They did not resist, but Pilsudski, in view of his inferior strength and the possibility of trouble, commenced negotiations with these Councils which led to an agreement on November 16 for the peaceful evacuation of the German troops on condition that they laid down their arms before crossing the frontier. By November 19 they were all evacuated.

POLAND PARTLY LIBERATED

A very considerable part of the new State was thus actually liberated. But there were other and stronger German armies on the march home from White Russia on the north, and the Ukraine in Russia on the south, and might cause great disturbances in Poland and even threaten her very existence, not only by fighting but also by preparing the way for Bolshevism. Fighting took place between the Poles and the Germans in the *Kresy*, but it did not spread, and the bulk of the German troops eventually took directions back to Germany that did not trespass on the new State. Poland broke off relations with Germany on December 15, thus showing her solidarity with the Allies; she broke with Soviet Russia two days earlier.

LWOW TAKEN

Pilsudski took prompt steps for the relief of Lwow. When the Ukrainians seized the city they failed to dislodge a small Polish force from one part of it, and presently these Poles were joined by a number of their compatriots, including women, from other parts. A fierce struggle went on in the streets for nearly three weeks, the Poles succeeding in recovering some ground, but as they were entirely isolated their plight was desperate. The first move for their relief came from Cracow; Przemysl, which the Ukrainians had occupied with Austrian support, was retaken, and a base provided for further operations. On November 13 an order was received from Pilsudski by Roja at Cracow to attack the Ukrainians at Lwow; at the same time detachments were sent from Warsaw and Lublin.

The combined expedition left Przemysl on November 19, surprised the Ukrainians by a rapid march along the railway, and got into touch with the Poles defending the city on the following

day. On November 21 the force, about 1,400 strong, attacked the part held by the Ukrainians, and after hard fighting drove them out of it. Next day Lwow in its entirety was held by the Poles, but they were not strong enough to embark on an offensive, and the Ukrainians proceeded to invest the town. The struggle for Lwow continued till well into 1919, but the Poles repulsed all attacks on it. Pilsudski had also to deal in Volhynia with that other Ukrainian Republic which had figured prominently in the Brest-Litovsk Treaty in 1918; its leading soldier was the Ataman Petlura. Early in January 1919 it signed a treaty of union with the Western Ukraine Republic, and the two together made practically a single front against the Poles.

The German armies had begun to withdraw from the north, but the areas from which they retired were forthwith occupied by troops of the Soviet. This Bolshevik movement started on November 17, 1918, and covered by the end of the year a large part of White Russia and Lithuania and small portions of Latvia and Estonia. Sapieha and other Poles of the *Kresy*, parts of which the Soviet was occupying, organized at Warsaw a committee that was authorized to recruit a White Russian-Lithuanian division to oppose the advancing Bolsheviks, who on January 5, 1919, took Vilna and, a fortnight later, held Pinsk, Lida and Brest-Litovsk. They were driven out of these places, except Vilna, early in February by the Poles.

GROWTH OF POLISH ARMY

During the first three months of Pilsudski's rule the army grew rapidly; on November 11, 1918, it consisted of no more than 24 battalions of infantry, three squadrons of cavalry, and five batteries of artillery. By the middle of January, 1919, the battalions exceeded 100; there were more than 70 squadrons of cavalry and 80 batteries, with technical units and a small air force, the whole strength amounting to about 110,000 men.

PILSUDSKI AS CHIEF OF THE STATE

But Pilsudski was also Chief of the State. The Regency Council had at first wished to keep the civil power in its own hands, but

public opinion was too much against it, and in abdicating it handed everything over to Pilsudski. Later in his life he said it would have been better if he had assumed an absolute dictatorship, but at the outset he was dominated by the idea of legality, and did not wish to be himself the "source of legal power in Poland." He wanted a genuinely Polish Government constituted, and he designed to work with and through it. Politically the new State was in a ferment; the wine of freedom was heady. Pilsudski's view was that Revolution from the Left was always more dangerous than from the Right, and therefore it was necessary to take the Left into account first, and get it to participate in the government of the country.

THE FIRST CABINET

Daszynski gave no trouble; on the contrary, he came to Warsaw and co-operated with Pilsudski in an attempt to form a Cabinet of the Left, but it failed owing to the opposition of the Right, with the support of the People's or Populist Party (*Ludowcy*), headed by Witos, a well-off Galician peasant, who had been a member of the Reichsrat in Vienna. Pilsudski next entrusted the formation of a Cabinet to Moraczewski, a Galician Socialist of a more moderate type than Daszynski; Moraczewski was successful and his Government took office on November 18, 1918, with himself as Prime Minister, Wasilewski as Foreign Minister and Thugutt as Minister of the Interior. Four days later a decree appeared, signed by Pilsudski, in which he stated that he assumed supreme power as provisional Chief of the State, and would exercise it until the institution of the first Seym, when he would transfer it to that body.

A MOST DEMOCRATIC FRANCHISE

On November 28 two fresh decrees were published; the first sanctioned an extremely democratic electoral law which had been elaborated by Moraczewski, and the second set the general election for January 26, 1919. The franchise was to be equal and direct; to include both sexes, the voting age being fixed at 21; to be secret, and based on the system of proportional representation.

The struggle for political power in Poland became intensified among the various parties and groups. The Right, mostly composed of National Democrats, had their eyes turned to Paris, Dmowski and the National Committee, the representative Polish organization recognized by the Allied and Associated Powers. As yet the new Polish Republic of Pilsudski enjoyed no such recognition; to procure it was the next big step.

Two days after his installation at Warsaw as provisional Chief of the State, Pilsudski informed belligerents and neutrals of the "existence of a Polish independent State, uniting all Polish territories." In his message to the Allies he added that "independence was due to the brilliant victories of the Allied armies," and that he hoped the "powerful Western democracies would give their aid and fraternal support to the restored Polish Republic." Besides asking Foch to send to Poland the "Polish troops which formed part of the French Army," he dispatched a somewhat similar radio to Wilson at Washington, but its appeal was directed to "all soldiers of Polish nationality who had fought under foreign flags."

WARSAW-PARIS NEGOTIATIONS

Dmowski arrived in Paris from America on November 19, and the French Foreign Office, after consulting him, decided to take no notice of Pilsudski. After some hesitation the Committee resolved to get into contact with Pilsudski by sending Stanislas Grabski to Warsaw for the formation of a coalition Government. Grabski was successful in bringing about an accord in principle between the Committee and Pilsudski respecting a common front at the Peace Conference, but he failed as regarded a coalition Government.

Pilsudski next sent a delegation, composed of Dluski, M. Sokolnicki, Sujkowski and others, to Paris to discuss with the Committee the taking of joint action. With Dluski went a private letter from Pilsudski to Dmowski, in which he said he desired to avoid a double representation of Poland before the Allies, as a single front could alone guarantee the effective hearing of their claims. Dluski also carried to Dmowski a letter from Grabski

stating that Pilsudski agreed to accept the Committee as representing Poland in the peace negotiations, on condition that the Committee should have representatives of himself and the Warsaw Government added to it.

On January 7, 1919, Dmowski, Zamoyski, Seyda and Wielowieyski, of the Committee, met Dluski, Sokolnicki and Sujkowski in conference. Dmowski made a statement in which he said that if Poland was recognized by the Entente as an independent and Allied State, it was thanks to the Committee; it alone was qualified to represent Poland at the Peace Conference; it alone could designate Polish diplomatic representatives in the Allied countries. Dluski replied that he was aware of the services rendered to the cause of Poland by the Committee, and that he recognized the political talent of its chief; but he protested against assigning to the Committee exclusively the merit of having worked for the restoration of the State, and he suggested that as Poland was to have two delegates at the Peace Conference one should be nominated by the Committee and the other by Pilsudski. Further, he announced that he was charged by Pilsudski to present to the heads of the Allied and Associated Powers notification of the independence of Poland. Dmowski in his turn protested against this, and the matter dropped. This and subsequent meetings were without favourable result. Dmowski was uncompromising in upholding the Committee as the accepted of the Allies, and in his opposition to Pilsudski, who, he declared, had no standing with them, which was true.

PADEREWSKI GOES TO POLAND

The Allies knew little of Pilsudski, and did not like what they knew; they remembered how his Legions had fought for Austria, and how he collaborated with the Germans in the Council of State; they did not give proper value to his reason for resigning from that body and his consequent imprisonment at Magdeburg; they had no clear idea of the work he was doing in Poland in organizing the country and in stemming the Bolshevik tide, but they had heard exaggerated accounts of pogroms of Jews, and they looked on him as rather dangerously advanced from his

Socialist associations. For several months the French Foreign Office supported Dmowski against Pilsudski. It seemed as if there were two Polish Governments, one in Warsaw and the other in Paris. The basic feature of the situation was, however, that Pilsudski was installed in Warsaw as Chief of a Polish State in being, with an ever-growing army wholly, passionately devoted to him. Poland was fortunate in having in this emergency another great son—Paderewski.

In his own province of the world of art no one was better known or more highly esteemed than Paderewski. Was he something more than a great artist? In the United States he had done splendid work for the Polish cause, winning the confidence of Wilson and House. He arrived in Paris from America on December 15, 1918, conferred with Dmowski and other members of the National Committee, as well as with representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers, and took passage in the British cruiser *Condor* for Danzig, where he landed on December 25. But he did not go straight to Warsaw; he went first to Poznan (Posen), the capital of Poznania, part of German Poland.

REVOLUTION IN POZNANIA

On November 14, 1918, the Polish members of the Reichstag and of the Prussian Diet met in Poznan and decided to form a Supreme Popular Council, for which they later held an election of delegates by universal suffrage. This Council met on December 3, and appointed an executive committee of six men, amongst whom were Korfanty, a deputy from Silesia; L. Seyda; and Mgr. Adamski, afterwards Bishop of Silesia, head of the Co-operative Credit Societies which had helped the Poles in their fight with the Germans for possession of land. The Council ignored Pilsudski and the Warsaw Government and gave its adhesion to the National Committee in Paris, constituting it the representative of German Poland. The National Democrats, of whom Seyda was the local leader, were strong in this area; to their party belonged the gentry, the intellectuals and the middle classes. One of their principal representatives in the Reichstag was Trampczynski, a member both of the Reichstag and of the Prussian Diet. Neither

the Socialists nor the Populists had an important place among the Polish parties in this section. A political storm had been gathering for weeks in this area, and Paderewski's visit to Poznan on December 27, 1918, caused it to break. The Poles welcomed him enthusiastically; the Germans retaliated with some shots of which a Pole called Ratajczak was the victim, and then the Poles at once rose in open revolt and turned the Germans out of the city. The insurrection speedily extended over the whole district; the Germans resisted, and severe fighting took place, which was not terminated till February 16, 1919, when an armistice was concluded at Trèves by Foch in the name of the Allies and Poland. Legally, however, German Poland belonged to Germany till the Treaty of Versailles handed it over definitely to Poland, and some time elapsed before Poznania was fully integrated in the Polish State.

PADEREWSKI AND PILSUDSKI

From Poznan Paderewski went on to Warsaw on January 3, 1919, and was received by its population with enthusiasm. He had his first meeting with Pilsudski on the following day, but it led to nothing, and from Warsaw Paderewski proceeded to Cracow, where demonstrations similar to those in the two other cities were made in his honour. His enormous popularity among his countrymen could not be doubted, but his mission of conciliation had so far failed. That its success was necessary was indicated during the night of January 4-5 by an attempt, to which Paderewski was privy, at a *coup d'état* led by Sapieha against Pilsudski and the Moraczewski Government. The conspirators arrested the Prime Minister and other Ministers, but did not succeed in taking Pilsudski, and the plot collapsed. Next day Pilsudski released the Ministers and imprisoned the ringleaders. Ignoring what had happened, he invited Paderewski to return to Warsaw, and negotiations were resumed.

On January 14, 1919, Paderewski informed Dmowski that he had come to a complete agreement with Pilsudski. As it was impossible to constitute a Government composed of representatives of all parties, because of their excessive demands, Pilsudski

proposed forming a Government of independent personages representative of the three sections of Poland, and capable at the same time of assuming the direction of the great Departments of State. Paderewski said he agreed and wound up by insisting on the addition to the National Committee of ten members of the Left. Dmowski endorsed what Paderewski had done, and accepted the enlargement of the Committee.

THE PADERIEWSKI CABINET

The Moraczewski Cabinet resigned on January 16. Next day Paderewski formed a Government of consolidation and social construction in a *union sacrée*, with himself as Premier and Foreign Minister. A genuinely National Government was formed; it was recognized as such by the National Committee on January 21; and two days afterwards Paderewski recognized the Committee as representing Poland's interests with the Allied and Associated Governments.

Dmowski and Paderewski, with Dluski as alternate, were the Polish delegates at the Peace Conference, which opened at Paris on January 19, 1919. The presence of the Polish delegates was equivalent to official recognition both of the Republic and of its Government, with Pilsudski as Chief of the State. Recognition *de jure* was accorded to Poland by America on January 30, by France on February 23, by England on February 25, and by Italy on February 27.

FIRST GENERAL ELECTION

The general election for the first or Constituent Seym was held on January 26, but the Poland to which it applied covered only the former Austro-German Governor-Generalships and Western Galicia. An election was impossible in Eastern Galicia because of the conflict with the Ukrainians, and the former deputies in the Reichsrat from that area were appointed members of this Seym. Not till after the Treaty of Versailles did the Popular Council of Poznania send deputies to Warsaw. The election passed off tranquilly, and about a fortnight later the Seym sat in Warsaw.

FIRST OR CONSTITUENT SEYM


On February 10, 1919, the opening took place, after a solemn service in St. John's Cathedral, attended by Pilsudski, who wore his old uniform of the First Brigade of the Legions, Paderewski, the Archbishops and Bishops of Poland, the Cabinet and the high officers of the army, as well as all the elected deputies. Pilsudski entered the House accompanied by Paderewski, and addressing the deputies, said:

A century and a half of struggles often entailing blood and sacrifice has found its triumph this day. A century and a half of dreams of a Free Poland has waited for their realization to this moment. To-day is a great holiday for our nation—a day of joy after the long dreadful night of suffering. At this moment when all Polish hearts are beating fast I am happy that to me has been given the honour of opening the Polish Seym, which will be the sole master and ruler of the home of our country.

But the great joy of this day would be much greater if it were not troubled by the fact that we are met at a very grave moment. After a long and terrible war the whole world, including Poland, waits and longs for peace. This longing, however, cannot become to-day a reality for Poland. Her sons must go to defend her borders. They must assure to her a free development.

It was not a time for rejoicing and thanksgiving alone; the State had to be served, its frontiers protected, its internal development secured. A week before, the Polish forces had begun a counter-offensive against the Bolsheviks; on February 9 the Poles occupied Brest-Litovsk. But more soldiers were needed.

After Pilsudski had declared the Seym open, its oldest member, Prince Ferdinand Radziwill, a former member of the German Reichstag and of the Prussian Diet, as well as president of the Polish Kolo or club, made a speech in which he spoke of the honour done to him and his colleagues from Wielkopolska, the historic name of Poznania, by inviting them to take part in the first Seym without being elected. Assuming the leadership at the first sitting of the Seym, he appointed the two youngest members, the Socialist Niedzialkowski and the National Democrat Kaczyński, to act as secretaries. On February 14, 1919, a second session was held, and Trampczynski was elected Marshal or Speaker by



M. PADEREWSKI

155 votes against 149 for Witos, the former member of the Austrian Reichsrat and of the Galician Diet, and the leader of the Piast Peasant Party. This was a victory for the Right. The Seym at the moment had 305 members, and appeared to be about equally divided, but party lines could not be called rigid.

Later this Seym consisted of 395 members: 241 deputies from the Congress Kingdom, all elected; 105 from Galicia, of whom 77 were elected and 28 appointed, and 49 from Poznania, of whom 42 were elected and 7 appointed. According to a decree of the Chief of the State on February 7, 1919, all Polish deputies in the German Reichstag were considered deputies in the Seym, and the same principle was adopted respecting Polish members of the Austrian Reichsrat. Six months later an election was held in Poznania; an election was held in Pomerania in 1920. Korfanty and Sosinski were appointed to represent Upper Silesia. In 1922 Vilna was represented by twenty delegates from the Vilna district.

POLISH PARTYISM

The Seym was composed of many parties and groups, and swung to this side or that under the influence of political winds and currents not often gentle; the internal conditions of the country, as well as the external, were difficult; political experience was lacking. The party divisions were not novel, and similar groupings were to be found in other countries and parliaments: the Right (Conservative), the Centre (Moderate) and the Left (Radical) were terms understood throughout Europe in much the same sense. In the Polish Seym the Right consisted of the National Democrats, the National Christian Party and the Christian Socialists; the Centre was made up of the Peasant Party calling itself Piast, from the name of a founder of Poland whom legend said was a peasant, and three other parties; the Left included the Socialists, the National Workers' Party, and the Populists. There were besides various "Independents," two Communists, and the National Minorities—a few Jews and a couple of Germans. The largest party was that of the National Democrats, and they sought to dominate the Seym. Numbers of deputies were simple peasants, but they were divided in their politics, some belonging to the

Piast Party, which was led by Witos, and others to the Populist *Wyzwolenie* (Deliverance) Party, whose leader was Thugutt.

The Right identified Pilsudski with the Left, and in any case was bent on circumscribing his power as much as possible. On February 20, 1919, Pilsudski's position as Chief of the State was confirmed unanimously by the Seym (305 votes), but this decision was accompanied by other decisions, the whole forming what was afterwards known as the Little Constitution, which in effect took back what it had given him, for the Seym constituted itself the sovereign power, and relegated the Chief of the State to the secondary part of doing what it told him. The Little Constitution remained in force till it was replaced by the Constitution passed in March 1921, which reasserted the absolute supremacy of the Seym. On February 20, 1919, the Seym also passed a vote of confidence in the Paderewski Government.

LAMENTABLE ECONOMIC STATE OF POLAND

While the general political position in Poland was being clarified during the winter of 1918-19, the economic situation of the country, Poznania excepted, was lamentable. There was a grave shortage of food; in some localities where seed had been sown the results were poor; in others no crops had been put in at all; many thousands of people were half-starved, and there was much sickness. Live stock had been depleted by German and Austrian requisitions, and what was left was ill-nourished. Means were lacking to start what factories were still standing; in Lodz a quarter of a million work-people were out of employment; there were no raw materials and no markets. When the Moraczewski Government tried to raise loans, it failed because of its Socialist complexion. The Paderewski Government was in better favour, more especially in America. Even before Paderewski became Prime Minister the Americans, through the admirable Hoover organizations, had come to the assistance of Poland.

AMERICAN HELP

On January 4, 1919, Americans representing Hoover arrived in Warsaw, and discussed the food situation with Pilsudski, Mora-

czewski and others. In two days arrangements were made for the transport and distribution of supplies from ships on the way from America. The first vessels with cargoes of flour reached Danzig on February 17; German opposition to the use of the port for the Poles was so strong that the Allies had to intervene to overcome it. During February 1919, 14,000 tons of foodstuffs arrived in Poland; further progress was made, and in April 52,000 tons of food passed through Danzig into Poland; nor did the work stop there, but went on for many months. America also showed her goodwill by giving credits for the supplies she sent, Congress having passed the Appropriation Act which made a sum of \$100,000,000 immediately available for credits in just such cases as that of Poland, with her lack of money.

2

STRUGGLE FOR TESCHEN

The fight for the frontiers continued. Indeed, scarcely had the National Government under Paderewski been constituted when hostilities broke out between the Poles and the Czechoslovaks in Teschen. On January 23, 1919, after a short ultimatum, Czechoslovak forces attacked Bohumin, Frystad and Karwina on the north-west, and compelled the Poles, who were in inferior strength, to retire; at the same time Czechoslovak troops marched in on the south and occupied Jablonkow. Reinforcements were sent from Cracow, and then from Warsaw and other Polish centres, to the town of Teschen where the Poles had concentrated. But pressed by much stronger forces and with their left flank threatened, the Poles fell back on the Vistula. The Czechoslovaks attacked vigorously on January 29, the chief struggle taking place at the railway bridge at Drohomysl. Next day they assailed Skoczow, farther south, and a sharp contest went on for two days along the whole line, but the Poles retained their positions. On January 31 they agreed to an armistice which the Czechoslovaks proposed. The Allies in Paris intervened, and on February 3 a convention was signed between the two countries by Dmowski and Benesh. Before it went into force the Czechoslovaks attacked

once more, but were repulsed, during the night of February 23-24. Another convention was signed and the Poles recovered the town of Teschen. Another frontier question—concerning Spisz and Orava, on the line of the Carpathians in former Hungary—also embroiled these peoples.

POLAND AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE

On January 29, 1919, Dmowski, accompanied by Piltz, appeared before the Supreme Council and in a speech of five hours' length, first in French and then in English, demanded that Germany should assign to Poland all territories the majority of whose inhabitants were Poles, and also surrender Danzig as Poland's sole port of access to the sea. Further, he set forth the claims of Poland concerning her eastern frontiers.

The struggle, as it developed in the Peace Conference, was complicated by divergences of view between Clemenceau and Lloyd George, with Wilson holding a half-way position, respecting the Polish claims. The result of Dmowski's speech was the decision of the Supreme Council to send to Poland, to make investigations on the spot and report, an Inter-Allied Commission; it consisted of Noulens and Niessel (France), Howard and Wiart (England), Kernan and Lord (America), and Montagna and Longhena (Italy). A Commission on Polish Affairs was constituted on February 12, 1919, its members being Jules Cambon (France), who presided, Tyrrell (England), Bowman (America), Torretta (Italy), and Otchhai (Japan).

Wilson's Thirteenth Point postulated an independent Polish State inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, and with a free and secure access to the sea; it also brought in the principle of economic necessity in favour of Poland. This point, as well as the other thirteen, had been accepted by the Allies, the Central Powers and the Poles. But such expressions as *indisputably Polish* and *economic necessity* were hardly definite enough to leave no room for differences of opinion. There were such differences, and the Polish Delegation did its utmost to remove them. Its propaganda was as persistent as it was copious; so was that, however, of its opponents, who also loudly accused the Poles of "Imperial-

ism," though they were doing nothing more than trying to get back as much as they could of what had been their own. It was always obvious that the principle of nationality needed great care in its application, and equally that all the care in the world would not prevent instances occurring of the necessary overriding of that principle—which meant the existence of National Minorities, often considerable, in various States. The claims put forward by the Polish Delegation covered important National Minorities; Poland besides had in her large Jewish population a so-called National Minority problem such as no other State had to face.

POLAND AND THE JEWS

When the War broke out there were about three million Jews in Russian and Austrian Poland; there were upwards of 300,000 in Warsaw alone. Some Jews had been assimilated, and were styled "Poles of the Jewish faith," but the vast majority retained their own language, dress and customs, and lived a separate life as far as possible. Most of the Polish Jews were on the side of the Central Powers; many identified themselves with Germanism; others demanded national autonomy for Jewry in Poland. Before the Peace Conference Jews streamed to Paris from Europe and America, and made an intensive propaganda out of the stories given prominence in the Press of pogroms perpetrated by Poles on Jews at Lwow in November 1918. These stories were exaggerated, the truth being that some sixty Jews supporting the Ukrainians were killed during the fighting for the possession of that city between the Poles and the Ukrainians. One journal put the number of Jewish victims at from 2,500 to 3,000! But until the truth was known it was believed that the Polish Government was organizing pogroms, and a formidable campaign was conducted by Jews in England, France and America against Poland on the score of this and other alleged outrages on Polish Jews. Some Jews in Paris were strongly in favour of *national* rights, but others spoke merely of the emancipation of their co-religionists in the East, or *equal* rights. There was also a tendency on the part of some Jews to co-operate with the Ukrainians, whose delegation on February 10, 1919, addressed a memorandum to the Supreme

Council demanding the recognition of the Ukrainian Republic, "constituted by the will of all its people on Ukrainian territory, formerly belonging to Russia and Austria-Hungary"—Eastern Galicia, as well as the Ukraine in Russia.

THE FRONTIERS CLAIMED

Following up his speech on January 29, 1919, Dmowski sent a Note to the Commission on Polish Affairs on February 28 dealing with the frontier claimed by Poland on the west. On March 3 he addressed to this Commission another Note on the frontier claimed by Poland on the east. In the first he presented Poland's case with respect to Galicia, Poznania, West Prussia (Pomerania) and Warmia (Ermeland—a western part of East Prussia). Concerning Galicia, he denied that the Ukrainian movement justified taking away its eastern half from Poland, but admitted that the Ukrainians there had rights—which Poland would respect. He touched on the controversy with Czechoslovakia over Teschen, Spisz and Orava. He discussed the Polish claim to the possession of Upper Silesia as regarded the district of Oppeln, certain parts excepted, and other districts in that territory. Next, he passed to Poznania, the "cradle of the Polish race, and the seat of the oldest Polish civilization," and then to West Prussia; he traced the frontier desired by Poland up through Pomerania to the Baltic, demanded the attribution of Pomerania and Warmia to Poland, and suggested that East Prussia should be separated from Germany and become an independent republic. In his second Note, Dmowski said that Poland relinquished, though with regret, its claim to the eastern zone of the *Kresy*, namely, the Government of Kieff, the eastern parts of Podolia and Volhynia, the eastern part of the Government of Minsk, and the Governments of Mohileff and Vitebsk.

Finally, he advocated the organization of the regions speaking Lithuanian as a distinct country within the Polish State, with a special government based on the rights of Lithuanian nationality. There had been a good deal of discussion respecting Lithuania in the Polish Delegation; Pilsudski wished for Polish-Lithuanian federation; Dmowski and his friends favoured a policy of incor-

poration or annexation; on a vote being taken, Dmowski won by ten votes to four.

On March 12, 1919, the Commission on Polish Affairs sent to the Supreme Council its report on the Polish-German frontier, after considering the information submitted to it from the Inter-Allied Commission. It recommended that the western limit of the Polish ethnographical majorities in Poznania and West Prussia should be the frontier between Poland and Germany; that Danzig and the territory traversed by the Danzig-Eylau-Warsaw railway, with the line itself, should be given to Poland; that all districts of Upper Silesia having a Polish majority should be Polish, except a small corner in the south, to be given to Czechoslovakia; and that the fate of Allenstein (Olsztyn) should be decided by plebiscite. Without accepting the whole of Dmowski's programme, the Commission had conceded a very large part of it. The report was unanimous. When it came before the Supreme Council, Lloyd George moved its return for revision on the score that it violated the principle of nationality respecting Marienwerder (Kwidzyn—through which the Danzig-Eylau-Warsaw railway ran) and Danzig. The report was sent back with his proposals that there should be a plebiscite for Marienwerder and that Danzig should become a Free City.

POLISH ARMY IN FRANCE GOES TO POLAND

On March 27 the Seym at Warsaw passed a unanimous resolution that Poland was the ally of the Allies, in reply to propaganda which affirmed that she was anti-Ally. Earlier in the month the Seym had voted conscription and the calling up for the Army of six classes of recruits, 1896-1901. By that time the Polish Army comprised about 230,000 men, but during March the Poles stood almost everywhere on the defensive. It was not till the middle of that month that the Supreme Council authorized Foch to demand from Germany passage for the "Polish Army in France" into Poland through Danzig. The German Government refused on the ground that these troops were not, properly speaking, Allied troops. On March 26 Foch issued an ultimatum based on clause XVI of the Armistice, and this led immediately to a violent Press

campaign in Germany which went so far as to declare that rather than yield on the question of Danzig it would be preferable to break the Armistice. Foch then demanded that Germany should send a representative to Spa to come to a definitive settlement; Erzberger was sent, and an agreement was signed on April 4, 1919, by which, while the Allies maintained in principle their right to utilize Danzig, they met the German view by consenting to the dispatch of the troops overland across Germany to Poland or by sea to Stettin and Königsberg and thence into Poland, instead of their going through Danzig. On April 16, J. Haller, who commanded this army, left Paris for Warsaw, where he arrived five days later; the force, which comprised four divisions and the elements of two more, reached Polish territory in the latter half of April.

LLOYD GEORGE AND POLAND

Meanwhile the Commission on Polish Affairs had been considering Lloyd George's revision of their report on the Polish-German frontier, and had come to the conclusion unanimously to stand by that report, which they therefore returned unchanged to the Supreme Council on April 12, 1919. Concerning Danzig they stated that, having heard Paderewski on the subject, they confirmed the attribution of the city to Poland, as they believed that any other solution would "compromise the establishment and maintenance of the peace of Europe." The Supreme Council again refused Danzig to Poland, Lloyd George being implacable. Poles offered several explanations of his unfriendly attitude. Some put it down to "personal attacks" on him by Dmowski, who in his book *Polityka polska* ascribed Lloyd George's hostility to Jewish influences. A third opinion was expressed by Kutrzeba, in his book *Polska odrodzona* (Poland Resuscitated); he said that England did indeed desire the re-establishment of a Polish State, but small and weak, because a strong Polish State would increase the power of France too much—which British diplomacy sought to prevent.

Lloyd George ostensibly based himself on the nationality principle, and he prevailed. He was supported as a rule by the

British Press. The Poles found a great advocate in Clemenceau, backed by preponderant French opinion. Clemenceau wanted a "strong, a very strong" Poland, as one of the surest guarantees of peace in face of German ideas of revenge and as a barrier between Germany and Bolshevik Russia. Italy rather favoured the Poles, while Japan was indifferent.

When the *Terms of Peace* were presented to the German Delegation on May 7, 1919, the Polish-German frontier was set forth in accordance with Lloyd George's rectification of that recommended by the Commission on Polish Affairs: Danzig was to be a Free City, and the fate of Marienwerder was to be decided by plebiscite, as was that of Allenstein. On May 29 the German Delegation addressed to the Supreme Council a voluminous document entitled *Observations on the Peace Terms*. In particular strong objection was taken to the loss of Upper Silesia, about which there was great excitement in Germany. Lloyd George was afraid that the Germans would refuse to sign the Peace Treaty, but in the Supreme Council he laid special stress on the arguments advanced by the delegation which were cunningly adapted to Wilson's principles, and, winning the President to his side, he overbore Clemenceau, a plebiscite being decided on for this area, as the Germans were told on June 14. The Peace Treaty was signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919, the Polish signatories being Paderewski and Dmowski. Article 87 of the treaty began: "Germany recognizes, as the Allied and Associated Powers have already recognized, the complete independence of Poland."

POLAND'S SUBSTANTIAL GAINS

Poland made very substantial gains. Nearly the whole of Poznania, as well as a large part of West Prussia or Pomerania, had been restored to her, and she had access to the sea. Poland's access to the sea through Danzig, which was placed as a Free City under the League of Nations, was guaranteed by special legislation, but it was neither as free nor as secure as it would have been if Danzig had been attributed unreservedly to her, as the Commission on Polish Affairs recommended. In 1919 Danzig was undoubtedly German, and the compromise which gave it the status of a Free

City caused it to remain German, though economically dependent on Poland for its existence. Fortunately Pomerania lying west and south of it—what the Germans called the *Danziger Korridor*—was racially as Polish as Danzig was German; whatever dispute there might be about Danzig being historically Polish or German, there could be no denying that Pomerania was historically as well as ethnographically Polish, as the Allies maintained, and that therefore its restitution to Poland was an act of elementary justice, notwithstanding the other fact that it separated East Prussia from the rest of Germany. As the Allies put it: "The interests which Germans in East Prussia, who number less than two millions, have in establishing a land connection with Germany, are less vital than the interests of the whole Polish nation in securing direct access to the sea."

What the Versailles Treaty did secure for Poland was the fixation of a considerable length of her frontier on the west; her frontier on the east was left indeterminate, and in the upshot she had to fix it for herself by hard fighting. The treaty was not too popular in Poland, but the Seym ratified it on July 31, 1919, by 285 votes to 41. On June 28, Paderewski and Dmowski also signed the Minorities Treaty, which was even less popular because of its unilateral character.

POLISH MINORITIES TREATY

The Polish Minorities Treaty provided equality in civil and political rights, and the right to use their own language, for all racial, linguistic and religious minorities, who also were entitled to organize their own religious, educational and charitable institutions. Where a minority formed a considerable proportion of the population of a district, it was given the right to have instruction in its own tongue in the primary public schools. The treaty provided that, whether citizens or not, all should enjoy life, liberty and the free exercise of their religion. At the Peace Conference Jews were prominent in agitating for and securing this Minorities Treaty; in fact, the alleged anti-Semitism of Poland was largely responsible for the existence of the treaty, "outrages" on Jews in Vilna and Pinsk in April in the course of the fighting

between the Poles and the Bolsheviks being reported with great exaggeration in the Press.

An independent committee, under Morgenthau, an American Jew, appointed later by Wilson, at the request of Paderewski, to investigate, reduced the incidents to their proper proportions, but its report was not published till late in 1919; Jewish hostility to Poland continued to be marked at the Conference. The true nature of the outrages on Jews in April was much the same as that of the "pogrom" in the struggle for Lwow in November 1918. They were incidents in the fight for the eastern frontiers, regrettable but well-nigh inevitable.

FIGHT FOR THE EASTERN FRONTIERS

That fight was resumed in April 1919. The Polish line was divided by the military situation into two sectors—from the centre to the north it confronted the Bolsheviks, and from the centre to the south it faced the Ukrainians. In March Lwow had again been closely invested by the latter. The Supreme Council intervened, and tried to bring about an armistice in Eastern Galicia, but ineffectually, and truces arranged on the spot were quickly broken. It next endeavoured to secure a settlement by negotiations between the Polish and Ukrainian delegations in Paris, and with this object set up a commission, with Botha as president, which prepared a draft armistice convention. The Ukrainians accepted, but the Poles rejected it, because the security of Poland against the Bolsheviks would not be complete without the military occupation of Eastern Galicia. On May 27 the Supreme Council telegraphed to Pilsudski a threat to withdraw supplies and assistance if he did not accept its decisions; Pilsudski replied that Poland had reason to fear a combined attack of Bolsheviks and Germans, if the Peace Treaty was not accepted by Germany, and he thought it essential to link up the Polish and Rumanian forces—the latter occupied Pokucie, south of Stanislavov-Halicz, from May to August 1919. Meanwhile the situation on the Polish eastern front had undergone a tremendous change owing to the success of the Polish operations.

By the end of March 1919 the Polish forces were sufficiently

strong to undertake an offensive. Polish opinion demanded that operations should first be started for the relief of Lwow and the complete recovery and permanent occupation of all Eastern Galicia. Pilsudski, whose conception of the whole situation was of far wider range, believed that the Ukrainians were much less dangerous than the Bolsheviks, and that his immediate business was to deal with the latter. He fully realized that the Soviet Government was as Imperialistic as the Tsarist Government had been, and that it was therefore necessary for Poland to throw the Bolsheviks back to the east, as far as possible from her central, most Polish territory.

There was another reason. The Supreme Council had done nothing about Poland's eastern frontier, for though it was supporting the Russian anti-Soviet forces, it had no definite programme about Russia. What would be the position, it asked, if Bolshevism was overthrown, and it was called on to fulfil the treaties made with Tsarist Russia? On April 9, 1919, Tsarist and other Russians, such as Sazonoff and Prince Lvoff, who had constituted in Paris a "Russian Political Conference," sent a Note protesting against the attribution of the *Kresy* to Poland, and proposing the line of the Bug as the Polish frontier. That frontier was not what Pilsudski was determined to secure. To make certain that the Bug would not be the frontier, Pilsudski decided on presenting the Council with a *fait accompli*, and took the offensive in the northern sector of the front, with the liberation of Vilna from the Bolsheviks as its chief objective.

VILNA CAPTURED

Concentrating his troops rapidly in secret, he carried to brilliant success a short campaign, which, opening on April 16 with an assault on Lida, captured next day, gave him Vilna, after hard fighting, on April 21. Novogrodek was occupied on April 18 and Baranowicze on the following day, the Bolsheviks being beaten in a sharp struggle of three days' duration. Towards the end of the month the Bolsheviks began a counter-offensive for the recapture of Vilna. On April 27 Pilsudski had to return to Warsaw, and

Rydz-Smigly took over the chief command; by May 1 the Bolsheviks, though in superior strength, were repulsed, and Rydz-Smigly, passing to the offensive, materially advanced the Polish front within the next few days.

The Polish commanders had all the time to "observe" the German and Lithuanian forces on their left flank, from the Vilia to Grodno; there were indications of an understanding between the Germans, still strong and aggressive, in the Baltic region and the Bolsheviks. The political feature of the campaign for Vilna was the proclamation Pilsudski addressed to "The People of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania," in which he spoke of the idea of federation, not of incorporation, in consonance with his fine conception of a Great Poland, with White Russia and the Ukraine as partners in one federated State. Vilna also figured in the Jewish propaganda against Poland. There were many Jews in that city, but instead of there being an organized pogrom, they suffered losses in the fighting for Vilna in precisely the same way as in that for Lwow.

EASTERN GALICIA OCCUPIED

Pilsudski next dealt with the south sector—the Ukrainian. He placed J. Haller in command of the operations, and two of the divisions that had come from France were to take part in them, but when the Polish offensive was about to open, the Supreme Council forbade the utilization of these troops. Pilsudski thereupon made a new plan, moved fresh troops up to the front, regrouped others, and on May 14–15, 1919, the whole Polish line advanced in Eastern Galicia and in Volhynia, the total strength being 50,000 men, with 200 guns. After a few days' fighting, the Poles were completely successful, the Ukrainians falling back in disorder. On May 20 the Poles were in possession of Drohobycz and the oil region; they pushed eastward to Luck and Brody, and were in Halicz and Stanislavov on May 27, linking up with Rumanian forces. The Supreme Council again intervened and threatened to cut Poland off from military supplies if the campaign was pressed. On June 8 the Ukrainians, who had reorganized part of their troops, began a counter-offensive from Trembovla,

which bent back the Polish line, and brought Pilsudski himself into the field.

Reinforcements were hurried to the front, and the Poles again attacked, recaptured Brzezany, June 28–29, and regained most of the lost ground, but it was not till the middle of July that they reached the Zbrucz, the old frontier between Austria and Russia. The remnants of the forces of the Ukrainian Republic of the West (in Eastern Galicia) were thrown across that river, and they joined up with the troops of the other Ukrainian Republic (Russian Ukraine), which had already been severely handled by the Bolsheviks. They had been driven out of Kieff and Odessa in March, and from Rovno and Dubno in May; in July they began negotiations with the Poles, who in Volhynia were then in contact with the Bolsheviks. But so far as Eastern Galicia was concerned, Pilsudski had another *fait accompli* for the Supreme Council, which on June 25, 1919, authorized the Polish Government to occupy Eastern Galicia as far as the Zbrucz, and to introduce a civil administration. Thus, before the Treaty of Versailles was signed, Pilsudski had carried forward in the east the probable frontier of Poland to a line that covered part of the *Kresy* and the whole of Eastern Galicia. In July–August 1919, further fighting took place between the Poles and the Bolsheviks, Minsk being taken by the former on August 8 and an advance to the Beresina achieved before the end of that month.

The second of the Peace Treaties, the Treaty of St. Germain, was signed on September 10, 1919, by Austria, who recognized by it the independence of Poland and accepted her frontiers as these had been or were ultimately determined.

DISSENSIONS IN THE SEYM

During the spring and summer of 1919 the sessions of the Seym were not infrequently heated and even turbulent. Its dissensions caused Paderewski to return from Paris, where he had distinguished success, to Warsaw in May for the purpose of easing the political strife by his gift of conciliation; on May 23 the Seym passed a vote of confidence in him and the Government, and he went back to Paris. He had a similar experience in July when

once more he had to go to Warsaw—that time in connection with the acceptance of the Treaty of Versailles. He was supported by the Right, which continued to be inspired by Dmowski, who remained in Paris. On April 15 the National Committee had passed a resolution dissolving itself, but it continued as a committee of liquidation for four months longer. The Seym had been convoked by Pilsudski to draw up a Constitution, but it was not till May 3, the 128th anniversary of the historic Constitution of 1791, that a Government draft was laid before the Seym, which on November 3 itself produced a new draft, but it lay on the table for a long time.

AGRARIAN REFORM

In the Seym interest chiefly turned on the question of Agrarian Reform. The Right, which included many landowners, was opposed to any marked change, but the political power of the peasantry, with its numerous deputies in the Seym, and the support of the Left generally, was sufficiently strong to effect the passing on July 10, 1919, of a drastic resolution for taking estates from the large proprietors and handing them over for parcellation among the peasants. Of the large proprietors there were about 16,000, whereas two-thirds of the mass of the agricultural population had less than five hectares, or 12-13 acres, to each family, which was insufficient for its subsistence. The pronounced discontent among the peasants, together with the possible influence on them of Bolshevism, made a sweeping measure of reform appear imperative. The main clause (carried by a majority of one in a Seym of 360 members) of this resolution was the limiting of the amount of land to be held by anybody to 60 hectares (about 150 acres) and to 100 hectares (about 250 acres) according to the situation of the property in industrial or purely agricultural districts, except in the *Kresy*, where properties might extend to 400 hectares (about 1,000 acres). The Seym recorded its decision, and though no law was enacted till the following year, the peasant agitation was stayed for a while. Unemployment and unrest among the workers were mitigated to some extent by steps taken by the Government to assist in restarting factories

and mills, but the rebuilding of the economic life of the country simultaneously with the fight for the frontiers imposed an enormous strain on the young State.

Of questions still open in 1919—the plebiscites, the Eastern frontier, and Teschen, the last showed itself as intractable as any. After a cordial meeting at Prague of Paderewski with Masaryk, a conference was set up on July 20, 1919, at Cracow, Stanislas Grabski and Udrzal respectively representing Poland and Czechoslovakia, but no agreement was reached. Early in September following, the claims of the two States were argued before the Supreme Council by Benesh and Dmowski, the result being that a plebiscite was ordered in Teschen, and in Orava and Spisz, a decision that pleased neither the Poles nor the Czechoslovaks, and in the end was inoperative. These questions had their repercussions in the Seym, which Paderewski found more and more difficult to manage, though he spent himself and his money lavishly in the service of his country. He had ceased to dominate the Seym; it dominated him, and his authority crumbled away.

PADEREWSKI RESIGNS

At the beginning of November 1919 Paderewski returned to Warsaw, after a stay of some length in Paris on the nation's business. He found the political situation quite beyond his control. Pilsudski advised him to resign; but he could not persuade himself that he would be unable to find a solid majority; he tried and failed. The Left particularly opposed him, and the Right was lukewarm. A crisis ensued which lasted some weeks; it became acute when L. Skrzynski, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, clashed with Paderewski, his Chief, and resigned. Suddenly, on November 27, the Marshal of the Seym announced Paderewski's resignation, whereas he was making another attempt to form a Cabinet. The decision of the Supreme Council, as November closed, to give to Poland a mandate to administer Eastern Galicia for twenty-five years was regarded by the Poles as a severe blow, and in effect finished Paderewski's political career. At Pilsudski's request Paderewski attempted to form another combination, but with the same result. Realizing that he

was no longer wanted, he resigned on December 9, 1919, and retired into private life. But he had done a great work for Poland; for months he had been the necessary man holding together Pilsudski and Dmowski, Warsaw and Paris; and now his work was over. Superb orator, splendid diplomatist, ardent patriot, he was not a shining success as a politician. After two or three years, during which he occasionally represented Poland, he returned to the art in which his genius was supreme, and once more ravished the world.

CHAPTER IV

THE CRISIS OF FATE

1920

1

POLAND's fight for her eastern frontiers developed in 1920 into a desperate struggle for her very existence. That she emerged from it triumphant when the rest of the world supposed she had lost was due, first, to a tremendous revival of national purpose and courage which expressed her invincible will to live, and, secondly, to the military genius of Pilsudski, who turned humiliating and disastrous defeat into glorious and decisive victory. In 1924, the Marshal published at Warsaw his book entitled *Rok 1920* (The Year 1920), an illuminating account of the later stages of the war between Poland and Soviet Russia. In it he pointed out that this war dated from 1918 during the "springtime of the free life" of Poland, menaced from the start by the advance of the Bolshevik forces by prearrangement with the Germans as they withdrew from the east. He stated that, as planned, he had pushed the Soviet line in 1919 as far to the east, and therefore as far from the essential Poland as possible.

Pilsudski's plan also included giving to the peoples of the ethnographic non-Russian countries of the borderlands the chance of escaping from Bolshevik tyranny. Poland in December 1919 signed a military convention with Latvia, the result of which was the capture from the Bolsheviks of Dvinsk (Dunaburg) on January 3, 1920, by combined Polish and Latvian forces. This and further action straightened out the Polish front on the Dvina (Duna); the Poles withdrew from Latvian territory. Another sign of this policy was the presence of Polish representatives at a conference of the Baltic States held on January 15 at Helsingfors. The term Baltic States covered Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, as well as Poland, and the general aim of the conference was defence in common against Bolshevik attack. Early in

February 1920, however, Estonia concluded a peace treaty with Soviet Russia; the other Baltic States signed peace treaties with her in the course of 1920.

SOVIET MOVES

The Supreme Council issued on December 8, 1919, a declaration fixing a provisional eastern frontier, corresponding with that suggested by the Russian Political Conference. Later this frontier came to be known as the "Curzon line," from Lord Curzon's Note to the Soviet, July 11, 1920; it made the Bug Poland's eastern boundary, and no Pole could accept it. In January 1920 Sazonoff expressed his approval of this frontier, and said that it ought to serve as a basis for peace negotiations between Russia and Poland. Chicherin, the Soviet Commissary for Foreign Affairs, proposed on December 22, 1919, to Poland to begin negotiations for peace, but the Polish Government made no response, as it considered the message much too vague.

On January 29, 1920, the Soviet sent a formal Note to Warsaw stating that it recognized "without reserve the independence and sovereignty of the Polish republic," and requesting negotiations for peace. On February 4 Poland replied that she took cognizance of the Note, would examine the situation, and thereafter dispatch her answer.

The situation of Poland *vis-à-vis* Soviet Russia really resolved itself into the question: Could Poland trust the Soviet when the World Revolution remained the chief plank in the Bolshevik platform? Poland lay right across the path of the World Revolution, and the Poles suspected that the Soviet's proposal was made to gain time. During 1919 the political and military position of the Soviet had immensely improved; the counter-revolutionary armies of Yudenitch, Kolchak and Denikin had been defeated, despite the support of the Entente Powers. Huge quantities of new war material supplied by the Allies fell into the hands of the Bolsheviks.

In 1919 the Soviet war with Poland had been a secondary matter in presence of the struggle with the counter-revolutionary armies, and that fact, as Pilsudski knew very well, accounted for

the relatively easy advance eastward of the Poles; in 1920 the position was fundamentally different. At the very moment when the Soviet was proposing peace it was hurrying troops to the Polish front and making ready for a fresh campaign. Pilsudski was under no illusion. He was aware that besides gaining time for concentrating its forces, the Soviet purposed by preaching peace to shake the ardour of the Polish soldiery, and at the same time to capture pacifist opinion in Western countries and direct it against Poland, maliciously pictured as an Imperialist State.

In the West it was not generally known that on April 9, 1918, the Council of the People's Commissars at Moscow, in a spell of revolutionary disinterestedness, had annulled by decree the conventions with Prussia and Austria concerning the partitions of Poland as contrary to the principle of the self-determination of nations. By this decree Russia gave up all those territories which belonged to Poland before the first partition in 1772, among them being Lithuania and Vilna. But when the Soviet Government grasped the implications of the decree it set about "interpreting" it, and did its best to nullify it. But the decree was not rescinded, and had an important bearing, favourable to Poland, on the treaty between the Soviet and Lithuania, of August 12, 1920, as it made that treaty null and void, so far as its territorial clauses were concerned, because Russia had abandoned all claims to the former Polish lands.

POLISH ARMY UNIFIED

By the beginning of 1920 the Polish Army had grown to 600,000 men, in 21 divisions of infantry and 7 brigades of cavalry, drawn from every part of the country, including Poznania—an exemplification of the unity Poland had now achieved. The unification of the army had been celebrated by a solemn service at Cracow on October 19, 1919, but in some respects it was incomplete. Most officers preserved the traditions of the military training they had received in the German, Austrian or Russian armies. To remedy this Pilsudski adopted for all arms the French system of military instruction, which was furthered by the French Military Mission under General Henrys.

THE SKULSKI CABINET

Public opinion in Poland was not unanimous respecting Piłsudski's policy. The winter of 1919–20 proved exceptionally severe, and the financial and economic situation, already very bad, grew worse. The Polish mark depreciated, and prices rose. Sickness increased and typhus was prevalent. The political situation was confused. After the resignation of Paderewski a new Cabinet was formed on December 13, 1919, the Prime Minister being Leopold Skulski. But his Government was only partly taken from the Seym, the remainder being composed of experts and technicians. Attacked by the National Democrats of the Right and the Socialists of the Left, his position soon became precarious.

One splendid feature of Skulski's administration was the taking over of Pomerania from the Germans in January 1920; on February 10 the Polish flag was raised once more on the shores of the Baltic. The Germans evacuated Danzig on January 24, and in mid-February Sir R. Tower was appointed High Commissioner of the Free City by the League of Nations. Another striking incident of the first three months of 1920 was that Piłsudski became Marshal of Poland, a title new in the Polish Army. A commission of generals, known as the Commission of Grades (of officers), invited him to assume the title of Marshal, and on March 19 he intimated his acceptance; on April 3 he was gazetted by an order signed by the Minister of War.

POLAND REPLIES TO THE SOVIET

Patek, Polish Foreign Minister, on March 27, 1920, replied to the Soviet Note of January 29, and set forth the conditions under which Poland would agree to enter into negotiations for peace. The Note closed with a proposal to begin negotiations on April 10 at Borisow, a town near the front. On March 28 Chicherin in reply asked for the immediate suspension of hostilities on the whole front (so as to be free to deal with Wrangel, who was still in the field), and suggested that negotiations for peace should be begun in a town of Estonia. Three days later Patek (who knew about

Wrangel) answered that Poland could not agree to an armistice, again proposed Borisow, and promised that hostilities would be suspended in that sector. Chicherin then suggested Petrograd, Moscow or Warsaw for the meeting, but Patek stuck to Borisow as the most appropriate place—whereupon Chicherin, endeavouring to put Poland in the wrong, informed the Allies that she was opposing peace by insisting that the negotiations should take place only in one particular town. But why the objection to Borisow, if peace was sincerely desired?

Patek's statement of Poland's conditions of peace adumbrated Pilsudski's conception of federalism; one condition demanded the recognition of the States that had come into existence on former Russian territory, such as the Baltic States; another condition postulated for Poland alone the right to establish the status of the peoples living in the *Kresy*, the regions west of the 1772 frontier. Pilsudski's opponents were in favour of coming to terms quickly with the Soviet. They did not see why Poland should concern herself with the fate of the States issued from Russia, and their aim was to incorporate only a part of the regions west of the frontier of 1772, the rest being left to the Soviet. They did not sympathize with Pilsudski's desire to establish a White Russian State with its capital at Minsk or a Ukrainian State with its capital at Kieff, and did not accept his view that these States would be the natural allies of Poland. These conflicting policies found sharp reflection afresh in the Seym and throughout the country.

PILSUDSKI ATTACKS

Aware of the growing menace of the Soviet on his eastern front, Pilsudski resolved not to await attack but to anticipate it. His first objective was the liberation of the Ukraine from Bolshevik occupation. His intention was that, having freed the Ukraine, he would hand over the territory to the Ukrainians, and then attack the Bolsheviks in the northern sector. But the Ukrainians were in a precarious position; their main force had been beaten and its remnants had taken refuge in Poland. Petlura, their best leader, had fled into Poland; abandoning the claim to Eastern Galicia, he asked Pilsudski to aid him against the Bolsheviks. On April 23,

1920, a treaty was signed at Warsaw between them; it declared Ukrainia was not interested in Eastern Galicia, accepted the 1772 frontier, and postulated collaboration with Poland against aggression.

KIEFF OCCUPIED

Three days later the Marshal launched his offensive; prepared in secret it took the Bolsheviks by surprise. Led by Pilsudski in person, the Polish army, supported by two Ukrainian divisions under Petlura, made a swift advance to the Dnieper. Kieff was occupied on May 7. Petlura issued a proclamation calling on the Ukrainian people to rise and defend their national independence. Pilsudski also issued a proclamation, in which he stated that the Polish troops would remain in the Ukraine only till a Ukrainian Government was established. The Bolsheviks countered these proclamations by calling on the peasants to resist the violation of Russian territory by "Polish lords," and to prevent "Polish capitalism" from exploiting Russian workers and peasants. On May 5 the newspapers of Moscow published a letter from Brusiloff to the Soviet Chief of Staff, who said that Polish intervention in territory which had belonged from all time to Russia must be repulsed by force..

Trotsky, in his book, *My Life: the Rise and Fall of a Dictator*, said: "The country (Russia) made one more truly heroic effort. The capture of Kieff by the Poles, in itself devoid of military significance, did us great service; it awakened the country. Again I had to make the tour of armies and cities, mobilizing men and resources." Trotsky said nothing of the Bolshevik concentration on the northern Polish front. Outside Russia Bolshevik propaganda became more and more venomous against Poland, who was held up to the Western working man as the aggressor, tyrannical and bloody-minded, out to trample on the proletariat.

Pilsudski returned from the front to Warsaw on May 18, 1920. He was given a great reception; a *Te Deum* was sung in St. Alexander's Church, and the Seym held an extraordinary session to acclaim the victorious Marshal. For the moment the clamour of his enemies was hushed, but it soon broke out again. Dmowski, recovered from the serious illness that had laid him aside in Paris

in September 1919, appeared in Warsaw. On May 22 he had a long interview with the Marshal, but that they reached no agreement was plain, because the attacks of the National Democrats on Pilsudski's policy of federalism took on fresh violence. Soon the anti-federalists had their innings, for the victory in the Ukraine proved short-lived. Presently it was evident that the easy advance of the Poles on Kieff had been in some measure a ruse to draw off Polish troops from the northern sector where the Bolshevik attack was about to begin.

SOVIET HELD IN THE NORTH

Tukhachevsky, the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet armies in the north, a man only twenty-eight years of age, had been formerly a sub-lieutenant of the Imperial Guard. With the 15th Bolshevik Army, comprising six infantry divisions and one of cavalry, he began an enveloping movement on May 15, 1920, of the Polish left wing. To oppose him the Poles had their 1st Army, which consisted of three infantry divisions and a brigade of cavalry. The superior strength of the Bolsheviks forced back the Poles a considerable distance. Lower down the line Tukhachevsky attacked Borisow, bringing into action the 16th Bolshevik Army against the 4th Polish Army, which succeeded, however, in repulsing the assault. The resistance, too, of the 1st Army stiffened, and reinforced it held the Bolsheviks at bay near Molodeczno; behind it an Army of Reserve, under Sosnkowski, was formed of four infantry divisions, a cavalry brigade and other troops. Close to the 4th Army two infantry divisions were concentrated. These fresh forces attacked the Bolsheviks, and nearly caught them as in a vice, but they contrived to make good their retreat, though with heavy losses. The general result was that the Bolsheviks were pushed back nearly to the positions from which they had started, and the Poles stood on the line of the Dvina, Auta and Beresina as the first week in June closed.

SOVIET SUCCESS IN THE SOUTH

At the beginning of June Pilsudski's plan was to hold his front in the northern sector and to attack in the southern, in which in the

last days of May Budienny, the Red cavalry leader, had become active. At the head of 12,000 horse, with 300 machine guns and 50 guns, he pierced the Polish front on June 5. The Polish 3rd Army was nearly surrounded in Kieff, but on June 13 effected its retreat to the west. A fresh line was taken up, but could not be held. Later a concentric attack by the Poles, under Rydz-Smigly, was unsuccessful, Budienny crossed the Horyn on July 3, and pressed on to Rovno, which he occupied two days afterwards. The Poles had to abandon the Ukraine. One cause of the failure was the antagonism of the Ukrainian peasantry, about whose sympathies Pilsudski had been misled by his agents; another, Petlura's strength had been over-estimated.

On June 9, 1920, the Skulski Government resigned.

FIRST GRABSKI CABINET

On June 24 a new Ministry was constituted by L. Grabski, but it was evidently a makeshift affair. Pilsudski had openly expressed his opinion that a Cabinet drawn from the Left was desirable, and had reiterated his wish that the broad masses of the population should be the foundation of the State.

SOVIET SECOND OFFENSIVE IN THE NORTH

Tukhachevsky launched his second offensive on July 4, 1920. Two days before, he issued an order to his troops in which he said: "The destinies of the World Revolution will be settled in the West. Our way towards world-wide conflagration passes over the corpse of Poland." He invited his soldiers to "avenge the dis honouring of Kieff, and to drown the criminal Government of Pilsudski in the blood of the crushed Polish Army." He concluded with the cry: "Forward on Vilna, Minsk, Warsaw! March!"

The Soviet had more than 200,000 men, divided into four armies, in the fighting line. The Polish forces, arranged in three armies, with Szeptycki in chief command, numbered about 120,000 men, none too well equipped, whereas their enemies had the benefit of the excellent and plentiful French or British material taken from the defeated counter-revolutionary generals. Nowhere were the Poles in very strong force, and the superior weight of

the Bolsheviks soon made itself felt, the Polish front being broken on the second day of the fighting. On the night of July 6-7 Tukhachevsky forced the passage of the Beresina, and the Poles, menaced by the enveloping movement of their left wing by the enemy, gave way on the Dvina and shortly afterwards along the whole front north of the Pripet.

SWIFT SOVIET ADVANCE

Vilna fell on July 14, and Grodno was surprised on July 20; the line of the Niemen was lost. Pilsudski wished to stop the retreat on the line of the Bug, but the Bolsheviks took Brest-Litovsk on August 1, and their advance guards approached Malkin—there the Poles held the Reds up and for a breathing-space the retreat, which had gone on for a month, and covered a distance of nearly 300 miles, was stayed. The Poles in the south checked the army of Budenny and captured Brody, a victory which relieved the pressure in the direction of Lwow. It had been Pilsudski's intention to make a counter-attack on the Bolshevik rear with a mass of manoeuvre from Brest and the Bug, but with the fall of Brest he had to change his plans; for the same reason the advantage at Brody was not pressed. The new plan he formed had the same idea behind it, but the terrain was shifted. On August 2 the Marshal returned from the front to Warsaw.

POLISH COUNCIL OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

A week after the Grabski Government entered on office the Prime Minister made a speech in the Seym setting forth the necessity of constituting a Council for the Defence of the State (*Rada Obrony Państwa*). The existence of the State was at stake, and he exhorted the nation to support the army fighting its battles in the field against great odds. Next day, July 1, 1920, the Seym adopted a Bill creating the Council; its president was Pilsudski as Chief of the State, and its members consisted of representatives of the Seym, the Government and the army; it was given power to decide all questions appertaining to the conduct of the war and the conclusion of peace. The Council appealed to the whole Polish people to rise in arms against the Bolshevik invaders, and

did not appeal in vain. To stimulate the patriotism of the peasantry, then busy with harvest, the Seym passed into law the resolution on Agrarian Reform which had stood on its books since July 1919.

For the regular army the classes from 1890 to 1894 were called up in July. In all more than 100,000 men volunteered. Women also answered the call, as always the case in Poland in times of national stress; a Legion of Women was formed; many women came forward to work beside the men in the trenches. In short, the national spirit not only revived, it soared to wonderful heights of devotion and self-sacrifice.

POLAND APPEALS TO THE ALLIES

Poland lacked arms, munitions and money. The Polish Government appealed for help to the Supreme Council in conference at Spa, July 5–16, 1920, Grabski appearing there in person to plead the Polish cause. His reception was frigid, but he did obtain a hearing on July 10. Lloyd George was not more friendly to Poland than before, but promised assistance if she agreed (1) to renounce all ideas of conquest; (2) to refer to the Supreme Council all questions in dispute, including Danzig and Teschen; (3) to withdraw her forces to the Curzon line (the Bug) and to a point 50 kilometres south-west of Lwow (which meant giving up Vilna and district in the north and most of Eastern Galicia, including Lwow, in the south). To the Bolsheviks he said that their forces must not advance beyond a line 50 kilometres from that occupied by the Polish forces—if they did advance in spite of this prohibition, the Allies would give their whole support to Poland. An armistice conference would be constituted in London between Soviet Russia on the one side and Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Finland on the other; representatives of Eastern Galicia would also be invited to attend. Grabski agreed, but the Soviet would not agree, for when the British Government conveyed these decisions to Moscow Chicherin coolly replied that England had not the standing in the matter which qualified her to intervene, and that Poland must treat with the Soviet direct.

A Note was sent from London asking the Soviet to declare its

intentions, and stating that if these were not made known, the Allies would support Poland with all the means at their disposal; a similar statement was made in the French Chamber by Millerand, the Prime Minister. England insisted that Poland should ask the Bolsheviks for an armistice, and this the Polish Government did on July 22, but the Soviet procrastinated, as it thought it was on a great wave of victory that would presently overwhelm the Polish forces. Negotiations were spun out to July 30, when Polish plenipotentiaries entered the Bolshevik front, but without obtaining an armistice, and they returned to Warsaw. A second peace delegation left Warsaw for Minsk on August 13 and remained there for three weeks, without result.

CONSEQUENCES OF POLISH REVERSES

Grabski had agreed that all questions in dispute, including Danzig and Teschen, should be referred to the Supreme Council. On June 14, 1920, the Free City elected a Constituent Assembly, which was anti-Polish. But as this was the business of the League of Nations, it did not come specially before the Spa Conference. Teschen did. This question, which brought into play historical and economic claims on the part of Czechoslovakia against the principle of self-determination urged by Poland, had so far not found a solution. On July 10 at Spa Grabski and Benesh signed a protocol requesting the Supreme Council to make a definite settlement; the Council referred the question to the Ambassadors' Conference, which had the whole subject threshed out afresh, Poland being represented by Paderewski, specially delegated for the occasion, and Czechoslovakia by Benesh; experts on both sides were heard. A settlement was reached by Poland and Czechoslovakia on July 28, not only for Teschen but also for Orava and Spisz. Teschen was divided into two unequal parts, the larger going to Czechoslovakia, who also obtained most of Orava and Spisz.

Paderewski signed the agreement on July 30, after protesting in a letter to Cambon, who presided over the Ambassadors' Conference, that however sincerely the Polish Government wished to execute its contractual obligations, it would never be able to

convince the nation that justice had been done. On his side, Benesh declared his regret that Czechoslovakia had not been given in their entirety historic frontiers to which she was entitled, but hoped for compensation in peace between the two States and their better relations. Neither country, however, was really satisfied; feeling in Poland was particularly bitter, for the Poles, then reeling before the Bolshevik invasion, thought it was a case of *Vae victis!*

Polish feeling had already been deeply stirred by the result of the plebiscites for Allenstein and Marienwerder; they went in favour of Germany, and here again the Poles thought that if they had not been preoccupied by the war with the Bolsheviks there might have been a different story to tell. Another event of importance in July also bore heavily on the Poles, but it came direct out of the war with the Soviet. On July 12 the Soviet Government recognized the independence of Lithuania by the Treaty of Moscow, signed by Chicherin for Russia and by Smetona for Lithuania; the treaty was in effect one of military alliance, and it ceded Vilna and the Vilna district to the Lithuanians.

ALLIED MISSIONS GO TO WARSAW

At Spa Lloyd George had promised Grabski, in return for accepting the onerous conditions imposed, that the Allies would support the Poles. After consulting Millerand, Lloyd George decided to send an Anglo-French Mission to Poland to help her in her desperate straits; it included Lord D'Abernon and Sir Percy Radcliffe, Director of Military Operations at the War Office, as representing England, and Jusserand and Weygand, Foch's Chief of Staff, as representing France. The Mission left Paris for Warsaw on July 22; it stopped at Prague on the way and saw Masaryk, who said that Czechoslovakia would hold herself strictly neutral as between the Poles and the Bolsheviks; it reached Warsaw on July 25.

FIRST WITOS CABINET

The quarrels of the politicians had been stopped by the constitution of a Government of National Union on the previous day;

Witos was Prime Minister and Daszynski Vice-Premier; Sapieha retained the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ladislas Grabski that of Finance, and Narutowicz that of Public Works; Skulski became Minister of the Interior, and Sosnkowski, Pilsudski's friend, was Minister of War.

That Council passed a unanimous vote of confidence in Pilsudski—in the absence, however, of Dmowski, who thereafter resigned from it; he thought that while Pilsudski should remain Chief of the State he should cease to be Commander-in-Chief. Joseph Haller was appointed to the Chief Command on the northern front in place of Szeptycki, and Rozwadowski replaced Stanislas Haller as Chief of the General Staff, but Pilsudski remained Commander-in-Chief. The Marshal invited Weygand to accept the post of adviser to the General Staff, and even asked him to share with himself the Chief Command, but Weygand declined the latter offer on the ground that he knew neither the Polish troops nor their commanders.

PILSUDSKI'S GREAT PLAN

After Pilsudski's return from the front to Warsaw on August 2 he conferred with Weygand and Rozwadowski on the situation, though he left most of the talking to them; his brain was busying itself on that plan of his own. Weygand's advice was to defend the line of the Vistula while a counter-offensive was being prepared behind the river; for the south he contemplated the falling back of the Poles to the San, which meant withdrawal from Lwow, and was extremely disliked by Rozwadowski, an Eastern Galician Pole. Most Polish generals favoured a counter-offensive based on Modlin (Novo Georgievsk), the old fortress lying north-west of Warsaw; they had in their minds the idea that Tukhachevsky would follow the example set in 1831 by Paskevitch, who forced the Vistula below Modlin and took Warsaw from the west—in this case that would mean the cutting of communications with Danzig, whence supplies from the Allies were to be forwarded.

Lloyd George had promised assistance "in the largest measure, especially in war material, consistent with the exhaustion of the

Allies and their other heavy engagements." But there were serious obstacles in the way which perhaps he had not foreseen. On July 25 Germany declared her neutrality, and forbade the transport over her territory of war material to both Poland and Soviet Russia; the prohibition applied in practice to Poland alone. In Czechoslovakia railwaymen, infected by Bolshevik propaganda, held up the wagons *en route* for Poland. In Danzig the German dockers refused to unload the Allied munition-ships—after a time that was undertaken by soldiers of the Allies stationed in the Free City. Munitions sent by France were prevented from reaching the Polish armies till the decisive battle was fought and won by Pilsudski. Poland was practically left to herself.

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During the night of August 5–6, 1920, the Marshal came to a final decision. Having heard the views of Weygand, Rozwadowski and Sosnkowski, and not liking any of them, he shut himself up in his room in the Belvedere in Warsaw, while working out his plan of operations. This was to execute a co-ordinated retreat to the Vistula and the Wieprz, a southern affluent; to assemble secretly on the Wieprz a strong attacking force, constituted by a regrouping of the armies in the northern and southern sectors, and with that force to attack with the utmost violence the left flank and rear of the Bolsheviks while holding them in front of Warsaw by heavy fighting. The Polish forces in the southern sector were to cover the right flank of the attacking troops, and at the same time to hold the line of the Bug to the south of Brest-Litovsk, but without exposing Lwow. As General Camon pointed out in his book *La Manœuvre libératrice du Maréchal Pilsudski contre les Bolchéviks août 1920*, Pilsudski's plan was a "Napoleonic manœuvre on the enemy's flank and rear." Pilsudski's political and military opponents taunted him with being an amateur, because he had not undergone the customary training of an officer, but he had studied the military art for years, and had also trained himself in the field. His military preparation and knowledge were much greater than generally supposed.

On August 6 an army order, based on Pilsudski's plan, was issued by the General Staff, but it modified to some extent the original conception of the Marshal. A copy fell into the hands of Tukhachevsky but he considered it a trap or a "bluff," and disregarded it. As for the Polish General Staff, the changes it made were due to its constant preoccupation with respect to the dreaded turning by Tukhachevsky of the Polish left wing in the north. The Marshal was not able to obtain as large a mass of manœuvre as he desired, but the whole Polish front was regrouped in accordance more or less with his ideas. There was a serious check when Pultusk fell to the Bolsheviks on August 8, and this led to the strengthening of the army in the north with other troops, which reduced the numbers available for the great manœuvre.

WARSAW IN DANGER

At this time Warsaw, which had been strongly fortified, was held by some ten divisions, supported by powerful artillery. The evacuation of the city and the removal of the Government to Poznan or elsewhere were discussed. The foreign diplomats were uncertain what to do, though they were informed that the Government proposed to hold the city to the last, and would take steps for ensuring their safety. The Government itself was a little doubtful, but Pilsudski, confident of ultimate victory, held it together. Dmowski had withdrawn to Poznan, and the rumour ran that he, backed by Dowbor-Musnicki, who had contemptuously declined a command offered by the Marshal, was contemplating the formation of a Secessionist Government if Warsaw fell.

Poland was not helped by the Western Powers, who were intimidated by the repeated threats of their Socialists to resort to "direct action" to prevent assistance to the Poles. On August 6 the British Labour Party published a pamphlet which stated that the workers of Great Britain would take no part in the war as allies of Poland. In Paris the French Socialists, through their organ *L'Humanité*, spoke of a "war against the Soviet Republic by the Polish Government on the orders of Anglo-French Imperialism," and cried "Not a man, not a sou, not a shell for reactionary

and capitalist Poland! Long live the Russian Revolution! Long live the Workmen's International!"

At an interview with Millerand at Hythe Lloyd George maintained that nothing could be done to help Poland. The negotiations for peace between the Bolsheviks and the Poles had not been broken off; they were still suspended because of the success of the Bolshevik offensive and the prospect of the fall of Warsaw, for which eventuality Moscow had a ready-made Polish Bolshevik Government on hand. On August 10 Lloyd George delivered a speech in the House of Commons advising Poland to accept the Soviet's terms of peace, communicated to him on the previous day. They were the disarmament of Poland by the reduction of her army to 60,000 men and the establishment of workers' and soldiers' councils in all Polish towns; in addition there was to be a civilian militia of 200,000 men. In *The Soviets in World Affairs*, published in 1930, Louis Fischer said, referring to the Bolshevik terms of peace to Poland: "These terms, according to Lloyd George, changed the situation, and he wired Poland to accept. But Kameneff (the Soviet representative) had wilfully omitted from the document a most important item of the Bolshevik demand: that the civilian militia, numbering perhaps 200,000, would consist only of working men. This was revolutionary propaganda, and not a peace term, for Moscow obviously knew that no bourgeois Government would accept such a proposal. . . . Kameneff wished to prevent British interference." He succeeded.

SOVIET ATTACKS PRESSED

On August 8, 1920, Tukhachevsky issued an order enjoining the 4th Bolshevik Army on his right wing to turn Warsaw from the north, to march westward towards the Lower Vistula and the "Corridor," to outflank the Poles and cut them off from Danzig, while enveloping their left wing. The Polish forces which had retreated west of the Bug on August 2 fell back slowly, according to Pilsudski's instructions, in the direction of Warsaw; twice they fought delaying actions, as he ordered, to give time for the accumulation of his mass of manœuvre on the Wieprz near Deblin (Ivangorod). On August 13 the Bolsheviks began their attack on

the Warsaw bridgehead with two divisions, and breaking into and through the Polish front trenches captured Radzymin, a small town about fifteen miles from Warsaw. The Poles withdrew to the second line of defence, but Bolshevik patrols approached to within six miles of Praga, the suburb of Warsaw on the east side of the Vistula. Something like panic seized Warsaw. With the exception of Archbishop Ratti, the Papal Nuncio (afterwards Pope Pius XI), Tommasini, the Italian Minister, author of *La Risurrezione della Polonia*, and the American and Danish chargés d'affaires, all the foreign diplomatists, including D'Abernon, left the city on the night of August 13 on hearing of the fall of Radzymin.

The Polish General Staff in great alarm telephoned on August 14 to Pilsudski, who was with his mass of manœuvre, to advance the execution of his plan. About the same time Haller ordered Sikorski, in command of the 5th Polish Army, to attack on the Wkra in order to relieve the pressure on the Warsaw bridgehead. On August 15 a Polish division supported by armoured cars retook Radzymin, but not till the next day did the Poles recover the whole of their first line of defence, and only after bitter fighting.

SIKORSKI'S SUCCESS

Farther north Sikorski, who wrote a full account of what he did at this time in his *Miedzy Wisla a Wkra* (literally, Between the Vistula and the Wkra), attacked the Bolsheviks who had forced the Narew, but threw them back so decisively on August 16 that next day they retreated in disorder—an excellent piece of work, which, however, Camon described as "nothing but an *hors d'œuvre* in the manœuvre of Pilsudski, a useful *hors d'œuvre*, since it retarded the retreat of the 4th Soviet Army. But in reality the rôle of the 5th Polish Army should have been restricted to the defence of Modlin, and a part of its troops added to the mass of manœuvre of which the effective was quite insufficient." Not unimportant in itself, Sikorski's success was of good omen, and possessed considerable psychological value. Belief abroad was almost unanimous that Warsaw would fall; indeed, some Berlin papers announced its capture on August 15!

PILSUDSKI WINS BATTLE OF WARSAW

Pilsudski arrived at Pulawy on August 12 to take command in person of the great manœuvre, the main instrument for it being the 4th Polish Army, with a division of the Legions and some cavalry, assembled in the region of the Wieprz in accordance with his orders. The force was not well-equipped, many of the men were barefoot, and parts of the army had had little rest, but on the night of his arrival he issued a stirring order which concluded by stating that the battle must be won "by the legs and bravery of the Polish foot-soldier." And so it was! He found his troops in better condition than he expected; to encourage them to the greatest efforts he went up and down their ranks talking to officers and men with quiet confidence, and enduing them with his own indomitable spirit. "Dans cette masse," wrote Camon, "Pilsudski avait fait passer de son âme." On August 14 came the telephone message from Warsaw begging him to advance the day of attack; he had planned to start it on August 17; he changed the date by a day.

On August 15, the fête of the Virgin, the mass of manœuvre in a special service prayed for victory and fatherland. At four o'clock next morning the manœuvre was launched north-eastward in three swift-marching columns under Skierski, and was successful from the start. Two Bolshevik divisions were surprised, routed, captured or put to flight before nightfall. The left flank of the Bolshevik armies before Warsaw was completely uncovered. Next day the Poles pushed on "like madmen," as Tukhachevsky reported, and got well behind the Bolshevik left wing in front of Warsaw, which immediately began to give way, its retreat being hastened by attacks from the Polish trenches. On that day the Poles reached Biala and Siedlce and were pressing on to Brest-Litovsk; the Bolsheviks broke in hurried, disorderly flight to the east; the 3rd Bolshevik Army abandoned the Narew, and the 16th Army retreated in confusion, with heavy losses.

Warsaw was delivered. A miracle had been wrought! The situation was entirely changed, though this was not clearly realized in Warsaw, either by the General Staff or by its citizens; the overthrow of the Bolsheviks, so sudden and sweeping, seemed too

good to be true. It certainly was not fully realized either by Tukhachevsky, who still thought the position might be retrieved in the north, or by the Soviet Government. But in the north the 15th Bolshevik Army was already in retreat; only the 4th Army was still marching to the Lower Vistula, unconscious of what had taken place.

PURSUIT OF THE BOLSHEVIKS

When Pilsudski went to Warsaw on August 18 to organize the pursuit of the beaten enemy, he found his General Staff considering with trepidation the 4th Bolshevik Army which was nearing Plock on the Vistula—it attacked the place on that very day, and carried it next day, forcing the passage of the river. It had lost touch with Tukhachevsky, but hearing of the disasters that had overwhelmed the other Bolshevik armies it began retreating on August 21, and after heavy fighting on the frontier of East Prussia passed over into German territory and laid down its arms. The operations that led to the result interfered with Pilsudski's general plan for the pursuit by drawing to that side of the field the 1st Polish Army, which thereupon co-operated with the 5th Army, thus permitting the 3rd and 15th Bolshevik armies to recover their liberty of movement and retreat towards the east.

On August 25 the pursuit came to an end; by that date the remnants of the Soviet armies were on the far side of the Niemen-Bug line whence the Bolsheviks had set out a month before confident of victory. Though there had been no great envelopment of the Bolsheviks—nothing approaching a Sedan—the Poles took 65,000 prisoners, 231 guns, more than a thousand machine guns, 10,000 wagons of munitions and technical material, besides large numbers of armoured cars and motor-lorries. It was estimated that at least 30,000 men were disarmed in East Prussia. Tukhachevsky's total losses during July-August 1920 were put at 150,000 men, with more than half of his guns and war material gone. The losses of the Poles were much smaller.

COMMENTS ON BATTLE OF WARSAW

No sooner was it won than the Battle of Warsaw, sometimes called the Battle of the Vistula, became the subject of envenomed

controversy, as Pilsudski's political opponents maintained that the victory was due to Weygand and not to the Marshal; they said that the conception was Weygand's, the execution at most Pilsudski's. The Poles gladly recognized the value of Weygand's advice, and particularly of his help in organizing the defence of Warsaw; they also admitted that French officers and under-officers assisted them, but the number of these Frenchmen was small, their real significance being far more moral than material. Weygand himself repelled the statement that the victory was his in any way: in an interview which he gave to Paul Genty, the correspondent of the Paris *Information*, printed in that journal on August 21, 1920, he said, in reply to the remark that some Poles proclaimed him the "saviour of Warsaw": "That is not the case, and I beg you to fix French opinion on that important point. The magnificent victory being celebrated in Warsaw is a Polish victory; the military operations were executed by Polish generals in accordance with a Polish plan."

Marshal Franchet d'Espérey, sent by the French Government to decorate Marshal Pilsudski with the Médaille Militaire, said in Warsaw on November 20, 1927: "Poland freed herself (in 1920) thanks to her national energy and the military genius (*commandement génial*) of Marshal Pilsudski." Millerand, in an article entitled "Au secours de la Pologne," in the *Revue de France* on August 15, 1932, quoted Weygand's statement made to Genty, and added, "In according to the glorious Marshal Pilsudski the whole honour for the victory, General Weygand rendered homage to truth."

Camon began the Introduction to his *Mancœuvre libératrice* with the words "Marshal Pilsudski is incontestably the author of the manœuvre which saved Poland."

GREATNESS OF PILSUDSKI'S VICTORY

In the *Information* interview Weygand observed: "The magnificent Polish victory will have results of great importance on the international situation. It consolidates the Polish State." It did that, but it did a great deal more; it saved not only Poland from Bolshevization, but probably all Europe. In an article published

in the *Gazeta Polska*, Warsaw, on August 17, 1930, Lord D'Abernon said:

The history of contemporary civilization knows no event of greater importance than the Battle of Warsaw, 1920, and none of which the significance is less appreciated. The danger menacing Europe at that moment was parried, and the whole episode was forgotten. Had the battle been a Bolshevik victory, it would have been a turning-point in European history, for there is no doubt at all that the whole of Central Europe would at that moment have been opened to the influence of Communist propaganda and to Soviet invasion, which it could with difficulty have resisted. It is evident from speeches made in Russia during the war against Poland that the Soviet plans were very far-reaching. In the more industrialized German towns plans were made on a large scale to proclaim a Soviet régime a few days after Warsaw had fallen. . . . Several times Poland has been the bulwark of Europe against Asiatic invasion, yet never had Poland's services been greater, never had the danger been more imminent. The events of 1920 also deserve attention for another reason: victory was attained above all thanks to the strategical genius of one man and thanks to the carrying through of a manoeuvre so dangerous as to necessitate not only genius, but heroism. . . . It should be the task of political writers to explain to European opinion that Poland saved Europe in 1920, and that it is necessary to keep Poland powerful and in harmonious relations with Western European civilization, for Poland is the barrier to the everlasting peril of an Asiatic invasion.

To this appreciation, which D'Abernon developed in his *Eighteenth Decisive Battle of the World*, there might be added that the taking of Warsaw by the Bolsheviks and the Bolshevization of Poland must have led to the practical cancellation of the Treaty of Versailles almost at once. The Polish victory could not but be a great relief to the Allies. At the close of a conference held in Lucerne on August 23, 1930, Lloyd George and Giolitti, Italian Prime Minister, published a *communiqué* which reflected that relief, though its phrasing was inadequate; it expressed profound regret that the Soviet had sought to impose on Poland conditions of peace which were incompatible with the independence of that democratic country; it stated that the Bolsheviks had been punished for their aggression; and it wound up with the hope that the war would now terminate. But the war did not terminate; the Soviet was not convinced that it was beaten, and its terms of peace were still those which it had put forward in the

second week of August to Lloyd George; therefore the victory had to be carried farther.

Trotsky ascribed the "extraordinary proportions of the catastrophe before Warsaw" to the conduct of the southern group of the Soviet forces in the direction of Lwow. There was truth in this view, for Yegoroff, their commander, hated Tukhachevsky, and would not collaborate with him. It was part of Pilsudski's success that the Bolshevik Command in the south made no attempt to interfere with the manœuvre until too late. It was not till August 20, when the victorious Poles were in pursuit of the Bolshevik northern armies, that the left wing of the Bolshevik line in the south began an offensive towards Lublin, with Budienny's horse marching towards Zamosc, which was reached on August 27. The garrison at Zamosc, supported by Ukrainian troops, though almost surrounded, put up a strong resistance; in vain Budienny tried to break it; Polish forces from the 3rd Army attacked him from the north, and the 6th Army from the south, and he was nearly surrounded in his turn. He broke off the battle, and retreated with all haste towards the east, followed by the Poles, who again attacked him, but he made no stand; the legend of the invincibility of Budienny was destroyed.

POLISH TRIUMPH SOUTH AND NORTH

These operations were a prelude to a general offensive planned by Pilsudski and carried out by Sikorski and other Polish commanders which began on September 12 in a rapid encircling movement that quickly crushed the 12th and 14th Bolshevik armies, Kovel, Luck, Rovno and Tarnopol being occupied by September 18. Pinsk was taken on September 26, and by the middle of October the whole Polish line in the south stood well to the east of the frontier of Eastern Galicia. Meanwhile in the northern sector Tukhachevsky succeeded in assembling considerable bodies of troops, partly fresh formations, partly remnants of his defeated armies, and partly men permitted by the Germans and Lithuanians to rejoin their fellow-Bolsheviks farther north. To meet these forces Pilsudski regrouped the 2nd and 4th Polish armies.

His first task was to reoccupy the region of Suvalki which was

held by the Lithuanians. During 1919 and the first half of 1920 they were neutral in the war between Poland and the Bolsheviks, but after the treaty between Soviet Russia and Lithuania on July 12, 1920, Lithuanian troops took possession of the Suvalki district, though it had been recognized as Polish by the Supreme Council. The Polish Government demanded its return by Lithuania, who refused. But it was occupied by the Poles by the beginning of September without bloodshed; the Lithuanians, however, began an action against the Poles at Seyny, which they took on September 2, and for some time conducted small operations in collaboration with the Bolsheviks.

BATTLE OF THE NIEMEN

Next followed the Battle of the Niemen, of which little was heard in Western Europe, though in the opinion of some good judges it was more important from both the military and political points of view than the Battle of Warsaw. Still less was heard of the Battle of the Szczara which partly synchronized with that of the Niemen. Faury, the French general who as a lieutenant-colonel was in 1920 attached to the staff of Skierski during Pilsudski's manœuvre, and was subsequently director of the Polish War Academy, always maintained that the two battles together, which completed the defeat of Tukhachevsky, were of greater significance than the Battle of Warsaw.

The battles together constituted a knock-out blow to the Bolshevik World Revolution so far as the West was concerned—a fact of literally enormous importance. Not all the Poles approved this fresh offensive, and prominent soldiers, politicians and others advised against it. When leaving Warsaw on August 27 Weygand expressed the hope that the Polish Army would not be drawn too far in pursuit of the enemy, “a thing which might occasion regrettable misunderstandings with the Allies.” Pilsudski, however, had made up his mind to crush the Bolsheviks and relieve Poland of their menace for years to come. He succeeded, and relieved Europe of it at the same time.

In the second week of September the forces of Tukhachevsky stretched from Grodno to the Pripyat marshes; beyond Grodno

they were in touch with the Lithuanians. So satisfied was the Bolshevik commander with the position and its prospects that he organized a new offensive, but Pilsudski anticipated it. His plan was to turn the Bolshevik front by the north, to march rapidly on Lida and fall on the rear of the enemy while fixing him by a sharp attack on his front near the centre. Action started on the Niemen on September 20; Seyny was taken from the Lithuanians on September 22, and Grodno from the Bolsheviks four days later, after a bitter struggle, as Tukhachevsky attached great importance to holding it. Higher up the Poles forced the Niemen at Druskienniki, cut the Grodno-Vilna railway, and advanced through Radun on Lida, getting behind the right flank of the 3rd Bolshevik Army. Lower down they took, lost and re-took Wolkowysk from the 15th Bolshevik Army, while farther down they pushed the 16th Bolshevik Army towards Baranowicze. To escape complete envelopment the Bolsheviks began retreating on September 25, but their 3rd Army was cut off and practically destroyed by September 28, only small detachments getting away.

BATTLE OF THE SZCZARA

The victory of the Szczara followed at once. Pilsudski, who conducted the whole of the operations, gave the Bolsheviks no rest. Part of the 2nd Polish Army at once crossed the Niemen south of Lida, and pushed on through Novogrodek towards the Baranowicze-Minsk railway, driving the 15th Bolshevik Army before it in the direction of Minsk, while the 4th Polish Army co-operated against the Bolsheviks retreating on Minsk and against the 16th Bolshevik Army retiring hotfoot on Slutsk. From Pinsk another Polish force attacked the remnants of the 4th Bolshevik Army. The Bolsheviks offered no serious resistance, and breaking their ranks fled in panic eastward.

In the meantime negotiations for peace had been resumed, but on the demand of the Polish Government they were transferred from Minsk to Riga early in September. On September 14 the Polish Peace Mission left for Riga, and fresh negotiations for an armistice were begun with the Bolsheviks in that city a week later. The Poles were then in the full flood-tide of their success

in the Battle of the Niemen, and the Soviet was in a correspondingly chastened mood, which the Battle of the Szczara deepened. In that fortnight's whirlwind campaign the Poles took 50,000 prisoners, 160 guns, a thousand machine guns, 18 armoured cars, 7 armoured trains, 3 aeroplanes, 21 locomotives, and 2,500 railway cars and wagons. Two of the Red armies ceased to exist, and two more were severely handled. A protocol embodying the preliminaries to a peace was signed on October 12, 1920, and an armistice went into effect at midnight, October 18.

VILNA REOCCUPIED

By that date Pilsudski had realized the programme he had set before himself immediately prior to beginning the offensive on the Niemen. The result of the September–October operations was the strategic frontier which he desired at that time, and which eventually was recognized as the definite frontier in that area of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Soviet Russia. His action respecting Vilna was dictated by political as well as military considerations. The dispute over the possession of Vilna which had been going on between the Poles and the Lithuanians was settled in summary fashion by a *fait accompli*; Pilsudski disavowed its paternity at the time, but confessed it later. Zeligowski, after defeating Lithuanian forces at Jaszuny, entered Vilna on October 9, and also occupied the surrounding district north and west, the line reached and held being that which, before the Polish retreat in July, had been the line of demarcation between the Polish and the Lithuanian troops. Zeligowski himself was a Lithuanian Pole, like Pilsudski, and the troops he commanded, the 1st Lithuanian–White Russian Division, had come from Lithuania and White Russia. In the occupied territory Zeligowski instituted a little State, "Central Lithuania," with a Government of its own.

Officially the Polish Government repudiated Zeligowski. The Vilna controversy might be said to have begun with the occupation of the city in April 1919 by the Poles, despite the protests of the Lithuanians, and the Allies had laid down a line of demarcation to prevent war, but the Poles had retained the place until taken by the Bolsheviks during Tukhachevsky's second offensive in

July 1920, a result of which was its cession to Lithuania on July 12, though the Bolsheviks did not evacuate it till the end of August, and then the flowing tide was no longer with them, but with the Poles. The League of Nations intervened in the dispute in September 1920 by ordering a plebiscite to ascertain the wishes of the population of Vilna and district; under the auspices of the League an armistice was signed on November 29, and a neutral zone was fixed between the forces of "Central Lithuania" and Lithuania. The League had decided, in view of the plebiscite, to send a mixed international force of police to Vilna, but finding this impossible abandoned the plebiscite, and later had recourse to a special conference of the interested parties in the spring of 1921 that failed to solve the question, which remained a source of bitterness and contention.

RIGA PEACE CONFERENCE

Joffe was the chief representative of the Soviet at the Riga Peace Conference. He was in constant touch with Lenin, and took practically the entire conduct of the Bolshevik case on his own shoulders.

On the Polish side there were eight delegates. The leading figure nominally was Dabrowski, but he was overshadowed by Stanislas Grabski, who had prepared in advance a plan of the Polish-Soviet boundaries, which he induced his colleagues to accept. The delegates were in telegraphic consultation with the Council for the Defence of the State and with Sapieha, the Foreign Minister, in Warsaw, and they supported Grabski. The negotiations began on November 14, and went on into 1921.

STORMY DEBATES ON POLISH CONSTITUTION

The Seym had been called into being by Pilsudski to formulate a Constitution, but the subject was not seriously considered by the Seym till after the Bolshevik invasion had been repelled. A Constitutional Commission had been appointed early in 1919, and in December 1919 Professor Dubanowicz, of the University of Lwow, and an ally of the National Democrats, had been elected its chairman; it consisted of eight other deputies chosen from the

principal political parties. On July 8, 1920, the Commission put before the Seym the Constitution it had drawn up, but it was not till September 25 that the real debate started; it did not terminate for several months. The nation was anxious that a Constitution should be voted without unnecessary delay, but party strife was very keen, and progress was slow.

POLISH-DANZIG CONVENTION

Danzig came into prominence again in the latter half of 1920. Its Constituent Assembly adopted a Constitution on August 11 and submitted it to the League of Nations, which returned it for modification. The Constituent Assembly also elaborated a convention with Poland. Both Constitution and Convention had been prescribed in Articles 103 and 104 of the Versailles Treaty; on the strength of Article 102 of the treaty the Allies made a declaration on October 27, 1920, which gave the city of Danzig its *de jure* position as a Free City on November 15, the Allies having transferred their rights under the Versailles Treaty to the League. The Polish-Danzig Convention was signed at Paris on November 9, and it came into force on November 15. The Convention put several glosses on the terms of the Versailles Treaty, and they were not favourable to Poland; the principal change was the creation of a Harbour Board consisting of five Poles and five Danzigers, with a president of Swiss nationality appointed by the League; in the event of a tie between the delegates the president had the casting vote. According to the clear meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 104 of the treaty Poland was to have the exclusive administration of the port; the Convention not only deprived Poland of that exclusive administration, but also of the control of the Vistula within the territory of Danzig, to which Poland was entitled by paragraph 3 of the same Article. The port of Danzig virtually became the property of the Harbour Board.

POLISH ECONOMIC SITUATION BAD

From the economic point of view 1920 was a bad year for Poland. The war with Soviet Russia, though successful, led to the devastation of extensive tracts of the country, and rendered of little avail

the efforts of the Government and people for the reorganization of industry and agriculture. On the one hand, workers and peasants left the factories and the fields for the front; on the other, refugees swarmed into Warsaw and Western Poland, bringing with them pestilence and disease in epidemic form. The Budget deficiency of about 7,000 million Polish marks in 1919 was more than seven times as much in 1920. The international valuta or exchange continued to fall; the mark constantly depreciated; in January 1920 the dollar (American) was worth 120 marks, whereas in part of the preceding year it had been worth no more than 12 marks; by the end of 1920 it took 500 marks to buy a dollar. And as the mark tumbled, the cost of living increased.

Although dearly bought, the great positive gain made by Poland in 1920 was the early and assured fixation of her eastern frontier by treaty with the Soviet Government; with the exception of Upper Silesia, her whole territory had obtained practically its boundaries.

CHAPTER V
NATIONAL CONSOLIDATION
1921

1

FRANCO-POLISH ALLIANCE

EARLY in January 1921 the French Government invited Poland to send representatives to Paris to facilitate the "conclusion of a political and economic entente between Poland and France." The Polish Government accepted the invitation, and intimated that Pilsudski as Chief of the State would visit the French capital in person, the date being fixed for January 12. But the Marshal, who had undergone a severe strain during the preceding year, fell ill, and the visit was postponed till February 3. Pilsudski was accompanied by Sapieha, the Foreign Minister, and Sosnkowski, Minister of War, and welcomed by Briand, Barthou and Weygand.

Negotiations between the French and Polish Ministers proceeded briskly, and on February 6 Briand communicated to the British, Italian and Japanese Ambassadors at the Quai d'Orsay the terms of a joint Franco-Polish declaration: "The Governments of France and Poland, being equally anxious to safeguard their security and the peace of Europe, have recognized once more the community of interests which unite the two countries in friendship, and have agreed to confirm their decision to co-ordinate their efforts and to this end to maintain close contact for the defence of these interests." On the same day Pilsudski paid a visit to Verdun, where he was received by Pétain, who showed him over that ever-famous battleground; Verdun conferred on him the freedom of the city; in return he decorated Verdun with the Polish *croix de guerre*. Thereafter the Marshal went back to Warsaw.

The Political Agreement resulting from the visit was signed by Briand and Sapieha at Paris on February 19, 1921. Its Preamble and First Clause ran:

The Polish Government and the French Government, being equally anxious to safeguard, by the maintenance of the Treaties which have been signed in common, or which may eventually be recognized, the state of peace in Europe, and the security and defence of their territory, as well as their mutual political and economic interests, have agreed:

(1) In order to co-ordinate their endeavours towards peace the two Governments undertake to consult each other on all questions of foreign policy which concern both States, so far as these questions affect the settlement of international relations, in the spirit of the Treaties and in accordance with the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Clauses Three and Four stated:

(3) If, notwithstanding the sincerely pacific views and intentions of the two contracting States, either or both of them should be attacked without giving provocation, the two Governments shall take concerted measures for the defence of their territory and the protection of their legitimate interests, within the limits specified in the Preamble.

(4) The two Governments undertake to consult each other before concluding new Agreements affecting their policy in Central and Eastern Europe.

The Fifth and last clause prescribed that the Agreement was not to come into force until the commercial agreements then being negotiated had been signed. Ratifications were exchanged at Paris on June 27, 1922, and by that time conventions between the two States had been concluded respecting military cooperation, the oil industry and other matters. The Political Agreement was registered with the League of Nations on July 2, 1923.

POLISH ALLIANCE WITH RUMANIA

Poland's treaty with Rumania was signed at Bucarest on March 3, 1921, by Sapieha and Take Jonescu. Nothing stood in the way of a very complete entente between Poland and Rumania; they had no quarrel, no dispute over frontiers; they had a compelling common ground for co-operation in Soviet Russia, Rumania like Poland being a "Barrier" State. Rumanian troops had taken joint action with Polish forces in the Ukrainian campaign in 1919; one of the reasons for the swiftness of Tukhachevsky's push for Warsaw had been the determination to forestall help to the Poles by Rumania. The treaty was entitled a "Convention for a Defensive Alliance," and consisted of eight articles, the first four being:

(1) Poland and Rumania undertake to assist each other in the event of their being the object of an unprovoked attack on their present eastern frontiers. Accordingly, if either State is the object of an unprovoked attack, the other shall consider itself in a state of war and shall render armed assistance.

(2) In order to co-ordinate their efforts to maintain peace both Governments undertake to consult together on such questions of foreign policy as concern their relations with their eastern neighbours.

(3) A military convention shall determine the manner in which either country shall render assistance to the other should the occasion arise. This convention shall be subject to the same conditions as the present convention as regards duration and denunciation.

(4) If, in spite of their efforts to maintain peace, the two States are compelled to enter on a defensive war under the terms of Article 1, each undertakes not to negotiate or conclude an armistice or a peace without the participation of the other State.

The Fifth Article validated the treaty for five years, with liberty to either State to denounce it after two years on giving the other State six months' notice. By the Sixth Article neither State could conclude an alliance with a third State without having first procured the assent of the other State—alliances, however, were excepted which had in view the maintenance of treaties already signed jointly by Poland and Rumania, but these had to be notified. Then the Polish Government declared that it knew of the agreements entered into by Rumania with other States for upholding the Treaties of Trianon and Neuilly, and the Rumanian Government declared similarly that it knew of the agreements entered into by Poland and France. The Seventh Article provided for the communication of the treaty to the League of Nations in accordance with the Treaty of Versailles, and the Eighth for its ratification at Bucarest. Ratifications were exchanged in the Rumanian capital on July 25, 1921, and the treaty was registered with the League on October 24, 1921.

TREATY OF RIGA SIGNED

Negotiations between the Polish and Bolshevik plenipotentiaries at Riga were concluded on March 18, 1921, by a treaty, the main feature of which was the tracing of the Polish-Soviet frontier. When the boundary proposed by the Polish Delegation was submitted to Joffe and his colleagues, it was accepted respecting

the line of the boundary south of Polesia, but farther north the Bolsheviks wished to have the frontier drawn as far to the west of Minsk as possible, and they opposed to the last moment the inclusion in Poland of the territory north of Vilna. The Poles, for their part, were determined that there should not be a common frontier between Soviet Russia and Lithuania, and as the situation on the front was hopeless for the Soviet it had to agree to this condition. They were also firm regarding Eastern Galicia; when Joffe, at the request of the Soviet Republic of the Ukraine, asked for a plebiscite in that district, they refused. The frontier agreed on was well within that of 1772, but it ran considerably to the east of the Curzon line, and included in Poland about 110,000 square kilometres of the *Kresy*.

By the treaty Poland recognized the independence of the White Russian and Ukrainian Soviet Republics; on the other hand, the Soviet declared itself disinterested respecting the Polish-Lithuanian dispute over Vilna.

Poland and Soviet Russia mutually agreed to recognize the political sovereignty of the other, and not to mix in each other's internal affairs; to refrain from propaganda and from harbouring organizations hostile to the other contracting party. They renounced claims for war reparations, but the Soviet undertook to restore all art collections, libraries and historical and other documents that had been removed to Russia after 1772, as well as all industrial plant, implements and so forth that had been carried off between August 1, 1914, and October 1, 1915; also to pay to Poland thirty million gold roubles as her quota of the assets of the former Russian Empire, for the Debts of which she was to be held irresponsible. The Soviet accorded the most-favoured-nation treatment to Poland, and both States agreed on free transit, reciprocally, across their respective territories, except for munitions of war; Poland, however, reserved the right to regulate the transit of goods of German or Austrian origin.

THE "KRESY"

Only one-third of the region lying west of the frontier of 1772 was returned to Poland by the Riga Treaty. It was always impossible

that there could strictly be a genuine ethnographic boundary between Poland and Russia, for between the ethnographic Poland and the ethnographic Russia lay that broad band of land mostly occupied by peasants of mixed nationality which the Poles designated the *Kresy*. According to the Polish census of 1921 there were in the part of it returned to Poland—Vilna, Novogrodek, Bialystok, Polesia and Volhynia—45·8 per cent Poles; 22·7 per cent White Russians; 17·3 per cent Ukrainians; 9·7 per cent Jews, the remainder being Lithuanians, Russians and others. The census figures showed that though the Poles had not an absolute majority in their area they had a high relative majority of the total population, which was put at 5,424,437.

The treaty clarified the position respecting Eastern Galicia for Poland, the Soviet and the Soviet Ukrainian Republic. In December 1919 the Supreme Council had withdrawn the resolution giving Poland a mandate to organize and govern Eastern Galicia for 25 years, as the Poles declined to accept it. In February 1921 the subject was brought before the Council of the League of Nations by some members of what had been the “Rada of the Western Ukraine” (Eastern Galicia) who had taken up their abode in Vienna; later their headquarters were transferred to Berlin. On the motion of Hymans, the Belgian representative, the Council referred the matter to the Ambassadors’ Conference. Poland registered the Riga Treaty with the League on August 12, 1921. But nearly two years elapsed before the treaty-frontier was recognized by the Great Allies and the question of Eastern Galicia settled at the same time by the attribution of the district to Poland on an autonomy basis. So far as the treaty was concerned the Vilna question was placed outside the orbit of the Soviet. The situation at the moment was that Vilna and the Vilna district, under the name of Central or Middle Lithuania, was held by Zeligowski with his “Lithuanian–White Russian troops,” without any recognized connexion with the Polish Government.

The net outcome of the Polish–Soviet War was that Pilsudski had succeeded in interposing between the essential or ethnographic Poland and the Soviet a considerable block of territory, which, in view of the attitude of the Supreme Council, Poland would

probably not have obtained otherwise. To express Pilsudski's success in another way: the Soviet had done its utmost by military action, to say nothing of propaganda, to make Poland Bolshevik, but thanks chiefly to the Marshal it failed. Trotsky said: "The Poland of Pilsudski came out of the war unexpectedly strengthened . . . The development of the Polish revolution (a supposed Bolshevik internal revolution in Poland) received a crushing blow. The frontier established by the Riga Treaty cut off the Soviet from Germany, a fact that was later of great importance in the lives of both countries."

POLISH CONSTITUTION PASSED

On March 17, 1921, the Seym passed the Constitution *en bloc* by a large majority, the minority being composed of the Socialists and the *Wyzwolenie* Populists. The struggle over a Senate was finally closed on January 27, 1921, when the Seym decided to adopt the bicameral system. This was a victory for the Right, as was also the part of the Constitution dealing with the election and functions of the President. The action of the Right was inspired by animosity to Pilsudski; it believed that he would be elected President, and it was determined that if it could not prevent his election, it would limit his power as much as possible; it therefore accepted the most radical proposals to gain its object. As things were, Pilsudski was not only Chief of the State but also Commander-in-Chief; the Constitution made the President Commander-in-Chief during peace alone, as he was definitely forbidden by it to exercise the Supreme Command in time of war.

Compared with the famous Polish Constitution of May 3, 1791, which was far in advance of its time, the Constitution of March 17, 1921, like most other European Constitutions of recent date, showed the enormous progress towards democracy that was characteristic of political opinion in general, especially after the War. The "Little Constitution" had been based on the most democratic franchise—"universal, direct, equal, secret and proportional." It was the same with the new Constitution so far as the Seym was concerned, but for the Senate the voting age was made 30, instead of 21 for the Seym, and a candidate for the

Senate had to be 40, instead of 25 for the Seym. But in point of fact these differences might be considered negligible, as the place assigned to the Senate in the general scheme was so insignificant that the only House which really counted in Poland was the Seym.

TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION

The text of the Constitution was divided into six chapters: 1, The Republic; 2, The Legislative Power; 3, The Executive Power; 4, The Judicial Power; 5, The General Rights and Duties of Citizens; and 6, General Provisions. The First Article was "The Polish State is a Republic," and the Second "The sovereign power in the Polish Republic vests in the nation. The organs of the nation are the Seym and the Senate in legislative matters; the President of the Republic, acting conjointly with responsible Ministers, as regards the exercise of the executive power; and the independent Tribunals of Justice in judicial affairs." The sovereign power vested in the nation was to be expressed by Parliament—the Seym and the Senate, but the Senate had no initiative, and if the Seym dissolved itself, as it could, the Senate automatically ceased to exist. The President of the Seym, known as its Marshal (Speaker), continued in office after the dissolution of Parliament till the election of the same or another man as Marshal by a new Seym. In the event of the President of the Republic not being able for any reason to function, it was the Marshal of the Seym who took his place, not the Marshal of the Senate. All that was given to the Senate was a restricted right of suspensive veto, which the Seym could overcome by an eleven-twentieths vote in ordinary session; if that happened, the President of the Republic had to promulgate its decision as law at once.

THE PRESIDENT

By the Constitution the President of the Republic was the head of the Executive; he was to hold office for seven years after his election by the Seym and the Senate united in a National Assembly; all the Acts of the President had to be countersigned by Ministers of the Government, who were responsible for them. The President

had no power to dissolve the Seym without the assent of three-fifths of the total statutory number of senators in the presence of at least one-half of the total statutory number of deputies (of the Seym). He had no right to initiate legislation or of veto. He nominated the Government—the President of the Council of Ministers (Prime Minister) and the other Ministers; the Constitution left the method to the discretion of the President; on the other hand, it was expressly provided that the Government was responsible to the Seym and had to resign if the Seym demanded it to do so. When the Government had been nominated by the President it had to appear before the Seym and submit its policy for the Seym's approval or the reverse; the Seym could thereupon dismiss the Government or demand the resignation of any of the Ministers. It was an ultra-Parliamentary régime, but it gave no heed to the fact that owing to the multiplicity of parties and groups the Seym was not in a position to provide a strong Parliamentary Government based on an adequate majority.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Respecting local government the Constitution in its Third Article said: "The Polish Republic, having its foundation based on the principle of wide local autonomy, transfers to the organs of the said autonomy the power of legislation, particularly in administrative, social and economic affairs." By a law passed on July 15, 1920, Upper Silesia was given autonomy and a local legislature; this was, of course, a special case, but it afforded an example of what the Constitution had in view. Article 68 provided for the establishment of an economic autonomy of chambers of agriculture, commerce, industry, craftsmanship, salaried labour, and others, forming jointly the Supreme Economic Chamber of the Republic.

THE JUDICATURE

According to the Constitution the judiciary enjoyed an autonomous and independent status, guarded by provisions prohibiting the dismissal or transfer of judges, and making them responsible only

to statutory enactments. Article 81 stated, however, that "the Courts of Justice shall not have the right to challenge the validity of Statutes legally promulgated"—which meant the supremacy of the Seym over the judicial departments of the Government. As against that, judicial decisions could not be changed by the Seym or by the Executive. The President appointed the judges, except where the law provided otherwise. In the administration of justice, as in other matters, Poland was conditioned by her past; in 1921 and afterwards the separate legal systems in force during the partitions still prevailed.

In 1919 the Seym had set up a Codification Commission to draft uniform rules for the organization of justice, under the chairmanship of Professor Fierich of Cracow University, a distinguished juristic authority. The Commission comprised two divisions, one dealing with the Civil Law and the other with Penal Law, but the work was difficult and necessarily took a long time, especially as the Commission set before itself the task not only of unifying Polish law, but also of finding a synthesis between the right of free citizenship as posed by the French Revolution and the extreme Socialization posed by the legislation of some post-War States.

Chapter V of the Constitution dealt with the rights and duties of Polish citizens. Full protection of life, freedom and property was guaranteed in Poland to all her inhabitants, without distinction of origin, nationality, language, race or religion; aliens, on condition of reciprocity, had the same rights as Poles and the same duties, except where the law required Polish nationality. No privileges of birth, class, heraldry and aristocratic or other titles, except scientific distinctions and official and professional titles, were to be recognized. Freedom of religion, conscience, of the Press, of petition and of association were guaranteed. Article 109 provided that every citizen had the right to retain his nationality and to cultivate his language and national customs. Special legislation was to safeguard for minorities the full and unrestricted development of their national life through autonomous, legally recognized public institutions within the general unions of local government.

NATIONAL MINORITIES

By Article 110 Polish subjects belonging to national minorities, or to those of religion or language, had equally with other citizens the right to form, control and administer, at their own expense, charitable institutions of a religious or social character, as well as to use their language freely, and to observe the precepts of their religion. These and other clauses of the Constitution implemented the treaty entered into by Poland with the Allies on June 28, 1919, respecting her national minorities. The Constitution also provided for the protection of labour, "the principal source of wealth in the Republic," and for the protection of maternity and children. It made primary education compulsory, education in State or local government schools being free to all; in State-supported schools religious instruction was compulsory for all under 18 years of age, the conduct and control of this teaching resting with the respective religious bodies, under the supreme control of the educational authorities of the State. By Article 114 it was declared: "The Roman Catholic confession being the confession of the majority of the people, has a preponderating authority in the State among other religions which enjoy equal treatment. The Roman Catholic Church is governed by its own laws. The relation between the Church and the State shall be determined on the basis of a concordat with the Holy See, to be ratified by the Seym." Four years passed, however, before a concordat was signed.

Property was the subject of Article 99. It was of particular interest because of its bearing on Communism and agrarian reform. It stated:

The Polish Republic recognizes all property, whether belonging to individuals or collectively to associations, autonomous bodies, institutions or the State itself, as one of the principal foundations of social organization and legal order; it grants to all inhabitants, institutions and communities the protection of their property, and does not admit any limitation or abolition of individual or collective property, except as provided by Statute for the common benefit and with compensation.

The last chapter of the Constitution provided that its revision could take place only after a vote to that effect in the presence of at least one-half of the total number of the members of the National

Assembly, and carried by a majority of two-thirds. The motion for revision had to be signed by one-quarter of the total number of deputies, and was to be announced at least fifteen days in advance. However, the second Seym, elected on the basis of the Constitution—the first fully representative Seym—could exceptionally proceed to revise the Constitution if revision was demanded by a three-fifths vote of at least one-half of the total number of deputies. In any case, a final clause provided for revision every twenty-five years by the Seym and the Senate sitting conjointly as the National Assembly.

After the Constitution was passed, a procession of deputies went to the Cathedral, where Trampczynski, the Marshal of the Seym, laid a wreath on the tomb of Malachowski, the Marshal of the Parliament of 1791 which voted the Third of May Constitution. The Constitution was promulgated on June 1, 1921, but the "Little Constitution" remained in force pending the passing of an electoral law, but more than a year elapsed before it was put on the statute book.

Witos was still Prime Minister, but during November 1920 the National Democrats went into opposition, and ordered Grabski, as one of their party, to withdraw from the Cabinet. He was succeeded as Minister of Finance by Steczkowski, who now applied himself to find some remedy for the increasingly bad situation of the country owing to inflation, Government deficits being covered by fresh issues of Polish marks from the printing press. He had sound ideas on reducing expenditure and balancing the Budget, but the great evils of inflation were not generally recognized at the time, while there was the evident fact, on the other side, that inflation did provide money for new factories and other industrial enterprises. The next secession from the Witos Government was that of Daszynski, who withdrew in December 1920 and took his party with him.

1921 interest in Poland tended more and more to concentrate itself on the question of Upper Silesia. On December 27, 1920, the Ambassadors' Conference had decided that, to reduce the chances of disorder during the taking of the plebiscite, outvoters should vote a fortnight later than the resident voters. But this decision was cancelled by the Supreme Council in February 1921, which ordered that the vote of residents and non-residents should be taken on the same day, the change having been brought about, it was believed by the Poles, by England and Italy as against France. There was great dismay in Poland, and the papers of the Left went so far as to demand the resignation of Sapieha, the Foreign Minister.

UPPER SILESIA QUESTION

Nearly two years had passed since the signature of the Treaty of Versailles when the plebiscite was taken in Upper Silesia on March 30, 1921. According to the German Upper Silesia census of 1910 the population of the district consisted of 1,245,000 Poles and 672,000 Germans. During the two years' interval between the treaty and the voting the Germans worked hard to strengthen their position, and the Poles, under the leadership of Korfanty, had been active in their opposition, which included two risings, one in August 1919 and the other in August 1920. An inter-Allied Commission was sent to maintain order and prepare for the voting, but no disturbances marked the actual holding of the plebiscite. Korfanty had been appointed by the Polish Government president of the Polish Plebiscitary Committee, and he enjoined calm on his fellow-countrymen. The result of the voting was 707,605 for Germany and 479,359 for Poland, according to the final figures issued on April 23; it was admitted, however, that the German count included upwards of 100,000 out-voters; these had been brought by special trains from the interior of Germany, and were sent back again as soon as they had voted. A close examination of the voting showed that the majority of the communes voting Polish lay in the eastern part, the majority of the communes voting German in the western part of the plebiscitary area. The commission reported that it

was unable to agree about a frontier, owing to the intermingling of the Polish and German communes. Germany contended that Upper Silesia, from the economic point of view, was indivisible, expected that she would be given it as a whole, and maintained that if even a part of the province was taken from her she would never be able to pay reparations.

BRITISH OPINION

In England the bulk of opinion supported the German thesis of the indivisibility of Upper Silesia, but France was entirely hostile to it, while Italy was inclined to agree with the Germans. Towards the end of April a Polish deputation visited London with the object of enlightening the Government and the British people generally respecting the case for Poland and the treatment Poland had been receiving from Germany.

Owing to the state of British opinion at the time, this visit was as a voice in the wilderness. Presently it leaked out that Lloyd George was in favour of the German doctrine of the indivisibility of Upper Silesia.

Though the Poles were afraid that Lloyd George would favour the Germans at the expense of Poland, the news that he stood for the indivisibility of Upper Silesia created among them the greatest irritation which found expression in the breaking out on May 2, 1921, of a Polish insurrection led by Korfanty in the plebiscitary area. In a few days the insurgents were in possession of the part of it inhabited by the Polish majority. Korfanty was disavowed by the Polish Government, but no one doubted where its sympathy and that of the whole Polish people lay. There were no British troops in the area; the French troops there showed no enthusiasm for resisting Korfanty, but the Italian forces on the ground did oppose him, as did a German irregular body, the *Selbstschütz* (Self-protection).

A truce was finally arranged between the combatants in Upper Silesia, and the Plebiscite Commission was asked by the Allies to submit a proposal in common. But there was the same opposition in the commission as there was in higher quarters; General Le Rond, the French commissioner, stood for Poland as

against the other commissioners who took the German view; it was thus impossible for them to make a unanimous report. In Poland Korfanty was acclaimed, naturally enough, as a national hero, and he and his partisans retained their ground for some time. It was August before the Supreme Council tackled the question again.

THE VILNA QUESTION

Another question which deeply interested Poland had meanwhile reached another stage. On March 3, 1921, the Council of the League of Nations passed a resolution requesting Poland and Lithuania to enter on direct negotiations with a view to solving the question of Vilna, and accordingly a Polish-Lithuanian Conference was held. Its president was Hymans; the Polish Delegation was headed by Professor Askenazy, a distinguished Pole of Jewish origin, and a well-known author. Galvanauskas, Foreign Minister of Lithuania, headed the Lithuanian Delegation. The conference opened at Brussels on April 20, 1921. On May 10 Hymans delivered to the two delegations a sketch of an agreement by which Lithuania would be organized into two autonomous cantons, Kovno and Vilna, with the city of Vilna as their capital, to be united with Poland by a political, military and economic treaty.

Hymans explained he was inspired by the hope of establishing between the two countries very close ties—"to create between them a kind of general entente, though respecting at the same time their sovereignty to the fullest extent. While these ties will not go so far as a federation, they will approach it. When this has been achieved," he continued, "we could solve the problem of Vilna by giving it to Lithuania, but establishing a régime in which the rights of the whole Polish population would be respected and the future of Polish culture fully assured." The Brussels Conference closed early in June, with the acceptance in principle by Poland of the Hymans project and its non-acceptance by Lithuania. On June 28 the Council of the League approved the Hymans scheme, and recommended Poland and Lithuania to take it as a basis for further discussion. As before, Zeligowski held possession of Vilna.

SKIRMUNT FOREIGN MINISTER

About a fortnight earlier in June an important change took place in the Witos Government, Skirmunt, who had been Polish Minister at Rome, replacing Sapieha as Foreign Minister. In May the Seym's Commission on Foreign Affairs had passed a vote of non-confidence in Sapieha, at that time on a mission at Paris, and he came back to Warsaw and resigned.

Pilsudski always kept the Ministries of War and Foreign Affairs under his personal control. He was keenly interested in everything connected with foreign policy, particularly when it related to Soviet Russia and Lithuania.

One of the clauses of the Riga Treaty prescribed that both Poland and Soviet Russia should refrain from propaganda and from harbouring organizations inimical to the other. In Poland and in Warsaw especially there were large numbers of Russian *émigrés* who were the open or secret enemies of the Soviet. Their most prominent leader was the well-known revolutionary Savinkoff, and he actively fomented counter-revolutionary agitation against the Soviet Government. He was denounced by the Soviet representative to Skirmunt, and his expulsion demanded. It was plain that by the Riga Treaty the Soviet was acting within its rights. But they were friends of Pilsudski, and he protected them. Skirmunt, however, insisted on the observance of the treaty, in accordance with his general policy, and Pilsudski gave way, but not with a good grace.

THE "INDUSTRIAL TRIANGLE"

The Assembly of the League had the Upper Silesia question before it. The Commissioners, unable to agree on a proposal in common respecting Upper Silesia, informed the Allied Governments of that fact. The Council was summoned to meet on August 8, 1921, the matter being remitted some ten days before to a Committee of Experts, who failed to agree on a frontier, but concurred in stating that the intention of the Versailles Treaty had not been to assign the whole area to Poland or Germany, but that a line as frontier should be drawn, on the basis of the

voting by communes, each State being given its proper ethnical share of the province. This finding did away with the idea of allocating the territory as a whole to Germany. Among the rumours that had led to the Korfanty rising of 1921 was one which alleged that if there was a division Poland would get only the southern districts of Rybnik and Pszczyna (Pless), while the extremely valuable industrial part, sometimes called the "Industrial Triangle," went to Germany. The Poles protested that they were entitled to the greater part of the Triangle—the name was derived from the fact that the towns of Beuthen, Gleiwitz and Katowice stood at three angles of the industrial region.

Upper Silesia was the outstanding feature of the Conference of Paris, August 8–13, 1921, with the opposed policies of France and England very much in evidence, the result being a deadlock, which was broken only on the last day of the conference by the adoption of the Italian suggestion that the question of the frontier should be referred to the Council of the League under Article 11, paragraph 2, of the Covenant for a recommendation—not a decision, though that was what was meant, for, as it presently came out, the Allied Governments had solemnly undertaken to accept the solution recommended by the Council. Ishii, Acting President of the Council, convened it for August 29, 1921, and on September 1 the Council decided to entrust the preliminary examination of the question to four of its members who had no bias or special interest in the matter: the representatives of Brazil, China, Spain and Belgium, who proceeded to take evidence, not from official representatives of either Poland or Germany, but from delegations of miners, masters and others whether Poles or Germans from the disputed area. Weeks before the investigation came to an end a Ministerial crisis occurred in Poland.

GRAVE FINANCIAL SITUATION

In addition to the questions of Upper Silesia and Vilna the Witos Government was materially weakened by the increasing gravity of the financial situation. In July it took 2,000 Polish marks to buy one dollar. Steczkowski, the Finance Minister, had thought of obtaining a large internal loan from the great landowners in

return for some modifications of the Agrarian Reform Law of 1920, but his plans encountered keen opposition from the peasants and others. Witos disapproved and Steczkowski resigned on September 5, 1921; this brought about the fall of the Government four days later.

The formation of a Parliamentary Coalition Government was considered, but was abandoned, the truth being that none of the groups was anxious to take part in a Government the pressing business of which would be the imposition of heavy taxation, for that would inevitably alienate the masses of the people. The leaders fell back on the familiar expedient of constituting an administrative, extra-Parliamentary Cabinet.

THE PONIKOWSKI CABINET

In the end the choice fell on Ponikowski, rector of the Polytechnic in Warsaw, and a distinguished educationist. Officially designated Prime Minister by Pilsudski, he formed his Cabinet on September 19, 1921. To the Premiership he joined the Ministry of Education; Skirmunt, Narutowicz and Sosnkowski retained the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Public Works and War respectively; Milchalski, a Lwow Professor, an authority on economics and fiscal affairs, as well as a director of the National Bank, Lwow, was appointed Minister of Finance. When Ponikowski presented himself to the Seym on September 27, he was received coldly, because of his insisting on the passing of the Electoral Law, as prescribed by the Constitution, at the earliest possible moment.

VILNA AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

A few days before the Assembly of the League of Nations dealt with the Eastern Galicia and Vilna questions. On September 24, 1921, Hymans described his plan to the Assembly for the settlement of the Vilna dispute and the efforts he had made to bring about an agreement between Poland and Lithuania. Earlier there had been much discussion of the question in the Council, Askenazy and Galvanauskas appearing again as advocates respectively of the Polish and Lithuanian points of view. The Assembly adopted a resolution which appealed to the "fraternal memories

of the two people to achieve agreement, which was a necessity for the peace of the world." But there was no immediate result. Zeligowski remained in Vilna. On November 30, however, he issued a decree, in agreement with the Polish Government, as the *de facto* executive of Central Lithuania, fixing a general election for a Constituent Seym for that area on January 8, 1922. In the same decree he appointed Meysztowicz head of the acting Government, and he withdrew from Vilna.

UPPER SILESIA SETTLEMENT

Thanks to the Council of the League a settlement was at last effected of the frontier in Upper Silesia. Its recommendation was made known on October 24.

The line of frontier recommended to the Council showed that nationality was the great consideration. In the Triangle one large angle consisting of the towns of Krolewska-Huta (Königshütte) and Katowice was given to Poland, Beuthen and Gleiwitz, the towns making the two other angles, going to Germany. The problem of the League was to reconcile the ethnic and economic aspects of this division of the territory, and it solved it in part by prolonging the economic unity of the whole area for fifteen years. Poland was already bound by her Minorities Treaty to give equal rights to Germans within her portion of Upper Silesia once it had been attributed to her, but Germany was under no like obligation respecting Polish nationals in her portion. The League recommended that the relevant parts of the Polish Minorities Treaty should be accepted by the German Government, and the Ambassadors' Conference decreed that this should be the case for the transitional period of fifteen years. Further, to implement the carrying out of the whole affair there were set up an Arbitral Tribunal composed of a Polish and a German arbiter, with a neutral president, for the settlement of private disputes, and a Mixed Commission, consisting of two Poles and two Germans from Upper Silesia and a neutral president, both neutrals being appointed by the League; the commission was charged with the carrying out of the arrangements generally. The League's recommendation was accepted by the Allies,

October 19–20, 1921. Briand, as president of the Ambassadors Conference, addressed covering letters to the Polish and German Governments respectively, together with the text of the decision. In his letter Briand pointedly stated that the Allies considered that their decision constituted a whole that they were firmly resolved all parties concerned must observe. Poland received the award with mixed feelings; it was not in accordance with her wishes, but it gave her substantial advantages. Germany was full of lamentation, though the larger part of Upper Silesia was left to her. The German Government, then headed by Wirth resigned as a protest, the effect of which was discounted by its almost immediate return to office; in the Reichstag Wirth obtained a vote of confidence on October 26. Next day the German Ambassador in Paris sent a letter of protest to the Ambassadors Conference, for which body Briand replied on October 29 that it considered the protest of the German Government as unfounded null and void. About a month later negotiations began at Geneva between the Poles and the Germans for the convention prescribed by the decision; but final agreement was not reached till May, 1922.

DANZIG—POLISH TREATY

Another important event made October 1921 memorable; it was the signing in Warsaw, on the 24th of the month, of a treaty between Poland and Danzig. This treaty had been preceded by a Polish-German Convention signed at Paris on April 21, 1921, by which, in accordance with Article 89 of the Versailles Treaty, Poland granted free transit across the so-called Corridor between Germany and East Prussia, without customs and passport formalities, thus making the frontiers practically invisible, and thus also removing one of the objections advanced by Germany against the attribution of the "Corridor" to Poland. The convention came into force in 1922, and from the outset was loyally observed by Poland, not only as concerned passage across Pomerania but across Poznania as well. The interests of Danzig in that convention were taken charge of by Poland. The treaty between Poland and the Free City contained no less than 244 Articles; it regulated the individual rights of Polish citizens, the right of acquiring

Danzig citizenship, intercourse across the frontiers, the opening of Polish commercial businesses in Danzig, the right of purchasing real estate, and questions of jurisdiction, Customs, finance, navigation, imports and exports, and the railways.

Sahm and members of the Danzig Senate visited Warsaw for the signing of the treaty, to which they affixed the historic seal of Old Danzig. Both the High Commissioner of the League resident in the Free City and the Council of the League had constantly before them disputes between Poland and Danzig which in general were caused by the pro-German attitude of Sahm and the Senate, and their evident desire to make things difficult for the Poles. The treaty settled some of the contentious points, but others remained a perpetual source of trouble. It was in these circumstances, coupled with the sharp recollection of the hostile attitude of the Danzigers in refusing to unload munitions for Poland in 1920 when her need of them was extreme, that the idea of building a port on purely Polish soil, with absolutely free access to the sea, was conceived and came to birth in Poland.

In November 1921 an improvement in the relations of Poland and Czechoslovakia was seen in the conclusion of a Defensive Convention between these States. Two months earlier a treaty of commerce had been signed by them at Warsaw.

POLISH-CZECHOSLOVAK TREATY

Skirmunt visited Prague and signed with Benesh the Defensive Convention on November 6, 1921. By this treaty both States mutually guaranteed their territorial integrity, and agreed, in case of an attack on one of them by a neighbouring State, to observe a benevolent neutrality and to permit the free passage of war material. Poland declared her disinterestedness in Slovakia and Czechoslovakia hers in Eastern Galicia. Each State undertook to dissolve on its territory all organizations aiming at the severance of parts of the other State and, to that end, to suppress propaganda. Disputes between the two States were to be settled by arbitration.

But the treaty was not ratified by Poland; it came to grief in 1922 over the possession of Jaworzyna, a small commune in the High Tatra region of the Carpathians, with a population of some

400 and about as many acres of arable land, though it had a total extent of upwards of 14,000 acres. This dispute was settled eventually against Poland by the International Court at The Hague in December 1923.

CENSUS OF POLAND, 1921

In November 1921 the results were available of the census of the population of Poland which had been taken on September 30, 1921. The census did not cover the part of Upper Silesia finally assigned to Poland, nor could Vilna be included in it, as the status of Central Lithuania was still in suspense. What the census showed was a total of 25,406,103, which, however, did not include the military forces. Later when these figures were finally corrected, and Upper Silesia and Vilna were added, the total population was put at more than 27 millions, of whom, roughly, about 69 per cent were Poles, the remainder comprising upwards of three million Ukrainians, more than two and a half million Jews, one and a half million White Russians, an equal number of Germans, and small numbers of Lithuanians and Latvians. The National Minorities thus composed nearly one-third of the population; the Ukrainians were not only the most numerous but the most concentrated—in the south-east of the country; the Jews were scattered all over the land; the White Russians had their homes in the north-east; the Germans were a decreasing quantity and large numbers of them had already withdrawn from Poznania and Pomerania. Warsaw was credited with 931,176 inhabitants, and Lodz, the next largest city, with 451,813; Poznan, with 165,623, had become, owing to the German efflux, the most Polish city in Poland.

The census showed that while what was German Poland had suffered comparatively little from the War and the subsequent fighting, the rest of Poland had endured heavy losses. The decrease in population was not half the tale in that large area. In 1921 Poland was still importing foodstuffs in large quantities; but that year was a year of peace, and the labour of the hard-working Polish peasantry was beginning to tell. The grain harvest of 1921 amounted to seven and a half million tons compared with two

and a quarter million tons in 1920. There was a parallel revival in the national industries; it received a check, however, in October, which was met by the emission of fresh Government credits on a large scale, a reduction of railway rates, and a lowering of the tax on coal; the revival continued thereafter.

FINANCIAL SITUATION DEALT WITH

Michalski, the Finance Minister, succeeded in fixing the attention of the Seym on the financial situation. He predicted a heavy deficit in the revenue when taken into account with the expenditure, and stated that only great sacrifices on the part of the whole nation could bring about an equilibrium of the Budget. The programme he proposed had three chief features: an intensification of the production of the country, for which the Government would give assistance; strict economy, including a great reduction in the number of Government functionaries, and a reduction in the strength of the army, the cost of which amounted to more than half of the total national expenditure; and the imposition of the *danina*, which was explained as an "extraordinary national contribution" to the revenue, but in effect a capital levy, that was also intended to provide a basis for the formation of a "bank of issue."

After these proposals had been discussed in the Budget Commission of the Seym they were put before the Seym itself on December 9, 1921; the debate lasted a week, and resulted in their being accepted in the main by large majorities. On December 16 the Seym voted the *danina*, and on the following day passed a law for "the amelioration of the financial administration of the State," which conferred on the Finance Minister virtually dictatorial powers. A Finance Council was created as an advisory body to the Ministry of Finance.

The Ministry of Provisioning was abolished, as were various other State services; the State monopolies were reorganized; more than half of the army was demobilized. It was estimated that the *danina* would bring in eighty to a hundred milliards of Polish marks, the hoped-for result being the withdrawal from circulation of half the inflated currency, the stoppage of fresh

emissions of banknotes, and the attainment of budgetary equilibrium. The struggle to regulate the currency had been part of the whole terrible national struggle at the outset in 1918–19. The monetary system was chaotic. In circulation simultaneously there were Russian roubles—Tsarist, Kerensky and Soviet—of unequal value, Austrian crowns, German marks and Polish marks; the last had been established by the Germans, who had set up in Warsaw the “Polish Territorial Loan Fund” to issue these marks under the guarantee of the Reichsbank, the Polish mark being held as equivalent to the German mark, then worth about an English shilling.

When the Germans evacuated Poland the issue of these Polish marks exceeded 880 millions. The Territorial Fund was taken over by the Government, and given by decree the sole right to issue banknotes. On January 15, 1920, an Act was passed making the Polish mark the only legal tender, and the other currencies were withdrawn from circulation within the next few months. The Polish mark had suffered a great diminution and it continued to depreciate; at the end of September 1921 it took more than 6,500 Polish marks to buy one dollar; then there was an improvement, which Michalski’s reforms increased, and on December 31, 1921, the exchange was a little below 3,000 to the dollar. Concurrently the amount received from taxation by the Government was enlarged. The year closed with a more optimistic feeling respecting the financial situation; in spite of everything it had been a year of advance.

CHAPTER VI
THE PARLIAMENT AND PILSUDSKI
1922-1923

1

POLAND's position *vis-à-vis* the neighbouring States in the beginning of 1922 was described by Skirmunt, Foreign Minister, in a statement to the Press:

The way which opens before Poland at the opening of the New Year is bright with sunshine. Good relations exist between her and all her neighbours. The Polish-Czechoslovak *rapprochement* is a guarantee of the peace of Central Europe. I have not lost hope that Polish-Lithuanian relations will end likewise in a *rapprochement*—which is the desire of the whole Polish nation. It will be the same perhaps with respect to Russia. The relations which subsist between Poland and France and between Poland and Rumania are as fraternal as they can be.

In this chain of good things the weakest link was seen in the reference to Polish-Lithuanian relations. The general election for a Constituent Seym which Meyszowicz, as head of its Government, had ordered for Central Lithuania was held on January 8, 1922, despite the protest of the Lithuanian Government. There were 106 seats to be filled, and the vote was given to all inhabitants, male and female, 21 years of age, who had been resident in the country for three years and whatever their nationality. The election was boycotted by the local Lithuanians and partly by the Jews of the city of Vilna; the cold was intense and the means of communication were bad; yet nearly 65 per cent of the possible voters voted, for of the 387,397 persons on the electoral rolls, 249,325 recorded their votes. In the city of Vilna, notwithstanding the abstention of the Jewish population, 43,489 votes were cast out of a possible 79,348, or about 55 per cent. In some of the country districts 95 per cent of the votes were polled. In all cases the election proceeded without disturbances or unfortunate incident—a remarkable tribute to the order that was maintained by the provisional Government, which put no pressure, as foreign

journalists present testified, on the inhabitants to vote or not to vote, though the Lithuanian Government afterwards alleged that the voting was not free. Of the deputies elected 69 belonged to parties corresponding to parties in Poland, who advocated the incorporation of Central Lithuania with the Polish Republic. The Seym of Central Lithuania met in Vilna on February 1, 1922.

VILNA SEYM'S RESOLUTION

The Lithuanian Government brought the question once more before the Council of the League of Nations. On January 13, 1922, the Lithuanian delegate, Sidzikauskas, requested the Council to draw the attention of the Supreme Council to the gravity of the Polish-Lithuanian dispute, and to ask it to fix the eastern frontiers of Poland in accordance with the 3rd paragraph of Article 87 of the Versailles Treaty, as that fixation would settle the matter. The Council practically did nothing. The Seym of Central Lithuania on February 20 passed the subjoined resolution, 96 deputies voting for it and 6 abstaining:

In the Name of Almighty God, We, the Seym of Vilna, elected by the free and universal will of the population of the country of Vilna; possessing fullness of right to decide the fate of this country; remembering the secular ties which, crowned by the treaties of Horodlo and Lublin (1413 and 1569), as well as by the Constitution of May 3, 1791, joined our countries (Poland and Lithuania) in one union; remembering the blood poured out by our ancestors in the national struggles after the wicked partition of the fatherland; rendering homage to the courage and the sacrifice of Polish soldiers and Marshal Pilsudski, the son of this country, as also the heroic action of General Zeligowski; in agreement with the right of the self-determination of peoples; in the name of the population of this country, its present and future generations; aiming at their liberty and their full spiritual and material development:

At the session of February 20 we decide to decree:

1. We regard as irrevocably broken all legal and political ties which were imposed on us by force by the Russian State; likewise, we deny to Russia the right to interfere in questions concerning the country of Vilna;

2. We reject and throw aside for ever the legal and political pretensions to the country of Vilna on the part of the Lithuanian Republic—pretensions set forth in the Lithuanian-Soviet Treaty of July 12, 1920, as well as all other pretensions;

3. We solemnly declare that we shall not recognize any decision

taken by foreign factors contrary to our will respecting the fate of the country and its interior organization;

4. The country of Vilna forms, without reserve or condition, an integral part of the Polish Republic;

5. The Polish Republic alone possesses full sovereignty over this country;

6. Only the competent authorities of the Polish Republic possess, solely and exclusively, the right to decide as regards law and the organization of the country of Vilna, in accordance with the Constitution of the Polish Republic of March 17, 1921;

7. We invite the Seym as constituted and the Government of the Polish Republic to proceed immediately to the execution of the rights and duties resulting from the title of sovereignty of the Polish Republic over the country of Vilna.

This resolution was placed by the Vilna Seym in charge of a delegation of twenty of its members who were ordered to go to Warsaw and bring it officially to the notice of the Polish Government with a view to negotiating an Act of Union between the "country of Vilna" and the Polish Republic. The delegation arrived in Warsaw on March 2, 1922; two days later the rest of the deputies of the Vilna Seym were also there—to find the Polish Government in the throes of a Cabinet crisis. The Ponikowski Cabinet was afraid that the annexation, pure and simple, of Vilna would cause serious international complications. The Right clamoured for incorporation, some of the political groups hesitated, the Left opposed it; the conflict between the incorporationists and the federalists broke out afresh, and when Ponikowski resigned on March 3, 1922, Pilsudski accepted his resignation.

For some weeks previously the position of the Ponikowski Government had been precarious. On February 11, 1922, the Government submitted to the Seym a Bill to give State grants in aid of the agricultural reconstruction of the country; the Seym held up the Bill, but four days afterwards the Government modified the measure; the crisis passed, but it left the Government weaker. The Vilna question next became acute. On February 20 Lithuania sent a Note proposing that the Polish-Lithuanian controversy should be submitted to the International Court at The Hague. The Polish Government replied that the controversy had already been brought before the Council of the League of

Nations, whose decisions had not been accepted by Lithuania; it was useless to take it elsewhere. So far as Vilna was concerned, the representatives of that territory had pronounced unequivocally for union with Poland.

SECOND PONIKOWSKI CABINET

The Ministers of France, England and Italy at Warsaw called on Skirmunt, and told him that the annexation of Vilna, without some form of autonomy, by Poland went beyond the policy of their Governments; international difficulties must therefore arise if annexation was persisted in. When this became known the position of Ponikowski, whose attitude respecting Vilna it supported, was much strengthened. All the groups except the Right designated him for the Premiership again. On March 10 Ponikowski formed another Government, which he presented to the Seym on March 21, and in the course of a speech said that the Government would try to realize the incorporation of Vilna in such a manner as would exclude the possibility of protests from any quarter. Concerning the internal situation he stated that his chief efforts would be directed to the amelioration of the country's finances by finding new sources of revenue and by large economies.

BALTIC STATES CONFER AT WARSAW

Poland's policy was manifested by co-operation with the Little Entente and with the Baltic States. Regarding the former, Poland had a representative in the Conference of Experts which was held at Belgrade in the second week of March 1922, the object of which was to arrange for common action from the economic point of view at the approaching Genoa Conference. A Conference of the Baltic States—Poland, Finland, Estonia and Latvia, Lithuania absenting herself—was held in Warsaw on March 13. Skirmunt was elected president, and the conference terminated on March 17 with the signature of a convention by which the four States recognized reciprocally the treaties they had concluded with Soviet Russia; resolved to enter into administrative and economic agreements for their common benefit; guaranteed the

rights of the National Minorities; and agreed to observe benevolent neutrality if any of them was attacked without provocation on its part.

VILNA INCORPORATED

One of the first things the reorganized Ponikowski Government did was to come to terms with the delegates of the Vilna Seym. The federal idea was completely dropped, and after negotiations between the Government and the delegates an Act of Incorporation was signed by them on March 22, 1922. Two days later the Seym of Poland unanimously decided that the twenty delegates sent by the Vilna Seym to Warsaw should be recognized as the duly constituted representatives of Vilna and district in the Polish Seym; the delegates forthwith took their seats as deputies. On March 28 the Marshal (Speaker) of the Vilna Seym announced the dissolution of that body. Central Lithuania ceased to exist; so far as Poland was concerned all that was lacking to the final settlement of the Vilna question was the recognition by the Allies of the "state of fact" which had been established, but nearly a year elapsed before it was accorded.

The capital levy or *danina* had gone into effect and was well received. For the first quarter of 1922 the total amount collected amounted to twelve milliards of Polish marks, Poznania leading with upwards of five milliards, former Russian Poland coming next with four milliards, and Western Galicia making up the remainder. On the score of economy no fewer than 25,000 Government functionaries were retired. The army was reduced to 250,000 men, with a proportionate lowering of the expenditure. Sikorski, then Chief of the General Staff, told the Seym's Army Commission that while the High Command was animated by the most pacific disposition and was anxious to help in improving the financial position of the country, it did not believe that further reduction in men or money was possible, having regard to the national security. Expenditure on the army had been brought down to 18·5 per cent of the whole expenditure of the State.

Vilna and its territory were taken over by Poland. On April 18 Pilsudski, accompanied by Ponikowski and other Ministers,

Cardinal Dalbor, Polish Primate, and other notables, took part in Vilna in a moving ceremony, in the course of which the president (mayor) of the city presented the keys of Vilna to the Marshal, and an Act was signed consecrating Poland's sovereign rights over the region. Afterwards a *Te Deum* was celebrated in the cathedral by the cardinal. At the banquet which followed, Pilsudski made a speech in which he referred to Lithuania: "I cannot refrain," he said, "from holding out my hand across the barrier which separates us to those of Kovno who perhaps regard this day of our triumph as a day of defeat and of mourning. I cannot abstain from offering my hand and appealing for concord and affection—I cannot regard them otherwise than as brothers." But the "Kovno Government"—the Poles spoke of the "Lithuania of Kovno"—showed what it felt by refusing to have even posts and telegraphs established between the two countries, and obstinately maintained its claim to Vilna. On May 12 Lithuania again requested the Council of the League of Nations to fix the eastern frontiers of Poland.

GENOA CONFERENCE

With Narutowicz as second Polish delegate Skirmunt arrived at Genoa on April 8, 1922, and immediately got into touch with the Little Entente Delegation for the purpose of their concentrating on a common programme. The dominant issue before the conference was the renewal of relations with the Soviet, and this was forced to the front suddenly when it became known on April 17 that Germany had signed the Treaty of Rapallo with Russia behind the back of the conference, which virtually wrecked it.

On March 18 Barthou, head of the French Delegation, strongly advocated that the Inviting Powers should bring Poland and the Little Entente into consultation with them respecting the new situation that had arisen; the proposal was agreed to unanimously, and Skirmunt took an active part in the subsequent discussion. He explained at length how Poland was affected by the Soviet-German treaty, and how she was well aware of the gravity of the "sanctions" proposed by the Allies. "We shall adhere," he said, "to the proposals of the Allies, as we think that the place of Poland is always by the side of the Entente Powers."

Though Lloyd George had expressly declared to Skirmunt that the question of Poland's eastern frontiers would not be raised at the conference without previous consultation with him, yet on May 10 Lloyd George, without informing Skirmunt, did raise the question by strongly insisting at a meeting of the Inviting Powers that the questions of Vilna and Eastern Galicia should be settled by the conference. But Barthou did not concur, and it was decided that these questions should be dealt with by the Political Sub-Commission, which four days later reported that their settlement was not included in the programme of the conference; had the verdict been the opposite Poland was determined to withdraw from the conference. The fact remained that the conference taken as a whole was a failure, which afterwards was made abundantly evident by the failure in June of The Hague Conference.

SOVIET-GERMAN TREATY OF RAPALLO

Both of these conferences were overshadowed by the Treaty of Rapallo and the intransigence of the Soviet. Naturally there was disquiet in Poland and Eastern Europe because of the treaty and its possible outcome. The Soviet ceased to carry out the terms of the Treaty of Riga. It had organized armed bands in Soviet White Russia which attacked their Polish neighbours, and in May the Polish Government had sent a Note to Moscow demanding the putting down of these raiders. Soviet troops continued their concentration in the regions bordering Polish territory; the Soviet Army was being reorganized, it was reported, by German generals. In May the *Eclair* of Paris published what purported to be a military convention between the heads of the Red Army and the German General Staff signed at Berlin on April 3. Poland had good cause to keep on her guard, as against the Soviet, as well as Germany. Another matter for concern was that Finland decided not to ratify the convention agreed to on March 17 by Poland and the Baltic States at Warsaw. On May 31 Skirmunt described to the Seym what had taken place at Genoa; the alliance with France, he declared, had been the basis of Polish policy at the conference, as before it, and the Polish Delegation had done all it could to prevent the conference from failure.

GENEVA CONVENTION RESPECTING UPPER SILESIA

At Geneva a convention concerning Upper Silesia as divided between Poland and Germany was signed on May 15, the document itself being of extraordinary length—605 Articles. The German representative who signed it made a formal declaration that Germany accepted under constraint the decision of the Ambassadors' Conference—and looked to the future for redress! The Seym ratified the convention on May 24, the Reichstag on May 31; there were demonstrations in both Parliaments. In the former the speakers pronounced for ratification, though they complained Poland had not obtained all the territory that should have been hers; in the latter there were signs of mourning—over the building the German flag was half-masted, and in the chamber, in front of Loebe the president, the white-and-yellow standard of Upper Silesia was shrouded in black, with the eagle of Upper Silesia in crape. Six weeks passed before the Polish Government entered into possession, and before that took place a Ministerial crisis in Warsaw, evolving differently in its nature from others that had preceded it, had engendered much excitement.

PONIKOWSKI CABINET RESIGNS

There was a sort of political truce among the groups while the Conference of Genoa was proceeding. Even during this period of relative calm the Government was disturbed by a conflict over the pay of the army, but Pilsudski intervened and effected a compromise. Early in June he intervened again—this time concerning the Government itself, which he took upon himself to dismiss. On June 2, 1922, he invited Ponikowski and the rest of the Government to the Belvedere, his residence, and asked for a statement of its policy; he criticized its actions, and particularly censured Skirmunt for what he considered its weakness touching Soviet Russia. It was plain that the Ministry did not possess his confidence, and Ponikowski and his colleagues decided to resign. A second meeting of the Cabinet with Pilsudski at the Belvedere was arranged for June 6; when it took place the Government was informed by him that he accepted its resignation—virtually it was

dismissed. Hence arose a crisis of the first magnitude between the Seym and Pilsudski, and it lasted for nearly two months.

PILSUDSKI FORCES CRISIS WITH THE SEYM

Next day the heads of the groups in the Seym met to discuss the situation, the real question being whether or not Pilsudski, as Chief of the State, had the right to dismiss the Government; it was agreed to demand explanations from him, as well as from Ponikowski, and Trampczynski, as Marshal of the Seym, went to the Belvedere to inform him of this decision. On June 8 Pilsudski made a declaration justifying what he had done. He said that Poland was standing in the midst of a very difficult period—the general election must be held very shortly, with the result that there would be great political excitement and agitation throughout the country, which would be all the more dangerous because of the instability of the whole international situation, for that instability, which he did not think would soon be terminated, was bound to have its repercussions internally. In these circumstances it was necessary, he maintained, that Poland should have a Government strong enough to uphold her prestige abroad and to cope with feverish conditions at home. The Government which had retired had no great authority such as was indispensable. It had not a firm backing in the Seym. It was conscious of its lack of authority, and it had sought to support itself on his (Pilsudski's) authority as Chief of the State, but the powers of the Chief of the State were extremely limited, and he could not give what he did not possess. What was requisite was a really strong Government.

Steps were taken by Trampczynski to form a new Cabinet, but the majority favoured entrusting Ponikowski with office again; the Seym voted in this sense by 256 votes to 164. Pilsudski declined to give in; when Ponikowski presented himself to him on June 10, he was asked for full information about his policy and forthwith refused to go on Cabinet-making. During the next day or two Pilsudski received in succession representatives of all the groups, and instead of consulting them about forming another Government, requested them to answer a question he had put

into writing, namely, What place with regard to the Seym did the Chief of the State and the party heads hold respectively? On June 12 Pilsudski asked the Seym to interpret the Third Article of the Little Constitution which stated that "The Chief of the State designates the whole Government on the basis of an understanding with the Seym."

The Seym remitted the subject to the Constitutional Commission, which reached no agreement and in its turn referred the matter to a Sub-Commission—with the same result; but on June 16 the Seym in full session passed by 188 votes to 179 a resolution which read: "The initiative, so far as the nomination of the Prime Minister is concerned, belongs in principle to the Chief of the State, but if the Chief of the State does not make a nomination or if his nominee is not accepted by the Seym or by the organ created by it, then it is this organ which, by a majority of votes, designates the Prime Minister." The organ mentioned was an innovation; it was created on June 16, and was called the Principal Commission; on June 24 it voted unanimously that Pilsudski should be invited to exercise the initiative in the formation of a Government.

THE SLIWINSKI CABINET

On June 26 Pilsudski nominated as Cabinet-maker Sliwinski, Vice-President of Warsaw, who immediately began negotiations with the various parties, and by June 26 could count on 226 deputies, while the Opposition numbered 188 deputies. In Sliwinski's Cabinet Narutowicz replaced Skirmunt as Foreign Minister, and Jastrzembski succeeded Michalski as Finance Minister.

The new Government presented itself to Pilsudski on June 30, and to the Seym on July 5. On July 7 the Seym passed a vote of non-confidence in the Government by 201 votes to 195; the Cabinet at once resigned. Pilsudski accepted the resignation, and called on the Seym to appoint another Prime Minister.

After several days of difficult negotiations the Seym nominated Korfanty for the Premiership; he had the support of 219 votes against 205 of the deputies. When Pilsudski was informed of the

decision of the Seym he sent on July 14 a letter to its Marshal, the substance of which was that the Chief of the State would resign rather than endorse the appointment of Korfanty. When Korfanty presented to Pilsudski the list of the names of the Ministers in his Cabinet on July 19, Pilsudski absolutely refused to sign the nominations; Korfanty insisted that he had been given a mandate by the Seym, but the defections from him had now placed him in a minority. The excitement in Parliamentary circles became extreme; both the Right and the Left carried on intemperate campaigns in their respective newspapers; the Left went so far as to declare a general strike, and it violently attacked Korfanty. On July 26 the Seym amid turbulent scenes discussed a motion proposed by the Right of non-confidence in Pilsudski; the Left expressed its full confidence in the Chief of the State, and eventually the motion was rejected by 205 votes to 187, the seceders from the original Korfanty block voting with the Left, who greeted the result of the division with a tremendous ovation to Pilsudski, while the Right quitted the chamber.

THE NOWAK CABINET

The Seym revised its interpretation of the clause in the Little Constitution, and on July 29 asked Pilsudski to assume the initiative.

He nominated as Premier Professor Nowak, of Cracow University, and the Seym approved the selection by 240 votes to 164. The long crisis was at last at an end—in a complete victory for Pilsudski. Nowak's Cabinet, which entered into office on July 31, 1922, and presented itself to the Seym on August 5 as extra-Parliamentary, but desirous of the confidence of the Seym—which gave it by 193 votes to 139. On July 28, 1922, the Seym passed an Electoral Law, and Nowak, in agreement with the Seym, fixed the general election for November 5 for the Seym, and November 12 for the Senate.

POLAND OCCUPIES HER PART OF UPPER SILESIA

While the Parliamentary crisis was at its height Poland entered

into possession of her part of Upper Silesia, the region being

evacuated by the Allied and other forces, regular and irregular, and the powers of the Inter-Allied Commission coming to an end in the period June 15–July 9, 1922. On July 16, Katowice was the scene of a solemn celebration of the reunion of Upper Silesia to Poland, many of the Ministers taking part in it.

Pilsudski himself visited Katowice on August 28, 1922, and a dinner gave him the opportunity of making a striking speech in which he painted a picture of the progress of Poland. He compared the difficult beginnings of Polish independence in 1918 with the position of the country as it was when he was speaking. "In 1918 lands waste, large importations of wheat for the population starving and worn out by the War, railways and rolling stock in ruins, unemployment, no army, no munitions, the enemy on the frontiers! In 1922, not a single pound of wheat imported, but on the contrary, new prospects of exports opening up; trains running normally; unemployment almost unknown! Consequently the situation justifies our best hopes." This was true, but the Polish mark was tumbling again, and in Upper Silesia there was the additional trouble caused by the sharp fall of the German mark. To remedy the latter the Polish Government transferred to Upper Silesia five milliards of Polish money. On September 24 a general election of members of the Seym of Upper Silesia was held; out of 48 seats the Poles carried 34 and the Germans 14; of the Poles elected 18 belonged to the National Block of Korfanty, 8 were Socialists, 7 were of the National Workers (Labour) Party, and 1 was a Populist.

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In connection with foreign policy the visit paid by Pilsudski as Chief of the State to Rumania in September 1922 was of importance. On September 24 Pilsudski met at Sinaia King Ferdinand, who spoke of the ties which united the two States, and Pilsudski in his reply referred to their common interests—"which guided, guide and will guide our two lands on the same pacific road." Duca, Rumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated in an inter-



PRESIDENT NARUTOWICZ

view that the result of the visit was that the alliance would be completed by economic conventions then being negotiated.

STATUTE OF AUTONOMY FOR EASTERN GALICIA

One of the things which occupied the serious attention of the Nowak Government from the outset was the elaboration of a statute dealing with the autonomy of Eastern Galicia, and it remitted the matter to a Commission of Specialists, the work of which was further facilitated by Glabinski, the leader of the Right, submitting a proposal setting forth the general principles respecting the autonomy of the *wojewodies* (counties). The whole question was brought before the Seym on September 26, and the Statute was voted the following day. By it Eastern Galicia was divided administratively into three autonomous wojewodies—Lwow, Stanislavov and Tarnopol—each of which was given a county *Seymik* (little Seym or Diète) to deliberate on administrative and other affairs of local interest. In each *Seymik* the Central Government was represented by the voievode, who had the right to take part in the debates and of suspending them if infringing the general laws of the Republic. The Poles and Ukrainians elected their representatives separately; the Poles and Ukrainians thus elected formed each a *curia* within the *Seymik*, but sitting apart and discussing such matters as were of particular interest to each alone; they met together only when matters interesting to both were discussed. The respective rights of the two nationalities were guaranteed concerning languages, schools, and the distribution of posts. Two special Departments were to be created in connection with the Ministry of Public Instruction and Cults; these were to be staffed by Ukrainians; one was to deal with questions concerning the Uniate Eastern Church (in communion with Rome, but using the Eastern Rite), and the other with public instruction in Ukrainian. Nowak described the Statute as conferring a "large autonomy on Eastern Galicia"—or "Eastern Little Poland," as all Poles called it—"in accordance with the justice and tolerance which were the bases of Poland's policy towards her National Minorities."

END OF FIRST SEYM

After existing for nearly four years the first or Constituent Seym came to an end on September 27, 1922. At that time the Polish mark had not quite half of the value it possessed when the Ponikowski Government fell, about 9,000 marks being needed to buy a dollar. The hopes raised by the legislation of 1921, which seemed successful for some months, were disappointed by the continuous subsequent fall of the mark, its instability making Budgetary calculations completely unreliable. A new stable currency was found, it was hoped, but wrongly, in the *Zloty*, the value of which was put at 1,000 marks or one gold franc; the Seym authorized the zloty, as well as the issue of an internal loan at 8 per cent, the interest being payable half in marks and half in zlotys, as were the original subscriptions, one class of the bonds being for 10,000 marks *and* 10 zlotys, and the other for 50,000 marks *and* 50 zlotys. No one could guess the true value of the mark from day to day, and in November the price of the bonds had to be adjusted to meet the increased depreciation. The loan was well subscribed, but it was soon evident that at best it was only a temporary expedient.

The financial situation worsened, yet the general economic situation of Poland improved enormously during 1922; an excellent harvest put fresh heart into her agriculture and industry alike; and a new factor—the attribution to her of the larger part of industrial Upper Silesia—told or would presently tell greatly in her favour. Her relations with her neighbours were either better than or as good as they had been before. Chicherin passing through Warsaw towards the close of September had meetings with Pilsudski, Nowak and Narutowicz, and promised to implement the Treaty of Riga. In November Poland, Finland, Latvia and Estonia attended a conference on disarmament at Moscow, and on November 23 the Polish-Soviet frontiers were finally delimited. In October a friendly conference of Poland and the Baltic States was held at Reval (Tallinn). At a conference in Dresden, Polish and German representatives met and discussed some of the questions that were open between their countries.

On the other hand, Lithuania again demanded that the Great Allies should exercise their right to "fix the eastern frontiers of Poland," and there was trouble with Czechoslovakia over Jaworzyna.

GENERAL ELECTION, 1922

In an atmosphere of calm and peace the general election for the Seym took place on November 5, 1922, some Communist elements alone proving refractory. The total number of those entitled to vote was 13,109,793, and 8,760,195 went to the polls, or about 67 per cent. The Right, as a solid block, obtained 2,528,256 votes, gained 22 seats, and had 163 seats in all, but not an absolute majority. The Centre, as it had existed in the former Seym, was practically blotted out, having only 6 seats. The Left had about 190 seats, of which the Witos Populists held 70, the Radical Populists 49 and the Socialists 41. The most striking feature of the result of the elections was the large number of seats occupied by the National Minorities—upwards of 80; it was clear from the first that they could, if they acted together, play a decisive part in the new Seym, a fact which was deeply resented by the Right. The general election for the Senate was held on November 12, 1922; the Right got 49 seats; the Centre none; and the Left 36, while the National Minorities had 26. In the Senate, as in the Seym, the National Minorities held the balance.

The majority of the deputies in the second Seym belonged to the *intelligentsia*, whereas the majority in the first were peasants, many of them rather illiterate, and destitute of political experience. Taking into account the extraordinarily difficult political and economic situation of Poland during the first Seym's existence, it should be said that the Parliament did achieve a certain amount of useful work, despite the constant strife of factions and the consequent dilatoriness and fluctuations it exhibited. If Pilsudski's great experiment in founding it on the freest and most democratic franchise did not turn out a wonderful success it could not justly be charged with being an absolute failure. The bound from political servitude to political liberty was too sudden, too dazzling; restraint, discipline, obedience had to be acquired. The

years of bondage had worked into the bones of many Poles a feeling of doubt, even of hostility, to government—to any Government, no matter if it was their own. As a nation the Poles had, as it were, to go to school again to learn and to unlearn, and this was a process for which time was needed. The struggle that centred in the strong, commanding personality of Pilsudski and the Constitutional question associated with him left its mark on the first Seym, as on those that followed it. Soldier and statesman, autocrat and democrat, Pilsudski filled the rôle of Teacher and Schoolmaster as well as Leader of his people. This became clearer later.

SECOND SEYM MEETS

Pilsudski opened the second Seym on November 28, 1922, by reading a message in which he recalled the opening of the first Seym and spoke of the progress the country had made in all directions since those inspiring but anxious days. No longer were the frontiers menaced; there was peace externally, and Poland had the opportunity of giving herself up entirely to the pacific and fruitful work of consolidating the State. Great difficulties had still to be overcome. Later on the same day he opened the first session of the Senate, whose function he described as that of a moderator assuring the equilibrium of the Parliamentary institutions of the country. On December 1, 1922, Rataj, a member of the Witos Populist Party, was elected Marshal of the Seym by 253 votes to 117—a defeat for the Right, for which, however, it received some compensation by the election of Trampczynski, Marshal of the first Seym, as Marshal of the Senate by 56 votes to 41. The next important matter was the election of the President of the Republic. Several names were mentioned, among them those of Paderewski and General J. Haller. During the closing days of November some papers announced that Pilsudski would not be a candidate; this report was soon confirmed. To a delegation of the Left which urged him to change his mind he said that the Constitution did not in his opinion give the President sufficient powers, and he could not endure such an ambiguous position. In his remarks he outlined his conception of the relations that should subsist between the President on the one hand and

the Government, Parliament and the army on the other. What emphasized this declaration of his views was the fact that if he had chosen to stand he would have been elected.

NARUTOWICZ ELECTED PRESIDENT

The presidential election took place on December 9 in the National Assembly, composed of the Seym and the Senate sitting together. Five names were submitted: Zamoyski, then Polish Minister at Paris and the candidate of the Right; Wojciechowski; Professor Baudouin de Courtenay, of Warsaw University; Narutowicz; and Daszynski, the four last named being put forward by parties of the Left. On the first ballot Zamoyski received 222 votes; Wojciechowski, 105; Courtenay, 103; Narutowicz, 62; and Daszynski, 49. Five ballots were taken; Wojciechowski, Courtenay and Daszynski were eliminated; and Narutowicz was elected President by 289 votes to 227 votes for Zamoyski. It was a heavy defeat for the Right, which was infuriated because the result had been brought about by the votes of the National Minorities. On December 11 Narutowicz took the oath of fidelity to the Constitution, and made a speech in which he rendered homage to his "illustrious predecessor Marshal Pilsudski"; he declared that he would "follow faithfully Pilsudski's policy of peace, justice and impartiality towards all Polish citizens without distinction of origin or opinion."

Great excitement reigned in Warsaw; there were violent incidents in the streets; the Right absented itself *en bloc* from the ceremony of the oath-taking by the President; one of the Ministers resigned; the chief of the police was dismissed. Next day the working classes of Warsaw organized a twelve hours' strike as a protest against the excesses of the partisans of the Right. A treacherous calm followed. On December 14 Narutowicz went to the Belvedere where Pilsudski, surrounded by the Prime Minister, the Marshals of Seym and Senate, the members of the Cabinet and other dignitaries, awaited his coming, and thereafter participated in the transmission of his powers to the new Head of the State. Early in the afternoon the Marshal left the Belvedere, which had been his residence while Chief of the State. Immediately after his

installation Narutowicz received the Prime Minister, who, in accordance with the Constitution, offered the resignation of the Government.

NARUTOWICZ ASSASSINATED

But the political atmosphere was still charged with passion and hate, and two days later the President, while attending an Art Exhibition, was assassinated by three shots from a revolver fired by a Nationalist fanatic named Niewiadomski, who was arrested at once. At his trial he stated that he had long intended to strike at Pilsudski and had shot Narutowicz, since he would be only the docile instrument of Pilsudski if he lived; Niewiadomski said that he believed Pilsudski would be the ruin of Poland.

At first it was suspected that the assassination was part of a widespread conspiracy, but it appeared from the trial that the murderer, who was found guilty, sentenced to death and executed, had acted entirely on his own initiative. Such a crime had never before been committed in the history of Poland; that it took place showed only too plainly to what a pitch of intensity the spirit of faction had gone.

THE SIKORSKI CABINET

According to the Constitution Rataj, as Marshal of the Seym, became provisional President, and on the advice of Pilsudski he called on Sikorski, then Chief of the General Staff, to form a Government; the general accepted the task, took over the Ministry of the Interior for himself, and his vigorous measures, which included the proclamation of a state of siege (martial law) in Warsaw, had immediately a tranquillizing effect on the general situation. A new appointment was that of Skrzynski, formerly Polish Minister at Bucarest, as Foreign Minister. Pilsudski was nominated Chief of the General Staff provisionally.

WOJCIECHOWSKI ELECTED PRESIDENT

On December 20 the National Assembly elected Wojciechowski President of Poland by 298 votes to 221 given to Professor Morawski, of Cracow University, the candidate of the Right, the majority being composed of the same parties as before.

Wojciechowski was a member of the Witos Populist Party, though he had been a Socialist in pre-War days when he collaborated with Pilsudski on the *Robotnik*; he had been Minister of the Interior under Paderewski, and had remained a friend of Pilsudski.

The new President addressed a message to the nation in which he implored the Poles to eliminate ill feeling and to build up the Republic by hard work and in accordance with the law. The most urgent needs of the country were, he said, a strong and stable Government which had the confidence of the Seym, and a balanced Budget, the national expenditure being met out of the national income. When, according to custom, Sikorski and the Cabinet resigned, he asked them to remain in office.

BUDGET DIFFICULTIES

The Government was faced with the financial problem the solution of which was becoming ever more difficult. In January 1923 it took 35,000 Polish marks to buy a dollar—twice as many as in the previous month. Late in December 1922 Sikorski had invited all the former Finance Ministers of the Republic to attend a conference in Warsaw on January 9, 1923, under the aegis of the President in order to draft a programme of reform. The conference drew up a plan based on the equilibrium of the Budget and the stabilization of the mark. The need was recognized of increasing the revenue, and of decreasing the expenditure at the same time; but loans were to be contracted for making up the deficiency so as to balance the Budget. It was decided to establish the Budget on the basis of a fixed monetary unit—the gold franc—and to impose a new extraordinary tax on aggregate incomes, to be paid in six equal instalments, once every six months, in 1924, 1925, and 1926, the total yield being estimated at one milliard gold francs. Agriculture was to pay 500 millions, industry and commerce 375 millions, and the other taxpayers were to find the rest, but it was provided that if the yield from these three sources should prove to be insufficient, the scale of the tax was to be increased proportionately for the three groups in order to

obtain for the State the full milliard of gold francs. General taxation was to be raised considerably.

But the mark was still the sole legal tender—and it depreciated daily; it was necessary to establish the revenues of the State in a stable currency; this was not done, however, till late in the year. By that time three Finance Ministers had tried their hand at solving the problem without success, and a fourth, made financial dictator, was embarking on a desperate effort to find a way out, with the mark at six millions to the dollar. Jastrzembski resigned in January 1923 and was succeeded on January 13 by L. Grabski. The Seym resumed on January 16, and three days later Sikorski said that financial equilibrium would be assured by an increase of taxation, but even while he was speaking the mark was slipping, slipping down; no one dreamt to what depths it would descend.

POLISH FOREIGN POLICY OF PEACE

Sikorski on January 19 spoke of the foreign policy of Poland. The assassination of Narutowicz and tendentious stories spread abroad by hostile papers, which went so far as to say that the Republic was reproducing the “anarchy” of former days, had at first caused disquiet in Western countries, but the effective way in which the Government handled the situation quickly dispelled all apprehensions. Poland was at peace within herself. She desired, said the Prime Minister, the maintenance of peace in Europe on the basis of law and respect for existing treaties—that was the unchangeable foreign policy of the State. Poland wished not only to consolidate but to enlarge the alliance with France; their fraternity would contribute greatly to the consolidation of European equilibrium. Then, with the Ruhr and the consequent conflict between France and England in the thoughts of all, he went on: “The guarantees of that equilibrium consist in a close union between France and England, and its maintenance is a direct interest of Poland, who will work to improve her relations with England, in the hope that in the future course of international events England will come to appreciate the importance of Poland as a factor making for stability in the East.” He referred to the alliance with Rumania and the desire for good relations with the



PRESIDENT WOJCIECHOWSKI

Little Entente, deplored that relations with Lithuania were still not normal, and stated that Poland had lodged a protest with the Ambassadors' Conference against the "violation of Memel." After a long debate on the Governmental declaration the Seym passed a vote of confidence on the Sikorski administration by 320 votes to 110; this majority appeared conclusive of the solidity of the Government, but disintegration set in before many weeks elapsed, the second Seym manifesting the same political instability as the first.

MEMEL QUESTION

After remaining in the background for more than three years the question of Memel thrust itself to the front by the occupation of the port and the surrounding district by a force of Lithuanian partisans on January 10-15, 1923. By Article 99 of the Versailles Treaty Germany renounced Memel in favour of the Allies, and an Inter-Allied Commission, presided over by a French representative, was in provisional charge of the town and district. The Allies had been in no hurry to settle the question, probably because of the preponderantly German nationality of the territory; Lithuania laid claim to it, however, on nationalist, and even more on economic grounds, Memel being her only possible outlet to the sea; Poland opposed Lithuania's claim, because the port, if the natural maritime outlet for Lithuania, was also the natural outlet for the Polish territory lying in the basin of the Niemen. On January 19 a meeting held at Heydekrug in Memel territory declared for the union of Memelland, as an autonomous region, with Lithuania, the Seym of which, four days afterwards, authorized the Lithuanian Government to effect this union, a proceeding which caused a great commotion in Poland and brought the Ambassadors' Conference into action, a Commission of Inquiry being dispatched to Memel. On February 16, 1923, the Ambassadors' Conference decided to constitute an autonomous district of Memel under the sovereignty of Lithuania, on condition that the economic interests of Poland were safeguarded in the Statute governing the case.

Another phase of the Polish-Lithuanian controversy was

reached when the Council of the League of Nations on February 3, 1923, came to a final recommendation respecting fixing the line of demarcation between Poland and Lithuania in the neutral zone which had been in existence for more than two years; the Council described this line in detail. The Lithuanian delegate declared that Lithuania would oppose this decision by all the means in her power. Some days later the Polish Government requested the Ambassadors' Conference to fix the eastern frontiers of Poland, in accordance with Article 87 of the Versailles Treaty; the Lithuanian Government had made several requests to the same effect during the preceding year. On March 14, 1923, the Ambassadors' Conference decided to recognize the line fixed by the Council of the League as the frontier of Poland and Lithuania. Lithuania said she would not accept the decision, though she had repeatedly asked for one. Poland, satisfied that the recommendation of the Council of the League would be adopted by the Ambassadors, began to take possession of her share of the neutral zone on February 15; Lithuanian irregulars made some resistance, but no serious fighting occurred.

POLAND'S EASTERN FRONTIERS FIXED

The fixation by the Ambassadors' Conference on March 14, 1923, of Poland's eastern frontiers included the frontier with Soviet Russia; the Ambassadors recognized the frontier traced by the Treaty of Riga. The news of the decision was received with great rejoicing in Poland. On March 19 a *Te Deum* was sung by Cardinal Kakowski in the cathedral at Warsaw, in presence of President Wojciechowski, the members of the Government and many distinguished people. Great joy was manifested in Vilna and Lwow, the Vilna question and the Eastern Galicia question being definitively settled. The protocol respecting the fixation of the eastern frontiers was signed on March 15, 1923, at the Quai d'Orsay by Poincaré for France, Phipps for England, Avezzana for Italy and Matsuda for Japan; Zamoyski, Polish Ambassador in Paris, signed the document in token of Poland's acceptance of the decision.

Gdynia Begun

Poland's debt to France for munitions was liquidated at this time by a loan from France of 400 million francs (afterwards reduced to 300 millions). An internal loan in the shape of Treasury bonds for fifty million zlotys at 6 per cent was issued in April, the value of the zloty being put at 8,000 marks. Relief was temporary, and the fall of the mark was not arrested. Despite her financial difficulties Poland was able to vote funds towards the building of a port of her own on the part of the Baltic littoral assigned to her. The creation of this port, called Gdynia, was dictated mainly by her economic necessities, but it also clearly had a political bearing. The port of Danzig alone was not enough for the assured growth of her maritime trade and commerce, but the constant disputes in which the exaggerated Germanism of the Danzigers involved her and the fact that Danzig could not properly be a Polish naval port, could scarcely fail to impart to Gdynia a political significance. In the past when Poland had been in her prime Danzig had been a great Polish port, but the Poles themselves had not been a seafaring people. Far-sighted Poles in 1920-21—chief among them Julius Rummel—were urging on their countrymen that in Poland's new position it was necessary for them to look to the sea to ensure full national prosperity. A training ship was stationed in Danzig waters in 1921. Polish and foreign experts chose Gdynia as the best site for a port, and some preliminary work was done. In the course of a tour of Pomerania President Wojciechowski visited Gdynia on April 29, 1923, accompanied by Sikorski, several other Ministers, and the Marshals of the Seym and the Senate, and saw the beginnings of the enterprise—which the Danzigers ridiculed.

In the spring of 1923 Polish politics underwent a remarkable change by the undermining of the combination of the parties in the Seym on which the Sikorski Government really rested. The majority of the Government was composed of the Left and the National Minorities; the Right had all along maintained that there should be a purely Polish majority in Parliament governing the country, and this view appealed to Witos and other moderate

Populists. Besides, some of the deputies of the National Minorities were accused of treasonable activities against the State; two White Russians were charged with high treason, as was also a Ukrainian deputy; when their arrests were being discussed in the Seym, the Witos group supported the Right. The Populists were also given to understand by the Right that their adhesion would be followed by an enforcement of the Agrarian Reform Law, which so far had been almost a dead letter. Negotiations took place openly at Cracow in April between Witos and other leading Populists on the one side and Korfanty, Glabinski and other members of the Right on the other. A common programme on internal and external policy was drawn up, but action in the Seym was postponed in view of the forthcoming visit to Poland of Marshal Foch.

MARSHAL FOCH VISITS POLAND

Foch crossed the frontier on May 2, was welcomed by Sosnkowski on behalf of the Polish Government, and presented with the baton of a marshal of the Polish Army in the name of President Wojciechowski. He went to Warsaw, where he was met at the station by Sikorski and Pilsudski, and the chiefs of the Allied Military Missions. Next day he attended a great review of troops in connection with the inauguration by the President of a statue of Poniatowski, the Polish marshal of Napoleon. In the evening he was the guest of honour at a banquet given by Sikorski, who, when toasting him, prefaced his speech by addressing him as "Marshal of France, Great Britain and Poland," and referred to him as representing "our sister France." Foch spent nearly the whole of May 5 with Pilsudski discussing military matters. Two days later he was in Poznan, returned to Warsaw for a rest, and next visited Lwow and Cracow, recrossing the frontier on May 13. During his visit he saw a good deal of the Polish Army, and expressed his satisfaction with it. Warsaw was also visited by Lord Cavan, Chief of the British General Staff, and other British officers; they too saw something of the Polish Army, and Cavan said he would report to Lord Derby, Minister of War, how profound an impression it had made upon him.

SECOND WITOS CABINET

On May 26 the Sikorski Government was overthrown in the Seym on a question of credits by 278 votes to 116, and immediately resigned. Wojciechowski called on Witos to form a Government—which he did on May 28, 1923. On June 1 Witos made a declaration of his policy in the Seym; he began by stating that the Government had the support of a purely Polish majority, but the Cabinet did not regard itself as a party one, and was far from taking up a chauvinistic attitude towards the National Minorities. Foreign policy would continue on the same lines as before. Domestic policy would be concerned with Budget equilibrium, agrarian reform and the extension of legislation in favour of the working classes. The Seym passed a vote of confidence in the new Government by 226 votes to 171, the figures showing already a change against it of some 50 votes as compared with those when the Sikorski Government was turned out.

PILSUDSKI RESIGNS FROM THE ARMY

By far the most striking result of the installation of the second Witos administration and the coming into power of the Right was the resignation by Pilsudski on May 29 of the posts of Chief of the General Staff and President of the Superior War Council, which he had held under the Sikorski Government, and his decision to retire into private life. He was under no illusions with respect to the hostility of the Witos Government, and the action of Witos himself, who in the general election had figured as his supporter, in forming an alliance with his bitterest enemies filled him with disgust. "Serve under such people!" cried the Marshal; "Never!" His resignation as Chief of the General Staff was immediately accepted, and General S. Haller was his successor. Szeptycki, one of his adversaries, became Minister of War. On June 28 the Seym, at the instance of the Witos Government, who did not wish to drive the Marshal too far, passed a resolution, by 162 votes to 88, the rest of the deputies abstaining, to the effect that "Joseph Pilsudski, both as Chief of the State and as Com-

mander-in-Chief, has rendered meritorious service to the Nation." Some days later Parliament awarded him a pension for life of about £600 a year, equal to the salary of a Prime Minister. He never spent the money on himself or his family, but handed it over, as received, to Vilna University. He had never used his position to benefit himself financially, and when he retired he was penniless; he had always lived simply, not to say hardly, and he continued to do so. He maintained himself at Sulejowek by his pen.

On July 2, at the close of a discussion in the Superior War Council, Pilsudski announced his decision to quit the army. Next day his political friends and admirers entertained him at a banquet in Warsaw; to the toast of his health he replied in a speech the language of which was memorable in the light of what took place some three years afterwards. He insisted that "moral values" were at stake in the political struggle that was going on in Poland. "The Republic," he said, "is returning to the bad habits of former days, and great efforts will be needed to make it re-enter the road of moral renewal." As if to give point to these efforts, he wore on this occasion his old Legion uniform; he affirmed that he had regained his liberty in order to play an active political rôle. On August 6 the Marshal presided over the annual congress of the legionaries which was held that year at Lwow, and he delivered speeches in praise of the Polish soldier at Vilna and elsewhere; but he devoted most of his time to writing memoirs of Narutowicz and articles, some of which appeared in the *Kurjer Polski*. However, the army still regarded him as its chief, and he quietly kept in touch with it.

RUMANIAN SOVEREIGNS IN WARSAW

Accompanied by Bratianu, Prime Minister, and Duca, Foreign Minister, of Rumania, King Ferdinand and Queen Marie returned the visit which Pilsudski, as Chief of the State, had paid to Rumania during 1922. The Rumanian sovereigns arrived in Warsaw on June 24, and were received with enthusiasm, the importance of the alliance of Poland and Rumania being empha-

sized. After visiting Cracow and Lwow they returned home on June 29. In that month the Witos Government was shaken by the continued financial crisis. Negotiations for loans abroad were not successful, and the situation did not improve. In the summer and autumn several strikes occurred among the workers because of the rise in the cost of living; these increased the difficulties of the Government; the catastrophic daily tumble-tumble of the German mark reacted unfavourably on the Polish mark; in spite of all, the Government preserved an optimistic front, abolished Ministries, reduced the number of functionaries, and made other economies, while striving at the same time to check speculation and to control prices. The capital levy was imposed. In October the Government invited Hilton Young, an English financial expert, to act as its financial adviser, and he got to work without delay. The situation, as in Germany, grew worse. Yet it was not the calamitous fall of the mark that brought about the fall of the Witos Government some weeks later; it was a question of domestic politics.

WITOS OVERTHROWN

The Seym resumed on October 9, 1923. Witos made a statement in which he admitted that the political and economic restoration of the country was difficult, but asserted that persevering work would accomplish it. On October 17 the Seym passed a vote of confidence in the Government by 208 votes to 197—a much reduced majority. At the end of the month Korfanty was brought into the Cabinet as Vice-Premier and Dmowski became Foreign Minister, the evident intention being to strengthen the Government by the inclusion of these Chiefs of the Right. A few days previously a quarter of a million workers had gone on strike at Lodz; there were strikes elsewhere; a general strike was proclaimed at Cracow on October 27, but was not put in force throughout the country till November 5–6; serious rioting occurred at Cracow. The situation was growing desperate. Meanwhile in the Seym politics centred once more on the question of agrarian reform, towards the solution of which Witos had done something by creating in July 1923 a Ministry of Agrarian

Reform and by passing legislation looking to the carrying out in a modified form of the Agrarian Reform Act of 1920. Not a few of Witos's own followers disapproved of his action as not radical enough; this in the end precipitated a crisis which was fatal, and on December 14 Witos resigned.

CHAPTER VII

FINANCIAL RESTORATION AND RELAPSE

1924-1925

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Not since 1920 had Poland experienced so critical a situation; then, the menace had come from without; now, it came from within. Five years had passed since the liberation of the country, and during that short period no fewer than eleven Governments had had their brief and troubled day; nearly all of them had been extra-Parliamentary, and all had been more or less the sport of faction. Wojciechowski called on L. Grabski, who on December 18, 1923, was able to constitute a Cabinet—but again it was a Government of an extra-Parliamentary character. Grabski became Prime Minister and Finance Minister.

SECOND GRABSKI CABINET

When the new Government presented itself to the Seym on December 20, 1923, Grabski told the deputies that the principal task of himself and his colleagues, as of the country, was the restoration of the financial situation; until it was achieved the Government must be given plenary powers in the domain of finance. The Seym, well aware that it had failed, was ready to abdicate as required by Grabski; it accepted his declaration by 193 votes to 76 on December 22, the opposition coming entirely from the National Minority groups. Parliament adjourned till after the holidays. Meanwhile the mark continued its fall and the cost of living its rise.

ITS FINANCIAL PROBLEM

Put briefly, the problem to be solved by the Government was to balance the Budget in the face of a mountainous Treasury deficit. It was some time before the real source of the trouble was recognized in the inflation of the currency, the printing and issuing

of notes by the Government to make up deficiencies in its income and the consequent impoverishment of everyone concerned, as was made very plain by Hilton Young in his *Report on Financial Conditions in Poland*, which was submitted to Grabski in February 1924.

The various attempts which had been made by Polish Governments to retrieve the situation had been ineffective. Taxation had been increased—but not enough; expenditure had been lowered—but not enough; the zloty had been introduced—but in terms of the unstable mark and had itself therefore no stability; insufficient loans had been raised—and so on. A real step towards a solution of the crisis that went on developing in severity was the passing of an Act on December 6, 1923—one of the last things done by the Witos Government—which placed on a gold basis or “valorized” all imposts, Customs, taxes, railway and postal tariffs, as well as the credits granted by the State and other public authorities. The principles of the programme of reform had been enunciated in the beginning of 1923, but the ineffectiveness of the Seym had been demonstrated in this, as in other affairs, by the dilatoriness of the legislation needed to give effect to them. The Seym recognized its abject failure in finance, a failure emphasized when in January 1924 the mark fell 50 per cent farther, nine and a quarter million marks being then the price of the dollar.

GRABSKI FINANCIAL DICTATOR

The Seym was panic-stricken, and on January 11, 1924, it passed on the demand of the Government an Act giving the Finance Minister plenary powers in financial matters; in effect, the Seym made Grabski financial dictator of the State. The aim of the Act was defined as the “restoration of the Treasury of the State and the reform of the monetary system.” To realize these objects the Act envisaged increased taxation and its enforced collection; sweeping economies in State administration which were “indispensable to avoid a Budgetary deficit”; the transference from the State to the local authorities of certain expenditures which more properly belonged to the latter; the raising of loans up to a half-milliard of gold francs on special guarantees; the sale,

up to a value of a hundred million gold francs, of certain commercial and industrial undertakings that had hitherto been conducted by the State; the reorganization of the banking institutions of the State; the establishment of a new monetary system, with a stable value to the zloty, which was to cause the permanent suppression of the mark; the creation of a Bank of Issue and the liquidation of the *Polska Krajowa Kasa Pozyczkowa* (Polish State Loan Bank); and the conversion and consolidation of former loans and other State obligations.

BUDGET BALANCED

Grabski took prompt action. By estimating the Budget for periods of one month, he was able to supervise each detail of the financial situation, and his energy was such that the Budget was balanced as from February 1, 1924; on the same date inflation was decidedly checked by a decree suppressing the issue of marks. On April 14, 1924, an important part of his programme was carried out by a decree establishing the zloty as the sole monetary unit with the fixed value of the Swiss franc. The official ratio between the mark and the zloty was established at 1,800,000 marks to one zloty; the two units circulated together till July 1, 1924, when the zloty became sole legal tender. On April 15 another decree confirmed the Statutes of the *Bank Polski* (Bank of Poland) as the Bank of Issue; it was a private joint stock bank, the shares of which were taken up by public subscription; its capital was a hundred million zlotys (raised in October 1927 to one hundred and fifty million zlotys but reduced to one hundred millions again in February 1936), and it had the exclusive right of issuing banknotes. It opened for business on April 28, 1924.

THE BANK OF POLAND

The decree dealing with the establishment of a Bank of Issue was published on January 20, 1924. The Government stated that it would reserve 25 per cent of the share capital for itself, but it reduced the amount to 10 per cent because more than the

whole capital was publicly subscribed; from industry came 33 per cent, from agriculture 8 per cent, from co-operative societies 8 per cent, from banks 17 per cent, from commerce 5 per cent, from Government officials 17 per cent and the remainder from other sources. The share capital was entirely in gold, foreign currencies or foreign exchange. The exclusive right to issue bank-notes was conferred on the Bank for forty years, subject to extension. For its notes in circulation there had to be a cover of 30 per cent in gold or foreign exchange; 70 per cent had to be covered in its entirety by bills of exchange possessing the requisite guarantees and by reserves of metal currency estimated at its gold value. In return for its monopoly of the issue of notes the Bank had to grant the State a credit of fifty million zlotys. Part of the business of the institution was the liquidation of the Polish State Loan Bank. Also on behalf of the State the Bank undertook to exchange marks, the maximum issue of which had reached nearly 600,000,000 millions on March 3, 1924, for zlotys, the number of zlotys required for the operation being about 317,000,000. During the first three months of its existence the Bank exchanged for zlotys upwards of 90 per cent of the marks that had been in circulation, the rest being exchangeable till the close of 1925.

To help matters the Government was authorized to mint gold coins—100, 50, 20 and 10 zlotys pieces—to any extent required; silver coins—5, 2 and 1 zlotys pieces—to the equivalent of 8 zlotys *per capita*; and nickel and bronze coins in groszy—100 to the zloty—up to the value of 4 zlotys *per capita*. Until the small coinage was manufactured the Finance Minister was empowered to issue corresponding fractional currency notes, exchangeable later for the metal coins or for Bank of Poland notes.

FINANCIAL REFORMS

Among other reforms was the commercialization of the railways, which had been running at a loss entailing heavy subsidies from the State. The railways were thoroughly reorganized and placed on a self-supporting basis. The whole administration of the

State itself was simplified; superfluous services and offices were eliminated, one entire Ministry—Posts and Telegraphs—was suppressed (it was revived, however, in 1927); and a general policy of staff reduction was carried out—a process that, beginning as far back as 1921, resulted in a reduction in all of some 40,000 officials. A first payment on the score of the capital levy fell due early in 1924 and materially assisted the revenue, which was also substantially augmented by increasing the land tax, the income tax and the industrial tax.

Inflation had been going on for three years, and had had a profound influence on the whole economic life of the country. For some time it seemed to favour the reconstruction and development alike of agriculture and industry, with a remarkable expansion in production; and the depreciation of the currency, by maintaining home prices at a lower level than those of the world markets, assisted exports. The depreciation of the currency had also the effect of stimulating the demand for goods which represented real and more or less stable values; the public rushed to buy goods before prices rose, a process relatively much slower than the fall of the mark; in other words, goods were accumulated instead of currency, as that appeared to be the more profitable proceeding. With the stabilization of the currency the situation changed completely. Goods were abundant, money was lacking; supply far outran demand. Wages and costs did not fall, but rose in general, and industrial production greatly diminished. Neither did the cost of living fall, particularly in the cities and industrial centres. Unemployment vastly increased. On top of all these things there came in that year 1924 a bad harvest. It was a most discouraging economic situation, and it was not surprising that in the end it defeated revenue expectations. But that was not evident till later in 1924. Not only were the shares of the Bank of Poland oversubscribed, but a Loan to establish the railways on an independent footing was taken up by the public. The *moral* of the nation was strong and still confident. At the start the Seym had entrusted Grabski with plenary powers for six months; at the end of that period it willingly gave him the same powers for another six months.

THE STATE BANKS

Part of the Grabski programme was the reorganization or creation of banks of a State character, and the economic situation stressed the need for carrying it out. Thus the State Land Bank was reorganized by decree on May 14, 1924, one of its chief functions being the financing of the agrarian reform, and another the granting of credits to landowners and peasants. Its capital was provided mainly by the State. Another institution, the National Economic Bank, was established by decree on May 30, 1924, and in it were merged several Government credit institutions. Its business was to grant long-term credits and loans by means of mortgage debentures, and municipal and railway bonds and shares; to co-operate with and support municipal banking institutions; to encourage building and reconstruction throughout the country; and to transact ordinary banking, with special reference to assisting State and municipal undertakings. The capital of this bank came primarily from Treasury grants, but for its long-term advances the bank depended on obtaining money by the selling of bonds and debentures abroad. Another State institution, the Post Office Savings Bank, was reorganized, and its progress was assisted by currency stabilization.

Revenue was obtained through internal loans: Treasury bonds and notes at 5 and 6 per cent; and lottery bonds at 5 per cent in dollars which yielded about eight million zlotys by May 1, 1924. The Government also raised a loan of 400 million lire at 7 per cent, redeemable in twenty years, for the introduction of the Tobacco Monopoly, and guaranteed on the revenue from the monopoly. This loan, floated by an Italian bank at Milan, was oversubscribed eleven times.

THE NATIONAL MINORITIES

The Grabski Government had been given plenary powers only in the domain of finance, and the two great questions of the putting into force of the agrarian reform and of the National Minorities had still to be dealt with; the latter was the more urgent, for not only was it a disturbing factor in the internal

life of the country, but it also affected the external relations of the State, chiefly in and through the League of Nations. At that time Poland was not a member of the Council, and her interests at Geneva were taken care of by a representative, who during the second half of 1923 and the first half of 1924 was Skirmunt, then Polish Minister at London. The Minorities Treaty of 1919, to which Poland had subscribed, had in effect constituted the League guardian of the National Minorities; the League had besides before it the Memel question and Danzig; and it had been appealed to in the Jaworzyna dispute between the Poles and the Czechoslovaks.

The last-named matter had been decided against Poland by The Hague International Court in December, 1923; it was got completely out of the way when a protocol was signed by Poland and Czechoslovakia at Cracow on March 6, 1924.

LITHUANIA GETS MEMEL

In December 1923 the Council of the League had sent to Memel a commission, headed by an American, to investigate and report on the situation. The commission submitted its report and a draft convention to the Council which it approved in March 1924. This convention, which was accepted by the Great Allies, differed from the draft agreement proposed by the Ambassadors' Conference in July 1923; under it Poland was to have a free zone in the port of Memel and the freedom of the Niemen as a waterway, as well as a share in the control of the port; but Lithuania had refused to accept it, and the Ambassadors had remitted the affair to the League. The main points of the convention were that the Lithuanian Government should study the possibility of abolishing duties on the import and export of timber before May 1, 1925—Poland wanted free floatage of logs on the Niemen; that all foreigners residing in Memel and its territory must conform to Lithuanian law—Poles were to have no privileges; and that a Port Council was to be created comprising a Lithuanian, a native of Memel and a delegate of the League of Nations. Vilna, the chief town in the Polish hinterland of Memel, protested; the Seym protested, but in vain. On May 8, 1924, Lithuania

signed the convention, which practically conferred on her sovereign rights over Memel and its territory. A month later the Ambassadors' Conference called on Poland and Lithuania to negotiate a *modus vivendi* with respect to the Niemen; Poland was willing, but Lithuania held aloof, and clamoured for Vilna, though the Vilna question was definitely settled. In England the view was expressed that the attribution of Memel to Lithuania should be accepted by her as full compensation for Vilna, but this opinion found no echo in Lithuania.

NATIONAL MINORITIES EXPLOITED AGAINST POLAND

The question of the National Minorities was incapable of any quick solution, either by the League of Nations or any particular State affected by it. Poland had large National Minorities within her territory; there were large Polish Minorities in other lands. If there was any real solvent, apart from common interests, it was time alone. As it was, the question affected Poland's relations with Germany and Soviet Russia. In Poland the *Kresy* gave an easy opening to the intrigues of the Third International, the instrument of Soviet attack. During 1921-23 there had been disorder and agitation in these regions; it came out that the unrest was financed from Moscow. In Western Poland the German Minority had greatly declined, and German propaganda asserted that this emigration had been compulsory, though it was voluntary in very large measure; the former German officials had cleared out, and other Germans with short roots in the country or no roots at all had returned home.

BY GERMANY

Late in December 1923 the Council of the League of Nations had before it the case of German colonists who had been expelled from Poland, and it decided, against the Polish contention, that these colonists were entitled to indemnities. The German Government expelled from the Reich a certain number of its Polish citizens; the Polish Government retaliated by applying similar treatment to an equal number of its German citizens, the upshot being that the Poles who had been expelled from Germany also

received indemnities. In March 1924 the Council considered certain difficulties arising out of claims to Polish nationality in Upper Silesia, invited the Polish and German Governments to negotiate respecting the matter, and failing a successful issue, to have recourse to the mediation of the president of the Arbitral Tribunal of Upper Silesia. On March 25, 1924, the German Government sent a Note to the Polish Government complaining of the treatment of the German Minority in Polish Upper Silesia. The Polish Government replied that in conformity with her Constitution Poland accorded to all her citizens, irrespective of race, full liberty and the protection of equal laws, no concrete case in which German interests were injuriously affected had been made out; no reason had been adduced for any modification of the Polish authorities' attitude towards the German population, as it was in accordance with the law and was perfectly correct.

BY SOVIET RUSSIA

Soviet Russia, too, raised the question of Poland's National Minorities by sending on May 10, 1924, a Note to the Polish Minister at Moscow accusing the Polish Government of oppressing these minorities and of breaking the provisions of the Treaty of Riga—the reference was to the non-Polish peoples in the *Kresy*, who were alleged to be discriminated against in the distribution of land, to be kept in a state of illiteracy, to be deprived of their churches, and to have their papers censored. The Polish Government replied in a Note repelling the Soviet's accusations, which, it stated, were in any case inadmissible since they were an interference in the internal affairs of Poland. There was no breach by Poland of the Riga Treaty; good relations between Poland and Soviet Russia would be advanced if the latter, instead of busying itself with unjustified accusations, was to execute loyally and strictly the obligations it had undertaken in the Riga Treaty.

FALSE IMPRESSIONS OF POLAND

In one way or another an impression was produced abroad that Poland was failing to fulfil her obligations under the Minorities

Treaty of 1919. Even in France this impression led a number of people in May 1924 to sign a protest against what was alleged to be the ill-treatment in Polish prisons of persons belonging to the National Minorities and other political prisoners. On May 24 the Polish Legation in Paris published a *communiqué*: "Certain Paris papers have published a protest against a so-called 'White Terror' which reigns in the prisons of Poland. The Legation is authorized by the Polish Government to deny in the most formal manner this assertion which is destitute of any foundation."

FAVOURABLE LANGUAGE LAWS FOR NATIONAL MINORITIES

In the party warfare of Poland it was the Left which had taken the side of the National Minorities; the Right thought it had good reason to suspect their loyalty to the State. But the Constitution had given them fullness of citizenship, and Grabski introduced and carried three Laws dealing with the subject, the Seym passing them on July 10, 1924. They established the use, along with Polish, of the White Russian, Ukrainian and Lithuanian languages in the regions where these languages were spoken, in the administration, schools and courts. Instruction in a Minority tongue was also legalized in private schools; further, it was provided that in areas where the non-Polish minority amounted to twenty-five per cent of the population instruction might be given in White Russian, Ukrainian or Lithuanian, as the case might be, if the parents of forty children desired it. Arrangements were envisaged by which these Minority languages would have a fair share in the higher schools and educational institutions of the country.

BORDER AFFRAYS

In mid-May 1924 men armed with rifles and grenades attacked and plundered a village near Vilna, two policemen being killed and several people severely wounded; another band attacked a farm a few miles away, killed the proprietor, and pillaged the place. These bands were believed to come from Lithuania, and the outrages they had committed led the Polish Government to reinforce the frontier guards with troops in the region of Vilna, Bialystok and Novogrodek. A more serious affair occurred early

in August, when three bands armed with machine guns, rifles and grenades, crossed from the Soviet side and attacked Stolpce, several persons being killed and others wounded, and offices and private residences despoiled. It was about this time that the Polish Government found guilty of espionage four employees of the Soviet Legation in Warsaw. An employee of the Soviet Trade Delegation when arrested had in his possession hundreds of proclamations intended to stir up a general strike in Silesia. On August 8, 1924, Skrzynski, who had succeeded Zamoyski as Foreign Minister in July, handed to the Soviet Minister in Warsaw a strong Note, in which it was said that the attack on Stolpce was prepared on Soviet territory, and that the Soviet authorities must have been cognizant of the preparations; the Polish Government demanded that a stop should be put to such outrages. The Soviet replied that it would cause an investigation to be made.

STRIKE IN POLISH UPPER SILESIA

In the beginning of August 1924 a serious strike broke out in Upper Silesia. The question was concerned with hours of work, which were limited in Poland to eight hours a day by one of the earliest laws of the liberated State, whose whole "Social" legislation was of an advanced character. In German Silesia the Reich, under its own economic pressures, introduced the ten hours day, and Polish Silesia was forced to follow suit. In Soviet Russia the twelve hours day was in operation, yet Bolsheviks actively fomented the strike in Polish Silesia and tried to extend it to the Polish industrial region of Dombrova—there they failed, but they were successful in the other area, where upwards of 100,000 workers came out and remained out for three weeks, when the strike was settled by arbitration.

In the September 1924 Assembly of the League of Nations the question of National Minorities was brought up by Apponyi, the Hungarian representative. Skrzynski, the head of the Polish Delegation, spoke of the Polish Minorities, and said that the Polish Government had accepted the principle of arbitration. Later it was announced in the Council of the League that the question

concerning claims to Polish nationality which had been before it in March had been settled by a convention between Poland and Germany, on the basis of a decision of the Arbitral Tribunal of Upper Silesia.

DANZIG AND WESTERPLATTE

As from the first Danzig continued to do everything in its power to embarrass the Poles and to impair the special privileges Poland had been specifically given by the Allies. In December 1923 the question was raised of providing Poland with a larger site than that which she had for a depot for war material in transit from the port to Warsaw or elsewhere in her own territory. The Council decided to investigate the matter through a commission of experts, who visited Danzig, and reported in favour of the Polish claim. In March 1924 the Council approved this report, and decided that the peninsula of Westerplatte at the canalised mouth of the Vistula, the entrance to the port, some miles from the town of Danzig, should be placed at the disposal of the Polish Government.

In the same month Henry Strasburger was appointed Polish Commissary-General at Danzig. He worked to such good purpose that various agreements were entered into by the Free City and Poland respecting passports, loans contracted by the Council of the Port, participation by Danzig in the treaties of commerce signed by Poland, and so forth.

DANZIG AND GDYNIA

In pre-War days German policy had preferred Stettin and Königsberg to Danzig, and its trade had declined. In 1912, Danzig's best year before the World War, nearly 6,000 vessels entered and cleared the port; in 1923 rather more than that number of ships entered and cleared, and their tonnage was nearly twice as great. Opinion in Poland held that Danzig would be insufficient for her requirements, and there had been begun a new port at Gdynia, but it was not till 1924 that construction on a considerable scale was undertaken. On July 4, 1924, an agreement was drawn up for an extensive building programme between the Minister of Commerce for Poland and a consortium or syndicate, composed

chiefly of the firms of Schneider-Creusot and Hersant, the *Société de Construction des Batignolles* and the Industrial Bank of Poland. The contract called for the completion of the port by the beginning of 1930, and the cost was put at 35 millions of gold francs; and a second contract—for the equipment of the port at a cost of 15 million francs—was discussed with the Schneider firm.

These contracts were supplemented or changed in part two years later, and though work proceeded briskly on the port, the economic situation of Poland in 1924–35 did not allow as rapid a development as had been contemplated. Before 1924, 550 metres of provisional harbour had been built and 150 metres of breakwater. In 1924 more breakwaters were constructed and excavation was commenced on a large inner dock.

STEP TOWARDS AGRARIAN REFORM

The question of agrarian reform continued to harass the internal politics of Poland. The legislation of 1919–20 remained on the Statute Book, but in practice was inoperative; the attempt of Witos in 1923 to deal with the question had led to the fall of his Government. Grabski put off direct action in this matter, but had to face it indirectly with the collection of the capital levy. Towards the end of 1924 he announced that as a large portion of the levy falling due within the year had not been paid he would introduce a Bill empowering the Government to seize land of proportionate value, belonging to proprietors of estates of more than 750 acres who had failed to contribute to the levy; in the case of the large industrial concerns who were similarly in default the Bill would authorize the Government to impound their share capital to the amount required. On November 11, 1924, the Seym, after discussing Grabski's proposals, rejected a vote of non-confidence by 237 votes to 52, the opposition coming mainly from the National Minority groups.

PILSUDSKI AS AUTHOR

Pilsudski was living in retirement at Sulejówek during 1924, but he continued to keep in fairly close touch with the army. On March 19, his name-day, he received large delegations from most

regiments offering their homage; in August he addressed the Congress of Legionaries, and was given enthusiastic ovations; his popularity with Polish soldiers, whether new or old, was as remarkable as ever. A good deal of his time was spent in writing; in the spring of that year he wrote *Rok 1920*; he took as a text the work called *The March to the Vistula*, by the Soviet general Tukhachevsky, and included in the Marshal's book.

Though Pilsudski had collaborated with Sikorski after the assassination of Narutowicz, the two men were not on terms of friendship. Sikorski, as Minister of War, endeavoured to get Pilsudski to return to the army, and even prepared a high place for him in it—that of Inspector-General. But Sikorski effected certain changes in the commands of regiments which had the result of reducing the influence of Pilsudski in the army by breaking up the Pilsudskist groups in it. Pilsudski declined to accept the post of Inspector-General on the plea that the powers that went with it were in his view far too limited.

BETTER INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

Skrzynski was an excellent Foreign Minister, and during the period he was in office—it extended till well into 1926—there was a distinct improvement in the foreign relations of Poland, which was no doubt materially assisted by the general clarifying of the international situation. The difficult situation of 1923, caused by the occupation of the Ruhr and the divergence between France and England, went on into 1924, but its dangers were lessened by two events. The earlier of these was the Report of the Dawes Commission on Reparations in April, and the other was the defeat of Poincaré in the French general election in May. As the alliance with France was the foundation of Poland's foreign policy the result of that election, which brought Herriot into power, was of enormous interest to her. These changes in the international situation occurred before Skrzynski became Foreign Minister, but on entering office one of the first things he did was to send a telegram to Herriot in which he spoke of the alliance between their countries, and expressed his conviction that their relations would become more and more intimate, thus guaranteeing the

security of both, which was an "essential condition of the maintenance of the general peace." In a cordial reply Herriot said: "France and Poland have the same interest in the consolidation of peace and their alliance constitutes, in my opinion, a valuable guarantee of security."

SKRZYNSKI'S GOOD FOREIGN POLICY

In connexion with reparations there had been much discussion of the entrance of Germany into the League of Nations. In the spring of the year Poincaré had intimated that France was prepared to accept that entrance if Germany adopted the Dawes Plan. In this and other matters Poland was willing to follow the French lead, but she took up the position that if Germany became a permanent member of the Council of the League, she was also entitled to have a permanent seat; indeed, she conceived that her situation *vis-à-vis* Germany demanded it. Though relations with Germany had somewhat improved, Poland was well aware of the hostile attitude of the Reich, an attitude constantly stressed by the extravagant declarations of German Nationalists respecting frontier revision. Nor did Poland forget the existence of the Soviet-German Treaty of Rapallo. During 1924, too, the international position of the Soviet had been greatly strengthened by its recognition by England, France and Italy. Yet Poland and Soviet Russia made some slight progress to more normal relations. A railway convention was signed in April, arrangements were come to regarding the exchange of prisoners and a consular convention was adopted in July.

Touching the Baltic States Poland pursued the policy that was becoming traditional with her. In February 1924 the Foreign Ministers of Poland, Finland, Latvia and Estonia met at Warsaw, Zamoyski, then Polish Foreign Minister, presiding; in his opening remarks he said it was the seventh time that these States had met in conference. The four Governments found themselves in general agreement on an absolutely pacific policy, but there was no Baltic League, though its formation was strongly advocated by Meierowics, the eminent Latvian statesman, whom death cut off the following year. Relations with Lithuania were still very unpleasant;

the Conference of Ambassadors addressed another Note to the Lithuanian Government inviting it to come to terms with Poland, but it again refused to do so. The pleasantest thing bearing on Polish foreign policy in 1924 occurred when Herriot raised the French Legation in Warsaw to the rank of an Embassy, the understanding being that the Polish Legation in Paris would be given the same.

THUGUTT ON POLISH POLITICS

Skrzynski was an undoubted success; the curious thing was that he owed his post of Foreign Minister to the fact that Thugutt, to whom Grabski had offered it after the resignation of Zamoyski, had been compelled by his party to decline it. Thugutt had thereupon resigned the leadership of the Radical Populist or Peasant group *Wyzwolenie*, and took advantage of the occasion to write an open letter which threw a lurid light on the domestic political situation in Poland. He protested against the systematic and sterile opposition to the Government made by the party at a time when the work of national reconstruction demanded the collaboration of every Pole, irrespective of party.

The Ministers, he said, went in fear of the Seym, the Press, and their subordinates, and were afraid of every gesture and even of every idea. The Seym, while not without a capacity for sacrifice in moments of crisis, was afflicted with a probably incurable impotence. Bold reforms were needed, and for their accomplishment all the parties should recognize that party sacrifices were necessary. It was the duty of every politician who understood the situation to offer to collaborate with the Government, no matter whether such action ran counter to party combinations or other influences. Thugutt's words made a great impression.

REYMONT AWARDED NOBEL PRIZE

Before 1924 close attention was directed throughout the world to another phase of Poland. In November the Nobel Prize in Literature was awarded to Ladislas Reymont for his novel *Chłopi* (The Peasants). The award could not but recall that the same high distinction was in 1902 conferred on another great Polish

novelist—Sienkiewicz, the author of *Quo Vadis?* Sienkiewicz had died at Vevey on November 16, 1916, while engaged with Paderewski and others in assisting the victims of the War in Poland. With appropriate ceremony his remains were transferred from Swiss to Polish soil in 1924; as the train which took them to Warsaw stopped at Vienna and Prague, there were the most striking demonstrations of sympathy and homage in these cities. On October 26 the funeral train reached Warsaw, where there were memorable scenes; the cortège in its procession through the streets of the capital halted in front of the statue of Mickiewicz, the national poet, and there President Wojciechowski delivered an oration in praise of Sienkiewicz.

When in June 1927 the ashes of Slowacki, another great Polish poet and Pilsudski's favourite, were transferred from Paris to Cracow for sepulture, there were impressive demonstrations of the national feeling of reverent pride in their great dead similar to those which attended the removal of the remains of Sienkiewicz from Switzerland to Poland.

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When the Seym resumed in January 1925 it was not asked by the Grabski Government for a renewal of the plenary powers granted during the previous year. The success of the great efforts for financial restoration that the Government and the country had made appeared to be crowned by the funding of the "Relief" Debts contracted after 1918 with the various Allied and Associated Powers for foodstuffs, machinery and other goods which they had provided in the first years of the liberation of Poland. The total National Debt of the State was small, the amount on January 1, 1925, being 1,747,811,500 zlotys or about £70 million stg. The Internal Debt, consisting of domestic loans and advances from the Bank of Poland, was 148,510,000 zlotys; and the External Debt stood at 1,599,301,500 zlotys. The United States was the largest creditor, Great Britain coming next; by the funding agreements, which were negotiated in November and December 1924, the repayment of the Debts to these countries was spread

over sixty-two years, at a comparatively low rate of interest. Favourable arrangements were also made with other creditor countries about the same time.

POLISH BUDGET "SATISFIED"

Grabski discussed the situation in a speech before the Budget Commission of the Seym on January 19, 1925. He said the Budget for the previous year had been "satisfied," and there was a surplus; this was a great success, particularly in view of the fact that a good deal of doubt had been expressed in some quarters whether it was possible to obtain the necessary revenue.

He next spoke of the unfavourable situation as shown in the dearness of money and the lack of credit, in unemployment, and the high cost of living, all of which had been accentuated by the poor harvest of 1924, and the consequent heavy rise in imports of foodstuffs. The remedy, he said, could not be found in resorting to inflation, but in the concentration of all the organized forces of the nation upon work and greater economy of production, together with an adjustment of tariffs, railway rates and other things to assist in augmenting that production. Referring to the rôle filled by the Bank of Poland, he touched on the stabilization of the zloty, which had kept its parity at 5.18 to the dollar since February 1924.

Treasury operations in 1924 resulted in a Budgetary deficit of 189 million zlotys, which was covered mainly by the issue of small coins and Treasury notes. In March 1925 a loan for 50 million dollars was offered in the United States at 8 per cent, but it was not a complete success and produced only a temporary betterment of the situation.

Not until the Budget for 1925 was under discussion was there a serious assault—which came from Michalski in May. The former Finance Minister declared there was no harmony between the economic and the financial life of the country; he sharply criticized the system of taxation and the administration itself, which permitted two million people, he said, to live off the State; he was outspokenly pessimistic. But he did not find much support in the Seym. Zdziechowski, president of the Budget Commission,

maintained the Government should be congratulated on its success. Till well into the summer of 1925 this was the view held generally in Poland. The Seym adopted the Grabski Budget for 1925.

DANZIG AND POLISH LETTER-BOXES

Very early in 1925 Poland leapt into sudden prominence in Europe and America, because of a controversy with Danzig over postboxes, bearing the Polish white eagle, she had installed within the limits of the port. On the night of January 5, Danzigers defaced the Polish insignia and replaced them by the old Imperial German eagle. Strasburger, the Polish Commissary-General, immediately sent a Note in protest to the Danzig Senate. McDonnell, High Commissioner of the League of Nations, intervened by requesting the Commissary-General to remove the postboxes, but he declined to do so. In Warsaw, where it was thought that McDonnell had exceeded his authority, feeling ran high. Thugutt said: "Poland should consider whether her practice of granting concessions for the purpose of reaching agreement with Danzig has proved worth while. Danzig prospers from its relations with Poland to a degree never reached before the War. It is enough to say that Danzig's participation in Polish customs gives it greater revenues than are enjoyed by any Polish city."

While the controversy was not of much intrinsic importance, its echoes reached round the world. The Polish Government submitted its case to the League, since it felt that the treaty provisions respecting a Polish postal system in Danzig were absolutely clear, as Skrzynski said in the Seym and at Geneva. The question came before the Council of the League in March 1925 and was referred to the Hague Court, which upheld the Polish claims, but it was not till September 1925 that the Council finally reached a decision in favour of Poland.

BALTIC STATES CONFER AT HELSINGFORS

Attention was given throughout Europe to the Conference of the Baltic States held at Helsingfors on January 16–17, 1925. Shortly before the Soviet had fomented a conspiracy for the subversion of the Republic of Estonia which had come to a head

in an outbreak at Reval (Tallinn), but which was successfully dealt with by the Estonian Government. This showed the danger to which these States were exposed in common, and the question of their security was discussed at the conference; however, they saw the answer, not in a regional league, but in the realization of the principles of the Geneva Protocol (which had not yet been killed by the opposition of England). The four States represented—Poland, Finland, Latvia and Estonia, Lithuania being again an absentee—signed a treaty of conciliation and arbitration; they agreed on the usefulness of acting together in all questions relating to security that might arise in international conferences.

POLISH CONCORDAT WITH THE VATICAN

A special feature of Poland's foreign policy was the conclusion of a concordat with the Holy See, signed at Rome on February 10, 1925. It was facilitated by the fact that the Pontiff, Pius XI, had been Nuncio at Warsaw, and was well acquainted with Poland. The great mass of the Polish people were Roman Catholic. The concordat gave the Church the fullest liberty; the State guaranteed to the Church the free exercise of the spiritual power, as well as the unfettered administration of its affairs and property in accordance with the canon law. It had the right to supervise religious instruction in the schools, and in return it agreed to submit its landed property to the agrarian reform—a matter which had been in dispute.

Like similar concordats made with the new States, the Polish concordat contained two points of national importance: one was that the names of archbishops and bishops about to be appointed by the Holy See in Poland should be submitted to the President of Poland to discover whether he had any political objection to them; and the other was that Polish dioceses were to lie entirely within the Polish frontiers. Thus, Silesia, where Polish, was withdrawn from obedience to the see of Breslau, and similarly the *Krey* from obedience to Mohileff. The Holy See recognized Vilna and district as an integral part of Poland—to the great indignation and discontent of Lithuania. The Seym ratified the concordat on March 27, 1925.

QUESTION OF "SECURITY"

In March 1925 the Geneva Protocol, which had been unanimously approved by the Assembly in September 1924, but which had been held up by British action in the Council that met at Rome in the following December, was finally rejected by Great Britain, supported by Italy and Japan. The loss of the Protocol was very much deplored in Poland; Skrzynski, who had taken a great interest in it, was particularly disappointed.

An interesting debate took place in the Seym early in April concerning the contingent of men to be raised by conscription in 1925. One of the deputies criticized the action of the Government and particularly Sikorski, the Minister of War, because he had not facilitated the return of Pilsudski to the army. In his reply Sikorski, going outside personal matters, said in the course of his speech that it would be a great mistake to base the peace of Europe solely on bayonets, but Poland must be in a position to defend herself. A Socialist deputy said that as universal disarmament was not to be expected, a country which felt itself menaced must take efficacious measures for its defence. "Poland," he maintained, "could not be refused the right of self-defence." In the end the Seym unanimously authorized the raising of a contingent of 170,000 men for the year.

POLISH-CZECHOSLOVAK TREATY

While attending the meeting of the Council of the League in March Skrzynski and Benesh discussed the various matters still unsettled between their countries, and the result was seen when Benesh visited Warsaw in the following April and concluded a Treaty of Conciliation and Arbitration between Poland and Czechoslovakia, a commercial treaty and a treaty respecting the liquidation of various outstanding questions, thus establishing really friendly relations between the two States.

"CORRIDOR'S" FRONTIERS "INVISIBLE"

A serious accident to a German train passing across the "Danziger Korridor," while very regrettable as twenty-five passengers were

killed and eighteen injured, called universal attention to the fact that transit through the "Corridor" between Germany and East Prussia was extraordinarily free. In 1921 a special mixed tribunal for the settlement of transit disputes had been set up in Danzig, under an agreement between Poland and Germany, and up to the date of this accident, which occurred on April 20, 1925, not a single case had been brought before it—which showed that the arrangements made by Poland for German trains passing over her territory had worked extremely well. Twenty minutes before the catastrophe happened a German fast train had passed safely over the place, and an inquiry instituted by the Polish railway administration showed that the rails had been criminally tampered with, the evidence pointing to a Communist plot in connexion with the usual demonstrations of the First of May. The German Government lodged a protest with the mixed tribunal, and alleged that the roadbed was in a dangerous condition, but on May 13 the tribunal, which was presided over by the Danish Consul in Danzig, dismissed the German protest and exonerated the Polish authorities from all responsibility for the disaster. Germany quite failed to make political capital out of the affair.

POLISH-JEWISH RAPPROCHEMENT

At the instance of Skryznski negotiations were started with the Polish-Jewish deputies in the Seym for a better understanding between the Poles and the Jews. At the beginning of June 1925 an agreement was concluded between Grabski and the Club of Jewish deputies, its president having made a declaration to this effect: "Adhering to the intangibility of the Polish Republic and the defence of the policy of Poland as a Great Power; adhering also to the view that the internal consolidation of the Republic is necessary; the Club of Jewish deputies in the Seym states that in conformity with these principles it prosecutes a policy in the Seym looking to the defence of Jewish rights and interests." In a speech the Prime Minister said that a step had been taken which he hoped would open up a new era in the history of the Jewish problem in Poland, and he promised to issue ordinances

that would satisfy the economic and political needs of the Jewish population—this was done on July 11, 1925.

NEGOTIATIONS FOR POLISH-GERMAN COMMERCIAL TREATY

Negotiations between Poland and Germany for the conclusion of a commercial treaty had been begun in the spring of 1925. Germany boycotted Poland economically in the first years of the liberation, but this led Poland to open up other markets, and Germany, to retain her geographical advantage, had entered into normal commercial relations with her neighbour in 1922, the result being that Germany absorbed 50 per cent of the Polish exports and had about 40 per cent of all the Polish imports. Poland, however, went on making commercial treaties with other States, and in 1925 had trade agreements with France, England, Italy, Rumania, Switzerland, Australia, Yugoslavia, Belgium, Turkey, Finland, Denmark, Holland, Sweden, Persia, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Greece. Consequently German exports to and imports from Poland suffered a diminution. According to the Polish-German Upper Silesia convention of 1922 Germany imported free of duty 500,000 tons of coal monthly from Polish Upper Silesia till June 15, 1925. Shortly before that date the German Government declared itself ready to renew this stipulation, but accompanied this with political conditions which Poland could not accept, particular objection being taken to Germany's proposal respecting *optants*.

Under the Versailles and Minorities Treaties Germans residing in Polish territory were given the right to retain their German citizenship, but with the proviso in all such cases to quit the country within three years. Polish residents in German territory were given similar rights. By an agreement signed in August 1924 Poland and Germany expressly recognized the right of reciprocal eviction, and August 1, 1925, was fixed as the date for the compulsory removal of the first class of these optants, namely, those possessing no real property, and dates were set for the progressive removal of the other optants. Germany now proposed to abrogate this agreement so far as the German optants were concerned. Poland refused, and Germany in reprisal refused

to take Polish coal; Poland retaliated by forbidding the import of German foodstuffs into her territory; next Germany interdicted Polish timber and agricultural products.

An economic war began between the Reich and Poland, which was injurious to both; it told very heavily against the programme of Poland's financial and economic restoration, but it did not result, as some German papers foretold, in Poland "bleeding to death." About 15,000 German families and 12,000 Polish were forced to leave Poland and Germany respectively in July–August 1925, in circumstances entailing considerable suffering and exciting strong feeling in both countries. After Locarno, and indeed as a consequence of the *détente* believed to spring from the Locarno Treaties, Poland informed Germany that she renounced her right to expel on November 1, 1925, the remaining optants. The British and French representatives at Warsaw took occasion to express to Skrzynski the hope this generous action would be properly appreciated by Germany, but Poland's *beau geste* met with no response.

SKRZYNSKI VISITS UNITED STATES

In July–August 1925 Skrzynski found himself able to go to the United States on an invitation, supported by its Government, to lecture before the "Williamstown Institute of Politics" on Poland. It gave him an excellent opportunity, of which he availed himself to the full, to present the case of Poland, not only to the Americans, but to all the world. In his first lecture he touched on almost every point of interest concerning the general situation of his country: its finances and economics; its army, of which he said, "considering our peculiar geographical situation—we have 2,400 miles of land frontiers to defend—our army is small, by European standards"; its National Minorities; Danzig; the "Corridor"; relations with Soviet Russia; Poland's support of the League of Nations; and her foreign policy—which he summed up as "essentially a policy of peace and consolidation, but independent in all matters relating to Polish affairs proper."

Chicherin visited Warsaw, *en route* for Berlin, towards the end of September 1925 and was given a friendly reception by

President Wojciechowski and the Grabski Government. The Treaty of Riga had never been fully executed by the Soviet. But there was a growing sentiment in Poland for some *rapprochement* with Soviet Russia.

POLAND AND LOCARNO

Skrzynski, who had taken part in the negotiations which had been going on for months between the Allies and Germany, represented Poland at Locarno on October 16, 1925, when the seven interlocking treaties generally known as the Locarno Treaties were concluded and initialed. Five days later he made an exposition of these treaties before the Commission for Foreign Affairs of the Seym, which met with its approval. Skrzynski said it was a question whether the Rhineland Pact constituted an iron barrier separating France from Europe, and, if so, whether France had the right to come to the support of Poland; France had that right; according to Article 16, in case Poland was attacked by Germany without provocation, France could go to the aid of Poland. He pointed out the reservation—if Poland was attacked without provocation on her part—was already found in the treaty of alliance between Poland and France.

What precisely Poland gained from Locarno was the undertaking by Germany not to resort to war for the alteration of her eastern frontier, and Poland's security was reinsured by the guarantee of France. There was nothing, however, to prevent Germany from trying for the revision of the frontier by pacific means, and there was always open the appeal provided in Article 19 of the Covenant.

Two attempts in the autumn of 1925 to regularize relations between Poland and Lithuania proved abortive. On August 31, representatives of the two States met in conference at Copenhagen, the questions under survey being floatage of logs on the Niemen, communications, consular services, and access to their respective territories. An agreement was reached on some points, but the negotiations were postponed till October when another meeting was arranged to take place at Lugano; it was held on October 11, 1925, but it broke down on two essential points—Polish consular protection for Poles at Memel and railway transit—

owing to the intransigence of the Lithuanian delegation. However, on January 31, 1926, the Lithuanian Government published an ordinance regulating floatage on the river, but it was not considered sufficient by Poland, and besides was not in accordance with the agreement of 1924.

SEVERE FINANCIAL CRISIS

The Seym resumed on October 20 with the discussion of the Budget which had been postponed from October 6. On October 23 the Seym passed a vote of confidence in the Grabski Government. In appearance the Government was still strong, but in reality its position was undermined by the financial and economic situation, which had again become extremely bad. After remaining steady for more than a year the zloty began to fall towards the close of July 1925.

Foreign observers were inclined to attribute the fall of the zloty to an abnormal expansion, followed by an intense restriction, of credits by the Bank of Poland, and an excessive Government issue of small Treasury notes and small coins. By the end of July the Bank of Poland was embarrassed, having used up a large part of its resources. In the spring of 1925 it had, in common with the State and the joint-stock banks, increased its credits for economic purposes, as it had received the greater portion of the first proceeds of the loan from America, with a consequent strengthening of its foreign reserves. But it had soon to stop increasing credits; it had to restrict them instead. The American loan was only a partial success.

SECOND GRABSKI CABINET RESIGNS

In Warsaw Grabski made a statement on October 1, 1925, at a meeting of the Economic Council (which the situation had brought into existence some time before) respecting the crisis; after reviewing its disturbing features, he said that the fall of the zloty and the restriction of credit would not be so formidable in themselves if the confidence of the public had not been shaken. But there was no sign then or for some time of a return of confidence;

the "man in the street" had lost faith in the zloty. When the Seym met in October Grabski faced it and the situation boldly; the Seym responded with a vote of confidence. Surprise was therefore all the greater when it became known that the Grabski Government had tendered its resignation, which had been accepted by Wojciechowski, on November 13, 1925, because of a difference between the Prime Minister and the President of the Bank of Poland with regard to the intervention of the Bank to stop the fall of the zloty—a proceeding which Grabski desired and was refused.

Grabski, in his letter of resignation, said he considered the maintenance of the zloty an essential condition of the financial and economic restoration, but he also added that on account of the campaign carried on against him in the Seym and in part of the Press he preferred to retire and thus lessen political strife. He had been in office for nearly two years—easily a record in the short political history of Poland—and during that time he had done some useful work apart from his financial legislation and despite party strife.

Wojciechowski called on Skrzynski to form a Cabinet; Skrzynski tried, but failed, the reason being that the National Democrats made the retention by Sikorski of the Ministry of War a condition of their support. By this time the controversy between Pilsudski and Sikorski had become acute, and it was well known that the Marshal strongly objected to Sikorski remaining at the War Office. Having no desire to be involved in this struggle, Skrzynski reported that he could not form a Government. The President next charged Rataj, the Marshal of the Seym, to constitute a Ministry, but he also was unsuccessful.

THE SKRZYNSKI CABINET

Meanwhile Pilsudski informed Wojciechowski that he was decidedly opposed to Sikorski being reappointed Minister of War—and the President took note of the fact. The Ministerial crisis was solved on November 20 when a second attempt on the part of Skrzynski succeeded, after a long night of conferences with the party leaders. Skrzynski became Prime Minister and

Foreign Minister, and soon afterwards Zeligowski was Minister of War.

But the zloty was the cardinal factor; on November 20 it was 6·80, instead of 5·18, to the dollar; on November 30 it was 8; and in mid-December 9·50. The "low" point was 11 zlotys to the dollar.

CHAPTER VIII

PILSUDSKI'S INTERVENTION

1926-1928

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DEPRESSION set in throughout Poland with the fall of the zloty towards the close of July 1925 and it went on deepening for months, though the harvest of 1925 was excellent and foreign trade, with rising exports, began to show a favourable balance in the following September, the improvement continuing well into 1926. What Kemmerer, an American financial expert whom the Polish Government summoned to its assistance in December 1925, rightly called a crisis of confidence made itself felt all over the country. The flight from the zloty became marked; hoarding of gold or its equivalents proceeded apace; the zloty was discredited more and more, and the people, under this intense nervous strain, were afraid that the immense sacrifices of the two previous years had been vain. As in 1924, the whole nation was affected, and this time the crisis was even more serious, for it came mostly from a devastating lack of faith. This psychological factor had its inevitable repercussions on the political situation, in itself as uncertain and confused as the financial situation.

Many Poles, too, had by this time lost faith in the Seym; indeed, its general impotence, owing to party strife with all its extraordinary bitterness, was known of all men. Added to its futility in government was the fact, which came to the surface now and again, that it was tainted with corruption, bribery, "wangling" of offices and posts in and under the administration, and concession hunting. Pilsudski alluded obliquely to this taint when, in his famous speech in July 1923, after he had left the army, he said that in the early days of the Republic he became Dictator "without any bribery, without any concession, timber or otherwise," and that when made Chief of the State there was "no bribery, no 'concession.'" The Seym played its last card in forming

the Parliamentary Government composed of a large coalition of parties headed by Skrzynski on November 20, 1925.

SEYM SUPPORTS SKRZYNSKI

On November 25, 1925, Skrzynski made the customary declaration of policy on the taking of office by a new Ministry; a debate followed, and a vote of non-confidence was rejected; the Seym accepted the declaration by the majority of 257 votes to 106, with 76 deputies abstaining.

On December 9, 1925, Zdziechowski, now Finance Minister, addressed the Seym on the financial situation. His speech was not pessimistic, and the politicians at least heard it gladly. A sign of the true state of things, however, was that farmers and peasants were allowed to pay their taxes in grain and other agricultural produce.

AGRARIAN REFORM ACT

At last the Seym took definite action respecting Agrarian Reform. An Act was passed on December 28, 1925, which modified that of 1920 by restricting the parcellation of estates annually to two million hectares (about five million acres) over a period of ten years. The measure met with fierce opposition in both Seym and Senate; more than 600 amendments were tabled; compromises were effected, and the atmosphere was improved by permitting voluntary parcellation, with recourse to expropriation by the State as a last resort. The principle of fair compensation was admitted and a definite scheme of indemnification was incorporated in the Act. The acreage which a landowner could retain was extended beyond what the former Act allowed, especially in the *Kresy*.

The Act itself was a compromise; it did not please the extremes of the Right or the Left; but it was a workable solution in part of a very difficult question, and it served to quieten the agitation among the peasants and reduce in some degree their discontent.

ECONOMIC DEPRESSION INTENSIFIED

During the first quarter of 1926 there was a more hopeful feeling in Poland, particularly in political circles. Kemmerer, the American

expert, was partly responsible for it, as he reported that the financial and economic situation was fundamentally sound. A rise in the zloty in mid-January was encouraging; the improvement, however, was not long maintained. On January 28 Zdziechowski presented to the Financial Commission of the Seym the draft of the Budget for the year adopted by the Skrzynski Government. The deficit in the Budget for 1925 had amounted to 225 million zlotys, but, as in 1924, it had been covered by the issue of Treasury notes and small coins—the emission in 1926 came to nearly 290 million zlotys. The amount of such currency put out at the beginning of 1925 was only 22·3 per cent of the amount of bank-notes in circulation, but by the end of the year it exceeded bank-notes in circulation by about 14 per cent; this in itself was sufficient to enfeeble the exchange. Concerning the Budget for 1926, Zdziechowski spoke of compressing further the national expenditure and bringing it within the revenue; the figures presented showed a deficit of about 200 million zlotys, which he proposed should be met by cuts in the administration amounting to 130 million zlotys, and a reorganization of State undertakings. The Seym had shown an example, as its members renounced voluntarily 10 per cent of their stipends. On February 9 the Budget Commission began its examination of the draft Budget and continued it into April, by which month the situation was undeniably much worse, and the depression throughout Poland more marked than before, with the zloty hovering round the low point again.

PILSUDSKI AND THE HIGH COMMAND

For two or three months the Skrzynski Government maintained a strong appearance. The alliance of the Socialists with Skrzynski still subsisted. A serious matter, as it involved the army, was the resignation of Zeligowski as Minister of War. The general, a great believer in Pilsudski, was extremely desirous of getting the Marshal into the active army once more. As in his controversy with Sikorski, Pilsudski was as determinedly opposed as ever to the draft of the law respecting the organization of the High Command, as it appeared to him to limit the action of the Commander-in-Chief; he now made the complete withdrawal

of the draft a condition of his return to the army. Though not a partisan of Pilsudski, Skrzynski was not one of his opponents; but the chief support of the Government was the Right which was hostile to Pilsudski, particularly regarding the High Command, and the Marshal's demand was embarrassing, and not less so because the Socialists supported it. The draft was withdrawn, whereupon Zeligowski withdrew his resignation.

RUMANIAN-POLISH ALLIANCE EXTENDED

The Treaty of Alliance with Rumania terminated in March 1926 and negotiations were begun for its renewal, but adapted to the new situation created in Europe by Locarno. The same reasons for its continuance existed as before, as both countries recognized. A new treaty, amplified on the Locarno basis, and enlarged by Rumania's guarantee of the whole existing territory of Poland, both west and east, was signed at Bucarest on March 26, 1926. Article 1 read: "Poland and Rumania undertake reciprocally to respect and maintain against all aggression their territorial integrity and their present political independence." Article 2 specifically referred to the Covenant of the League and its application. The treaty was registered with the League on March 7, 1927, after ratifications had been exchanged at Warsaw about four weeks before.

POLAND CLAIMS PERMANENT SEAT ON LEAGUE COUNCIL

What chiefly interested Poland at the moment respecting her foreign relations was the place she was to occupy in the Council of the League of Nations. On March 2 the Seym ratified the Locarno Treaties. Stronski, speaking for the extreme Right, moved that ratification should be postponed till Poland obtained a permanent seat in the Council. The Seym, however, adopted a resolution to the effect that the "attribution to Poland of a permanent seat was a necessity resulting from the rôle of the Polish State in Central and Eastern Europe, a rôle filled by Poland not in any particular interest, but in the general interest."

When this resolution was passed, the general belief was that

Germany would enter the League of Nations at the extraordinary Assembly called for March 8, 1926, and be accorded a permanent seat in the Council. There was also the question of a further enlargement of the Council. From the outset, however, Germany objected to any enlargement at this meeting of the Council in addition to her own membership; she had the support of Sweden. France, England, Italy and Belgium proposed as a compromise that the German suggestion of constituting a commission to study the question of enlargement be accepted, with a rider that meanwhile Poland, the only Locarnist Power not represented in the Council, be given a non-permanent seat. Germany refused this proposal, and it was clear that her objection was to Poland *qua* Poland. Another attempt at a compromise, entailing the resignation of Sweden and Czechoslovakia from the Council and the election of Poland and Holland, came to nothing, because Brazil announced she would vote against assigning a permanent seat to Germany unless she was accorded one at the same time. This broke up the Assembly, the questions involved being deferred to the ordinary Assembly in September, the Council taking in hand in the meantime, through a commission, the problem of its own composition. To allay fears that the League of Nations had been weakened by what had taken place, the Locarnist Powers—Belgium, Czechoslovakia, England, France, Germany, Italy and Poland—issued on March 16 a statement that there had been no attack on the work of peace realized at Locarno, which maintained its full value and force. Skrzynski gave an account of all that had occurred at Geneva to the Seym's Foreign Commission on March 23, and it was accepted by 19 votes to 5. All parties agreed that Poland must persist in her demand for a permanent seat in the Council.

Towards the end of March the Government had again to consider the financial situation. On March 26 Zdziechowski informed the Budget Commission of the Seym that there was a deficit of not less than 300 million zlotys, and that steps must be taken to achieve the necessary equilibrium—not by increasing taxation, which would weaken the taxpayers who were over-taxed already, but by rigorous economies. The Socialists supporting

the Government demurred to some of his proposals, but agreement was come to provisionally, thus obviating a Cabinet crisis, and the Budget for April was passed by the Seym.

NEGOTIATIONS WITH GERMANY SUSPENDED

Though her first *beau geste*, in the matter of the optants, had not been responded to by Germany, Poland made another by renouncing her right to liquidate or dispose of certain properties belonging to Germans in the territories that had formerly been in the possession of Germany. This right she had under Article 297 of the Versailles Treaty; Germany contested this right, and demanded that Poland should not exercise it; that she should not do so was one of the conditions Germany imposed in the negotiations for the commercial treaty which broke down in 1925. On March 25, 1926, a joint conference was held in Berlin to deal with this question. The properties Poland was willing to renounce included 15 large estates, nearly 800 farms of a total area of about 120,000 acres, 300 houses, and about 150 industrial establishments; she offered further concessions, the whole having both very considerable material value and a good deal of political importance. In 1922 there had been pourparlers on Article 297 with a view to defining the mode of its application. At this new conference the German representative cast doubt on the right of Poland to liquidate German properties in Poland, though the Article was perfectly clear, rejected the Polish offer, and demanded that Poland should renounce absolutely any liquidation whatsoever of such properties. The result of Germany's attitude was the immediate suspension of the conference.

The treaties with Czechoslovakia went into force during a visit to Prague paid by Skrzynski on April 13, 14 and 15, 1926. The commercial treaty of 1925 had not been ratified by the Czechoslovak Parliament, but it was put into force by a special ordinance of President Masaryk—an exceptional action which greatly impressed Polish opinion. From Prague Skrzynski went on to Vienna, where he signed a treaty of arbitration with Austria. He returned to Warsaw on April 16 to find the Seym, which had reopened three days before, deep in the consideration of the

depressing financial situation, but a fresh and unexpected turn took place in the European political situation.

SOVIET-GERMAN TREATY OF BERLIN

This was the Soviet-German Treaty signed at Berlin on April 24, 1926. It made a great sensation, and nowhere more so than in Poland. The circumstances were recalled in which the Rapallo Treaty was sprung on the Conference of Genoa, and the disastrous effect it had on that conference. The agitation produced by that treaty had long simmered down, but there were still people in Poland and Central and Eastern Europe who regarded that instrument as sinister and suspect, as a species of Russo-German outflanking attack on the Allied position, as in fact an indication rather than a suggestion of a Soviet-German alliance.

The Polish and Czechoslovak Governments engaged in a careful scrutiny of the treaty, and Benesh, in agreement with Skrzynski, drew the attention of the French, British and Italian Governments by a *questionnaire* to the need to investigate its bearing on the obligations Germany would have to undertake on her entrance into the League. Great dissatisfaction with the treaty was expressed in France; it was criticized in some quarters in England, but the view of the majority appeared to be that, instead of being a step away from the League, it might prove to be the means of bringing the Soviet into touch with Geneva. The German Government made it known that it believed the treaty to be complementary to and in no sense at variance with Locarno. A series of grave events of overriding importance which presently occurred at home relegated the treaty to a secondary place for a time in the thought of every Pole.

SKRZYNSKI CABINET IN DIFFICULTIES

The compromise which kept the Socialists in Skrzynski's grand coalition Government did not last long. To combat the bad financial situation they drew up a scheme on Socialist lines; one clause of it provided that the State should give large sums monthly in aid of the unemployed and in support of the industrial life of the country. The Bank of Poland was to issue notes against

the deposit of gold and silver articles. The salaries of functionaries were to be raised to the level of the previous year. The equilibrium of the Budget was to be secured by increased taxation. The Government programme was an addition of ten per cent to all taxes, whether direct or indirect, with a further readjustment downward of the salaries of functionaries, the result being an increase in the revenue of 156 million zlotys and a reduction in the expenditure of 111 million zlotys. The two Socialist Ministers resigned.

On April 20 the Socialist Party withdrew from the grand coalition. Skrzynski told the other Ministers that Wojciechowski was opposed to the resignation of the Government, and desired it to carry on—at least till the Budget for May had been voted. There was a fresh fall of the zloty and a deepening of the general depression. On April 28 the Seym voted the Budgets for May and June on the Government lines by 200 votes to 143. Except for some collisions between Socialists and Communists in the streets of Warsaw, the "First of May" passed off quietly. The National Fête, May 3, was celebrated throughout Poland with the usual ceremonies and rejoicing; in Warsaw a solemn service was held in the Cathedral attended by the President of the Republic, members of the Government, diplomatists, senators and deputies.

Two days afterwards Skrzynski, in agreement with the rest of the Cabinet, resigned. In a statement the outgoing Prime Minister said that the Government had resigned because the basis of the coalition had contracted, but he hoped that his resignation would facilitate the formation of a coalition inspired by the same principles as had been his own when he took over the Government. A truce in party strife and a loyal collaboration were indispensable. After mentioning that the monthly Budget had been passed, and that draft Bills had been presented to the Seym for assuring the equilibrium of the Budget, for dealing with the capital levy, for organizing the High Command and the police, Skrzynski said that the Government had resigned—it had not fallen. The reference to the Bill for organizing the supreme command indicated that an effort had been made to get Pilsudski to support the Government; but he refused to affiliate himself

with any parties, and declared that what was wanted was a non-partisan Government of experts.

THIRD WITOS CABINET

After five days of negotiations with the party chiefs the President invited Witos to constitute a new Government, and the Populist leader was successful on May 10 by making a coalition of the Right and Centre parties, with 237 votes out of the 444 in the Seym. It was the third Cabinet of Witos, and his supporters were of the same political colours as those of his second. He had a clear Parliamentary majority, but the parties of the Left clamoured for a dissolution of Parliament as the best solution of the crisis. A new figure at the head of the Ministry of War was General Malczewski, whom Witos had appointed without consulting Pilsudski whose enemy Malczewski was. During the months of the existence of the Skrzynski Government the War Office had been in the hands of Zeligowski, and he took the opportunity to undo what Sikorski had done respecting the commands of regiments; the Pilsudskists were put back in their former places. Malczewski as Minister of War would mean a fresh purging of the army as against the Marshal. And the new Government, a combination of the Right—the National Democrats and their allies—and of the Centre—the Witos Populists *Piast*—was the same kind of Government which had driven him out of the army. All this revolted Pilsudski, who regarded himself as the Leader in the Liberation and the Creator of the Army of Poland.

During the night of May 10–11, 1926, a persistent rumour spread throughout Warsaw that shots were fired at the house of the Marshal at Sulejowek, and an attack attempted by large numbers of men belonging to political organizations hostile to him. Coming on top of the discontent shown by a very considerable part of the Polish people with the Witos Government, this news caused tremendous excitement in the army, with the immediate result that several regiments stationed at Rembertow placed themselves at the disposal of Pilsudski. On May 11 the *Kurjer Poranny* published an interview given by him attacking in strong terms the Witos Government in general and Witos in particular;

he accused Witos of corruption and declared him unworthy to occupy such a position. "I do not regard the crisis as terminated," said the Marshal. "I enter on a struggle against the evil that corrodes the State, against parties without restraint, on the lookout for personal profits, and forgetful of the general interest." The Government suppressed the issue of the paper. *Rzecznopolska*, the organ of Korfanty, got out a special edition stating that judicial proceedings would be instituted forthwith against the "calumniator." Later in the day the *Kurjer Poranny*, through its evening paper, the *Przeglad Wieczorny*, again denounced the Government and supported its attitude with militant declarations by some prominent members of the Left. The tide of political feeling ran high in Warsaw. Placards on the walls proclaimed Pilsudski the one man who could save Poland. In the evening bodies of men roamed the streets and invaded the cafés shouting, "Long live Pilsudski!" Bands were compelled to play the *Pierwsza Brygada*, the march of Pilsudski's First Brigade of the Legions.

PILSUDSKI MARCHES ON WARSAW

Leaving the camp at Rembertow next day the Marshal, at the head of three regiments, marched on Warsaw. He said to some journalists late that night: "When I was Chief of the State I proved often enough that I am opposed to violence. It is, then, after a terrible struggle with myself that I have decided to use force with all its consequences. All my life I have fought for the respect of what are called imponderables—virtue, honour, courage and in general the moral values of man. . . . I have never sought profits for myself or my *entourage*. There should not be in the State such great injustice towards those who by their labour serve others. There should not be such great iniquity in the State if it does not wish to perish." Pilsudski's first move was the occupation of the Praga suburb, on the east side of the Vistula, and the bridgeheads of the Kierbedz and Poniatowski entrances into Warsaw. President Wojciechowski, summoned in hot haste from Spala, his summer residence, met the Marshal on the Poniatowski Bridge, and telling him that the Government would defend the Constitution and not yield to rebellion, ordered him to with-

draw his troops. The President was pale but resolute. He and Pilsudski had been friends of old, but latterly he had evinced a tendency to the Right. He had given way to the Marshal about Sikorski; he had made up his mind not to give way again. Pilsudski replied that if he, the President, dismissed the Witos Government he, Pilsudski, would see what could be arranged. But Wojciechowski stood firm—as did Pilsudski. The two men parted, the President to organize the defence of Warsaw, and Pilsudski to begin the attack.

GOVERNMENT RESISTS

From the Poniatowski Bridge, Wojciechowski went to the Radziwill Palace, the residence of the Prime Minister, where the Cabinet was in session. Having informed the Government of what had occurred, the President exhorted his Ministers to do their duty—they had thought of resigning—and drove off to the Belvedere, after bidding them let him know what was going on. The Government issued a proclamation to the nation, decreed martial law, and decided to resist at all costs. Rozwadowski, an opponent of Pilsudski, was placed in command of the Government forces, but these were considerably inferior in numbers to those led by the Marshal, who at the outset had gained a strategical advantage in securing the bridgeheads. Rozwadowski's first step was an effort to get possession of them, and fighting began early in the evening of May 12, but the attack was repulsed, and Pilsudski's troops marched into the centre of the city. The members of the Government fled from the Radziwill Palace and betook themselves to the Belvedere; the Government offices were occupied by the Pilsudskists. A hot battle raged in the streets as the Government forces slowly withdrew towards the Belvedere.

BATTLE OF THE STREETS

Next day, May 13, the fighting was renewed and for some hours the issue hung in the balance. The Government received considerable reinforcements; its troops counter-attacked from the direction of the Belvedere, and began pushing the Pilsudskists back to the centre of the capital. The citadel troops, with their officers,

went over to the Marshal *en masse*. In the afternoon Pilsudski was greatly strengthened by the opportune arrival of the Vilna Division commanded by Rydz-Smigly, and this decided the day. The Government forces were counter-attacked in their turn and driven back on the Belvedere, the fighting in the streets costing upwards of 237 killed and 1,000 wounded, but most of the casualties occurred among the civilians, who took no part in the struggle except as onlookers. Meanwhile the papers of the Right and Left were carrying on simultaneously a war of words; those of the Right stigmatized the action of Pilsudski as seditious, and assured the public that it would soon be "liquidated"; the Socialist *Robotnik*, on the other side, said a "Government of workers and peasants" would be established, with Pilsudski at its head. During the evening of May 13 the papers of the Right published another proclamation of the Government in which it was stated: "The Belvedere had become the symbol of legality and of fidelity to the fatherland and the Constitution." It also said that the Government forces were steadily increasing, and that the rebellion would soon be crushed, an opinion that was based on the receipt of a message by aeroplane from Poznan to the effect that Dowbor-Musnicki and Joseph Haller were raising an army of volunteers to march to Warsaw for the support of the Government. Nearly all the chiefs of the Right were together in Poznan.

VICTORY OF PILSUDSKI

Very early in the morning of May 14 Pilsudski launched a strong assault on the Belvedere which was completely successful. President Wojciechowski and his Cabinet were about to take breakfast when an officer warned them that the situation was desperate, and they immediately decided on flight to Wilanow, about 8 miles from Warsaw. In the evening the President and the Government decided to abandon the struggle. Wojciechowski resigned the Presidency, which thereupon passed provisionally to Rataj, the Marshal of the Seym, according to the Constitution; Rataj was sent for and on reaching Wilanow was given three sheets of ordinary writing paper by Wojciechowski on which respectively were inscribed the resignation of himself, the Government's

resignation, and a minute of the last meeting of the Government. Rataj returned to the Palace of the Seym—in which he had his quarters—and signed a statement accepting the Presidency *ad interim*. Shortly after the resignation of Wojciechowski and the Government, an army division from Pomerania arrived on the scene to support the Government. It attacked Warsaw from the west and came under the fire of the Pilsudskists. Presently an armistice was concluded. This was the last of the fighting; Pilsudski had triumphed. As quickly as possible he gave a legal aspect to his actions.

FIRST BARTEL CABINET

A new Government was constituted. At 8 o'clock in the morning of May 14, Rataj, as Acting-President of the Republic, conferred with the victorious Marshal, and they agreed to confide the task of forming a Cabinet to Casimir Bartel, who had been Minister of Railways during the war with Soviet Russia, and who, though a member of the Left, was popular with the other deputies in the Seym. He had difficulty in getting a Ministry together; the first idea had been to constitute a Government of National Union drawn mostly from the Seym, but some of those he approached declined, and the Socialists were annoyed because that sort of Government was different from what they had expected. Bartel had to be satisfied with a Cabinet composed almost exclusively of experts and high functionaries; he offered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Skrzynski, who refused it. August Zaleski, Polish Minister at Rome, happened to be in Warsaw on leave at the time, and became Acting Foreign Minister. Pilsudski contented himself with the Ministry of War. After the formation of the Government on May 15, the first act of Rataj was the issuing of a proclamation ordering a suspension of hostilities. The Government addressed a proclamation to the nation saying it would hold power till the election of a President by the National Assembly; that the causes of the tragic events of the last few days lay in the moral disorder which devastated public life; that there must be a moral renaissance, based on respect for law and social justice and the elimination of party and individual egotisms; that measures

would be taken immediately to root out the evil that afflicted the State, that all citizens of Poland must be absolutely one in their allegiance to and collaboration with the State.

In Poznania, the great stronghold of the Right, the *Kurjer Poznanski*, the organ of the National Democrats, said as late as May 19 that the crisis was still far from being terminated, and that the mission of the western provinces of Poland was to save the State. But Trampczynski, the Marshal of the Senate, and himself a Poznanian as well as a chief of the National Democrats, went from Warsaw to Poznan to explain that in the circumstances discipline must be observed by all, and that it was useless to agitate against the "rebels"; the whole matter must be regarded as definitely settled, for all was in order again. The chiefs of the Right at Poznan at first asked that the National Assembly should meet in that city instead of Warsaw, where they maintained the election would not be free. But Rataj had already decided on Warsaw—and in Warsaw it was held on May 31, 1926.

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTS PILSUDSKI PRESIDENT

It was generally thought that Pilsudski wished to be elected President. His friends and admirers began a vigorous campaign in his favour a fortnight before the meeting of the Assembly; the Centre and Left parties decided to support him for the office; the army hoped he would take it; but the Marshal himself would neither affirm nor deny that he was even a candidate. During these days of suspense and excitement Pilsudski made several public statements to journalists and others which elucidated his motives for the *coup d'état* and the consequent situation.

"Poland," he said, "is the victim of her Parliamentary system"—with the wars of Right and Left—but it was "the Right from which had come the assassin of President Narutowicz, which defended this Parliamentarism, and had given the country a Constitution that deprived the Executive of any possibility of prompt action." The Seym, he declared, imposed as Ministers not the most competent men, but men who had a talent for speech-making, and were adepts in intrigues and manipulations,

which, however, took up so much of their time when in office that they were otherwise inefficient. "The Government loses nine-tenths of its force from the pacts made with party groups, who, however, support a Minister only so long as he fulfils all the requests of these deputies. Yet what Poland needs is a strong Government . . . and Ministers independent of parties." On another occasion he said that when he returned from Magdeburg he was so sure of the wisdom of the nation which had been born again that he did not desire to be dictator, and therefore had put the supreme power into the hands of the Constituent Seym—with what result? "What do we see?" he asked. "Eternal quarrels, eternal discords! Democratic liberty abused to such an extent as to make democracy hateful! . . . To-day it would be easy for me to stop you from going into the hall of the National Assembly" (he was addressing some of the deputies), "but I am still trying to see if the interests of Poland cannot be served except by force. Our Parliament has far too many privileges, and those who are called on to administer the State must have more power."

Perhaps the most illuminating expression of Pilsudski's views was that which he gave to the distinguished French journalist, Sauerwein, who reproduced the interview in the *Matin* of May 26, 1926. When Sauerwein said to the Marshal that he did not speak like a dictator, Pilsudski replied:

Is it quite necessary that I should be a dictator? I am a strong man and I like to decide all matters by myself. When I consider the history of my country, I cannot really believe that Poland can be governed by the stick. I don't like the stick. Our generation is not perfect, but it has a right to some respect; that which will follow will be better. No! I am not in favour of a dictatorship in Poland. I conceive the rôle of the Chief of the State in a different fashion—it is necessary that he should have the right to make quick decisions on questions of national interest. The chicanes of Parliament retard indispensable solutions. We live in a legislative chaos. Our State inherited the laws and prescriptions of three States, and they have been added to. The authority of the President must be increased by simplifying things. I do not say that we should imitate exactly the United States where the great force of the central power is counterbalanced by the large autonomy of the different States. But something in that order of ideas should be sought for that can be applied to Poland. . . . They talk to satiety of the Right and the Left—I do not like these categories; they cover different social conceptions,

and the solution of social problems is still to seek. We are the neighbours of Russia who has tried a social experiment on a great scale by putting down the old institutions and replacing them by others. We have no wish to imitate her.

When I came here from Magdeburg at the end of the War I had absolute power in my hands. I could have kept it, but I saw that Poland must be prudent, because she was new and poor; she had to avoid hazardous experiments. The Right and the Left with us are about equal, as the weak majorities by which our social laws were passed proved. For the moment we must remain as we are, without essaying adventures with the Right or the Left. Morality in public life is the essential thing. A great effort of honesty is needed after the demoralization caused by the years of war and the centuries of slavery. I have friends in the Right and in the Left, but Poland cannot recover on a policy of party—the country and myself have had enough of these labels and programmes.

On May 31, 1926, the National Assembly elected Pilsudski President by 292 votes to 193 for Bninski, the candidate of the Right, and Governor (*Wojewoda*) of Poznan. The Assembly was composed of 554 deputies and senators; the total strength of the Right was 206 votes, of the Centre 96, of the Left 135 and of the National Minorities 111; there were 6 Communists; but 69 either gave in blank papers or abstained from voting. When the result was officially announced, Bartel, accompanied by Rataj and Trampczynski, the Marshals respectively of the Seym and the Senate, went to Pilsudski and informed him of his election.

PILSUDSKI DECLINES

Pilsudski said that he regarded the vote of the National Assembly as giving a legal consecration to his intervention; nevertheless he had no intention of accepting the Presidency. He gave his reasons in a letter sent that day to Rataj. After thanking the Assembly he observed that this was the second time his historical actions had been legalized, actions, however, which had often been subjected to a malevolent opposition. He was glad that on this occasion he had not been elected unanimously, as in 1919; there were now less treachery and falseness in Poland than there were then. He could not accept the Presidency. There were things he could not forget. He could not forget the corpse of Narutowicz, whom he had not been able to save from assassination, nor the

shots fired at his own children at Sulejowek (the attack on his house). He stated once more that he could not live without work that gave immediate results; the Constitution did not permit the President to do such work, and therefore he could not be President. After apologizing for disappointing those who had voted for him and those outside the Assembly who wished him to accept the post, he demanded a new election.

MOSCICKI ELECTED PRESIDENT

It was held next day, June 1, 1926, and Ignatius Moscicki, a prominent scientist and industrialist, who was a friend of the Marshal, was elected President on a second ballot by 281 votes to 200 for Bninski. In an interview next day Pilsudski spoke warmly of the new President as a "technician of the highest class, and possessed of a clear and methodical mind which would be brought to bear, in a salutary manner, on all questions concerning the political and economic life of the country." For his part Moscicki believed in Pilsudski as incarnating Poland "as no man in any other country incarnated his country." Moscicki took the oath as President on June 4, and addressed a touching message to the nation, calling on it to make an immense effort for moral and material regeneration, and begging it to remember the recent dissensions only as incentives to collective work for Poland.

At the time of his election Moscicki was a professor in the University of Lwow. He was born on December 1, 1867, at Mierzanowo, in the district of Plock; his father had taken part in the insurrection of 1863. Moscicki studied at Warsaw and later at the Riga polytechnic, where he specialized in chemistry. He returned to Warsaw, which he left for London in 1892, and there he remained for five years, engaged in perfecting himself in chemistry and physics. Thence he went to Fribourg, Switzerland, where he became Assistant Professor of Physics; four years afterwards he was Director of the laboratory of the University of Fribourg, and made several important inventions of an electro-chemical character. In 1913 he transferred his activities to Lwow, where he was appointed Professor of Electro-Chemistry. After

the War he took charge of the chemical factories at Chorzow for the Polish Government; the factories had been built by the Germans in 1915, but were completely stripped by them when abandoning Poland. He re-equipped them in a very short time, and soon had them producing more than the Germans got from them. He had written numerous works on his subjects which were greatly appreciated by foreign scientists.

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On Moscicki's election the Bartel Cabinet handed in its resignation, but the President asked Bartel to form another Ministry. On June 9 Bartel succeeded; the Government was composed mostly of the Ministers who had been associated with him before; but Klarner, formerly Minister of Commerce under Grabski, became Finance Minister, and Kwiatkowski, an engineer and a director of the Chorzow factories, Minister of Commerce. Almost from the start of his Ministerial career Kwiatkowski devoted a large part of his time and energy to the promotion of the construction of Gdynia, Poland's new port on the Baltic; in 1926 a second agreement was made with the Franco-Polish contractors already at work on the port, the building programme was enlarged, and the actual construction was being carried on expeditiously and well, with 1930 set for its completion. In the Cabinet Zaleski, after a short interval, was Foreign Minister, and soon after his appointment he issued the important statement that no change would be made in foreign policy.

Pilsudski retained the Ministry of War, and at the same time settled the long-disputed question of the High Command. Like the other members of the first Bartel Government (May 15 to June 1), he had resigned; on being invited by Bartel to resume the post, he conditioned his acceptance on the definitive solution of the question in the way he desired. Bartel and the other Ministers agreed to his proposal, which was to return to the decree he had issued on June 7, 1921, the decree that had been cancelled by the second Witos Government after the Marshal's withdrawal from the army. Reform of the Constitution, which had bulked

so largely in Pilsudski's utterances, and which really meant a curtailment of the powers of the Seym and the enhancement of those of the President, was taken in hand at once by the Government. A Bill was drafted and placed before the Seym, which reassembled on June 22, 1926.

CONFIDENCE REVIVING

During the opening session Klarner said that a last effort, which included a further compression of the expenditure, a ten per cent increase of taxation, and a rise in the price of alcohol by the monopoly, would permit the complete realization of Budgetary equilibrium—a result that, coupled with an active trade balance owing to exports exceeding imports, would exert a favourable influence on the zloty. In May the zloty had been as low as 11·10 to the dollar, but at the date of his speech it had gone up to 10 to the dollar. Thanks to large exports for months, the Bank of Poland had been able to increase substantially its reserves of gold or equivalents, and was therefore in a better position to deal with the exchange situation.

Discussing the economic situation, Kwiatkowski said that it could be greatly improved, but that the rapidity with which the betterment would be obtained depended not only on what the Government was prepared to do, but in greater measure on the determination of the nation. The Government would encourage the development of agriculture and the industries derived from it; but support would be extended to the coal, mining, textile, oil and chemical industries. In July Bartel gave a favourable estimate of the financial situation of the country, and spoke of the great animation pervading the national industries. Among these the coal industry, which had been seriously affected by the action of Germany in 1925, showed a remarkable expansion, largely due, however, to the opening of markets to Poland by the coal strike in Great Britain; in May 1926 Poland exported 700,000 tons; in June, 1,400,000 tons. Unemployment had been reduced, he continued, and a credit of 20 million zlotys had done much for the relief of agriculture. The railways were paying better and some additions had been made to them.


Further signs of the Government's financial policy were, first, the arrival of Kemmerer, with American experts, at Warsaw on July 3, to renew investigation of the financial and economic situation, and second, the conclusion of agreements with Harriman, the American financier, respecting the Giesche mines in Upper Silesia. On July 19 negotiations were begun once more for a Polish-German commercial treaty at Berlin.

CONSTITUTION MODIFIED BY THE SEYM

During July 1926 the Seym examined the draft of the reform drawn up by the Government and embodying some at least of the ideas of Pilsudski: it had also under consideration the draft of a Bill for conferring "Full Powers" on the Government. On July 22, 1926, an Act was passed, mainly on the lines of the Government reform draft, by 246 votes to 95. At the same session the Seym passed the Act of Full Powers. Together these measures effected a political revolution, the Seym lost much of its power, if not all of its predominance.

NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ACT

Moscicki promulgated the new Constitutional Act on August 2, 1926. It contained four main provisions. The first limited the rights of Parliament with respect to the Budget; if within a period of five months the Budget was not passed, the draft Governmental Budget (Finance Bill) acquired the force of law; if Parliament was dissolved without passing the Budget, the Government was given the right to fall back on the Budget of the previous year. It was also provided that if the Parliament was dissolved without voting the military contingent for the year, the Government had the right to call up a contingent similar to that voted the previous year. The second main provision was the most important of the four; it gave the President the right to dissolve Parliament on the proposal of the Government if unanimous, the new elections taking place within ninety days. The third provision authorized the President to issue decrees, having the force of law, until the new Parliament was in session, reservations being made respecting any changes in the Constitution and the electoral law.



PRESIDENT MOSCICKI

The fourth provision was that a motion for the retirement of the Government or of one of its Ministers could not be voted on in the course of the sitting during which it was made.

The Act conferring Full Powers, also put into force on August 2, 1926, authorized the President to promulgate decrees having the force of law, till the meeting of the new Parliament (which took place in 1928), respecting (1) putting in force laws in accordance with the Constitution, and giving effect to its stipulations regarding special laws; (2) the reorganization and simplification of the administration of the State, and the putting in order of the legislation of the country; (3) the regulation of the administration of justice and social work; (4) the balancing of the Budget, the stabilization of the currency, and the amelioration of the economic situation, particularly touching agriculture and silviculture. There were certain reservations regarding the introduction of new taxation, changing the electoral law, and so on. But the net effect of these laws was clear; the rights of the Polish Parliament were limited, and the Executive, hitherto subordinate, became the fundamental element in the political life of the nation instead of the Legislature. The Seym still had considerable powers; the Government collectively and its Ministers individually were still responsible to it.

PILSUDSKI GIVEN THE HIGH COMMAND

Pilsudski was only partly satisfied with these new laws, but he obtained all he wanted with respect to the High Command. On August 7, 1936, President Moscicki issued a decree settling the question. This decree stated that the President, as the supreme chief of the army, exercised its command through the Minister of War, and issued such decrees respecting it as did not need legislative action; named and dismissed the Inspector-General of the Army, the Under-Secretaries of the War Ministry, and the Chief of the General Staff—in virtue of a resolution of the Cabinet on the proposal of the War Minister—as well as the heads of divisions and other superior officers—also on the proposal of the War Minister. The War Minister became the effective chief of the army in time of peace, and the Inspector-General was

designated as Commander-in-Chief in time of war, with the General Staff under his orders, and all nominations to colonelcies or higher ranks made in agreement with him. Pilsudski made himself Inspector-General as well as Minister of War, and the army was entirely in his hands.

With the passing of the army into the strong grasp of its first Marshal, the May Revolution came practically to a close. New political bases for the government of the country had been established, but the financial and economic situation, though improved and improving, still left much to be desired. Since early in July Kemmerer and his experts had been busy; they made a thorough exploration of the situation, and conferred with Government officials, bankers, and representative industrialists and agriculturists. In September Kemmerer's report was submitted to the Polish Government, which accepted many of its recommendations, one of the most important being that the zloty should be stabilized at its current value, then ranging between 9 and 10 to the dollar, with a rising tendency. The Seym, after the summer vacation, resumed its sittings on September 20, 1926, and Klarner immediately put before it the draft of the Budget for the fourth quarter of the year. He said that there had not been equilibrium in the preceding quarter, but such an amelioration was now taking place that it was certain for the fourth quarter. Unemployment had again fallen; in January the figure had stood at 360,000, and was now down to 235,000. The reserves of the Bank of Poland had again increased. Exports continued to rise in proportion to imports; the trade balance amounted to 500 million zlotys for the eight months of the year. "The Budget," he stated, "will be made to correspond with the people's capacity to pay."

THIRD BARTEL CABINET

The Socialists and the Left generally supported the Government draft; some parties were against it; finally the Seym voted the draft, with a minor exception, but afterwards a motion was carried, by large majorities, of non-confidence in two of the members of the Government—the Ministers of Education and of the Interior—

with the result that the Bartel Government resigned. President Moscicki accepted its resignation, but forthwith asked Bartel to form another Cabinet, which he did on September 27, 1926, by composing it of the same Ministers as before. Next day the Senate began its consideration of the draft Budget; a motion by the National Democrats for its rejection in its entirety was defeated by 44 votes to 36, but another motion, by the same party, to reduce the credits demanded by the Government was carried by 40 votes to 37. When the Bill came up again in the Seym—September 30—the amendment made by the Senate was ratified by 206 votes to 94, with four abstaining. The Bartel Government again resigned, and Moscicki accepted its resignation.

FIRST PILSUDSKI CABINET

Political excitement rose high in Warsaw once more. The majority against the Government, or in other words against Marshal Pilsudski, was composed of that combination of the Right and the Centre which, under Witos, had been put down by the *coup d'état*; and its action in the Seym was a declaration of open hostility to the Marshal. There was much talk of a dissolution of Parliament. Pilsudski had no notion of dissolving the Parliament —only to have it replaced by another on the old lines he hated. Moscicki asked him to form a Government, and he consented to do so, to the joy of his friends and the chagrin of his enemies. On October 2, 1926, he constituted a Cabinet, with himself as Prime Minister and War Minister, Bartel as Vice-Premier and Minister of Education, Zaleski as Foreign Minister (on October 5), Slawoj-Skladkowski as Minister of the Interior, Czechowicz as Finance Minister, and Kwiatkowski as Minister of Commerce and Industry. Among the other members of the Government were two Conservatives and a Socialist; in fact, this administration was a sort of Cabinet of National Union, for it included men from the Right, the Centre and the Left, but all of them were believers in Pilsudski and independent of their parties. Pilsudski was looking beyond all the parties; his Government rested on no combination of parties, but on men in them who had faith in him and his policies. Before the *coup d'état* the Pilsudski question

divided the Right and the Left; after it all the parties were split up more or less by that question. The first step of the new Government was to adjourn the Seym for a month—it resumed in mid-November.

POLES A UNIT ON FOREIGN POLICY

However much the Poles were divided on internal policy, they were virtually a unit on foreign policy. During the May Revolution and the period that followed up to the meeting of the Assembly of the League of Nations in September, the claim of Poland to a permanent seat in the Council had by no means been lost sight of. Zaleski, on July 21, voiced the opinion of the whole country when he said to the Foreign Commission of the Seym:

The geographical situation of Poland, the territory she occupies, the extent of her population (which was increasing at the rate of 400,000 a year), and her importance as a political factor in the ensemble of the economic relations of Europe, assign to her a high rôle in world politics —so high a rôle that it is impossible to imagine any solution of the problem of the general peace without her active and permanent participation. Only the permanent collaboration of Poland in the Council of the League of Nations will permit the League to fulfil, completely and fruitfully, the rôle to which it is called in virtue of the fundamental principles of the Covenant.

POLAND GETS RENEWABLE THREE YEARS' SEAT IN LEAGUE COUNCIL

The Commission constituted by the Council to inquire into the question of the enlargement of its membership had recommended the addition of three non-permanent seats. When the Assembly met—Zaleski was Poland's representative—Germany was admitted by a unanimous vote of the 48 States represented, and given a permanent seat in the Council on September 8. The Assembly adopted the recommendation of the Commission respecting the enlargement of the Council, and made the total number of seats 14, of which 9 were non-permanent. Germany now being a member 49 States took part in the election, and of these 45, which included Germany, voted to give Poland a non-permanent seat. Another vote attributed a non-permanent seat for three years to Poland, 44 States supporting her. After all the seats, and the

length of time they were to be occupied, had been decided, Nintchitch, the President, announced that Poland asked to be declared re-eligible at the end of the three-years' period, in conformity with the new regulations that had been adopted for membership; 48 States were present at the voting, but only 44 voted; Poland to succeed required a majority of two-thirds, and actually obtained 36 votes, or six more than necessary; eight States voted against her, but as the voting was secret their names were unknown.

"KING OF POLAND" RUMOURS

Towards the end of October 1926 there were rumours that Pilsudski intended to make himself King of Poland. These were occasioned by a visit he paid to Nieswiez, an ancestral residence of the Radziwills, his ostensible object being the decoration with a military order of the grave of an *aide* of his, Prince Stanislas Radziwill, who had fallen in battle in 1920 during the war with Soviet Russia. Pilsudski was accompanied by two of the members of the Government, and he found assembled at Nieswiez a large number of the Polish aristocracy and gentry, including Prince Janus Radziwill, the head of his branch of his house, who gave him a warm welcome. Pilsudski's visit was explained by his wish to give to his Government as wide a base as possible of patriotic union; he desired the co-operation of these Conservatives, as of others, in his work for the good of their common country.

THE SEYM DEFIANT

When the Seym resumed on November 13, 1926, President Moscicki informed it that its task would be the examination of the Budget, as submitted by the Government, for the year April 1, 1927, to March 31, 1928. A decree issued on November 4 had restricted the "liberties of the Press," and penalized the spreading of false news; this was described by some journalists as "gagging the Press in a manner equalled only in Russia and Italy." The Socialists, who had supported the May Revolution, turned their backs on Pilsudski, and were loud in their complaints. There was continuous excitement in political circles, but at the same

time Pilsudski continued to have the support of all those who were disgusted with the ineptitude of the Seym.

Dmowski, who had taken little direct part in politics since his short tenure of the Foreign Ministry in 1923, was abroad when the *coup d'état* took place. On his return home he maintained an attitude of reserve, but after the Nieswiez meeting he published an article, entitled "The Crumbling of the Nation," in the *Gazeta Warszawska*, in which he said that the parties of the Centre and the Left were in perpetual flux, the Right alone being organized. A grouping of parties was required—the "Nation had to be organized." To help Dmowski's campaign the National Democrats asserted that he had never been regarded as belonging only to one party; and early in December 1926 an organization was formed at Poznan called *Oboz Wielkiej Polski* (The Camp of Great Poland), but it was composed almost exclusively of National Democrats.

The Seym discussed the Budget, but found time in between to pass unanimously a resolution abrogating the Presidential decree limiting the liberties of the Press. In his presentation of the Budget Czechowicz took a very favourable view of the financial and economic situation; the question to consider was the stabilization of the zloty and a large foreign loan to effect it, but the Government did not intend to pay too high a price for the loan. The situation was better, but there was still much to do.

QUESTION OF GERMAN DISARMAMENT

Polish opinion was deeply concerned with the question of the disarmament of Germany. On January 31 the Inter-Allied Military Commission, which had functioned in Germany since the Armistice, was withdrawn, and instead of there being a permanent control, there would be only the possibility of investigations by the Council of the League of Nations. In Poland it was known that Germany had not only not demolished the fortifications which had existed in 1919 at Königsberg, Küstrin and Glogau, but had strengthened them. To the Seym's Financial Commission Pilsudski declared that Poland must have a considerable army, notwithstanding the great cost incurred, because the German

Army still existed. Zaleski, speaking to the Seym's Foreign Commission, said on January 4 that it was impossible to pass over in silence some disquieting tendencies in Germany as against Poland. He also referred to the revolution in Lithuania—headed by Smetona which had overthrown the Slezevicius Government in December, and brought Voldemaras to the front—and denied that Poland intended to interfere. He reaffirmed Poland's readiness to conclude a treaty with Soviet Russia, giving guarantees respecting frontiers.

Zaleski also said that Poland thought that all the stipulations of the Versailles Treaty concerning German disarmament ought to be complied with. On January 9, he alluded to rumours of possible changes in the territorial status resulting from the World War, and declared that nobody in Poland would ever consent to buy good relations with the "western neighbour" at the price of a revision of frontiers. "We shall not cede an inch of Pomerania or Silesia. . . . Everybody knows that these territories are essentially Polish, and Poland cannot do without them. . . . Every Pole will sacrifice his blood and his fortune to defend them from all assaults, no matter whence they come." The Polish Government made strong representations in Paris respecting the German fortifications, which Poland could not but regard as a threat. Negotiations followed between the Allies and Germany; the result was a compromise in February which satisfied Foch if it did not quite satisfy Poland: part of the fortifications at Königsberg, Küstrin and Glogau were demolished.

The pourparlers between Poland and Germany for a commercial treaty were again suspended, the reason advanced by Germany being the old one of the right of expulsion, which was further complicated by the deportation of four German railwaymen from Upper Silesia. In the reply of the Polish Government to a German Note, it was pointed out that recently Germany had expelled 25,000 Polish workers, though they had lived a long time on German territory. When Germany demanded that this question should be settled before proceeding with the commercial treaty, Poland replied that such a demand was inadmissible. In March, however, as a consequence of conversations at Geneva

between Zaleski and Stresemann, the negotiations were reopened, but within a few weeks were threatened with interruption by a speech made by Herdt, German Minister of Justice and Vice-Chancellor, at Beuthen, in German Upper Silesia, in which he said that Germany claimed the return to her of Polish Upper Silesia. It was explained that Herdt was not speaking officially, but as an individual. The Polish Government made inquiries at Berlin, and was assured by Stresemann that Germany had not changed her policy, which was that of Locarno. The negotiations for a commercial treaty continued.

SUMMARY CLOSE OF THE SEYM

The Budget was passed by the Seym on March 22, 1927—and Parliament was closed by a Presidential decree, as the work assigned to it by the Government was completed. This summary stop to its activities was resented as another blow at the Seym by Pilsudski, but it was in accordance with the Constitution as reformed in the preceding year. A sensation was produced when in January five members of the Seym were arrested, despite their Parliamentary immunity, on the charge of being concerned in a plot aiming at a Communist revolution and the establishment of an independent White Russia on Communist principles. Numerous arrests of suspects in Warsaw and in the country followed, and stores of ammunition and compromising documents were found in their possession. In March the Minister of the Interior issued an order declaring illegal the White Russian Hramada, the organization that was behind the plot; at the same time a Communist peasant group was put under the ban. With the closing of Parliament the Government, through all its Ministries, went on energetically carrying out the programme of intensive work and reorganization embodying the Pilsudski policies. The various new organizations that had been brought into existence, such as the Economic Committee, the Financial Council and the Council for National Defence, were actively engaged in their several fields. The whole administration had been speeded up by the removal of incompetents, and the improvement in the State's financial position, which was very evident in 1927, was reflected

in an increase in the salaries of officials. A Loan Commission went to the United States and put fresh life into the negotiations for a large stabilization loan which had been proceeding for some months.

ASSASSINATION OF VOIKOFF

Poland's relations with Soviet Russia suddenly became strained when Voikoff, Soviet Minister in Warsaw, was assassinated at Warsaw railway station on June 7, 1927, by a young Russian émigré called Koverda. Shortly before this event, for which the Polish Government hastened to express its regret to the Soviet Government, Great Britain had broken off relations with Moscow, and the Soviet was in an angry mood. Only a short time before it had felt itself strong enough to suggest the signing of Pacts of Non-Aggression with Poland and other Baltic States. It now seized on Voikoff's assassination as an opportunity to reassert itself, and addressed a Note to Warsaw stating that Poland must be held responsible for the outrage, as she harboured Russian counter-revolutionaries in her territory. The Polish Government replied that it was horrified by the assassination, but pointed out that in affording asylum to émigrés of various nationalities Poland followed international usage; on the other hand, she did not permit the existence on her territory of organizations directed against foreign States. Poland refused to accept responsibility, particularly as Voikoff had declined the personal protection she had offered him. More Notes were exchanged. Poland offered to give money compensation to the family of Voikoff, but the offer was rejected. The assassin was put on his trial, found guilty, and sentenced to life imprisonment—afterwards reduced to 15 years' imprisonment on account of his youth.

THE "CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE"

An extraordinary session of Parliament was held in June to consider a Socialist amendment to the Constitution providing that the Seym had the right to dissolve itself on its own authority. The Seym passed it by 189 votes to 10, with 26 abstentions, but when it came before the Senate in July it met with a summary fate,

for Parliament was dissolved by a Presidential decree. This attempt of the Seym to regain some of its lost power came to nothing, but it indicated another phase in the "Constitutional struggle." The Seym was constantly reminded by the Government that there was in reality no Constitutional struggle, because the Government was careful to keep within the Constitution as amended—which was the case, but could not preclude efforts to revise that Constitution, and in that sense there was a Constitutional struggle; it went on developing with growing acerbity on the part of the Seym. Another extraordinary session was held on September 19, 1927. But next day Parliament was adjourned for thirty days by decree of the President.

GREAT STABILIZATION LOAN

Cutting across the struggle between the Seym and the Pilsudski Government came the news of the successful issue of the negotiations for the large stabilization loan, a witness to the enhanced standing abroad of Poland. On October 15, 1927, Poland contracted this loan for the purpose of obtaining funds to carry out a Plan of Stabilization, a programme for which was established by Presidential decree two days earlier—"with the view to stabilizing the zloty on a gold basis, establishing Poland's credit at home and abroad, and ensuring a solid foundation for the economic development of the country." The plan had been accepted by a group of American banks and financiers; the loan was for 72 million dollars, of which 47 million dollars were taken in New York, 2 million pounds sterling in London, and 15 million dollars in France, Holland, Switzerland, Sweden and Poland. The plan included the appointment for three years of an American adviser, and Charles S. Dewey, Assistant Secretary of the United States Treasury, was accepted for this post, which also covered his becoming a Director of the Bank of Poland.

By the stabilization plan the zloty was established at a little under 9 zlotys—8·914—to the dollar, which had been about its exchange value for some time previously (43·381 zlotys to the pound sterling). From the proceeds of the loan the capital of the Bank of Poland was increased by 50 million zlotys; one-half—

140 million zlotys—of the small Treasury notes were retired from circulation, and provision was made for converting the other half into silver coins; the floating debt of the Treasury amounting to 25 millions was paid off and 75 millions were allocated to Treasury Reserve; upwards of 140 millions were assigned to economic development—later this sum was increased by 32 millions from the profit on the seignorage of the silver coinage. Under an Act passed in October 1926 the Polish Government had renounced its right to issue paper money; the plan killed this form of inflation. The loan was floated with great success on the international market.

BUDGET DISCUSSIONS

On October 21, 1927, the Seym, again in session, examined the draft of the Budget for April 1, 1928, to March 31, 1929. The estimated revenue was 2,350 million zlotys, the expenditure 2,228 millions, with a surplus of 121 millions. In the expenditure were included 70 millions for the amortization of the Stabilization Loan, and an increase of 30 millions in the credits of the Ministry of Public Works, to be spent on improving communications. The heads of the party groups met to arrange a course of proceeding respecting the Budget, of which they complained Parliament was not given full particulars, but their discussions were concerned much more with the consideration of tactics against the Government than with the actual Budget. A Presidential decree adjourned the Seym to November 28 and this was equivalent to its dissolution, for the mandate it had been given in 1922 expired on that day by effluxion of time. The general election was set for February 1928.

POLISH PACT OF NON-AGGRESSION

At the September Assembly of the League Sokal, Polish Minister at Geneva, submitted a Pact of Non-Aggression, which had been the subject of negotiations that had somewhat modified its original form, and which ultimately took the shape of a Resolution passed unanimously on September 24 to the effect that wars of aggression were prohibited, and that only pacific means were to be employed for the regulation of all differences between States—a forerunner

of the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928. Poland also took her share in the League's deliberations on the question of Disarmament. The League also dealt with the question respecting the nationality of school children in Upper Silesia, whether Polish or German, by accepting Stresemann's proposal to refer it to the Hague Court (which rendered a decision in favour of Poland in 1928). Danzig, as usual, made its appearance in the proceedings of the League, but a change in the composition of the Government of the Free City, and the floating of a loan for it guaranteed by Poland, tended to better relations between the Danzigers and the Poles.

PILSUDSKI'S "IS IT PEACE?" TO LITHUANIA

Towards the end of the year it was Lithuania that chiefly attracted attention in Poland and the League of Nations. In October news reached Poland that the Lithuanian Government had published ordinances aiming at the destruction of Polish schools in Lithuania, and that Polish teachers were imprisoned in concentration camps, where they were treated as common malefactors. The report excited indignation in Poland, particularly as the Pilsudski Government pursued a policy of conciliation towards Lithuania and the Lithuanians living in Poland; it retaliated by closing 29 Lithuanian schools in the Vilna district. The Lithuanian Government lodged a complaint with the League, and the Council considered the question in December 1927. Poland had previously addressed a Note to the Council in which the opinion was expressed that an end should be put to the "state of war" maintained by Lithuania against her.

On December 7 the Council heard Voldemaras for Lithuania and Zaleski for Poland, and referred the question to Beelaerts van Blokland, Dutch Foreign Minister, for a report on it; conversations took place respecting the subject in private among the statesmen assembled at Geneva; special interest was imparted by the presence of Pilsudski, who arrived in the city on December 9. Next day the Marshal, impatient with the hesitations of Voldemaras, demanded of him in the Council Chamber: "Is it peace or war?" "It is peace," Voldemaras replied. "In that case," said Pilsudski,

"I have nothing more to do here," and turning to Zaleski he requested him to put this agreement in an appropriate formula. Both sides concurred in adopting a resolution, which the Council unanimously endorsed, to the effect that Lithuania was no longer in a "state of war" against Poland; and that Poland recognized and would respect the complete independence and territorial integrity of Lithuania; it recommended the two States to begin direct negotiations to establish good relations between them. Zaleski and Voldemaras arranged for a conference at Riga in January 1928.

CHAPTER IX

THE PILSUDSKI RÉGIME

1928-1929

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THE Pilsudski Government, of which the Bartel Governments which preceded it might be regarded as preliminary phases, had now been before the country for about a year and a half. Apart from the army, the care of which the Marshal regarded as specially his own, it was easy to see that what lay at the bottom of Pilsudski's policy was his dread of the recurrence of the anarchy which had been fatal to Old Poland, and his determination to make the New Poland different in that respect from the State of the tragic Three Partitions.

The results of his administration were patent in the better government of the country, as in its financial and economic progress. The May Revolution had been a success in itself and in its consequences. The strengthening of the Executive, with a corresponding reduction of the power of the Legislative, had undoubtedly been beneficial. The amelioration of the financial and economic situation was seen in the increase of the revenue; the growing prosperity of Poland added to the income and the consumption of the people, and caused nearly every tax, monopoly and profit-making enterprise to bring in more than had been estimated in the Budget. The zloty was stable. Inflation was ended. And if things were thus much better at home, the position and prestige of Poland abroad had likewise been enhanced. The record of the Pilsudski Government was good, though its contest with the Parliament, or more accurately the struggle of the Seym against it, had to be taken into account. The Parliament, however, had lived out its full term. Pilsudski had not crushed it any more than he had abrogated the Constitution; he could have done both. The question before the country was one of absolute simplicity—Pilsudski, yes or no?

PILSUDSKI "BLOCK" FORMED

Parties of the Right, the Centre and the Left at once "took position," but their disintegration made itself more and more marked. In the Right inveterate enemies of the Marshal denied him any merit and accused him of sacrificing Poland to his personal ambition and lust for power, but the Right was no longer solid, and many of its former partisans went over to Pilsudski. The Centre wavered, but on the whole was against the Marshal. The Left, of whom he had long been the idol, was against him, though there were defections even from its ranks. In these circumstances those who believed in him and his leadership—it was a strongly personal movement which put the man, the hero, Pilsudski first, and regarded his policies as emanations of his genius—formed a body to assist him. It was known as the "Non-party Block of Co-operation with the Government" (*Bezpartyjny Blok Współpracy z Rządem*), and was popularly styled the *Sanacja* (Sanitation Party). Its chiefs, such as Slawek and Prystor, were embued with the spirit of the old legionaries who had fought under him; it was, however, drawn from, and intended to be drawn from, all classes of the community and all the political groups who found a unity in him and his ideas, summarized in the moral and political regeneration of the State, the cultivation of the sense of public duty and the necessary national discipline. It was called, for short, the Pilsudski or Government Block, or, simply, the Block, but usually, "B.B."

INDUSTRIAL SUPPORT

Shortly after the dissolution of the Parliament Pilsudski received powerful support from the industrial element in Poland; it published a statement setting forth its views on the economic and political situation and the general principles and reforms which might serve as the basis of an electoral block. It insisted that the Pilsudski Government had brought order, stability and continuity to production and to the exchange. It declared that the Parliament had not responded to the hopes that had been entertained of it; its demagogic tendencies and the gaps in its work

caused the loss of its authority in the country. The fault, it suggested, did not lie so much with the members of the Parliament as with the system by which they were elected; a reform in this respect was essential. It enumerated other reforms such as the extension of the powers of the President, the enlargement of the powers of the Senate, with its members elected on a plan entirely different from that in use, and the institution of a Constitutional Tribunal. This was largely the Pilsudski gospel.

ATTITUDE OF THE CHURCH

The Church had something to say about the elections, and early in December 1927 the two cardinals and all the archbishops and bishops of Poland issued a pastoral urging the faithful to unity, and warning them against two dangers which might give an unfavourable turn to the elections and contribute to subversive elements; one was abstaining from voting—they ought to vote—and the other was scattering their votes instead of supporting a common Catholic programme. The pastoral concluded by inviting them to wage an energetic fight in common against “the greatest danger which menaces the World and, in particular, Poland—Communism, whose propaganda seeks to contaminate our souls.”

In mid-December 1927 there was talk of consolidating the groups of the Right and the Centre into a Catholic Block, the Christian Democrats taking the lead in the matter, but there was a good deal of shifting about among the parties interested until the National Democrats, hitherto known as the National Populist Union, or simply the Nationalists, in the politics of Poland after the Liberation, transformed themselves without co-operating with the Christian Democrats into the National Catholic Block. The pastoral had its repercussions among the supporters of Pilsudski, and these led to explanations which modified its results. In Poznania, Pomorze (Pomerania) and some eastern parts of Galicia the *Sanacja* took on the form of a “Catholic Union of the Western Provinces,” with Catholic candidates who were also Conservatives. As the campaign proceeded the Right disclosed itself as consisting of the National

Democrats and the Christian Nationalists; the Christian Democrats moved towards the Centre and the Witos Populists or Moderate Peasant Party. Taken together the Right and the Centre represented that "Witos majority" which had opposed the Marshal and his policies in the Seym, and in the elections they came out against him.

GOVERNMENT "DIRECTION"

Complaints were made of the intervention of Government officials and prominent members of the Pilsudski or Government Block in the course of the campaign; but there was no general interference with public liberties, the usual accompaniment of out-and-out dictatorships. Pilsudski himself disclaimed dictatorship, but he believed that the mass of the Polish democracy needed guidance—he was out to educate it, to fit it to play its part in the political life of the State. Thus the mayors and headmen in country places were instructed to explain to the peasants the advantages to be expected from their voting the Pilsudski ticket; on the other hand, the Opposition did not hesitate to exploit the fears of the peasants which arose from their ignorance, and suggested all sorts of dark possibilities.

It was not difficult for demagogues to take advantage of their lack of knowledge and their suspicion, inbred in the old days and still persistent, of any and every sort of Government. In the upshot cunning misrepresentation led numbers of them to vote against Pilsudski while all the time they believed they were voting for him. On the whole, the action of the Government did not go beyond what was legitimate. At the polls there was no interference; their secrecy was not violated, and no one was compelled to vote the Government list.

GENERAL ELECTION, 1928

The elections for the Seym took place on March 4, 1928, and those for the Senate a week later. Though not an absolute victory, the result was a great triumph for Pilsudski. The Government Block, the new Pilsudskist organization, obtained, on May 4, 135 seats, chiefly at the expense of the Right and Centre—this was the outstanding feature of the day. In the second Seym the Right and

Centre had disposed of about 230 votes; in the elections they lost nearly 150 seats, and it was impossible not to see in this fact that the country had given a verdict for Pilsudski. The most enthusiastic of his followers had not hoped for anything so sweeping.

There was, however, another side to the elections for the Seym. The Left had made some gains; the Radical Peasants obtained 41 seats as against 26 in the previous Seym, and the Socialists 64 as against 41; excluding 7 Communists elected, the total strength of the Left had gone up from 100 votes to 130. There was no change in the number of deputies returned by the National Minorities, though there were some changes in their designation. The Jewish representation fell from 35 to 13, whereas the Ukrainian went up from 21 to 43, the increase in the latter being explained by the fact that the elections of 1922 were boycotted by a considerable part of the Ukrainian population. The large Ukrainian participation in the 1928 elections appeared to indicate a better understanding between the Poles and the Ukrainians. The German representation increased from 17 to 19, and the White Russian declined from 7 to 6.

NO MAJORITY FOR PILSUDSKI

For the Seym the result was that while the Government Block constituted much the largest single group, it had not an absolute majority. The result of the elections for the Senate, held on March 11, 1928, was better, as it obtained 49 seats out of a possible 111; the Right and Centre tumbled from 64 to 16; on the other hand the Left, as in the Seym, had risen—20 as against 14. The National Minorities were one less at 24. For the Seym approximately 15 million men and women were on the roll, and of these 11 $\frac{1}{4}$ millions voted, or about 78 per cent. Upwards of 300,000 votes were cancelled for one reason or another; the exact number of those who voted was 11,408,218. Thirty-four political parties and groups had each a ticket or list, and thus the public had thirty-four lists of candidates to select from. The Government Block got 2,399,032 votes, and the Socialists, who came next, had 1,481,279; the National Democrats obtained 925,744, and their allies, the united Witos Populist-Christian Democrat Block,

770,891. The figures for the Senate were equally instructive respecting the change that had come over Polish politics.

After the general election Pilsudski conferred with the leaders of the Government Block and told them that he had always been a partisan of a Constitutional régime; in his view the Parliament ranged itself alongside the President of the Republic and the Government as an indispensable institution. He stated that he would try—for the third time—to make possible the collaboration of the Government and the Seym, which could contribute to this by reforming its methods of work. He outlined a programme for the Seym; it dealt with various questions of immediate practical interest and with Constitutional Reform.

SEYM ELECTS ANTI-PILSUDSKI SPEAKER

Seym and Senate held their opening sittings on March 27, 1928, and Pilsudski, as Prime Minister, read to each of them the Message of President Moscicki. In the Seym the Communist deputies tried to shout down the Marshal, but were promptly expelled from the Chamber by police, under the direction of Skladkowski, Minister of the Interior. After recalling the difficulties surmounted in the course of the first and second Seyms, the Presidential Message referred with satisfaction to the new Seym and its prospect of fruitful legislative work in an atmosphere of calm. The chief business of the Seym, it was suggested, should be concerned with clearing away the defects, which were generally recognized, in the Constitution, and with the solution of the great problem of the harmonious collaboration of the Organs of the State.

One of the first things the Seym had to do was to elect its Marshal or Speaker. Bartel was the candidate put forward by the Marshal. The other candidate was Daszynski, and on a second ballot he was elected by 206 votes to 142 for Bartel. In the Senate, Szymanski, a member of the Government Block, was elected Speaker by an absolute majority over the other candidates, who included Glabinski, one of the leaders of the Right. The Seym suspended the "immunity" of the Communist deputies, who were arrested, and in any case were wanted by the police on a criminal charge.

BUDGET SHOWS PROGRESS OF POLAND

Budget proposals were placed immediately before the Seym; they covered the monthly Budgets for April, May and June, and the full Budget for the fiscal year, April 1, 1928, to March 31, 1929. The revenue and expenditure for the previous year had respectively amounted to 2,767 million zlotys and 2,553 million zlotys, there being a surplus of 214 millions, which would have been larger had not the Government authorized the transfer of 51 million zlotys to increase the capital of the State Land Bank. Of the surplus 88 millions were devoted to various public works, 75 millions invested in standard securities, and the remainder held as a current reserve. The receipts exceeded the original Budget estimates by 39 per cent, a result obtained without increasing tax rates or creating new sources of revenue. The expenditure also exceeded the original estimates by about 28 per cent; part of it went to augment the pay of Government officials by special bonuses amounting to upwards of 70 million zlotys; another part was spent on permanent improvements urgently required. The increase in the capital of the State Land Bank was in consonance with the policy of promoting agriculture, especially the interests of the poorer peasants with small farms. The railways, which, besides turning over to the Treasury a larger amount than was estimated in the Budget, accumulated a surplus of 175 million zlotys. There had been some further railway construction, and work had gone on continuously and on a large scale in the building up of Gdynia, both as port and town. The Budget for the fiscal year 1928-29 estimated the revenue at 2,655 million zlotys and the expenditure at 2,528 millions.

KÖNIGSBERG CONFERENCE

While the Seym was examining the Budget, Poland was in the full stream of international affairs; those which concerned her most in 1928 were associated with Lithuania, the League of Nations and Germany. The prospect of an early conference between Poland and Lithuania after the December 1927 meeting of the Council of the League was not realized, and it was not till

March 30, 1928, and only after long negotiations, that a conference was opened at Königsberg, with Zaleski and Voldemaras as the heads of the respective Polish and Lithuanian delegations. Commissions, to meet elsewhere in May, were appointed to deal with the questions of security, indemnities, and traffic, but they made little or no progress. On May 18, 1928, Zaleski said in the Seym, that though the "state of war" proclaimed by Lithuania had been abrogated, the task of obtaining normal relations with that State was extremely difficult, as it had rejected the conventions for non-aggression and arbitration Poland had proposed, and was persistently raising the question of Vilna, though definitely settled by the Ambassadors' Conference.

In his speech the Minister touched on a visit he had recently paid to Rome which had been the subject of some "fantastic" comment, an allusion to certain statements that he was initiating a policy of collaboration with Mussolini against the Little Entente—statements, he said, that had no foundation; "on the contrary," he declared, "I was able to convince myself at Rome that Poland can count on Italy in her efforts for the maintenance of international peace." He concluded with the observation that Poland's relations with Soviet Russia were "normal and correct," that negotiations for a treaty of non-aggression with her were proceeding, and that favourable developments had taken place respecting business matters which might lead to a commercial treaty.

On May 26, 1928, Smetona, President of Lithuania, promulgated a New Constitution for that State by decree, and its Fifth Article designated Vilna as the capital of Lithuania. A few days later Zaleski addressed to Voldemaras a Note in protest, and sent a copy of it to the League of Nations. The subject came up before the Council, which had begun its fiftieth session on June 4, and which devoted the morning of June 6 to the relations between Poland and Lithuania, both Zaleski and Voldemaras being present. Beelaerts van Blokland, as *rapporteur*, having made his report, Austen Chamberlain said that Lithuania, as a weak, independent nation, like other small nations, had the sympathy of the Council, but Lithuania would not retain that sympathy if

she committed provocative acts such as no Great Power would ever dare to commit against another nation.

The Council, on the motion of Chamberlain and despite opposition from Voldemaras, passed a resolution in the sense of Chamberlain's remarks and directing the *rappoiteur* to submit a fresh report to the Council at its September meeting. Towards the end of June negotiations between Poland and Lithuania were resumed simultaneously in Warsaw and Kovno, the chief features being the claim of Lithuania for about two millions sterling for damage suffered in the Polish occupation of Vilna, and the counter-claim by Poland of approximately an equal sum for damage caused by Lithuania's breaches of neutrality during the Polish-Soviet War, 1920, and by Lithuanian sharpshooters and irregulars.

FOURTH BARTEL CABINET

Scarcely had the Parliament passed part of the 1928-29 Budget when all Poland was agitated by the announcement that Pilsudski had resigned the Premiership on June 27, that President Moscicki had accepted the Marshal's resignation, and that a new Government had been constituted with Bartel as Prime Minister. With the exceptions of two Ministers, the Bartel Government was identical with that of Pilsudski—who retained the Ministry of War; in reality the new Cabinet was but an expression of the unchanged Pilsudski régime. Kühn and Switalski, the new men, were respectively Minister of Communications and Minister of Education. Pilsudski had been Prime Minister for a year and nine months, and he explained why he resigned in a somewhat sensational interview in the *Glos Prawdy* (The Voice of Truth), a Warsaw paper, under the title, "Why I ceased to head the Government." Pilsudski said he had not resigned because of ill-health; he was well; his past efforts had no doubt strained his constitution—and it might be strained again. He might have taken a holiday and remained Prime Minister, but he would not do that.

WHY PILSUDSKI RESIGNED THE PREMIERSHIP

He had resigned because the functions of both the President of the Republic and of the Prime Minister were badly defined in the

Constitution, and in practice were intolerable to a man of his temperament. Further, the Parliament employed such insane methods in its work that he was no longer able to stand hearing or seeing it.

In order to avoid misunderstanding (he said) I wish to declare that I personally as Dictator called Parliament together and co-operated with it constitutionally, even though I could have crushed the whole lot under my thumb like a vile worm. When the third Seym began its work, and I saw no possibility as Prime Minister of tolerating its methods, I faced the alternative of introducing new laws or resigning. I chose the second way.

He declared that he might have remained Prime Minister but for the fact that the man holding that post had to have relations with the Seym, which he stigmatized as "a sterile, jabbering, howling thing that engendered such boredom as made the very flies die of sheer disgust." The deputies behaved as if they were in a common taproom. He continued:

All the time I was Prime Minister I was more Constitutional than the Seym; and no one can say that I have been wanting in democratic convictions. I would that our deputies would not identify their methods of work with democracy. They do democracy no honour. When the third Seym started work, and as Prime Minister I saw the bad old habits renewing their triumphs, I decided that once more I had to choose between abandoning all collaboration with the Seym, while placing myself at the disposal of the President to impose new institutions on Poland, or I had to resign the Premiership. I resigned, and advised the President to replace me by some personality willing to be head of the Government—for a certain time. I added that in case of a grave crisis I shall put myself at the disposal of the President, and boldly take responsibility for decisions and face not less boldly their consequences.

PILSUDSKI ON VILNA

At the close of the interview Pilsudski intimated that, with the consent of the President and of Bartel, the general guidance of Poland's foreign policy would remain in his hands "as heretofore." On behalf of the Seym, Daszynski made a spirited reply to the Marshal's criticisms.

At this time Poland's foreign policy was mainly occupied with Lithuania, intransigent because of Vilna. Negotiations went on but with such scant success that on July 25, 1928, England,

France and Germany made strong representations to Lithuania respecting complying with the recommendations of the League of Nations. In August the old Polish legionaries held their annual reunion that year in Vilna, and the Lithuanian papers magnified it into a concentration of a part of the Polish army in that city—this drew a Note to Poland from Germany. Rumour said that 40,000 veterans would assemble in Vilna. Lithuania sent a complaint to the League. Pilsudski, present at the reunion, delivered a speech which he prefaced with the remark that Vilna would be his theme, but that he would avoid saying a word hurtful to peace or that would cause bitter feeling. Throughout an eloquent address he never alluded to the conflict with Lithuania. The next step of Voldemaras was to propose a fresh conference at Königsberg, but when Zaleski replied that it would be more convenient for him if the conference was held at Geneva a little before the Assembly of the League in September, the Lithuanian statesman demurred and finally said that it could not take place till after the Assembly.

While these exchanges were proceeding, Zaleski went to Paris, where he signed on August 27, 1928, as the representative of Poland, the Briand-Kellogg Pact, a multilateral treaty popularly said to "outlaw war," the other signatories representing the Great Powers (including the United States, but not Soviet Russia), Belgium, and Czechoslovakia. Three days later the Council of the League began its fifty-first session, Zaleski being present, and the differences between Poland and Lithuania were discussed on September 6 and 8. Beelaerts van Blokland reported that the only progress achieved since the subject was last before the Council was that a provisional arrangement had been made granting facilities to people whose properties were cut across or separated by the frontier. A conference between Poland and Lithuania was arranged to take place in November at Königsberg; it sat from November 6 to 9, and ended in failure.

During September negotiations were resumed between Poland and Germany for a commercial treaty, but were almost immediately clouded by a speech of President Hindenburg, while on an official tour of German Silesia, denouncing the attribution of

Upper Silesia to Poland and demanding its restitution. The German Press echoed the President's words and attacked Poland. The natural result was the suspension, once more, of the negotiations, though ostensibly it came about from Germany advancing claims which Poland could not recognize.

POLAND'S IMPROVED ECONOMIC SITUATION

On October 31, 1928, the Polish Parliament commenced a new session. Since its last meeting there had been much discussion among the party leaders, in the papers, and in Poland generally of proposals for reform of the Constitution. Pilsudski had spent six weeks in Rumania to re-establish his health and recruit his energies; before leaving that country he paid an official visit to Bucarest, where he had an enthusiastic reception. He returned to Poland early in October. In the Seym, Czechowicz, Finance Minister, presented the Budget for the fiscal year 1929-30, and commented on the financial and economic situation of the country. The estimates showed a surplus. The improvement in the economic position was proved by the fact that the number of the unemployed had fallen more than 50 per cent since the beginning of the year—80,000 on October 1 against 165,000 on January 1, 1928—though, on the other hand, the trade balance was unfavourable, and caution was necessary.

DECENNIAL CELEBRATIONS

On November 11, 1928, all Poland united in celebrating the tenth anniversary of the Liberation. The country had experienced two great dangers and had emerged triumphantly from both: the war with Soviet Russia and inflation. An immense work had been achieved in every field of activity—administrative, legislative, military, social, agricultural and industrial. The Poland that had been despoiled and all but destroyed during the World War and the war with the Soviet had been renewed, reconditioned, rebuilt. The population had increased to upwards of thirty millions, and the country had recovered from the depression of 1926. Confidence was restored. Danzig and Gdynia gave striking evidence of the growth of Polish trade and commerce; the total traffic

figures for 1928 for the former port were 8,616,000 tons against 6,300,000 for 1926, and for the latter, on which construction was still proceeding, 1,966,000 tons against 414,000 tons.

Poland had the beginnings of a navy and a naval basin at Gdynia for her warships; she had something more than the beginnings of a mercantile marine at both Danzig and Gdynia; the *Zegluga Polska* (Polish Shipping Company), a State enterprise, with headquarters at Gdynia, acquired in 1927 a fleet of merchant ships trading into the Baltic and elsewhere, and had organized, as a subsidiary, the British-Polish Shipping Company, with London and Hull as its British ports. Gdynia was expanding into a town of 25,000 inhabitants, and gave promise of becoming a flourishing city, with a large population; in 1918 it had been a small fishing village. Agriculture was still the mainstay of Poland. Since 1925, with its bountiful harvest, the crops had been good, but prices were tending towards lower levels in 1928; the fall, however, was very gradual, and did not cause serious apprehensions for the future.

LUGANO COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE

Poland's foreign policy came much to the front in the December 1928 meeting of the Council of the League, held at Lugano. Zaleski represented Poland. On December 12 the Council considered the controversy between Poland and Lithuania, the latter having as her advocate Voldemaras again. Two days afterwards Quinones de Leon, the new *rappoiteur*, submitted two resolutions which were agreed to unanimously; the first reaffirmed the end of the "state of war," with Poland's recognition of Lithuanian independence and territorial integrity, and the second referred to the Communications and Transit Commission of the League the problem of removing the obstacles to free traffic between the two States.

On December 15, the last day of the session, a sensational scene developed just before its close in a discussion on the rights of the German Minorities in Polish Upper Silesia. The Council had received a considerable number of petitions from a German organization in Polish Upper Silesia called the *Volksbund*, a

body enjoying the support of the German Government; Adatchi, the Japanese representative, read a report on them, the reading taking up two hours. Commenting on these petitions Zaleski pointed out that in the great majority of cases they were either destitute of foundation or of very slight importance.

Zaleski quoted figures and facts to show that Poland had fulfilled all her undertakings respecting the German Minority in Polish Upper Silesia, and that, in spite of the economic war started by Germany in 1925, the economic position in that area was satisfactory. The struggles of the nationalities in the district would not continue if the *Volksbund* abandoned its agitation against the status which existed there—an agitation that created unrest and might lead to subversive action. Some of the members of the organization had been guilty of treason, and he instanced Ulitz, its leader, a deputy in the Silesian Seym, and therefore "immune." Zaleski concluded by declaring that the *Volksbund* was directed towards sapping the authority of the Polish Government in Polish Upper Silesia, and was a real danger to peace.

Stresemann, who had been listening with growing irritation to Zaleski, pounded on the table with his fist, and cried out that such language was intolerable. In a subsequent speech he declared he would bring the whole question of the Minorities before the Council at its next meeting—in May. It fell to Briand, as President of the Council, to calm the storm by observing that the views expressed had gone beyond the scope of the discussion, though he maintained that the League had not the slightest intention of abandoning the sacred cause of the Minorities.

STRESEMANN'S "GAFFE"

This encounter between the representatives of Poland and Germany excited wide attention. German comment naturally supported Stresemann and praised him for his "stout bearing." In France his "Bismarckian gesture" was generally deplored, but was noted as a characteristic specimen of German methods. In England not much was said about it; *The Times* in a leading article delicately hinted that Stresemann's health, which unfortunately had not been completely restored, might have something

to do with the affair; this was rather the view taken of it in Warsaw, though there were some references to the familiar use of the German fist as an argument.

On his way to Warsaw Zaleski made a statement to the Press in Vienna, the gist of which was that his straight speaking about the activities of the *Volksbund* would in the upshot serve to bring about better relations with Germany by removing one of the main obstacles to an understanding, namely, revisionist propaganda. On January 15, 1929, Zaleski delivered a speech before the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Seym in which he said that intensive propaganda for revision of the Eastern frontiers was being conducted in Germany, not exclusively by private organizations, though such activities were contrary to the spirit of the League, and could not but make a *rapprochement* between Poland and Germany, and the general stabilization of European relations, most difficult.

LITVINOFF PROTOCOL

Zaleski next referred to a proposal made by Litvinoff, later known as the Litvinoff Protocol, for the coming into force immediately of the Pact for the Renunciation of War as between the two countries. A similar proposal had been made to Lithuania. Poland had intimated to the Soviet that she was surprised that the proposal had not been made to Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Rumania, all States bordering Russia, whereas Lithuania had not a common frontier with Russia. In this matter Poland desired to act with the friendly Baltic States and with her ally Rumania. Litvinoff replied that Rumania would be invited to sign, and that negotiations were proceeding with the Baltic States; this negatived the idea that the Soviet's intention had been to separate Poland and Rumania. On February 7, 1929, the Seym unanimously ratified the Briand-Kellogg Pact.

On this occasion Zaleski said that Poland accepted the Litvinoff Protocol (signed on February 9, 1929, at Moscow) as she wished to demonstrate thereby that she supported every pacific action, and was glad to give a "fresh proof that the accusation levelled at her of harbouring aggressive aims against any neighbouring

State whatsoever was unfounded." But in this policy of peace all Polish parties were one; when the Budget Estimates for the Foreign Ministry were being examined by the Seym, Radziwill, the head of the Foreign Affairs Commission, declared in the name of all the Polish parties that they renounced discussion of them as Parliament approved the Foreign Minister's policy unreservedly.

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On February 6, 1929, the Government Block put before the Seym the draft of a new Constitution, the chief authors of which were Jan Pilsudski, a brother of the Marshal, and Makowski, a former Minister of Justice; it aimed at instituting a Presidential form of Government rather like that of the United States. The nation was declared to be the source of power, and the President the highest representative of that power. Instead of being chosen by the two Houses of Parliament sitting together as the National Assembly, the President was to be elected by a plebiscite of the whole people, as in Germany, the choice being between two candidates, one nominated by the Parliament, and the other by the retiring President. The post was to be held for seven years. The President was to have the right to open and dissolve the Parliament, to initiate legislation, and to veto Acts passed by it; to issue decrees between sessions and during the elections. The Government was to be responsible to the President alone, though it was open to the Parliament, by an absolute majority, to compel its resignation.

Before the Seym began a discussion of the proposed measure an event happened which was a sequel to the statement made by Zaleski in the December Council of the League respecting the *Volksbund* agitation in Polish Upper Silesia: this was the arrest of Ulitz, the leader of the organization, on February 13, on the dissolution of the Silesian Seym, of which his membership had given him "immunity" till that date. The charge was that he had falsified documents to facilitate the flight abroad of conscripts. Concerning this arrest Zaleski said Ulitz would receive from the Polish judicial authorities the same treatment as would any Pole

similarly accused. Poland would act strictly in accordance with the law. German comment on the arrest was bitter.

DRAFT OF NEW CONSTITUTION

In the Seym a general discussion of the draft of the new Constitution commenced on February 22, 1929, its chief advocate being Slawek, the head of the Government Block. He said that Poland needed a strong Government, that in the interest of the State the Poles must have their liberties restricted, and that all those who sincerely loved their country must support the draft. The National Democrats strongly opposed the draft, maintained the era of absolutism was past, declared the draft did nothing to improve the work of the Parliament, and that it would reduce the Seym to impotence; and in that way would the citizens of Poland be educated politically. A Socialist deputy, addressing Slawek and his friends, said that their ideas were separated by an impassable gulf from those of the party to which he belonged. It had become apparent that the Government Block was not unanimous for the draft. Two parties had developed; one, led by Slawek, was called the Colonels' Party, and had 111 votes in the Seym; the other had Bartel at its head, and in character was more moderate. It was reported that the "Colonels" had tried to drive Bartel out of the Government, but had been checked by the Marshal, who did not desire a change in the Cabinet at that time. What was apparent was that there was not the slightest chance of the Seym's adopting the draft unless substantially changed; the great majority of the deputies were absolutely opposed to it as it stood.

IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH DANZIG

On February 27, 1929, the Free City of Danzig actually gave a warm welcome to an official visit of Bartel, as head of the Polish Government. A distinct improvement in the relations of the Free City and Poland had come about some time previously, the cause being the defeat of the Danzig Nationalists by the Danzig Socialists in the elections, and this had prepared the way for Bartel. At a banquet Sahm spoke of the "mutual drawing together

of Poland and Danzig," and hoped that it would "soon reach complete fulfilment." Bartel in response said that the "close union of the economic interests of Poland and Danzig was not only the result of treaties, but also of geographical conditions, and found expression in Poland's policy of understanding with Danzig." He added: "In this policy of close economic co-operation with Danzig, the Polish Government also includes the firm desire to safeguard the cultural interests of the Free City and its particular national character."

NATIONAL MINORITIES AND THE LEAGUE

At the March 1929 meeting of the Council of the League the question of the National Minorities was discussed in a much calmer manner than it had been at the previous meeting. A committee consisting of the British, Japanese and Spanish representatives was appointed to make a thorough study of the Council's procedure and report to the June meeting. On March 9 the Council discussed a report presented by Adatchi on the complaints sent in by the Polish Minority in German Upper Silesia and concerned chiefly with the lack of schools for Polish children. Adatchi also reported on the protests made by the German Minority in Polish Upper Silesia regarding the arrest of Ulitz. On the first point Adatchi said the German Government had made reassuring statements, and touching the second the Polish Government had declared that the trial of Ulitz would be expedited. Ulitz was tried in July and found guilty; he was sentenced to five months' imprisonment, but the sentence was suspended during a probationary period of two years, and, on appeal, was quashed.

SEYM IMPEACHES CZECHOWICZ

Towards the close of February the Marshal appeared before the Military Affairs Commission of the Senate to ask that the army credits reduced by the Seym should be restored to the full amount the Ministry of War requested. He explained that he had brought this matter before the Senate and not the Seym, because the latter muddled everything. But the Senate declined to give the increase

by 48 votes to 46 on March 11; the amount in question was two million zlotys; next day the Federation of the Defenders of the Fatherland, whose head was General Górecki, appealed to the public to raise this sum, and opened a subscription list; within six months one million was handed to Piłsudski. A fresh stage in the conflict was reached by the Seym's impeachment of Czechowicz, the Finance Minister, for expending a sum of about 560 million zlotys in excess of the amount voted in the 1927-28 Budget. Czechowicz had resigned on March 7 in order to have greater freedom to reply to the accusation brought against him, and it was not till March 20 that the Seym decided on his impeachment by 240 votes to 126.

Shortly before the Seym passed the Budget for the fiscal year 1929-30, which had been drawn up by Czechowicz, the estimates being 2,954 million zlotys for revenue and 2,787 millions for expenditure; these estimates were higher than those in the 1928-29 Budget, but the figures were lower than those of the actual revenue and expenditure for the year, namely, 3,008 millions and 2,808 millions. Thanks to the greater prosperity of Poland all sources of revenue had yielded more than anticipated; taxation brought in 1,737 millions as against 1,495 millions for 1927-28; the monopolies produced 93 millions more than in the previous year. Of the expenditure a large amount was spent for investment purposes in the shape of public buildings, roads, bridges, waterways and drainage; for these purposes there was also floated an internal loan of fifty million zlotys; the capital of the State Land Bank was raised from 100 million to 130 million zlotys, and that of the National Economic Bank from 130 million to 150 million zlotys.

Technically Czechowicz had sinned, as supplementary estimates for the 630 million zlotys had not been presented to the Seym, but there had been no concealment. The higher figure had been published in the Statistical Bulletin of the Finance Ministry, but it was known that the great increase in this Department's expenditure took place during the months when the electoral campaign of 1928 was at its height. The Opposition in the Seym fixed on this fact, and it was Piłsudski, not Czechowicz, whom it

really attacked when impeaching the latter on March 20. It was the Pilsudski régime that was under fire. On the evening of March 20 President Moscicki adjourned the Parliament till after the Easter holidays.

Pilsudski on April 7 published an article in the *Glos Prawdy*, in which he castigated the Seym severely. He threatened that he might again become Prime Minister as a means of preventing the State Tribunal from trying Czechowicz.

THE SWITALSKI CABINET

The resignation of the Bartel Government was announced on April 13, 1929, and Moscicki requested Switalski, Minister of Instruction in the outgoing Cabinet, to form a new Government, which he did. The trial of Czechowicz began on June 26 and lasted four days; the Court heard many statements for and against the accused. Pilsudski himself spoke, attacked the Constitution and the Seym, and declared Czechowicz to be guilty merely of a "ritual crime," inasmuch as he was called on to answer for acts he had not committed. Daszynski and other deputies gave the Seym's version of the affair. On June 29 the Court decided for Czechowicz, as it considered the charge against him was "premature," the Seym not having exhausted the means at its disposal for a complete study of the matter, which, in the opinion of the Court, was much more political than legal.

During April, May and June 1929 Poland's foreign policy underwent no change. In the first month a Memorandum on Reparations written by Schacht, the German economist, drew from Zaleski the statement that no Government was disposed to give serious consideration to any revision of the Treaty of Versailles, nor could the fundamental rights of nations be bartered for financial concessions. In May the Italian Legation at Warsaw was raised to the rank of an Embassy by the Italian Government, and the Polish Legation at Rome likewise became an Embassy—a fresh tribute to the strong international position which Poland had acquired. During that month Zaleski paid an official visit to Budapest, where he was cordially greeted by the Hungarian Government and people.

POLISH UPPER SILESIA INQUIRY

In the June meeting of the Council of the League, which was held at Madrid, Poland was represented by Zaleski; before the public meeting Adatchi announced that Germany and Poland had agreed to give every facility for inquiry respecting elementary schools in Upper Silesia to the League's representatives. With regard to the question of the protection of Minorities, an agreement was reached on June 13, after four days of intense debate. Stresemann put forward his proposal, which Zaleski opposed, for a Permanent Minorities Commission; the Council passed a resolution which provided for speedier working and greater publicity on the part of the League's existing organizations, with the publication annually of a report of petitions sent in and of the meetings of the League's committees thereanent. On June 15 Germany and Poland decided to begin direct negotiations, under the direction of Adatchi, respecting the liquidation of German properties in Polish Upper Silesia. For some time feeling between Poland and Germany was less strained, and progress was made in the negotiations for a commercial treaty.

POZNAN NATIONAL EXPOSITION

That Poland was strong in herself, that her entire national life was developing steadily and well, was manifested to the world by the great Polish National Exposition at Poznan which opened officially on May 16, 1929, and closed on September 30 following. It was more than an exhibition; it was an important event in the history of the new Poland, for it was at once a record of the achievement of the past ten years, and a guide to what she was likely to achieve in future. The ground actually covered by the Exhibition fell but little short of that occupied by the British Exhibition at Wembley. The number of visitors was four and a half millions, of whom 300,000 came from abroad. Twenty official missions from foreign countries went to Poznan, and many eyes were opened for the first time to the greatness of Poland. And unlike Wembley, the Poznan Exposition did not wind up with a

deficit; it paid its expenses. But considered as exemplifying a stage in the national development, in which every Pole found a response to patriotic feeling, it was beyond price.

Among those who visited the Poznan Exposition was Madgearu, then Rumanian Minister of Industry and Commerce. Advantage was taken of his presence in Poland to begin negotiations for amplifying the commercial treaty between Poland and Rumania; these led to the signing of a series of conventions on September 4, 1929, regulating the direct transit of merchandise, both ways, between Gdynia and Constantza and Galatz—thus linking up the Baltic and the Black Sea—simplifying the customs, and adjusting railway rates and other charges. One of the most pleasant features of the Exposition was the great welcome given by the Polish authorities to the visit in September of the Bürgermeister and Council of Breslau, the capital of German Silesia. The visit was returned by the Mayor and Council of Poznan in October, after the Exhibition had closed. Both visits were distinguished by the friendly feeling shown by Germans and Poles. In every way indeed the Poznan Exposition was of great significance to Poland. Though it had nothing to do with the Exposition, the announcement in September that the British Legation in Warsaw and the Polish Legation in London were to be raised to the rank of Embassies, and an intimation by President Hoover that Washington would follow this example—in line with France, Italy and the Vatican—provided another source of legitimate pride and satisfaction to the Polish State and people. On September 21 Matuszewski, Acting Minister of Finance, published in the papers a statement respecting the financial situation, and underlined the truth that great economies were and would be necessary for some time. He said that the Budget for 1930-31 would in no case exceed that for the previous year; a fortnight later the Government Estimates gave 2,943 million zlotys for revenue and 2,934 millions for expenditure. A change had come over the economic situation, not through any fault on the part of Poland, but because of world conditions, as manifested chiefly in the fall in the prices of wheat, rye and other cereals.

CHECK TO POLAND'S PROSPERITY

The year 1929 was marked by an excellent harvest not only in cereals, but in potatoes, sugar beets and fodder crops; the total yield was considerably larger than the average for the previous five years. But world production was fast outrunning consumption, the balance dipped ever more heavily against the producer, and, as a predominantly agricultural country, Poland was one of the first lands to feel the difference in the general situation. In October 1929 rye was 40 per cent under the average price for the three previous years, barley was 37 per cent, and wheat 25 per cent. This state of things was intensified by the lack of capital or, in other words, the shortage of credit. The purchasing power of the peasantry necessarily declined, and this had its inevitable reaction on the whole economic position. On the other hand, the Polish heavy industries did well during the greater part of 1929; exports of coal amounted to nearly 14 million tons, and foundry production was well maintained for several months. The timber industry, however, was depressed throughout the year by low prices. In the latter half of 1929 the change began to show itself, and it was emphasized as the months passed by, particularly in the textile industry, owing to the peasants' lack of cash; most of the mills in Lodz were running at half-time, with a heavy drop in the numbers of the employed. The figures for the unemployed in all Poland rose from 126,000 on January 1, 1929, to 168,000 by the end of the year. In Poland belief was general that this change for the worse was merely temporary, but it was serious enough to give point to the need of economy on the part of the Government. The bursting of the long-continued "Boom" in the United States could not but aggravate the general world situation, and was bound to have an unfortunate effect especially on the Polish economic situation.

PRESSURE ON THE SEYM

Slawek, as chief of the Government Block, suggested to the chiefs of the other parties that they should meet to discuss the question of a new Constitution; besides the Block's draft already submitted to the Seym, there were the draft which had been drawn up by

the Socialists and the amendments tabled by the National Democrats. On September 29 Slawek published a statement that the parties in the Seym, for purely formal reasons, had refused to collaborate on the question. But this overture from the Block emboldened the Opposition; the Socialists clamoured for the resignation of the Government, and openly asserted that the régime had been forced to come to terms with the Parliament. Pilsudski published an article attacking the other leading parties in the Seym, and disclosing the fact that Daszynski had offered the collaboration of the Left with the Government because it had changed its views—it was to test the sincerity of that change that he (Pilsudski) had asked Switalski to communicate with the party chiefs, the result being nil. "It is the deputies," said the Marshal, "who endanger Poland most!" Daszynski replied demanding the immediate convocation of the Seym, and affirming that Pilsudski had shown more than once the "hatred and contempt with which the Seym inspired him."

ARMED MEN IN SEYM LOBBY

The Seym should have reopened on the afternoon of October 31, 1929, but did not, owing to a curious incident. Before the time appointed for the opening some fifty officers of the army assembled in the lobby of the Seym and loudly cheered Pilsudski when he arrived and joined the other members of the Government present. Four o'clock, the hour set for the opening, came, but Daszynski, having heard of the presence of the officers in the lobby, refused to start the proceedings, one of his functions as Speaker, and ordered the officers to leave the building; this they declined to do, as they wished, it was explained, to salute the Marshal on his retiring from the Seym. On Daszynski repeating his order, they again refused, whereupon he sent a letter to President Moscicki with his version of what was going on. After waiting for over an hour for the opening of the Seym Pilsudski became impatient, went to Daszynski's room, and asked him why he did not open the session. Because, Daszynski replied, officers were making an armed demonstration in the precincts of the Seym. "Is that your last word?" demanded the Marshal. "Yes," was the answer; "I

refuse to open the session under the menace of swords and revolvers."

Pilsudski went at once to the President, to give him his side of the story, the upshot being that Moscicki wrote to Daszynski that in view of the conflicting statements received, he proposed to postpone the opening of the session. Daszynski next communicated the President's decision to the party chiefs. The Socialists expressed their confidence in Daszynski, and the National Democrats condemned the "irruption of a group of armed officers into the precincts of the Parliament," while the Government Block said that in their opinion a grave attack had been made on the dignity of the officers who had come to salute the Marshal, and that the action of Daszynski, being demagogic, had for its real object the causing of disquiet throughout the country which the facts of the case in no way justified. The opening of the Seym was next set for November 5, but on that day Moscicki decreed the adjournment of the Parliament for a month.

POLISH-RUMANIAN AND OTHER RELATIONS

Meanwhile Zaleski paid an official visit to Bucarest, and signed with Mironescu, Rumanian Foreign Minister, a treaty of arbitration and conciliation. Both Zaleski and Mironescu in their public utterances emphasized that the alliance of their countries was strictly defensive, not directed against any other Power, and a factor making for peace and not for war.

Another step in Poland's foreign policy at this time was the signing at Warsaw on November 1, 1929, of an agreement with Germany for the liquidation of various financial questions that had remained over from the World War. Germany renounced all claims, whether Governmental or private, against Poland, and Poland likewise, and in conformity with the recommendations of the Young Plan of Reparations, renounced all claims against Germany; she also consented not to proceed with the liquidation of German properties in Polish territory. Various other matters which had caused friction between the two States were also settled, and the way was cleared, it was thought, for the commercial treaty that had hung fire so long. Another feature of the

late autumn of 1929 was the fall of Voldemaras at the instance of President Smetona; at first there was some hope in Poland that the change would lead to better relations with Lithuania, but this soon vanished, as the new Lithuanian Government under Tubelis, with Zaunius as Foreign Minister, intimated that there would be no alteration of policy.

The Seym met again on December 5, and during the month that preceded its opening the Switalski Government, the Government Block and the Opposition took the opportunity of putting their views before the country. The Socialists were particularly bitter; their paper, the *Robotnik*, declared that Pilsudski had completely changed, was no longer democratic, and had become a reactionary. It was said that at least one reason for their hostility arose from the loss by prominent members of the party of well-paid positions in connection with the National Health Insurance offices, the Government having replaced them by its own officials. The Peasant Parties declared against the Government, as did most of the National Minority groups. The National Democrats had always opposed Pilsudski and continued to do so. The advocates of the régime said they would never abandon the fight for a strong and stable Government, and that their object was not to gain power, for they already had it, but the creation of a sane Constitution such as Pilsudski was trying for.

PILSUDSKI'S AIMS

One of the best expositions of the aims of the Marshal was that given by Kwiatkowski at Lwow on December 1, 1929:

As regards the task undertaken by Marshal Pilsudski—the realization of the indispensable reform—it is not a question of a fight against national representation, since it was the Marshal himself who called it into being, and who has many times maintained that the Parliament in a free democracy, the outcome of a General Election, constitutes an effective factor in the life of a free State. Marshal Pilsudski has always tried and will continue to try to make the idea triumph that a Constitution for Poland must not be copied from something foreign, but must have its own character in correspondence with the natural conditions of the country. For success the Government must have the necessary power. The control of the Government by the Seym must not mean its interference with the business of the State. Methods of work must be

improved. A strong Government is not a dictatorship nor is it anti-democratic. The Pilsudski party will pursue its work without turning from the path marked out by its Chief—which leads to the organization of the State and not to anarchy, to the equilibrium of powers in a true democracy, to the collaboration of all the factors of the State, within the framework of a logical Constitutional régime, and not to the struggle of all against all.

Daszynski opened the Seym on December 5, 1929, with a speech in which he said that, apart from the Budget, the work in hand was the revision of the Constitution, and it ought to be completed as soon as possible. Next Matuszewski, Finance Minister, discussed the Budget, and again indicated that economy was essential. But the Opposition was not greatly concerned at the moment with the financial and economic situation. The Government was attacked first by the Socialist Niedzialkowski, who, in the name of six parties of the Centre and Left—hence known as the *Centrolew*—consisting of the Witos Populists, the National Workers, the Christian Democrats, the Radical Populists, the Peasant Party and the Socialists, moved a vote of non-confidence. Rybarski, a chief of the Right, denounced the Government for not having a definite programme of Constitutional reform. Next, the heads of the National Minorities came out against the Government. On December 6 Switalski and other members of the Cabinet replied, the burden of their speeches being that the country could not return to the régime in existence before the May Revolution. After a discussion lasting nine hours the motion of non-confidence was passed by 246 votes to 120. Next day the Switalski Government resigned.

FIFTH BARTEL CABINET

President Moscicki summoned the Speakers of both Houses, the chiefs of parties and groups, and other leaders, including Bartel, though he had resigned his mandate as deputy. On December 17 Moscicki assembled all the political chiefs, and after telling them that he did not intend to ask Switalski to form a new Government, said he had brought them together to know whether the Seym was ready to undertake the revision of the Constitution or not. Slawek, as leader of the Government Block, declared that hitherto

the other parties had not supported the efforts of those who were trying to effect it. The leaders of the Opposition, however, protested their willingness to help. The crisis was not over, but the President's tact and geniality produced a better atmosphere. Perhaps he had persuaded Pilsudski to give the Seym another chance. At all events on December 21, in agreement with the Marshal, he put the formation of a new Government in the capable hands of Bartel, who was successful; Moscicki accepted the new Cabinet on December 29. Bartel was Prime Minister—for the fifth time in his career. Zaleski remained Foreign Minister and Pilsudski Minister of War. Most of the other Ministers had been members of the preceding Government, but the number belonging to the "Colonels" group was reduced, and this was taken to mean a less forthright policy on the part of Pilsudski. To the Press Bartel said that he placed his trust in the method of collaborating with the Parliament. But there was no real weakening of the régime, incarnate in Pilsudski.

CHAPTER X

PILSUDSKI BLOCK'S VICTORY

1930-1931

I

FROM the financial point of view Poland started 1930 well by receiving benefits from the second Hague Conference, which was chiefly concerned with the settlement of "Eastern Reparations," in connexion with the Young Plan, the first Hague Conference, held in August 1929 having remitted them to experts for investigation and adjustment. The second conference sat from January 3 to January 20, 1930, and settled reparations affecting principally the Little Entente, Austria, Bulgaria, Greece and Hungary, as well as the Great Allies and Germany, but as an issue of this conference agreements were signed at The Hague on February 20, 1930, by which Poland was freed from payment of 2·5 milliards of gold marks as indemnity for German State properties in Poznania, Pomerania and Polish Upper Silesia, and from participation in the Debts of Germany and Prussia; in addition Poland was freed from payment of 1·5 milliards of gold crowns as indemnity for Austrian State properties in Galicia or Austrian Silesia; and the Liberation Tax, amounting in her case to 288 million gold francs, was cancelled.

Poland's relations with Germany during 1930 fluctuated. In February the Polish-German agreement of October 1929 came before the Reichsrat, which passed it. On February 11 the Young Plan and the agreement were discussed by the Reichstag, but it was not till March 12 that the plan was passed by 270 votes to 192, and the agreement by 236 to 217. On March 13 President Hindenburg promulgated the Acts referring to the Young Plan, but postponed signing the Act promulgating the agreement for a week. On March 17, 1930, a treaty of commerce was signed at Warsaw between Poland and Germany. The negotiations for it had begun as far back as March 1925 and had been broken off six times.

FIFTH BARTEL CABINET RESIGNS

There was a further development in the Polish internal situation when in the Seym the Bartel Government was overthrown on March 14; it resigned next day and the President accepted its resignation on March 17. Bartel's attempt to collaborate with the Seym, or rather with the Opposition, proved an utter failure.

Two drafts of a revised Constitution were before the Seym; one was that of the Government Block, and the other came from the Left. The first draft, which was put forward by the Block and not by the Government, was on Pilsudski lines; the second, while reinforcing the powers of the President, nationalized industry and transport, and gave autonomy to portions of the *Kresy*. On February 18 the Centre also submitted its draft. The Centre held that all that was needed was a slight extension of the legislation passed after the May Revolution, but the draft gave the right of a suspensive veto to the President while restricting his right to issue decrees; it increased the powers of the Senate, and stipulated that a vote of non-confidence in the Seym had to be passed by a majority of three-fifths to be operative. The Right did not submit a draft, as it failed to get sufficient backing. On March 4 the Commission asked the Government to choose between the drafts; the Cabinet, including Pilsudski, responded by a statement on March 7 that the programme of revision should make the President the supreme factor in the State, and with that object change the manner of his election; delimit the respective competences of the Executive and the Legislative; confer the veto on the President and enlarge the scope of his legislative action; determine precisely the powers of the Government; and define Parliamentary immunity.

Whatever prospect this programme had was spoiled by the action of the Socialists, who tabled a motion of non-confidence in Prystor, the Minister of Labour, on the ground that he had carried out changes in the administration of the National Health Insurance in defiance of the law—the reforms which had driven certain prominent Socialists from lucrative posts in that administration. Most of the parties approved Prystor's dealing with this

matter. Yet the National Democrats supported the Socialist motion, not because they objected to Prystor, but because they wished to attack another Minister, Czerwinski, who held the portfolio of Public Education and was thought to favour the "single school" system, a principle they detested but was dear to the Socialists. A bargain was struck between the Socialists and the National Democrats; but Bartel announced that the Government would consider a vote of non-confidence in Prystor a vote against itself. At the same time Bartel vigorously denounced the Parliament; he said that, completely disillusioned, he no longer believed in the possibility of collaboration between the Government and the Seym. Two days afterwards Bartel, on the Seym voting against Prystor, offered the resignation of the Government to President Moscicki. The motion against Czerwinski was not pressed to a vote. Pilsudski advised against submission to the Seym; he wished Prystor to retain his post—which meant that a Government could not be constituted till April 1, when the ordinary session of the Parliament terminated.

BUDGET AND THE CRISIS

During the session discussions of a noisy character on the Budget were frequent in the Seym; reductions were made in the amounts assigned to the Ministries of War and Foreign Affairs for secret services. The Seym passed an amended Budget on February 12. This Budget then went to the Senate, which passed it on March 13, but with the figures improved from the Government standpoint; thus, the amount assigned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was increased by two million zlotys over that voted by the Seym. The Budget went back to the Seym, which had to pass it by April 1, the date of the prorogation of the Parliament, otherwise the Budget as passed by the Senate would be legalized, a thing which the Opposition was determined to prevent. Pending the appointment of another Government the Bartel Ministry continued to function by request of the President, and day after day passed without the emergence of its successor; indeed, it was alleged that Pilsudski was playing for time against the Seym.

On March 18 the President invited Szymanski, Speaker of the

Senate, to form a Cabinet, but Szymanski's efforts, which extended over a week, failed. The leaders of the Block told Szymanski they did not believe that collaboration with *this* Seym was possible. Pilsudski said he would not take part in any Cabinet unless it agreed in advance to conditions which in effect deprived the existing Seym of most of its powers. Informed of these conditions, the Opposition leaders declined to support Szymanski, who on March 26 announced to Moscicki that he had not succeeded. The President next turned to Jan Pilsudski, younger brother of the Marshal, and asked him to constitute a Government; the result was the same as with Szymanski's attempt. The Socialists lost all patience, for April 1 was close at hand, and nothing had been settled about the Budget. On March 29 Daszynski convoked the Seym in full session, and it passed the Budget in half an hour, with the figures at 3,038 million zlotys and 2,940 million zlotys for revenue and expenditure respectively.

FIRST SLAWEK CABINET

Later in the same day Moscicki requested Slawek to form a Cabinet; Pilsudski supported Slawek, who quickly got together a Government, which was sworn in during the evening; at the same time the President decreed the closure of the Parliament.

The new Prime Minister proceeded to tell the Government Block that as the majority in the Seym—the Opposition—had not the welfare of the State at heart, and had no real understanding of the national interests, the logic of events dictated that this Seym must come to an end, with a general election to follow. It was the duty of the Block to inform the country in the meantime of the issues at stake in order that it should know how to vote. On April 5 the *Centrolew* issued a statement in which it said that as the Seym was shut public opinion must express itself in some other way; the time for silence was past; for its own part it demanded the abolition of the "dictatorship and a return to the lawful régime," and it expressed the hope that if the Parliament was dissolved, the elections would be "honest." Some three weeks afterwards 150 delegates, representing the National Democrats in

all parts of Poland, met in a conference at Warsaw, Dmowski taking part in its deliberations. A lengthy resolution was passed proclaiming the failure of the Government to deal with the economic situation, and demanding the suppression of the Pilsudski régime.

Daszynski, as Speaker of the Seym, presented, on May 9, 1930, to Moscicki a petition, signed by the requisite number of deputies, requesting the convocation of the Seym in extraordinary session. The President complied by summoning the Seym for May 23, but on that day he decreed its adjournment for thirty days. The *Centrolew* published a strong protest, and accused the Government of aggravating the economic situation by its policy; it declared for the maintenance of the struggle against the "dictatorship" and for the "Constitution." The National Democrats issued a declaration to a similar effect. On June 23 Daszynski convoked the Seym, but the President again intervened, and adjourned it for another month. It was clear that the Government had no intention of permitting this Seym to meet, and the *Centrolew* announced that a great congress would be held at Cracow on June 29 "for the defence of public law and liberty."

CONTINUITY OF POLAND'S FOREIGN POLICY

Notwithstanding the increasing tension of the conflict between the Pilsudski régime and the Opposition, Poland showed the continuity in her foreign policy that had been characteristic of her for years. Her desire for permanently friendly relations with the Baltic States was demonstrated by the welcome she gave Strandman, Estonian Head of the State, when he visited Warsaw in February 1930; the Polish Press was unanimous in stressing the fact that their country strongly favoured the independence of these States. Referring to Strandman's visit, Zaleski said it was the wish of Poland to be surrounded by friendly States, as she herself was one of the indefatigable champions of the *rapprochement* of nations. He spoke of the growing power and authority Poland enjoyed, and instanced her re-election to a second three years' seat on the Council of the League almost unanimously.

POLISH-GERMAN TENSION

Great expectations were attached to the signing of the commercial treaty with Germany. But on April 14, 1930, she raised her customs tariff to such an extent as to negative the benefits Poland anticipated from the treaty. Comment in Poland was sharp and bitter. A general election took place in Polish Upper Silesia for the local Parliament; the result gave satisfaction to the Poles, for their candidates polled 396,000 votes against 205,000 for the German candidates; there were 30 Polish members against 15 German. The Poles could also point with equal satisfaction to the falsification of the predictions made by Germans and others that production in their part of Upper Silesia would fall off substantially after the division of the territory; instead of a decrease an increase was recorded. Frontier "regrettable incidents" had been rare, but in May and June 1930 several occurred in which Poles were shot, and aroused Polish resentment. Curtius, German Foreign Minister, denied that they had been systematically provoked, as some asserted, and he declared that Germany was determined on a pacific settlement of every kind of conflict between States. The incidents were investigated by mixed commissions.

DANZIG'S DEMAND

Poland saw another indication of tension in a statement presented in June by the Senate of Danzig to the High Commissioner of the League of Nations in the Free City demanding that Poland should make full use of the port—which, it was alleged, she was not doing, but was giving preferential treatment to Gdynia. In the Danzig Volkstag Sahm said that Danzig was faced with an economic crisis through the fact that Poland, having succeeded at Versailles in separating Danzig from Germany on the ground that she would employ the port of Danzig, as her only approach to the sea, to its whole capacity, had since made the "fishing village of Gdynia a modern port, and was diverting Danzig trade to it by a lavish use of Government powers."

Strasburger, Polish Commissary-General at Danzig, made a trenchant and fully documented reply; he stated there was

nothing in the Treaty of Versailles preventing Poland from building a port on her own strip of the Baltic littoral, and, further, that thanks to Polish trade and commerce the port of Danzig had made enormous strides, the turnover in 1929 being four times that of 1913; no other port in the world could show such a wonderful advance. Relations between Poland and the Free City had changed for the better in 1929, but an election in May 1930 had resulted in putting again in power the extreme Nationalists who were hostile to Poland. The Polish Government once more stated that it regarded both ports as essential for Poland. In February 1930 another contract was concluded with the Franco-Polish syndicate by which the Gdynia building programme was greatly extended, at a cost of nearly 50 million zlotys; the whole construction was to be completed by April 1934. The population of Gdynia in 1930 was nearly 40,000.

Poland's relations with the Soviet were affected, though not seriously, by the discovery in April of a bomb in the chimney of the Soviet Legation at Warsaw. The Soviet Minister in Warsaw presented two Notes on the subject to the Polish Government, the first pressing for action to terminate a state of things in which it was possible for Soviet representatives to be frequently exposed to "terrorist violence," and the second regretting the "slow action" of the Polish Government in the matter. The culprit, however, had fled the country, but he was extradited, brought to Warsaw, and in April 1931 sentenced to ten years' imprisonment.

Returning Zaleski's visit to Rome in 1928, Grandi, Italian Acting Foreign Minister, arrived in Warsaw in June 1930 and was received most cordially. At a banquet Zaleski congratulated Italy on her "marvellous development during the last eight years," and spoke of the friendship existing between her and Poland. Grandi saw Pilsudski, and had a long conversation with him.

ECONOMIC SITUATION WORSENS

Poland's national balance sheet for 1929-30 was not bad, considering the position fairly. Due to business depression the rapid

growth of the revenue ceased, but it remained roughly as in the previous year. The expenditure was restricted to an amount slightly above that for 1928-29. For 1929-30 the revenue amounted to 3,030 million zlotys and the expenditure to 2,993 millions. Taxation brought in 1,736 millions, or about the same as in the preceding year. The source of revenue most affected by adverse business conditions was the customs duties; imports of manufactured or semi-manufactured goods decreased in quantity and quality as the purchasing power of the population declined. The monopolies, producing about one-quarter of the revenue of the State, contributed nearly as much as in 1928-29. The State forests yielded what the Budget estimated; posts and telegraphs did better. The State railways, on the other hand, which had been counted on to give about 70 million zlotys to the Treasury, were unable to turn over anything to the Government, and thus indicated the depressed condition of trade generally.

The authorized expenditure, which supplementary credits increased to 3,059 million zlotys, was not carried out in full; in June the Finance Ministry announced a reduction of approximately 160 million zlotys in "investments" (public works), and most new projects were postponed; notably, there was no interruption, however, of the work on the port and town of Gdynia. The Government adopted a sound policy in the circumstances in which the country was placed; it was in no way responsible for the effect of the world depression on Poland, who in 1930 had another excellent harvest—of grain and other natural products, which fetched, however, still lower prices than before.

WARSAW AGRARIAN CONFERENCE, 1930

What the position really was in all its starkness was disclosed at the conference held in Warsaw at the end of August, which was attended by delegates from the Little Entente, Estonia, Latvia, Finland, Bulgaria and Hungary, as well as Poland. There had already been agrarian conferences at Bucarest and Sinaia which came to some agreements. The scope of the Warsaw conference was wider; but the question at each was the same: how was this

disastrous surplusage of production to be met? The price of wheat, the pivotal grain of the world, went on declining, and it looked as if over-production had come to stay for a time, despite political régimes or conferences whatsoever. A crisis of plenty, instead of scarcity, on so vast a scale was something new in history, and it was difficult to say how it could be resolved.

Scarcely had the Warsaw agrarian conference terminated when the Pilsudski régime took decisive steps respecting the political situation. The *Centrolew* had held its great Congress at Cracow, and had adopted a resolution demanding the "liquidation of the régime and the re-establishment of the rights of the Parliament." Simultaneously the Government Block held some forty meetings in the county of Cracow at which the Opposition was censured for action contrary to the interests of the State, and confidence was expressed in the President and Pilsudski. The old legionaries met for their annual reunion that year at Radom on August 10 in the presence of Pilsudski, Slawek and other Ministers. In a fighting speech Slawek said that the legionaries remained faithful to the Pilsudski ideal, and Rydz-Smigly, who spoke next, said that ideal meant the prosperity of the State, and those who pursued it were the only true Nationalists.

By a strange coincidence it was on that very day that Treviranus, former German Minister for the Occupied Territories, delivered an address in the Reichstag demanding revision of Germany's eastern frontier. Here was something that went far beyond the strife of parties, and all Poland reacted at once, as was shown by the unanimity of the papers, whatever their colour, in maintaining that the only way in which revision could possibly come about was by war! It was afterwards explained that Treviranus spoke as a private individual, and not officially, but his statements left a very bad impression in Poland, and undoubtedly told in favour of Pilsudski, the tenth anniversary of whose victory over Soviet Russia was being celebrated. The country was reminded that he was a great soldier who could be trusted to defend it. It was not surprising that Pilsudski, tactician as well as strategist, deemed the moment opportune for making another big move in his campaign of political education.

SECOND PILSUDSKI CABINET

On August 23 the Slawek Government suddenly resigned. On August 25 President Moscicki accepted a new Government, composed of the same Ministers as before with the striking difference that Pilsudski became Prime Minister as well as Minister of War and a new-comer in the person of Colonel Beck, till then his *chef de cabinet*, was appointed Minister without portfolio, which covered his acting as Vice-Premier. Slawek resumed full activity as head of the Government Block, and prepared the way for an appeal to the country. On August 30 Moscicki decreed the dissolution of the Parliament and a general election for the Seym on November 16 and a week later for the Senate. In his message the President said that he had reached the conviction that the Parliament which had been in existence was unable to reform the Constitution, though its reform was imperative.

During September and October Pilsudski gave several interviews dealing in his own trenchant fashion with Parliamentarism in general and Polish Parliamentarism in particular. One of these referred to arrests of former deputies on September 10 in accordance with an official *communiqué* of that date, and Pilsudski justified them on the ground of the absolute need of cleansing political life in Poland. Eighteen deputies—Socialist, Populist, National Democrat and Ukrainian, including Witos who had thrice been Prime Minister—were incarcerated in the fortress of Brest-Litovsk, charged with both civil and political crimes; later they were joined by Korfanty and others on similar charges; arrests followed in various parts of the country; in all about 90 former deputies and others were imprisoned. In the meantime the *Centrolew*, less the Christian Democrats, formed an electoral Block under the name of the Union for the Defence of Law and Popular Liberty, and on September 24 Daszynski as its leader addressed a letter to the President in which he said he was afraid that the elections would not be “free and honest.” On the other hand, some of the Populist Piast Party declared for the régime.

On October 7, 1930, twenty electoral lists or tickets were published of candidates for the Seym and twelve for the Senate;

of these the chief were the ticket of the Government Block, with Pilsudski and Slawek at its head; the ticket of the National Democrats, headed by Trampczynski and Rybarski; the ticket of the Catholic Block (Christian Democrats), headed by A. Ponikowski; and the ticket of the Union of the five parties of the Centre and Left, headed by Daszynski. In one of his interviews Pilsudski said: "Poland at the elections has to reply to the question whether she wishes Polish Seyms to resemble those which existed before the partitions or whether she means to break with those traditions of a sad past." Though the National Democrats were opposed as strongly as ever to Pilsudski, the real fight lay between the Government Block and the five-party *Centrolew*.

GENERAL ELECTION, 1930

Without incidents, except at Poznan, where the young National Democrats were troublesome, and at Pruszkow, near Warsaw, where the Socialists belonging to the Government Block and those of the Opposition came to blows, the general election—the fourth since the Liberation—passed off quietly on November 16, 1930. The electoral system called for the election of 372 deputies, the remaining number, making in all 444, being distributed proportionally in accordance with the poll. The Block obtained 203 mandates, and got 44 more from proportional distribution, or in all 247—an absolute majority, and nearly twice as many votes as in the previous Seym. Its gains came chiefly from the five-party *Centrolew*, which received 92 mandates as against 166 in 1928. The Opposition party that improved its position was that of the National Democrats, who had 63 seats against 37 in 1928. The National Minorities lost 40 seats, having only 33 mandates against 73 in 1928; the Ukrainians had 20 instead of 37; White Russians 1 instead of 4; The Germans 5 instead of 19; and the Jews 7 instead of 13. The significant change thus shown was in itself a tribute to the Pilsudski régime, which was not unfriendly to the National Minorities. Out of 15,520,342 electors on the rolls, 13,078,682 voted; of these the Block got 5,293,694 votes, the *Centrolew* 1,907,380, and the National Democrats 1,455,399. Poland had pronounced for Pilsudski.

The elections for the Senate were equally favourable, the Block obtaining 76 out of 111 seats, or more than the two-thirds necessary for the revision of the Constitution. In the Seym, however, the Pilsudski majority fell below two-thirds—which meant difficulty in carrying out that revision.

SECOND SLAWEK CABINET

Pilsudski, in an interview given to the *Gazeta Polska* on November 26 said that the Government had now a solid and stable majority, something exceptional in Europe, and this would permit the creation of more normal bases for the collaboration of the three elements of power in the State: the President of the Republic, the Government and the Parliament. He thought that the principal task of the new Parliament was the revision of the Constitution. Soon after the elections he resigned the Premiership, as he had decided to go abroad for a long rest, and the Cabinet resigned with him; but with some changes it was reconstituted on December 4, 1930. Slawek again became Prime Minister; Zaleski remained Foreign Minister and the Marshal himself Minister of War; Kwaitkowski dropped out as Minister of Industry and Commerce and was replaced by Prystor; Beck became Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The new Parliament was opened on December 9 by the reading of the Presidential message by Slawek; Moscicki dwelt on the necessity of reforming the Constitution which, he said, had been drawn up "in the tumult of war and in the midst of deep intestine dissensions," and inevitably was imperfect. The next business in the Seym was the election of its Speaker, and Switalski was elected by 238 votes to 62 for Zwierzynski, the candidate of the National Democrats, the other parties and groups abstaining.

ELECTIONS IN POLISH UPPER SILESIA

Moscicki also decreed the dissolution of the provincial Parliament in Silesia, and elections were held on November 23, 1930, with 39 mandates for the Poles and 9 for the Germans; the Government Block secured 19, the Korfanty group 16, the National Workers 3 and the Socialists 1. The Polish success was greater than in

the previous election in 1930, and this further evidence of Polish national consolidation was most distasteful to the Germans, who alleged that German voters were prevented from going to the polls, and intimidated and terrorized. The German Government addressed three Notes on the subject to the League of Nations. In its Reply the Polish Government stated it was incorrect to say that a prepared terroristic campaign was conducted against the German Minority; it admitted that regrettable incidents took place, but added that these affected Polish parties as well as the German Minority, and if members of the latter were among the victims of disturbances, it was among the Poles alone that there were fatal casualties. The Polish Government had shown its most emphatic disapproval of the excesses during the electoral campaign, and instituted an inquiry, with proceedings against officials guilty of neglect of duty. Finally, the Government declared its readiness to indemnify all persons who had suffered damage. But German opinion in the bulk had become increasingly Nationalist, as was indicated by the marked success of the Hitlerites in the Reichstag elections, and was now correspondingly vocal respecting Poland, who was also charged with exercising pressure on the German Minority in the general election. The German Press conducted a violent anti-Polish campaign. An election took place in Danzig for its Volkstag in mid-November 1930, and its chief feature was the success of the Hitlerites, which could only mean more opposition to the Poles by the Danzig Government.

CASE OF IMPRISONED DEPUTIES

Two questions engrossed the attention of the Polish Parliament on its opening; one was the case of the imprisoned deputies, particularly those who had been shut up in the fortress of Brest-Litovsk, and the other was the Budget. On December 11, 1930, the National Democrats gave notice of a motion in the Seym respecting proceedings against the functionaries who made the arrests, but five days later the motion was defeated by 208 votes to 148. Tales, some true and others false or exaggerated, had been current that the prisoners in Brest had been treated with great rigour.

The *intelligentsia*, more especially of the universities, had taken up the matter, and the Opposition made the most of it. In the Seym the Government stated that all the prisoners had been released, and if they had complaints to make they should address them to the judiciary. The question was remitted, however, to the Judicial Commission of the Seym. On December 16 Matuszewski, Finance Minister, discussed the Budget for 1931-32, and commented on the severe depression in Poland, as elsewhere; in any case, he said, the Government was determined to maintain the equilibrium of the Budget. The revenue was estimated at 2,890 million zlotys, and the expenditure at 2,886 millions.

PILSUDSKI TAKES A HOLIDAY

On December 13, 1930, Pilsudski set forth in a farewell interview his views on the reform of the Constitution. After remarking that the 1921 Constitution had been made with the object of limiting his powers, as he was certain of a majority if he became a candidate for the Presidency, he said that the upshot was to make the rôle of the President of the Republic "simply comic," his function being merely to accept what his Ministers did. A new division of political work was necessary; the Head of the State must have full powers, as it was he who ought to regulate the whole machinery of Government. He should have direct relations not only with his Ministers, whom he ought to have the right to dismiss if he thought it advisable, but also with the Seym and the Senate. He should be elected by the whole country and not by the National Assembly. In an earlier statement he declared that the "only sovereign in Poland should be the President." On December 15 he left Warsaw for Madeira, which he reached a week later, his sole attendant being his doctor.

POLISH-RUMANIAN ALLIANCE RENEWED

On January 15, 1931, Zaleski and Mironescu signed at Geneva a new treaty of guarantee between Poland and Rumania; it differed

only slightly from the treaty of May 26, 1926, but it provided for its automatic renewal every five years, and it did not contain the clauses regarding arbitration and conciliation, as these were dealt with in a separate agreement.

SLAWEK JUSTIFIES ARREST OF DEPUTIES

Towards the end of January the Seym once more discussed the question of the deputies who had been imprisoned at Brest and other places. The debate was long and stormy, as there was a good deal of feeling on the subject, and not a few Poles thought that Poland had suffered in her credit abroad because of these imprisonments. Slawek put the case for the Government in a vigorous speech: he said that order had to be maintained in the State, and that this involved taking action against the *Centrolew* with its "mad agitation," the results of which had been seen in the streets of Warsaw (September 1930) when in a conflict between the police and partisans of the Left, who insisted on making a demonstration forbidden by the authorities, blood was shed and several lives lost. Respecting the allegations connected with Brest he said he made personal inquiry and ascertained that discipline was severe in the prison, but was not made more severe for the deputies than for anyone else; there had been no cruelty or torture. Slawek recalled that at the Cracow Congress in June 1930 President Moscicki had been accused of partiality and his resignation demanded; and that the good faith of Poland had been attacked when the congress declared that the Polish democracy would never recognize a foreign loan obtained by the existing Government. He concluded by saying the Government hoped that "in the future it would not be necessary, in order to overcome anarchy, to have recourse to such rigorous measures." The Seym supported the Government by 232 votes to 150.

SABOTAGE CAMPAIGN IN EASTERN GALICIA

Another subject discussed towards the end of January 1931 was the Ukrainian question in its recent developments. As far back as July 1930 there were clear indications of a campaign

of sabotage in Eastern Galicia, inspired by the organization in Berlin which was known as the Ukrainian Military Organization. This campaign was described by *Ukraina*, a semi-official paper of the organization published in Chicago, on October 17, 1930:

At present there takes place a second campaign of the Ukrainian Military Organization. This organized attempt is intended to foster unrest among the Ukrainians and panic among the Polish population; to check the expansion of the Poles; to sow among them doubts of their ability to protect Government authorities from Ukrainian attacks; to influence the Ukrainian masses against the Polish State and nation; finally, by causing unrest and anarchy, to foster abroad the notion of the instability of Polish frontiers and lack of internal consolidation in Poland. The campaign began with sabotage acts against the property of Polish public men, such as retired Cabinet Ministers, generals, and high Government officials. Shortly afterwards it was extended to all landowners and colonists, as well as to Government-owned properties.

For two months outrages continued, and did not come entirely to an end till October 1930; they began to abate only after the Government had taken strong measures to repress them. Charges were made that these measures were unnecessarily severe, and protests were addressed to the League of Nations, the result being that Poland incurred unfavourable comment abroad. Independent observers investigated these accusations on the spot and came to the conclusion that they were greatly and deliberately exaggerated for political purposes. Excessive zeal had led some minor officials to act in an extreme way, but they were few in number, and were punished by the Government. In any case, no Government in the world could deal leniently with what was confessedly an openly subversive attack. The Seym was well aware of the facts and endorsed the action of the Government. The League remitted the Ukrainian complaints to its Committee of Three for consideration. That there were loyal as well as disloyal Ukrainians in Poland was demonstrated by a speech in the Seym on February 5, 1931, by the Ukrainian deputy Pewny, who said:

The presence of Minority representatives in both Seym and Senate shows that Poland has no intention of denationalizing them, but treats them with complete equality. Moreover, the participation of representatives of all nationalities in the Government Block proves that Marshal

Pilsudski's Government not only protects them, but desires the co-operation of the National Minorities in the consolidation and development of the Polish State. In return it asks only their sincere and loyal attitude towards the Republic. . . . Neither Ukrainian intellectuals nor the masses of the Ukrainian people support political parties which trouble Polish-Ukrainian relations and co-operate with foreign elements hostile to the Polish State.

POLAND AND GERMANY

On January 21, 1931, the Council of the League heard the German side of the case respecting complaints regarding the elections and the Silesian elections argued by Curtius and the Polish by Zaleski. Zaleski spoke of the inquiry which had been and was still being carried on by the Polish Government, and of the punishment of those found guilty. He referred specially to a Polish organization called the Union of Former Silesian Insurgents (*Zwiazek b. Powstancow Śląskich*), on whose activities during the Silesian elections Curtius had severely animadverted. Zaleski compared it to the German *Stahlhelm*. It was true that the President of the Union was the Governor of Polish Upper Silesia, but was not Hindenburg President of the *Stahlhelm*? This comparison drew a strong protest from Curtius.

The discussion, which ranged over election incidents in Poznania and the "Corridor," as well as in Silesia, was, however, not heated, the Council maintaining the standpoint that it was concerned with the question of the treatment of Minorities and not with any quarrel between Poland and Germany. On January 25 the Council unanimously adopted the findings of its *rapporteur* Yoshizawa that there had been infringements of the Minority Convention, but that the Polish Government was inquiring into these infringements; and that the Council before going farther into the matter would wait till its meeting in May for a full report from the Polish Government of these proceedings. The Report suggested that the public authorities of the regions concerned should place themselves above suspicion of being involved in political strife, and it censured the Insurgents' Union as being "inspired by a spirit unlikely to facilitate *rapprochement* between two elements of a population whose reconciliation is a condition of political consolidation in their part of Europe."

ZALESKI ON POLISH FOREIGN POLICY

In the Senate Commission on Foreign Affairs Zaleski declared on January 10, 1931, that the Polish Government would most energetically oppose attempts to use the National Minority problem as a political weapon aimed at Poland's territorial integrity. On February 12 he made a general exposition of Polish foreign policy, and after stating that the alliances with France and Rumania, which were in conformity with the Covenant of the League, were maintained and even extended, he denied reports that a common front was being organized against the Soviet; Poland, he said, would always try to have neighbourly relations with Russia. The Minister also denied the truth of rumours of the exchange of Pomerania (the "Corridor") for Lithuania—such a "traffic in peoples and territories was impossible in modern times"; Pomerania was inhabited by an essentially Polish population, and Poland cherished nothing but real friendship for Lithuania. These statements naturally led him to add: "For us the question of the revision of the frontiers of our Republic does not exist. On this subject we shall never admit the possibility of discussion with anybody."

The Seym's Commission on Foreign Affairs devoted two long sittings on February 20-21 to a review of the international situation, with special reference to relations between Poland and Germany. Zaleski wound up the debate; always moderate, he advanced no departure from the policy that the Government had maintained in the past—a tactic of defence; he claimed it to be increasingly successful. "Slowly but surely," he said, "the world becomes more and more certain that the majority of the questions raised against us at Geneva have nothing material in them and are brought forward merely to excite prejudice against Poland; and seeing this the world is beginning to consider it more prejudicial to those who act in that way than to us."

POLAND RATIFIES GERMAN TREATIES

Tension in Poland was marked, but it did not prevent the ratification by the Seym of the Liquidation agreement of October

1929, and the commercial treaty of March 1930 between Poland and Germany. After a prolonged sitting on March 11–12 the former was voted by 278 to 90, and the latter by 180 to 70. The opposition to both ratifications proceeded chiefly from the National Democrats, who protested that the Liquidation agreement was more favourable to Germany than to Poland, and that the advantages of the commercial treaty had been rendered nugatory in practice by the subsequent imposition of what was virtually a prohibitive increase in tariffs on Polish imports.

NEW CONSTITUTION REFERRED TO COMMISSION

It was not till March 4, 1931, that the Seym debated the revision of the Constitution as proposed in the draft of the Government Block, but it was obvious that the Block had not the two-thirds majority required by the Constitution to pass it, and all that was done was to refer it to the Constitutional Commission. The Parliament closed on March 21, 1931, with the passing of the Budget for 1931–32, and the revision of the Constitution made no further progress, but it remained the chief question before the country.

Notwithstanding the unpropitious economic situation Poland made a fairly good showing financially for the year 1930–31. The actual revenue and expenditure had worked out respectively at 2,750 million zlotys and 2,814 million zlotys. As compared with the Estimates the revenue was lower by about 270 millions, but the expenditure also was lower, owing to economies, by about 175 millions. The deficit for the year was made good from the Treasury Reserve accumulated during the previous years; the reserve thereafter stood at 300 millions.

BUDGET ECONOMIES

To assure Budgetary equilibrium the Estimates for 1931–32 were modified by the Seym in conjunction with the Government. The salaries of functionaries were diminished by 15 per cent, as well as the pay of officers by the same figure (afterwards changed to 5 per cent), the total amount thus saved being 180 million zlotys. Expenditure on public works was reduced; thus, the sum of 19 million zlotys previously allocated for further construction

on Gdynia disappeared from the Estimates, but in this case the money was obtained from part of the proceeds of a loan for 32,400,000 dollars at 6½ per cent negotiated with a subsidiary of the Swedish Match Company in connexion with the Match Monopoly. There were, however, some increases in expenditure for social services, pensions and debt charges. The net result was that the Estimates for expenditure were reduced by about 20 million zlotys, the total amounting to 2,866 millions. The revenue was put at 2,867 millions.

SILESIA—GDYNIA RAILWAY

A loan for a milliard francs was negotiated by the Polish Government with a French syndicate, in which Schneider-Creusot was mainly interested, for the completion of the great railway from Polish Upper Silesia to Gdynia, the loan being ratified by the Polish Parliament in an extraordinary session in April 1931. A certain amount of work had been done on the railway already by the Government. The agreement with the syndicate provided for its completion, with double track, within three years. German comment dwelt on the political significance of the railway and loan as showing that France stood by Poland on the question of the "Corridor," but it also underlined the strategic importance of this north-to-south line traversing Poland almost parallel to and not far distant from the frontier. Polish eyes saw in the railway a fresh guarantee of the territorial integrity of Poland and of the intangibility of her western boundaries.

News of the Austro-German Customs Union project about the end of March gave rise to disquiet and alarm, as a Customs Union between Germany and Austria could not but be regarded as a step to their political union, which was apparently forbidden by Article 88 of the St. Germain Treaty. There was also the fact that the Customs Union appeared to be barred to Austria by the Geneva Protocol of October 4, 1922. On May 19 the Council unanimously decided to ask the Hague Court to pronounce whether the Customs Union was compatible with the St. Germain Treaty and the Geneva Protocol. Schober, Austrian Foreign Minister,

promised that meanwhile there would be no change in the existing arrangements between his country and Germany.

POLAND AND THE LEAGUE

Several questions of particular interest to Poland were discussed at this May 1931 meeting of the Council. Because of the success of the Nazis in the elections Sahm had resigned the Presidency of the Danzig Senate, and he was succeeded by Ziehm, who ignored all the protests of Strasburger, Polish Commissary-General, in connexion with numerous attacks on Poles and their property in the Free City. Strasburger handed in his resignation to the Polish Government, which, however, did not accept it. On April 25 Gravina, High Commissioner of the League in Danzig, had reported to the League that relations between Poland and Danzig were most unsatisfactory. In the upshot the Council appealed to both parties to take whatever action was necessary to re-establish a spirit of confidence and co-operation, and calm opinion in both countries. Touching the second question—the treatment in Danzig of Polish nationals and other persons of Polish language and origin—the Council decided to refer it to the Hague Court for an advisory ruling.

Another matter of great importance was discussed by the Council on May 23: the Report of the Polish Government which had been prepared at the Council's request on the judicial and other measures taken in Poland after and in consequence of the incidents in the elections in Polish Upper Silesia. When Yoshizawa, the *rapporteur*, proposed that the inquiry should be closed, Curtius asked for an adjournment till September, on the ground that he had not had sufficient time to form a definite opinion respecting the measures taken by Poland. Henderson, President of the Council, also favoured adjournment, and the examination of the Report was postponed to the September session.

THE PRYSTOR CABINET

With the return on March 29, 1931, of Marshal Pilsudski to Poland, by way of Gdynia on a Polish warship, some change in the com-

position of the Slawek Government had been generally expected immediately, but nothing of the kind occurred until May 26 following, when Slawek and the Cabinet resigned. The retiring Premier explained that he had decided to give his whole time to the leadership of the Government Block, and more particularly to pressing forward the amendment of the Constitution, which in his view remained the most important work before the country. On May 27 Prystor, Minister of Commerce in the outgoing Cabinet, was entrusted with the formation of a new Government, and was quickly successful. His Cabinet was nearly the same as the preceding one, the most notable change, in addition to Slawek's absence, being the appointment of Jan Pilsudski as Finance Minister. Shortly after entering on office Jan Pilsudski announced that his general policy would not depart from that of Matuszewski, his predecessor, and that to offset loss on the national revenue, the national expenditure would be reduced to 2,450 million zlotys.

THE STAHLHELM AT BRESLAU

Polish relations with Germany could scarcely be improved by the great Stahlhelm demonstration which was held on May 31 at Breslau, in presence of the ex-Crown Prince, Marshal Mackensen, and other German notables. One of the chiefs of the organization declared that it would never recognize the frontiers established by the Versailles Treaty—a threat, plainly, to the Poles. Zaleski sent a Note to Berlin suggesting that a demonstration so close to the German-Polish frontier tended to disturb international relations; in reply, Germany stated that the Stahlhelm was a private association and had no official character. About the same time Treviranus once more preached revisionism. But also about the same time, all over the world, interest in high politics fell away as the general financial and economic situation, grown much worse, came more and more into view, chiefly because of the virtual bankruptcy of the Reich, as evidenced by the failure of big national banking and other commercial institutions, and Hindenburg's appeal to President Hoover for help which led to the "Hoover Moratorium" postponing

for one year payments on account of War Debts and Reparations, by which, incidentally, Poland was temporarily relieved to the extent of some 114 million zlotys.

As was inevitable, the German crisis, with its spreading ruin, had its repercussions in Poland as elsewhere. The announcement of the moratorium had at first a tonic effect on the world situation especially and naturally enough in Germany, but as some time passed before it went into operation the benefit resulting from it was much less than had been anticipated.

NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET

Some stir was caused throughout Europe when towards the end of August it was announced that negotiations were going on between France and the Soviet and between Poland and the Soviet with a view to conclude in each case a treaty of non-aggression. It presently transpired that there had been pourparlers in Paris, of which Poland had been kept informed by her ally, respecting a commercial treaty with the Soviet, which, to improve its standing in French opinion, had also proposed a pact of non-aggression. On August 23 Patek, Polish Minister at Moscow, handed to Litvinoff a proposal for a pact of non-aggression, but there was nothing new in this as a proposal of much the same kind had been submitted by Poland to the Soviet in 1926, and there was the Litvinoff Protocol already in existence.

POLAND AND THE LEAGUE IN SEPTEMBER 1931

Great interest was attached in advance to the September meetings of the League of Nations, but this was much reduced when Dr. Schober, representing Austria at Geneva, stated that, with the assent of Germany, he "would pursue no further" the Austro-German Customs Union. His statement anticipated the verdict of the Hague Court which pronounced against the Union by a narrow majority on the score of its contravention of the Geneva Protocol of October 1922, but apart from that the conclusive argument was that it was only through France that the Austrian need of a loan could be satisfied. Germany, practically bankrupt



MARSHAL PILSUDSKI IN 1931

too, could not help Austria. The Council of the League noted the withdrawal of the question from its agenda.

On September 19 the Council had before it three questions that were of importance to Poland. The first concerned Danzig. In May the Council, apprised of the disturbed relations between the Free City and Poland, had asked Gravina, its High Commissioner in Danzig, to report on the situation, and he did so in August. A certain appeasement, he said, was observable, but he made a point of drawing attention to the manifestations hostile to Poland which were organized in the territory of the Free City by parties of the Right, both German and Danziger, their object being the return of Danzig to the Reich; these manifestations were undoubtedly inimical to good relations with Poland. The Council unanimously passed a resolution condemning "every action or manifestation directed against the status of the Free City."

The second question was concerned with the Upper Silesia elections in November 1930. At the May meeting of the Council a report submitted by Yoshizawa, *rappoiteur* in this matter, was held over at the request of Curtius, as he had insufficient time to study it. Before the question was discussed by the September Council, interviews took place between Zaleski and Curtius, but no change was made in Yoshizawa's report, which was accepted by the Council, after some remarks by Yoshizawa, who said that Zaleski had assured him that the Polish Government would do everything in its power to imbue the German Minority in Upper Silesia with confidence.

The third question related to the petitions received from the Ukrainian Minority in Eastern Galicia and referred by a previous Council to the Committee of Three for examination and report. This committee, with some changes in its composition, met first in London and later at Geneva; on receiving a Note from the Polish Government stating that steps were being taken to bring about an agreement with the dissident Ukrainians, the committee had postponed a decision—this was in May. But shortly before the September Council the situation was heavily clouded by the murder of Thaddeus Holowko, Vice-President of the Government

Block, at Truskawiec, in Eastern Galicia, by agents of the Ukrainian Military Organization. He had been prominent among the men who were trying, with more or less success, to come to terms with the Ukrainians. At the request of the committee the Council put off consideration of the Ukrainian Minority question to its next meeting, January 1932.

THE PARLIAMENT RESUMES

A month earlier than usual, the Polish Parliament reassembled on October 1, 1931. The financial situation of the country, with the world depression intensified by the abandonment by England and other countries of the Gold Standard, demanded particular attention, as Prystor, the Prime Minister, told the Seym in a speech on the opening day. He said the aim of the Government was to maintain a firm grasp of the domestic economic situation. The position of the Bank of Poland was good, with its "cover" of more than 50 per cent in gold or equivalents. The zloty was stable. The national expenditure had been decreased to meet in great part the fall in the revenue, and the equilibrium of the Budget would be maintained.

On the reading of the Budget for 1932-33, Jan Pilsudski, the Finance Minister, put the national income for the year at 2,377 million zlotys and the expenditure at 2,452 millions, leaving a deficit of 75 millions—which, he said, would not have to be met if the Hoover Moratorium was renewed for another year, but which, failing that relief, would be covered by a further curtailment of the expenditure, however painful that would be. He, too, emphasized the determination of the Government to keep the Budget balanced; there would be no recourse to inflation. At the beginning of its sessions the Parliament paid a warm tribute to Skrzynski, the former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, who had been killed in a motor-car accident on September 25 at Ostrow, in Poznania.

Most sessions of Seym and Senate were occupied with Government Bills dealing with the financial and economic situation; the Opposition was by no means inarticulate, but could do little against the unimpaired strength of the Government Block.

Among subjects discussed was that of the Constitution but the debate was largely academic. Zaleski, Foreign Minister continuously for more than five years, made the usual statements on foreign policy; he dwelt on the bearing of the world depression on the general situation, and stressed the value of the French alliance. On another occasion he referred to a controversy with Latvia concerning the Polish Minority in that State which was causing much feeling in Poland, where the help given to the Latvians in 1920 was not forgotten. Polish citizens of Latvia, in Dvinsk and its neighbourhood, were accused of cherishing irredentist aims—which, Zaleski stated, received no support from the Polish Government; it asked, however, that fair treatment should be given to people of Polish blood.

Among other questions that interested the Parliament were the decision of the Hague Court rejecting, in favour of Lithuania, the Polish request for the reopening of the Landwarow-Kaisiadoris railway, which involved the navigation of the Niemen; and the rejection by the League High Commissioner, after consulting the League, of the preposterous claim made by Danzig to a virtual monopoly of Polish sea exports and imports—to the exclusion of Gdynia. Another matter that touched the Seym closely was the beginning on October 26 of the trial of eleven deputies, some members of the last Parliament, and the rest of whom had been members of the Parliament then sitting, charged with sedition; they were among the number imprisoned in the fortress of Brest Litovsk, and subsequently released on bail.

ZALESKI VISITS LONDON

The Parliament was adjourned for a month on November 9 by Presidential decree. On December 17 Zaleski, addressing the Senate Foreign Affairs Commission, referred to the visit he had paid a week earlier to England, on the invitation of the British Government. Arriving in London on December 10, he stayed three days, was received by King George, had a meeting with Ramsay MacDonald, the Prime Minister, and another with Sir John Simon, Foreign Secretary, who entertained him at dinner. The British Press was friendly in its comment. In his speech

Zaleski, after stressing the fact that the geographical situation of Poland imposed on her a policy of peace, prudence and vigilance in collaboration with States who had a decisive voice in solving the difficult problems of the day, said he had profited from his visit, as he had discussed all questions with the British statesmen in complete harmony, while giving at the same time the Polish point of view, the common object being the conservation of peace. Naturally the Polish newspapers seized the opportunity of underlining the much better understanding reached, although rather slowly, by the British of Poland's importance in the ensemble of Europe, and how eminently pacific were her aims; it was observed that the growing trade between the two countries had contributed to this happy result. These statements scarcely seemed sufficient to account for the invitation given to Zaleski by the British Government. The real cause lay deeper. At that time relations between England and France were strained, and behind the invitation was the desire of the British Government to make friendly use of the good offices of Poland, the ally of France, in reducing, if not doing away with, the tension. This implied a much greater compliment to Poland than was indicated by the Press reports and comment.

POLISH WARSHIPS AND DANZIG

Another of the disputes between Poland and Danzig was concerned with the Polish claim to use the harbour of the Free City as a *port d'attache* for Polish warships, a claim which Danzig resisted. The case was argued before the Hague Court during November, Sir John Fischer Williams, of Oxford, appearing for the Free City and Poland being represented by Wlodimierz Moderow. The former maintained that nothing in the relevant treaty and other juridical documents supported the Polish contention, and that therefore it had no foundation in law, whereas the latter, while admitting this, deduced the justness of the claim from the fact that as Poland was charged with the defence of the port, as was also admitted, her use of warships in the port must be held to be implied. The Court, by 11 votes to 3, decided for Danzig on December 11.

FIRST DECENTNIAL CENSUS

Though 1931 had its good features for Poland, the year taken as a whole showed only too clearly the effects of the continued general depression in both the financial and economic spheres of the national life, one unmistakable sign being the fact that, after a reduction in the summer, the number of the registered unemployed was 300,000 at the close of the year. This figure, however, was 80,000 below that for the winter of 1930-31. During the year the Government had been active in various ways in relieving the situation for the peasants as well as the industrial workers; a Civic Committee was established, and to provide it with funds the Government instituted a surtax on letters, post-cards, railway tickets and goods sent by rail. The committee itself sought and obtained free gifts of thousands of tons of potatoes, sugar and coal, and to raise further funds promoted balls, dances and other forms of entertainment; besides, it found jobs for many of the workless.

In strong contrast to this story of the unemployed was an "active" or favourable trade balance for the year of 412 million zlotys, exports totalling 1,878 million zlotys against 1,466 millions for imports. In December the Government, to assist production in Poland, put additional taxes or duties on certain classes of imports, subject, however, to abatements in the case of imports through a Polish port, as, for instance, Gdynia. During the year the railway, shipping and other facilities of that port had been considerably extended, while the total movement of goods for the year showed a remarkable gain over the previous year—5,300,000 tons against 3,626,000, with a proportionate increase in the number of vessels employed. The population of the town had grown, and there was a corresponding expansion in its building development.

The most informative thing about Poland was the Census taken on December 9 for the whole country. Ten years before there had been a census, the precise date being September 30, 1921, and the corrected figures, 27,176,000, but the enumeration was incomplete or based on older returns in Vilna, Eastern Galicia and Upper Silesia. The 1931 census gave Poland 32,120,000 inhabitants,

an increase of close upon 5,000,000 souls, the largest proportionate increase being recorded in her eastern provinces (*województwa*), in one or two of which immigration had helped the "natural" factor, natality, set against the other factor, mortality. In the western provinces, formerly German, a considerable increase had taken place, notwithstanding the emigration of about 750,000 Germans; in the so-called "Corridor" there was a gain of 100,000. In the central provinces, formerly the "Congress Kingdom," and including the city of Warsaw, the total population had risen to 11,745,000, an increase of 1,821,000 since 1921, of which the capital accounted for 241,000, its population having grown to 1,178,000. In the southern provinces, formerly Austrian, the increase amounted to about 900,000—which meant that this area, which had lost a million of its people during the fighting from 1914 to 1920, had about regained its previous numerical strength. From 1921 to 1931 Poland registered 10,225,000 births against 5,332,000 deaths and an excess of 50,000 immigrants over emigrants. The high birth-rate had its bad as well as its good side in Poland, as in other countries similarly circumstanced.

CHAPTER XI
RELATIONS WITH GERMANY
1932-1933

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JANUARY 1932 saw the virtual conclusion of the negotiations for the non-aggression treaty between Poland and Soviet Russia which had begun as long ago as 1926, but, apart from the Litvinoff Protocol, had made little progress till 1931, when they were facilitated by the initialing of the Franco-Soviet non-aggression treaty, about which France had kept Poland informed, the understanding being that this pact would not be signed by France unless a similar agreement was signed by Poland. In such an agreement, however, Poland had to have regard to her alliance with Rumania and her interest in the Baltic States. Rumania was involved with the Soviet because of Bessarabia, and this question led Prince Ghika, her Foreign Minister, to visit Warsaw on January 8-10, when he discussed the subject with Marshal Pilsudski and Zaleski. The result was a *communiqué* stating that Poland and Rumania were in perfect accord. On January 25 at Moscow the Polish-Soviet non-aggression treaty was initialed by Patek for Poland and by Litvinoff for the Soviet. The two Powers renounced war as an instrument of national policy, and each engaged to abstain from all aggression against the other, but no guarantee was given or implied by either regarding their frontiers, or was there anything definite about Rumania and the Baltic States. In the meantime pourparlers took place between the Soviet and these countries, but without much success.

“BREST PRISONERS” SENTENCED

On January 13 the trial came to an end of eleven of the deputies who had been imprisoned in the fortress of Brest Litovsk in September 1930 and subsequently released on bail. They were accused of conspiring to “eliminate by violence the members

of the Government," and after upwards of fifty sittings and the examination of more than 200 witnesses, were found guilty, with a single exception, by the Warsaw Tribunal by a majority of two judges to one. Witos was sentenced to 18 months—the lightest sentence, because of his record in the early years of the Republic—and nine others got terms of imprisonment ranging from two to three years, but subject to reduction by the time each had passed in the Brest fortress. After the verdict demonstrations in their favour were held in Warsaw and Brest; the police intervened, and sharp clashes took place between them and crowds of sympathizers. The condemned men appealed and were permitted to remain at liberty pending the result. On January 15 the appearance in the Seym of the convicted deputies led to a scene which was terminated only by the suspension of the session. The Court of Appeal and, later, the Supreme Court, in 1933, rejected the appeal. Witos and two others fled the country, while the rest surrendered and served part of their sentences before being pardoned.

UKRAINIAN QUESTION

In the Budget Commission of the Seym on January 16 Pieracki, Minister of the Interior, declared that the policy of the Government respecting the National Minorities was to create rational bases for the harmonious dwelling together of all citizens, with the same rights and privileges; but some of the Minorities wished to arrogate privileges for themselves and deny the rights of other citizens. In 1930 certain Ukrainians had made systematic efforts in Eastern Galicia to deprive Poles living there of their rights, a thing which the Government could not tolerate. Criminal acts had been perpetrated—not, however, by the great majority of the Ukrainian population, but by organizations, such as the Ukrainian Military Organization, which, though not large, intimidated the bulk of the people and prevented the return to normal conditions.

Having quoted figures illustrating the development of the economic and cultural life of the Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia, in the shape of their co-operative societies and schools of their

own or bilingual, the Minister, continuing, said the Government understood the attraction of sports and physical education for Ukrainian youth, and was prepared to legalize clubs for such purposes provided they did not cover political aims. It was not true that the Government desired to Polonize the Ukrainians, as it respected their language, culture and religion. It was willing to meet their wishes as far as possible, and was considering a measure to that end, but it demanded loyalty in return.

Throughout Poland comment on Pieracki's speech was generally favourable, as it indicated a more hopeful approach to a settlement of the Ukrainian Question. This was the point of view taken by the Council of the League when it dealt on January 30 at Geneva with the statements and counter-statements concerning the outrages in Eastern Galicia in 1930; indeed Adatchi, the *rapporteur*, pointedly referred with approval to Pieracki's speech. The Council accepted Adatchi's report, which, emphasizing the danger of Minority Questions being used tendentiously, found that Poland did not persecute her Ukrainian Minority, and condemned the terrorist acts in 1930, but also found that she had been badly served by a number of her officials and soldiers in their excessive zeal, whom, however, she had suitably punished. Finally, attention was drawn to the conciliatory tone of Pieracki's remarks, and the hope expressed that the Polish Government would persist in that attitude.

DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE, 1932

In the international sphere the great feature of the year was the Disarmament Conference, which opened at Geneva on February 2, with delegations from most nations, that of Poland being headed by Zaleski, who set forth her views in a candid speech on February 10. He affirmed that the problem of disarmament was associated in the closest way with that of security, and he supported the plan of Tardieu which gave the League a real executive power. Having touched on the work of the Preparatory Commission, he said he saw in the Budgetary limitation of armaments the most efficacious measure, and, speaking of control, he raised the point that some countries might abuse the good faith of the others

by secret preparations for the violation of treaties. What was really necessary was moral disarmament. He noted, in conclusion, how small had been the progress towards security made under the League. On February 14 the Polish delegation submitted proposals bearing on moral disarmament. Various plans were put before the conference; there was much talk, but little fundamental agreement, especially among the Great Powers, each of whom was keen about its own interests.

TROUBLE IN DANZIG

Relations between the Danzigers and the Poles in the Free City remained unsatisfactory, and their disturbed state was accentuated when Strasburger, the Polish Commissary-General, resigned his post on February 25 after holding it for seven years. He had done his utmost to promote better feeling, and for a time with success, but the Nazi complexion of the Free City after 1930 made his efforts abortive. Rumours were spread abroad that Hitler purposed to seize Danzig, and these were offset by others that Pilsudski intended to do the same thing; on February 16 the semi-official *Gazeta Polska* of Warsaw contradicted reports of the existence of a Polish plan for the occupation of the town. Dr. Casimir Papée, a former legionary and afterwards Consul-General at Königsberg, was appointed in Strasburger's place; he stated that while Poland would respect the rights of the Free City, she would insist on respect for her own, as they were perfectly legal and just. The particular dispute at the moment was connected with the Customs, Poland and the Free City forming under the Paris Convention of 1920 a unit as regarded them. Poland alleged that Danzig merchants were getting round that convention by passing off goods made in Germany as if made in Danzig, and thus escaping the duties—with heavy loss to the Polish Treasury.

As far back as September 1931 the Polish Government had called the attention of Gravina, the League's High Commissioner in Danzig, to the position, but as he delayed a decision, it announced in January 1932 that the classes of goods in question would not be permitted entry into Poland, and that it had opened in Danzig an office for uncovering and taxing such goods. The

Danzig Government protested to the High Commissioner, who, acting on the advice of an expert, declared that Poland exceeded her rights, a ruling which she refused to accept, while her Press accused him of not being impartial. There were repercussions in the German Press and clamour in the Reichstag, yet towards the end of March a trade agreement, though not one of great importance, was signed between Poland and Germany. The much more significant commercial treaty signed in March 1930 was still in abeyance as Germany had never ratified it.

THE PARLIAMENT

Early in March 1932 Pilsudski, whose health had been indifferent, left Poland for Egypt. By way of Constanza, Alexandria and Cairo he arrived at Helouan on March 16, and remained there and elsewhere in Egypt for some weeks. In mid-April he was in Rumania again, and after a visit to Bucarest he travelled to Kishineff (Chisinau), in Bessarabia, where he had long interviews with the Rumanian generals in that province, as well as its Governor. On April 20 the Polish Legation in Bucarest published a *communiqué* which stated that the Marshal had meetings with the Rumanian Prime, Foreign and Finance Ministers, and after discussing with them political matters of common interest, came to the conclusion, with which they agreed, that the policy of the two States, based on their alliance, was "developing in harmonious collaboration." Pilsudski returned to Warsaw on April 22.

As the Government, supported by the Pilsudskist Block, was in full control of the country, there was no difficulty about the Marshal's holiday. Parliament closed on March 18, after sitting for five months, and much of that time had been taken up with the Budget and the depressing financial and economic state of the country. On March 17, when it was clear that there would be another Budget deficit, the Parliament passed an Act authorizing the President to issue decrees during the Parliamentary recess with a view to taking promptly such measures as would improve the situation, but certain reservations were specified, such as the maintenance of the value of the zloty and of the Statutes

of the Bank of Poland. Soon after the Parliament closed, Prystor made some changes in the composition of the Government with the twofold object of assisting the President in his task and of reducing the size of the Cabinet—in itself an economy. Various economies had been put before Parliament, but some of them aroused such an amount of opposition that they were dropped, though a 48-hours' strike engineered by the Socialists almost completely failed. The Budget for 1932–33 was published on March 25 in the official gazette as: Revenue, 2,377 million zlotys; Expenditure, 2,452 million zlotys; but as the year advanced the deficit increased.

Moscicki got to work at once by holding at Spala on March 29 a conference consisting of Prystor, the Prime Minister, Bartel, Switalski and Slawek, former Prime Ministers since 1926, and General Rydz-Smigly, for the consideration of the situation. Pilsudski was in Egypt. Nor did he take part in a similar conference held in Warsaw on April 26, but next day he had a long talk with Moscicki about its proceedings and other matters. These conferences had not a Governmental but a consultative character, yet from the standing of the men at them were important in assisting the President regarding the decrees he was empowered by the Parliament to issue for the relief of the country in its critical position. A number of these "Decree Laws" were promulgated from time to time dealing with both agriculture and industrial undertakings, and lightening the burden of taxes and debts, while helping them with certain credits.

TENSION WITH GERMANY

In the spring of 1932 important events in Europe and in the Far East overshadowed the Disarmament Conference for a time. With the passing of Briand on March 7, the general situation began to take on a less pacific appearance; in Poland it was recalled that he had signed the treaty formulating the Franco-Polish alliance in 1921, and the value of that alliance to both of the contracting parties was stressed once more in Warsaw; but the death of Briand, following on that of Stresemann, viewed in conjunction with the aggressiveness of the ever-increasing force

of Hitlerism in Germany, served to indicate that the policy, associated with these statesmen, of appeasement and peace was losing ground. On April 10 Hindenburg was re-elected President of Germany by 19,367,688 votes against 13,429,603 for Hitler, the third candidate, the Communist Thielmann, getting 3,705,898. The large number of votes obtained by Hitler could not but be impressive; not only Poland, but all Europe was made uneasy, and this all the more because the chiefs of the German army seemed to support Hitler, the Government being practically passive. Hitler's followers were energetic and clamorous; they advocated a big programme of expansion, particularly in the "East," including the "obliteration" of Poland. Hitherto German policy, based on the treaties of Rapallo and Berlin, had been pro-Soviet, and it was well known that Germany had established munitions factories in Russia, but Japanese aims in Manchuria had made the Soviet deeply apprehensive, and rendered her less valuable as an ally; in any case, Hitler was opposed to such an alliance, as he saw a splendid opportunity in the Ukraine for German "colonization."

This whole line of thought was becoming familiar to the Poles in 1932, and they had already had bitter experience of Hitlerism in Danzig. Anti-Polish propaganda waxed fiercer and fiercer in Germany on the question of the "frontiers"; it had been persistent for years, but now it was particularly venomous, so that all the world was aware of it, and rather expected something to happen. That was probably the reason why credence was given to despatches from Danzig which appeared in the *Daily Express*, of London, and other popular English papers on May 2 to the effect that not only had Poland had ready a plan for the invasion of the Free City, but that she was prevented from carrying it out solely by the intervention of France; it was hinted, too, that Gravina, the League's High Commissioner, knew these facts and had talked about them in Geneva. But the reports turned out to be pure inventions. Gravina declared to Papée that he was indignant about the dissemination of such false news by British journalists. Skirmunt, Polish Ambassador at London, at once called at the Foreign Office with regard to the reports,

and after stating they were entirely destitute of foundation, pointed out that the publication of such *canards* in the Press was bound to make more difficult the work of all those who were striving for the maintenance of peace. The Foreign Office concurred. Inevitably there was a good deal of excitement among the Poles; the best reply to the accusations, in which also figured a projected Polish invasion of East Prussia, levelled against Poland was given by the *Gazeta Polska* when it suggested that German apprehensions would be calmed by the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty between the two countries, with a reciprocal guarantee of the intangibility of their frontiers. But at that moment such a treaty was the last thing Germany desired. In the Reichstag on May 24, 1932, on the motion of the Hitlerites, it was resolved that the German Government should leave no doubt in the mind of the Polish Government that an attack on the Free City would be considered by the whole German nation as an assault on the vital rights and interests of Germany, who consequently would be ready to take action in the matter.

Another event which tended to add to the unease then prevalent in Europe was the assassination of Doumer, President of France, as indicating a lack of stability in French political life, but such a fear was dissipated by the election of Lebrun, as his successor, in the National Assembly by a tremendous majority on May 10. The General Elections in France in the beginning of that month showed a shift to the Left; Tardieu resigned, and was succeeded by Herriot, who was immediately confronted by the great problem of Disarmament, to which had to be added that older problem of Reparations, now the more acute. As regarded Herriot some Poles felt a little doubtful because of his zeal for the Soviet, but it was urged in his favour that in a Polish daily published at Paris, he had, about a year before, said that his attachment to Poland was and remained unalterable, in accordance with the old French republican tradition; he said that whatever was fortunate for Poland was also good for France. Telegrams exchanged between Warsaw and Paris on his accession to power were couched in the most friendly terms.

Danzig's claim to be the sole port of Poland was negatived by

the Council of the League on May 11, as the result of the report of the jurists to whom the question had been remitted, their findings being that while Poland was under obligation to use the port fully, she was not obliged to do so to the detriment of her own ports. With Mr. Anthony Eden, British Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, as *rappoiteur*, the Council adopted the report, but the decision did not please the Free City, and there was no slackening of the strain in its relations with Poland. It was increased during June by the "Cruiser Affair." On the 14th of that month a British cruising flotilla of nine destroyers appeared off Gdynia; four entered the port, where they were welcomed by the Polish authorities, and the rest went on to Danzig, where they were met by the Polish destroyer *Wicher*, which saluted and accompanied them into the harbour. The reason given by the Poles for this proceeding was that, as the Free City had no navy of its own and was represented by Poland as regarded foreign affairs, it was fit and proper for Poland to act in this manner.

Forthwith the Danzig Government sent a strong protest to Papée, Polish Commissary-General, and demanded that the *Wicher* should leave by a specified hour; but she remained beyond that time. Papée explained that the visit of the ship was intended as an act of courtesy to the British flotilla; but the incident created much excitement in Berlin as well as Danzig. Next, the German Government informed Warsaw that it was sending the cruiser *Schlesien* and two other warships to Danzig by request of the Government of the Free City. This announcement created consternation at Geneva, where it was feared that if Poland, acting on the same principles as before, sent the *Wicher* to Danzig to greet the German ships, some explosion would result and peace be gravely jeopardized. The Secretariat appealed to Zaleski, who succeeded in getting Pilsudski to promise that the *Wicher* should not be sent. The German vessels arrived in Danzig on June 23, and were welcomed with unbounded enthusiasm by crowds of Danzigers, many of whom displayed swastika flags. The ships stayed for three days; by way of protest, Papée absented himself from the Free City till they sailed for home.

CONFERENCE OF LAUSANNE

This conference opened on June 16, and closed on July 9 with the signature of a treaty decidedly favourable to Germany, as she was freed almost altogether from the burden of reparations, the amount she was thereafter to pay being only a small proportion of the sum charged to her previously by the Allies. She had stoutly maintained that it was absolutely impossible for her to pay anything at all, but at last consented to find, after some years, the sum finally decided on. By the "Gentleman's Agreement," signed on July 2, consideration of the inter-Allied Debts and ratification of the treaty itself were in effect postponed until it was known what course the United States would take concerning the large sums due to it by England, France and other States. Poland was not much interested directly in the question of Reparations; under the Young Plan she received an annual sum of half a million marks in payment for goods and *matériel* seized in Polish territories during the Great War. On July 1 Zaleski, as head of the Polish delegation, sent in a Memorandum, in which, after characterizing the conference as an effort towards the reconstruction of the world, and particularly of Central and Eastern Europe, it was stated that Poland was prepared to contribute to the correction of economic conditions in that part of the Continent on terms of reciprocity, with the normalization of the exchanges, transit of goods, customs and tariffs. Further, it recalled the initiative Poland had taken in trying to bring about the collaboration of the agricultural States in that region (Warsaw Agrarian Conference, 1930).

Earlier in 1932 the Polish Government considered Tardieu's projected pact for the five Danubian States—Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia—but nothing had come of the scheme, as there was little real support for it in certain quarters, politics interfering with economics and preventing any settlement, though the crisis bore more and more heavily on these States, as on Poland. Annex IV of the Treaty of Lausanne provided for the appointment of a committee to produce measures for the financial and economic reconstruction of Central and Eastern Europe, and among other points mention was made of

the difficulties caused to the agricultural countries of Europe by the low price of cereals. A committee was created at Lausanne consisting of representatives of Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Britain, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Rumania, Switzerland and Yugoslavia, and later it met at Stresa. Meanwhile Poland resuscitated and reassembled the Warsaw Agrarian Conference, its first meeting being held on August 24, and its aim was to unite the agrarian States in a common front at Stresa.

During the summer no improvement in the financial or economic situation was observable in Poland. Further decrees were promulgated by the President, and a sign of the hard times was the abolition of the Ministry of Public Works on July 1, with the merging in the Ministry of Agriculture of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. The Emigration Office was closed. The Government also established a salt monopoly, and had various *cartels* under review. On the other hand, the harvest was large—15 per cent above that of 1931, but prices were low and unprofitable. To dispose of the exports of grain without loss or to some advantage was one of the problems placed before the second Warsaw Agrarian Conference on August 24–27—it was a problem which all the other States attending it had to face. Poland's sea-borne commerce, however, did not cease to expand; public interest in Gdynia increased, as was demonstrated by the attendance of upwards of 60,000 people from all parts of the country at a sea-fête, organized by the Polish Maritime League, at the port on July 31. Moscicki, members of the Government, and other notables took part. Kwiatkowski delivered an ardently patriotic speech, and the President, recalling that Pomorze (Pomerania, in which province Gdynia is built) had never ceased being Polish, even during the German occupation, aroused the deepest emotion when he concluded his remarks with the words, "*Niema Polski bez morza i Pomorza*" (No Poland without the sea and Pomorze).

POLISH-SOVIET TREATY

Shortly after the initialing on January 25 at Moscow of the Polish-Soviet non-aggression treaty similar treaties were concluded by

the Soviet with Finland and Latvia and, somewhat later, with Estonia. In former years the Soviet had tried to get the Baltic States to sign treaties which were not acceptable to them, but they were able to accept these new treaties without demur, as they contained nothing objectionable—much the contrary, in fact. It was evident that the Soviet was anxious and in a hurry to have these pacts signed, the truth being that it was spurred on by fear of Japan's programme of expansion, and at the same time was alarmed by the continued growth of Hitlerism, with its passionate opposition to Communism. Moscow was keen to be on friendly terms with the "Border" States, and was not averse from coming to an understanding with Rumania on terms, such as the shelving of the Bessarabian question for a definite period; negotiations took place, but they were unsatisfactory to Rumania, who was not content with anything less than a complete non-aggression treaty recognizing her possession of Bessarabia.

On July 25 the Polish-Soviet treaty of non-aggression, valid for three years, was signed at Moscow by Patek for Poland and Krestinsky for the Soviet. Zaleski explained the treaty as a development of the Kellogg Pact, and declared that it was in keeping with all the international agreements of Poland, including her alliance with Rumania, though he hoped for the early conclusion of a treaty between Rumania and the Soviet on similar lines. It was pointed out that the fourth Article of the treaty made express stipulation respecting the unimpaired validity of the contractual engagements Poland and the Soviet had entered into before the signing of the treaty. The fact remained, however, that Rumania at that time did not look with favour on the treaty, and a large part of her Press was extremely displeased with it, but in the Rumanian Parliament Vaida Voevod, the Prime Minister, said he had received assurances from Poland that the treaty would not be ratified by her until a similar pact had been concluded with the Soviet by Rumania. But there seemed little prospect of such a pact, and at the end of August, Beck, Polish Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, when on a holiday on the Black Sea coast, took the opportunity to visit Bucharest to stress

the fact that the Polish–Soviet treaty did not invalidate in any way the Polish–Rumanian alliance, which had been renewed only so lately as the previous year. Beck was well received, and relations were better for a time. However, the treaty with the Soviet was ratified by Poland on December 23 (a “convention of conciliation” having been signed by both parties on November 27)—to the dissatisfaction of the Rumanians, whose own treaty with the Soviet was still in doubt.

Polish opinion on the whole was in favour of the pact with the Soviet. Some commentators saw in it a blow aimed at Germany, but most considered it excellent inasmuch as it gave some certainty of peace with Russia and the prospect accordingly of a great development of Polish trade with her—a prospect not adequately realized. In any case, the treaty became a major feature of Polish foreign policy, despite the continued existence of Soviet propaganda and espionage in Poland—eight Soviet spies were executed in 1932.

DÉTENTE WITH DANZIG

Poland had to think all the time of her western frontiers; with the threat to her eastern boundaries removed by the treaty with the Soviet she was in a stronger position *vis-à-vis* Germany, whose attitude towards her remained unfriendly. Elections for the Reichstag were held on July 31, with large Nazi gains. Hitler's party became much the largest in Germany and proportionately powerful. Von Papen, who succeeded Bruening as Chancellor on May 30, re-established the Nazi storm-troops which had been put down by his predecessor; this was a military sign none of Germany's neighbours could disregard. But under the fostering care of Pilsudski the Polish Army was now strong and really formidable. Its organization was so perfect that on August 1 it was able to dispense with the assistance—for which the Poles were grateful—of the French Military Mission that had been attached to it since 1919. The furious anti-Polish propaganda went on resoundingly throughout Germany, with reverberations in Danzig, suffering that summer from a Polish boycott particularly affecting Zoppot and other resorts in the Free City's territory. Poland did well to be ceaselessly on her guard.

Yet the month of August witnessed a sort of détente in the relations of Poland and the Free City with the signing of two protocols by their respective Governments. The first extended to Polish warships the right to enter the harbour of Danzig at any time, on condition that notice was given 48 hours in advance to the port authorities. The second, which was due to the good offices of Rosting, a representative of the League of Nations, pledged both Poland and the Free City to discourage all hostile activities and demonstrations on the part of their nationals to each other. Nevertheless, a great Hitlerite demonstration, disguised as a "sports rally," took place in Danzig on September 3, and speeches delivered on the occasion were inimical to Poland. Roehm, Chief of Hitler's Staff, had come from Berlin, and he exhorted the Hitler organizations in Danzig to co-operate more closely with similar organizations in Germany "in order to fight for the liberation of the Free City."

STRESA ECONOMIC CONFERENCE

This conference met on September 5 and Poland was represented by a strong delegation. The object assigned by the Lausanne Conference was the consideration of ways and means for promoting the recovery of Central and Eastern Europe from the effects of the world economic crisis. After prolonged debate, conducted, however, in a spirit of good will, the conference formulated various recommendations respecting debts and credits, more rational agreements with fewer restrictions, and a convention for the revalorization of cereals in the interests of the distressed agrarian countries. It was proposed that guaranteed markets should be provided, and that most of the States of Europe should contribute to a fund, placed at 75 million gold francs a year, in aid of the re-establishment of agriculture in the exporting countries. At bottom it was the enormous world wheat surplus that had brought down world prices of all cereals; Poland produced a comparatively small quantity of wheat, but she raised immense quantities of rye and barley, and these were her chief grain exports. At Stresa all grains were taken into account, and the Guarantee Fund was to benefit all. The Conference

concluded on an optimistic note—which the course of events in that particular field failed to justify. In Poland the Government took further action for the protection of the agricultural community by promulgating new decrees reducing or postponing payment of debts.

Changes occurred in the Cabinet on September 5, the most notable being the resignation of Jan Pilsudski as Finance Minister on his nomination as Vice-President of the Bank of Poland; his successor was Professor Zawadzki. No alteration in the policy of the Government was indicated. The firm grip of the Pilsudski régime was exhibited by the dissolution of the "Camp of Great Poland," the political organization set up in opposition by Dmowski in 1926. It had been active in Pomerania, and the Voivoda of that province, who ordered its extinction on September 26, stated that it compromised public security, and that its members had repeatedly been insubordinate to the authorities. It was also charged with fomenting strife and discontent among various classes of the population. Shortly afterwards the Voivoda of Poznania issued a similar order for his province. Somewhat earlier the Ukrainian organization called "Selrob-Jednist" (Union of Workers and Peasants) was liquidated as illegal by the Minister of the Interior. Outrages had again disturbed Eastern Galicia, despite the conciliatory efforts of Pieracki, and this organization, which had a large membership and four deputies in the Seym, was put down on the ground of being anti-Polish and Communist; its headquarters were at Lwow, but its roots were in Soviet Russia. In a discussion in the Council of the League at Geneva on October 6 on the question of the National Minorities Zaleski said that what was really wanted was the elimination of the political interference of other States, no matter which. Four days before Poland had been re-elected for another three years' term to the Council, for the third time, obtaining on this occasion 48 out of 51 possible votes, a result which was hailed by the Poles as a striking testimonial of the recognition by the nations of the growing political importance of their country. Zaleski was congratulated on the manner in which he had conducted Polish foreign affairs, though as these were always closely super-

vised and controlled by Pilsudski, the tribute should have been paid to him.

GERMANY'S "EQUALITY"

During September–October an international crisis of the first magnitude confronted the world. Japan, despite the League of Nations, continued her activities in the Far East, to the embarrassment of England and America and the apprehensions of the Soviet, but the chief centre of the storm lay in Europe where Germany's claim to "equality of armaments" had wrought confusion among the Powers. Poland was vitally interested, for any revision in Germany's favour of the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty would tell against her as matters stood. On September 14 the German Government announced its withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference until the question of equality was settled in principle in accordance with its wishes. England, Italy and France expressed their views; the tone of the first suggested some compromise, that of the second assent to the German thesis, and that of the third opposition. However, after visiting London Herriot conjoined France, in mid-October, with the two other Great Powers in proposing a conference, to be participated in by Germany, at Geneva, but Germany refused. The deadlock continued till December, when it was broken by an agreement by England, France, Germany, Italy and the United States which, with some restrictions, conceded the German claim.

Later, it was perceived that this decision militated against that French leadership on the Continent which had existed since the Great War and was equivalent to the hegemony of France over Europe, associated as she was with Poland and the Little Entente as allies. France had been showing a certain coolness towards Poland in the latter half of 1932, and this in its turn led Poland to doubt the value of her alliance with France. Only a year before the Poles had been delighted when France had come forward with a loan for the construction of the through railway connecting the coal-fields of Upper Silesia, by way of Katovice, with Gdynia, and had seen in it a proof of the friendship of France. The amount, as promised, of the loan was 1,100 million francs, and the first instalment of 400 millions was paid—and then no more money

was forthcoming. For a while the construction of the line was paralysed, and eventually Poland went on with it from her own Budget resources; the failure of France to implement the loan created a bad impression, as the Poles saw no reason for this change in French policy other than a disregard for the alliance itself on the part of France. And they thought they saw that disregard extended from the financial to the political sector when Herriot did not consult them before propounding his disarmament plan in November. The strain on the alliance was, however, still slight, but it was destined to become severe in the following years.

BECK FOREIGN MINISTER

The Parliament resumed on November 3, but on the previous day an important change had taken place in the Government—Zaleski, who had been Minister for Foreign Affairs for six years consecutively, resigned and was replaced by Colonel Beck. Zaleski's resignation did not surprise those who were well-informed, as they knew he was in need of rest; in May 1931 he had intimated his intention to resign to Pilsudski, but had been asked to carry on; now, he was tired and not too well, and his resignation was accepted. The consensus of opinion in Poland was that he had occupied his exacting and often difficult post with distinction as well as success. Prystor, the Prime Minister, gave a reception in his honour on November 8, and the Marshal and the other members of the Cabinet took part in it. In the evening of the same day the personnel of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs entertained him at a banquet, in the course of which Beck spoke warmly of the work Zaleski had done, and said he intended to try to follow in his steps. In a public statement the new Minister had already emphasized the continuity of the foreign policy of Poland. He had served under Zaleski for two years, but otherwise had little diplomatic training or experience; the great thing was that Pilsudski knew him well and gave him his confidence; like most of the Marshal's intimates he had fought in the Legions, and from May 1926 till his appointment as Foreign Under-Secretary in 1930 he had been Pilsudski's *chef de cabinet*. Count Jan Szembek became Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

On November 20, Beck, with Szembek, attended the Council of the League—its 69th session—at Geneva. A dispute with Danzig was, as usual, on the agenda. Poland had undertaken to introduce the Polish currency on the railways of the Free City, whose Government had appealed against this to the League, and the matter was considered on November 24 and 25, the upshot being that Poland agreed to forgo the proposed change and made some concessions, with responses from Danzig, that led to the signing of a treaty on November 26, tending to improved relations. This fortunate issue was greatly facilitated by Rosting's mediatorship; he was Acting High Commissioner at the time, Gravina having died in September, but both Beck and Ziehm, President of the Free City Government, were conciliatory.

From Geneva Beck went on to Paris, where he said, in a Press interview, he had come to make the acquaintance of Herriot whom he had not met before; after referring to the value of the Franco-Polish alliance, he stated he was convinced that the Polish-Soviet non-aggression treaty would conduce to the peace of Europe, and added that the treaty in no way affected the binding force of Poland's international obligations. He did not touch on the German situation, but it was impossible to suppose that he had not discussed it with the French statesmen in its two-fold aspect: the demand for equality of rights and Herriot's disarmament plan; and the interpretation to be assigned to the reduction of Hitler's strength in the elections on November 6, which created an impression, soon seen to be deceptive, that Hitlerism was on the decline. On his return to Warsaw Beck reported that his trip had had good results. But as the crisis *vis-à-vis* German equality persisted opinion in Poland remained on edge, nor was it much less so when the agreement was made with von Schleicher, who on December 2 had succeeded von Papen as Chancellor, by which Germany returned to the Disarmament Conference.

POLISH ECONOMIC CRISIS

While far from being insensitive toward the general political crisis in which the world was involved, the Polish Parliament was absorbed in considering the financial and economic crisis

at home. The Budget for 1933–34 placed before the Seym by the Government was discouraging, Revenue being put at 2,089 million zlotys against Expenditure at 2,449 millions. Zawadzki, Finance Minister, described the position with some optimism, and rehearsed the measures taken under the decrees for its amelioration, but actually it was depressing, however camouflaged by hope of better days to come. Among the decrees was that of August 23 establishing a new Customs tariff that came into force during October and promised in time to increase the revenue. The fundamental thing, however, continued to be the fall in agricultural prices and the impoverishment consequently of the bulk of the population of the country. On December 15 in the Senate Prystor outlined the Government's programme for combating the crisis. He said it was useless to think there would be a return to the price-level obtaining in 1928, and the agricultural community would have to adjust itself to present conditions as more or less permanent, but the Government would strive to prevent fluctuations, and give what help it could, as had already been done by the decrees, and would be done by reducing the prices of manufactured goods and the costs of agricultural production; as regards industries in general, the cartels would be taken in hand and deprived of excessive profits. The programme was attacked by the Opposition, but without effect. On December 20 the Seym authorized the compulsory conversion of rates of interest to a maximum of 4½ per cent on mortgage long-term farm bonds, while payments of the principal were suspended for three years.

Poland did not pay the amount due—upwards of three million dollars—to the United States on December 15 in part payment of her War Debt. In this matter her action was the same as that of France, where the problem of War Debts brought about the fall of Herriot on December 14 and the emergence, four days later, of a Cabinet headed by Paul-Boncour. The case of Poland, however, was not on all fours with that of France, whom the Lausanne agreement had practically deprived of German reparations on a large scale, whereas Poland's share in them was inconsiderable. On December 20 Beck stated in a Press interview

that Poland still intended to pay, but held that America should understand that the discharge of this debt would seriously embarrass a financial position which was already very difficult.

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Germany's success in gaining equality of rights, with her prospective return to the Disarmament Conference, did nothing to further the peace of Europe, though that had been the idea which informed the recognition of that equality; and in the beginning of 1933 her demand for revision of the territorial clauses of the Versailles Treaty was expressed vociferously and increasingly in her Press and in the speeches of some of the most prominent of her public men, the claim to the "Polish Corridor" being placed in the first line. Her campaign for it had already produced a certain effect on opinion outside Poland, as was shown by a curious incident which occurred on New Year's Eve, and in which the British Broadcasting Corporation, London, figured. Respecting a transmission from Warsaw, the announcer of the B.B.C. said: "Now, across the Polish Corridor which cuts Germany in two, we are relaying with Warsaw, the capital of the new country, Poland, that spends a third of its revenue in maintaining an immense army." Skirmunt, Polish Ambassador in London, lodged a strong protest with the Foreign Office. The British Press took the matter up and severely criticized the B.B.C. for issuing a statement that gave false impressions and stirred up ill-feeling. Sir John Reith, head of the B.B.C., went to the Embassy on January 11, and apologized to Skirmunt, who received on the same day a note from Sir John Simon, Foreign Secretary, endorsing the protest and hoping that with Reith's apology the incident would be closed.

In January numerous meetings were held in Poland in determined opposition to the German revisionists. On January 28 the deputies and senators of the Parliament who represented Pomorze (Pomerania or the "Corridor") and Poznania met at Torun and passed a resolution to the effect that all, whether

friends or foes of Poland, ought to know that hesitation on the part of a Polish Government for a single day about Pomorze would result in that Government being thrown out at once by a unanimous Polish nation; and that a Polish politician taking sides with Germany would pay for it with his life. Similar resolutions were passed throughout the country. This was a question on which there was only one opinion—no surrender of territory. The Government once more declared that for Poland no question existed about her frontiers; but that was certainly not the view predominating in Germany.

HITLER IN OFFICE

Revision being implicit in the Nazi programme, as based on Hitler's book *Mein Kampf*, his accession to the Chancellorship of Germany on January 30 could only increase the uneasiness of the Poles. The Government he composed, with von Papen as Vice Chancellor, contained representative Nationalists, such as Hugenberg, as ardent for revision as were the Nazis in the Cabinet, such as Goering. German opposition to revision had come from the Democrats and the Socialists; here and there among them voices had been raised admitting the right of Poland to Pomorze, Poznania and even Upper Silesia, but they were soon to be silenced by the Nazis, though Hitler declared on February 2 to the foreign journalists in Berlin that nobody desired peace more than he did or than did the German people. Yet, in an interview published in the *Sunday Express*, London, on February 12 Hitler said that the "Polish Corridor" was a "hideous injustice to Germany," and that this territory "must be restored to us." These strong expressions were, however, toned down next day by the official Wolff agency into something much less offensive, but they had violent repercussions on Polish opinion. There were emphatic protests in the Polish Parliament on the part of the Block and the Opposition parties; and on February 15 Beck, addressing the Seym's Foreign Affairs Commission, said that, while the amended version of the interview might pass without being officially noticed by the Polish Government, and "frontiers were not changed by words," it was still of such a nature as to

have an unfortunate influence on the relations of the two countries, these being dependent much more on Berlin than on Warsaw. In that period of the year the chief business of the Seym was the consideration of the Budget, but at the moment the situation *vis-à-vis* Germany demanded and held its closest attention, for peace seemed most precarious. Looking farther afield it also had to note another sign of French political instability; after being Prime Minister of France for forty days Paul-Boncour resigned with his Cabinet, which after some difficult negotiations was replaced by another headed by Daladier on January 31, though Paul-Boncour appeared in it as Foreign Minister. To add to the strain of the times the Disarmament Conference was making no real progress.

DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE, 1933

The second session of this conference began on February 2 at Geneva, with Count Edward Raczyński, resident representative of Poland for the League, as chief of the Polish Delegation. The first session had closed on July 23, 1932, but the Conference Bureau had prepared material for the second, and meanwhile the Five Great Powers Agreement of December had settled the return of Germany to the Conference more or less on the German terms. The principal subject of debate was the French plan for disarmament and "mutual assistance," plus a League army, and Beck, who met Paul-Boncour at Geneva, put before him the Polish Government's view, but it was Raczyński who presented it to the conference on February 6. Summarized, his speech amounted to a declaration that while the plan was good it was a logical whole, the taking away of any part of which would be fatal to it, but as it was plain, from the positions taken up by some of the Great Powers that they had decided objections to parts of the plan, that this was precisely the actual state of things, the plan, therefore, having regard to that fact, was futile. It was useless to proceed farther with it. He said:

Few illusions are left to us here respecting the possibilities of improving the present situation as regards international security. We see that certain countries, without whose effective participation a complete system of

security would not be possible, have given us the reasons which forbid them to assume new undertakings or to accept all the consequences of their existing undertakings.

Raczyński terminated his speech with the suggestion that when the debate closed the conference should concentrate on a programme of work which would include the various technical points that had been put forward by the delegates. In an interview published in the *Gazeta Polska* on February 8, Beck said that Poland had no disarmament plan of her own for so vast a problem, but only a proposal of marking a stage in the proceedings based on the realities of the situation. On February 22, when the conference was discussing the question of security, Raczyński stated that the conference, in the view of the Polish Delegation, could not disregard those fundamentals on which reposed the whole edifice of disarmament, fundamentals constituted by the precise texts of treaties which clearly expressed the obligations of the parties to them, and which remained of binding force; the conference had no power to change them. Raszynski noted that the German representative had testified to the respect with which his Government regarded these treaties; and he alluded again to the Polish proposal of formulating a programme of positive work. The vote, taken next day in the conference, though it showed a larger measure of support for the French plan than for any other, demonstrated, once again, the disaccord among the great nations. The Polish delegation did not vote. French comment was to the effect that the opposition was composed, under German and Italian leadership, of those States which desired to overthrow the existing order in Europe; but the simple truth was that England and the United States, as well as Germany and Italy, were hostile to parts of the French plan, and thus it could not but fail.

The conference was faced with another deadlock, and there was a general feeling that the result would be the confounding of the whole international attempt to promote disarmament by agreement. But on March 16, Ramsay MacDonald, British Premier, appeared at Geneva with the object of "saving" the conference. Meanwhile a further increase of the tension between Poland and Germany, with Danzig once more in the foreground,

had added to the disquiet of Europe, already aggravated by the conference's apparent lack of success.

WESTERPLATTE AFFAIR

Hitler's triumph in Germany naturally continued to do nothing to mitigate the extreme nationalism of Danzig, but gave it a further impetus, as was manifest in the proceedings which brought into prominence once more the tiny peninsula of the Westerplatte in February. On the fifteenth of that month the Danzig Government withdrew the detachment of special police called the *Hafenpolizei*, whose business was to maintain order in the port of Danzig, and replaced it by the *Schutzpolizei*, its own police, notwithstanding the protests of Papée, Polish Commissary-General. The *Hafenpolizei*, which had been established in 1921, was subordinate to the direction of the Harbour Board, a mixed body consisting of six Danzigers and six Poles, with a Swiss as neutral chairman, but Poland had no say whatever concerning the *Schutzpolizei*, which was subject absolutely to the authority of the Free City Government. By decisions of the Council of the League in 1921 and 1924 Poland had been assigned the Westerplatte as a military depot, but at first rather for munitions in transit than as a place for their accumulation. It was not fortified, but it contained a dock and some warehouses, in which munitions were stored; there was a guard of about ninety Polish soldiers, in reality an unimportant force, but it and its possession of Westerplatte were thorns in the flesh of the Danzigers. The action of the Free City Government respecting the police was instantly taken up by the Polish Press, as a fresh challenge behind which was Germany.

Towards the end of February and in the beginning of March the Polish Government received information that a plot was on foot in Danzig for the seizure of Westerplatte, and that Hitler was going to support it. Strong colour was added to this report when it became known that the German Chancellor had flown from Berlin to Königsberg, passing across Pomorze on his way, on March 4, on the eve of the Reichstag Elections. He was entitled to take this route, because German aeroplanes were

permitted by Poland under an agreement to do so, but the act in the strained circumstances of the two countries was none the less provocative. Poland took his flight very seriously in that sense; it was like the throwing down of a gauge of battle. In any case Pilsudski had determined that the Westerplatte must be defended against attack, and early in the morning of March 6 the *Wilja*, a Polish military transport, landed 120 men at Westerplatte to reinforce the guard. At the same time Papée informed Rosting, the League's High Commissioner, of what had been done, and the reasons which compelled the Polish Government to pursue this course. He stated that the reinforcement of the guard was, however, a provisional measure, and none of the new troops would be permitted to go into the territory of the Free City. On the same day Rosting told Papée that the reinforcement must be withdrawn, as its presence there was not authorized by the League, but the troops were not withdrawn; on March 7 Rosting referred the matter to Geneva, and at Papée's request also reported what the Danzig Government had done in the matter of the police.

As all Europe was in a highly nervous state, the Westerplatte Affair attracted enormous interest and caused not a little apprehension. It created more excitement than the Cruiser Affair of the previous year and more alarm, because of Hitler, whose power was growing, as was proved by the elections for the Reichstag on March 5, when the Nazis and Nationalists secured about 52 per cent of the total popular vote of more than 39 millions, an unprecedented victory, with a proportionate number of seats in the Reichstag itself. While some people questioned the length of his hold on office, nearly everybody agreed that he was a present danger to peace. The League had another fit of nervousness, but unexpectedly experienced no real difficulty in effecting a settlement of the Westerplatte episode on a basis of compromise. The matter was decided at a meeting of the Council of the League at Geneva on March 14, at which were present Ziehm, the head of the Danzig Government, Rosting, and Beck. The *rapporteur* was Simon, the British Foreign Secretary, and he had his report ready, but it was not necessary to read it. At the beginning of the proceedings, he said that he understood Beck wished to make

a declaration, and he would defer his report until after the Polish Foreign Minister had spoken. Beck first, however, asked Ziehm if he would guarantee that the Free City Government would take measures which would satisfy the rights of Poland with respect to the Westerplatte peninsula, and when Ziehm replied in the affirmative, he immediately said that Poland would withdraw the reinforcement. He admitted that Poland had exceeded her rights by acting as she had done, but there had been no intention of making a permanent increase of her force at Westerplatte, and the reinforcement was sent in exceptional circumstances.

Great was the relief of the Council, and everybody congratulated everybody else, apart from the German representative, who had not a good word for Poland; all were well aware, however, that Poland's action at Westerplatte was not a challenge to the League itself, but was intended to be and was a warning to Hitler that Poland was ready by force of arms to defend her rights under the treaties in Danzig or elsewhere. In other words, if he wanted war he could have it; Poland was prepared. It was significant that the German Press, instead of being jubilant over the outcome of the Westerplatte affair, exhorted German opinion to restraint and to accept it calmly, though its attitude may have also been influenced by two events which occurred almost immediately after the League's decision; one was connected with the Disarmament Conference, and the other was Mussolini's Four-Power Pact.

THE FOUR-POWER PACT

Apparently at its last gasp, the Disarmament Conference took on a semblance of renewed life when Ramsay MacDonald put before it a British plan on March 16 proposing, among other things, that the armies of Europe should be limited to definite strengths, that of Poland being put at 200,000 men. The plan envisaged a General Commission of Disarmament and Control; the latter factor—control—was one of the great stumbling-blocks in the path of disarmament, and the new plan scarcely could be said to remove it. Taken as a whole the plan did not meet with a good reception, and MacDonald suddenly took it and himself off to Rome for the purpose of securing Mussolini's support, but

what came out of their meeting was something entirely different. When MacDonald, who was accompanied by Simon, handed to the Duce his plan on March 18, he was doubtless thanked for it courteously, but he was at once handed in return a plan of Mussolini's own that forthwith took the place of the other, which retired thereafter into almost complete obscurity for a time. The Mussolini plan provided for the collaboration of the four Great Western Powers—England, France, Germany and Italy—in what amounted to a Directory of Europe, for the revision of the Peace Treaties respecting frontiers and the establishment of the military "equality" of Germany, with some proportionate treatment of Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria. In the House of Commons on March 23 MacDonald said that the British Government endorsed the plan in principle, and was ready to proceed with the elaboration of its details. He maintained that it would cause the disappearance of the irritants that might lead to war in Europe, and that this result was also in the best interests of the little States. Plainly what was meant was that the "little States" which had been established or enlarged by the War and the peace treaties should be mulcted in territory for the benefit of the States which had been defeated and had signed those treaties.

As soon as the terms of the pact became known a fresh storm raged on the Continent. The reaction was violent in Poland and the Little Entente. A French paper had asserted that the revision contemplated under the pact was to start with the "Corridor" and go on to the rearrangement of the Hungarian "territories." Count George Potocki, recently appointed Polish Ambassador at the Quirinal, and on the point of leaving Warsaw for Rome, sent in his resignation, as a protest against the pact. In London Skirmunt, the Ambassador there, called at the Foreign Office to express Poland's disapproval of the pact; he suggested to Beck that, if permitted, he would resign to show how strongly he felt about it, but Beck replied in the negative. There were marked repercussions in Prague, Belgrade and Bucarest; at Geneva, Benesh, Fotitch and Titulescu, the Foreign Ministers of the Little Entente and constituting its Permanent Council, published

a *communiqué* formulating "les plus expresses réserves" respecting the pact, which, they said, was the sort of thing that belonged to the past—when the League of Nations did not exist. Soon it was evident that the opposition was so strong that the pact would have to be materially modified, if not withdrawn altogether.

THE ECONOMIC CRISIS

Poland's fiscal year ended on March 31, in the midst of the continuing depression, though she was able to show at least one good sign in the completion of the railway from Upper Silesia to Gdynia. The opening ceremony was held on March 1, the Government having contrived to find the necessary funds in the absence of the second instalment of the French loan. This line was notable in Poland as the first running from the coal region to the sea, her other main railways having been constructed in the days before the restoration of the State, and built to suit the interests of the Powers who kept her in thrall. The new railway indicated a shift of the axis of Polish trade and commerce from an east-west to a north-south direction, and inevitably had a political as well as a commercial value. The Government did not slacken its efforts to fight and overcome the economic crisis, but undertook, on the contrary, by fresh legislation to make the struggle easier for those least able to bear it. Thus the Conversion Act of 1932 reducing interest on all loans to agriculturists, and postponing their capital repayments, was extended by an Act of March 29, 1933, reducing interest on other mortgage loans to 6 per cent and also deferring capital repayments on the same. To redress an unfavourable balance of trade, then in sight, the Government on March 22 prohibited imports of certain classes of goods except under permit from the Minister of Commerce, issued only on compensatory purchases being made. On the previous day the Parliament voted full powers to the President, save as concerned the Constitution. Before the vote was taken, Prystor explained that to meet the crisis Poland must not look for help from abroad, but depend on her own resources; to guard against sudden surprises from outside, the Government must be in a position to act swiftly, and hence the need for giving

the President these full powers. Slawek, head of the Block, supported the Prime Minister, for the reason that an emergency might arise at any moment. Towards the end of the month a law was passed for the control of cartels by the Government, in continuance of its policy to equilibrate industrial with agricultural prices. In contradistinction to the departure of the United States from gold about this time, Poland definitely adhered to the gold standard, without the restrictions that obtained elsewhere. Poland's struggle against the economic crisis assumed an almost epic character, and it involved her people in many sacrifices.

The Budget for 1933-34 was published officially on March 31, with the Revenue at 2,458 million zlotys and the Expenditure at 2,448 million zlotys, but long before the close of that year the figures on both sides of the account had to be scaled downward, though as 1933 went on there was an improvement in some directions, if not enough to justify the hope that the tide at last had turned.

DÉTENTE WITH HITLER

The controversy over the Four-Power Pact, fathered by Mussolini and sponsored by MacDonald, not too warmly received by France, and detested by Poland and the Little Entente, raged with increasing intensity during April. As March was closing Beck told Erskine, the British Ambassador at Warsaw, that the attitude of Poland to the pact was quite negative; she had not received official information of the terms of the pact, but in no case would she admit that she was bound by a decision of other Powers respecting herself, for her destinies were and would remain in her own hands. This statement of policy she afterwards developed more fully, not so much concerning revision, for her unchangeable point of view was that there was no question of such a thing as regarded her territories, but from her invincible objection to permit any Power or Powers to settle what her Army and armaments were to be, decisions respecting which were entirely her own affair. And to this line, not without an oblique reference to Germany, she kept steadfastly all through the conversations

and negotiations for or against the pact. The Little Entente, however, concentrated on opposing the programme of revision. In an interview published in the *Kurjer Poranny* on April 7, Benesh, for Czechoslovakia, said that unless the pact was much altered, his country would leave the League of Nations. In London Titulescu, for the Little Entente, told MacDonald and Simon that revision would bring war. Yugoslavia spoke in the same way; she looked on Mussolini as her arch-enemy, and hated this pact of his.

What preoccupied Poland far more was the continued tension with Germany, where the Weimar Republic had practically ceased to exist, and Hitler, though paying lip-service to Hindenburg as President, had become dictator. German threats to the "Corridor," including Poznania, and Upper Silesia did not cease; "incidents" occurred; Poles resident in Germany were said to be maltreated. In Upper Silesia, local Nazis assaulted Polish students, the result being anti-German demonstrations in many Polish towns and the boycotting of German goods—with protests from the German Minister in Warsaw and the Polish Minister in Berlin. The *Boersen-Zeitung* carried the headline, "Poland incites to war"; on the other hand, the *Gazeta Polska* printed articles, signed by prominent Pilsudskists, which suggested that Poland was ready for any eventuality. How severely the relations between the two countries were strained was indicated when on April 13 a monument to Germanism was unveiled near Schneidemuehl about a hundred yards from the common boundary. Beneath the figure of a woman looking towards the former German territories of Posen and West Prussia was inscribed: "Never forget, German, what blind hatred robbed you of. Await the hour which will expiate the shame of the bleeding frontier." In Germany when that frontier was not described as "bleeding" from its wounds, it was depicted as "burning" with anger against the Poles. The tension appeared to be perilously near a rupture when, on April 21, a force of 35,000 men was concentrated at Vilna, after only 12 hours' notice, and paraded before Pilsudski in full battle order. Officially this demonstration was organized to celebrate the 14th anniversary of the reoccupation

of Vilna, but many observers saw in it something like a dress rehearsal for the complete mobilization of the Polish Army. The Marshal was attended by a large number of its highest officers, as well as by Prystor and other members of the Government. The troops were of all arms, including tanks, armoured cars and several squadrons of aeroplanes.

Reports of this military demonstration found an echo in Berlin, where no doubt its significance was fully debated, particularly as rumours of the imminence of a "preventive war" directed against Germany were widely current. It was represented that Pilsudski sounded France regarding her joint participation in such a war, but finding her not feeling strong enough to engage in it, he had determined that Poland should undertake it alone. That Germany feared a preventive war was made plain by a statement of von Papen in a talk with Lord Newton in Berlin on April 26. Newton's visit was a private one, and he held no official position, but he had been connected with the British Foreign office some years previously. To him Papen said:

The talk of a preventive war against Germany was prompted by the fear that her inner regeneration would change Central European proportions of power. Such talk was not only a crime against Germany and her European mission, but a crime against the existence of European civilization. The German Government would take all necessary measures to enlighten world opinion about the source and the motives of such sinister plans against world peace, and would take most rigorous measures to preclude any possibility which would give occasion to foreign Powers to realize such dark schemes. (*The Times*, April 28, 1933.)

Von Papen emphasized the pacific policy of which Hitler had made repeated avowals; Germany, he declared, needed peace more than any other State, and all steps likely to recover the shattered confidence of the world were welcome; the aim of German politics was the realization of full equality of rights by peaceful methods. No mention of Poland seems to have been made in this conversation, though with the agitation about the frontiers and trouble again in Danzig she must have been in their minds. The Disarmament Conference resumed on April 26, the MacDonald plan being discussed, but from the start Germany was resolute; it was rearmament, not disarmament, that was her

purpose, as she made clearer and clearer to the other Powers. But if Poland were to attack her in her comparatively defenceless condition she might be in great difficulties. She could expect no help from Soviet Russia, and Hitler had certainly made no secret of his opposition to Bolshevism. Other reasons also suggested an accommodation with Poland, and Beck, in his speech on February 15, had shown the way when he said that the attitude of Poland to Germany depended on the attitude of Germany to Poland—as Berlin treated Warsaw, so Warsaw would treat Berlin. Hitler now proposed that Poland and Germany should work for a détente between them, and Pilsudski, who was the first foreign statesmen to recognize the completeness of the revolution in Germany and the probable permanence of Hitlerism, agreed. Under cover of a request for an interview that would clarify the situation, Wysocki, the Polish Minister in Berlin, met Hitler and von Neurath on May 2, and came to an understanding, which was endorsed later by Beck in Warsaw when he saw the German Minister.

The result was manifest in the simultaneous publication in both capitals of *communiqués* declaring the intention of the respective Governments to keep strictly within the limits of existing treaties and to examine their respective interests without passion. In the circumstances this conclusion was in reality very remarkable—and unexpected by the rest of the Continent, which was far from thinking that this was the initiation of a definite line of policy of immense consequence to Europe, where the general view was expressed by the Berlin correspondent of *The Times* when he wrote that “the most that seems to have been accomplished is a return to correct relationships and a dispersal of the dangerous feeling that an early war was likely or inevitable.” The Polish Press was unanimous in recognizing the détente in Polish-German relations, but was inclined to scepticism about its permanence, which, it maintained, following Beck, would depend on Berlin, not on Warsaw, where a durable peace with Germany was greatly desired. Comment in the German Press, not yet under the full control of the Nazis, was undecided—in the case of Nationalist, Hugenberg papers there was hostility. Yet afterwards it was notice-

able that the whole tone of the German Press gradually became more moderate towards Poland; even in Danzig there was a change.

During the last week of April a League of Nations committee was in session at the Foreign Office, London, for the purpose of considering proposals of the Polish and the Danzig Governments for the revision of the Warsaw Convention of October 1921, which, under Article 241, could be changed after ten years at the request of either. The proposals dealt with nationality, Customs and postal questions, and Rosting shared in the deliberations. On May 1 the Committee adjourned, its next meetings taking place in Danzig and Warsaw; an agreement, modifying the Convention, was signed on September 18.

MOSCICKI RE-ELECTED PRESIDENT

On May 8 Moscicki was again elected President of Poland by the National Assembly—Seym and Senate sitting together—in accordance with the Constitution. The total votes possible were 555, but the Opposition decided to abstain from voting, and out of 343 deputies and senators present Moscicki received the votes of 332. The Communists tried to put forward a candidate, but this was no more than a gesture, for they had no hope at all of securing the 50 votes necessary for a candidature. Moscicki, elected President in 1926 shortly after Pilsudski's *coup*, was and remained devoted to the Marshal, whose policies he greatly approved, but he himself was a scientist, industrialist and man of affairs much more than a politician, and his engaging personal qualities made him popular even with the Opposition, apart from politics. It was universally recognized that he made an excellent President, and there was very little real hostility to his re-election; before it other names were mentioned, and he might have preferred to return to his professorship and his laboratory, but the Marshal wished him to stand again, and that settled the matter.

JEDRZEJEWICZ CABINET

According to usage Prystor and the Government resigned after the election. Prystor intimated that he desired to be excused from

office, as the state of his health enjoined a long rest; he had been Prime Minister for two years. On May 10 Moscicki nominated Janusz Jedrzejewicz, a former Minister of Education, to the Premiership, coupled with the Ministry of Education. No alteration in policy took place, or was to be expected; the continuity of the Pilsudski régime was unbroken; as always, the Marshal was Minister of War, keeping a firm hand not only on the Army but also on foreign policy. A new Constitution was being prepared, but not given serious consideration, the reason probably being that Pilsudski thought the time scarcely propitious in face of the foreign situation, though that was rather better, and the economic situation, which, however, was worse. The latter fact was exposed on the publication of the actual Revenue and Expenditure for 1932–33: 2,202 million zlotys against 2,244 million zlotys, leaving a deficit of 242 millions. That the situation for Poland *vis-à-vis* Germany was improved was clear from Hitler's pacific speech, with its particular references to the Poles, on May 17, at the meeting of the Reichstag in the Kroll Opera House in Berlin. No hint of the "obliteration" of Poland appeared in his remarks; she was a "neighbour," with a position of her own—an observation which unquestionably had a strange sound in many German ears.

DANZIG ELECTIONS, 1933

In mid-May a serious situation suddenly developed in Danzig owing to the seizure by the Nazis of the building used by the local German trade unionists (Socialists), and the counter-demonstrations to which it led. Throughout the Continent it was again recalled that the Free City was one of the danger spots of Europe, and great apprehension of the outbreak of war was expressed, except in the Polish Press, which took, as a rule, the matter calmly with a wait-and-see attitude, in view of the elections which were to be held on May 28. There was a good deal of pressure on the population from the Nazis, who had been strongly reinforced from Germany, and some disturbances occurred, but they were not serious. The interests of Poland were not immediately threatened; indeed, on May 15 the organ of the

Nazis contained a sort of *communiqué* stating that the party wished for good relations with the Poles, and had decided to respect the treaties and the rights of Polish nationals and citizens in Danzig. The Nazis were victorious, but not overwhelmingly so; they had 39 seats out of a possible of 72, the total number, against 12 in the previous elections, whereas the Nationalists were reduced from ten to three, and the Socialists from 19 to 13; the Poles had only two seats, as before, and small "fractions" had the remainder. As soon as the results were published, Rauschning, designated leader of the Free City Government, went to Berlin—to consult his real chiefs, but he told inquiring journalists that he had come to see the Agricultural Show; he also told them that the Danzig Nazis, like the German Chancellor, wanted peace, and were ready at any time for a general clearance of the big questions, especially economic, in dispute with Poland. There was no intention, he said, of the Free City trying to Germanize the Poles, but Danzig must be permitted to retain its individual German character, and peace could not be one-sided. In June Rauschning was elected President of the Senate of the Free City, the head of its Government, and on the nineteenth of that month he declared his determination, at a meeting of the Nazi organizations, to cultivate good, neighbourly relations with the Poles.

Not that the controversy over the "Corridor" was finished, but to some extent it was less strident on the German side. A valuable contribution to elucidating the facts was made by a letter published in *The Times* on June 8 from Lord Howard of Penrith (Sir Esme Howard), who had been a member of the British Delegation to the Paris Conference, 1919. He was replying to a member of the British Parliament who had expressed astonishment that Germany should be expected to surrender her claim to that part of Poland because German ethnographical maps showed that it was inhabited by Poles, and who added that the German Government would never admit that the present settlement was just—"for the best of all reasons, that it is not just." Lord Howard gave a list of the facts which were considered at Paris "conclusive in favour of the establishment of the Polish Corridor":

1. Historical. The Corridor was never before 1772, the date of the first partition of Poland, an integral part of Germany, but belonged to the Polish province of Pomorze for something like seven or eight centuries, though the whole province came under the rule of the Teutonic Order for about 100 years.

2. Ethnographic. The maps and statistics issued by the Prussian Government after the census of 1910, which were drawn up with the accuracy for which that Government's publications were justly noted, showed conclusively in that region, apart from one or two of the larger towns such as Danzig and Bromberg, the majority of the inhabitants were undoubtedly Poles or Slavs closely allied to Poles.

3. Linguistic. The same maps and statistics (there are a series of them which anyone can still consult) showed that these inhabitants spoke mainly, not German, but either Polish or a dialect nearly akin thereto.

4. Political. They showed, further, that these districts returned to the Prussian Diet mainly members of the Polish Party, thus making clear where their political sympathies lay.

5. Religious. They also showed that the great majority of the inhabitants were Roman Catholics who, if they did not return Poles to the Diet, returned members of the Centre or Roman Catholic Party.

Lord Howard's conclusion was that the restoration to Poland of "this strip of purely Polish territory" was an act of "elementary justice," which, moreover, found additional justification in the declaration by the Allies of Poland's right to free access to the sea

WORLD ECONOMIC CONFERENCE

The World Monetary and Economic Conference, with about 170 delegates from sixty-six nations, opened in London on June 12. Poland had prepared for it by holding a National Economic Conference in Warsaw, the financial and economic situation of the country being thoroughly discussed, with special reference to agricultural conditions at home and in Central Europe. How the depression had hit Poland was well brought out by the President when it stated that her foreign trade had fallen from 0.84 ton in 1929 to 0.47 tons in 1932 per head of her population. At the London conference the principal Polish representative was Adam Koc, and on June 13 he set forth the views of Poland, who, he said, was always desirous of collaborating with other countries in the work of economic reconstruction. He urged that half measures were useless in dealing with the crisis, the solution of which lay in stabilizing exchange, the re-establishment of the

gold standard, the lowering of prices and interest charges to new levels, and the doing away with tariff and other restrictions; for these international action was necessary. But the conference was undermined from its inception by the question of the War Debts, though it was not on the agenda. On the surface the conference appeared to make some progress on currency stabilization, but this was dispelled by objections from Washington, and in the end Roosevelt's attitude on the Dollar proved in practice fatal to the negotiations. Poland was one of the gold block countries which signed on July 4 a declaration of their continued adhesion to gold as the monetary standard. Great hopes had been cherished of the relief the conference would bring to the distracted world, but these were dissipated almost completely when, as June closed, the conference adjourned without the deadlock being broken. It never met again. Nor was the World Wheat Conference, with meetings parallel to those of the Economic Conference, attended with much better success; the United States, Canada, Argentina and Australia having found it impossible for a long time to agree on reduction of output. These negative results were extremely disappointing to Poland and Central Europe.

On June 29 the Disarmament Conference, having come to no practical decisions, adjourned to mid-October. On the other hand, the Four-Power Pact had been initialed, but in part it had been greatly changed, revision being treated in such a way as to overcome the objections of the Little Entente. Poland, however, persisted in her opposition to the very idea of a Directory as incompatible with the principle of equality of nations on which the Covenant was based, and on June 9 Beck again stated that she would not respect any decision affecting her interests arrived at directly or indirectly from the pact; as before, he was intimating that Poland would not submit to dictation about her army—the third clause of the pact was concerned with Disarmament. France accepted the pact, and in covering letters sent by the French Foreign Office to Poland and the Little Entente the emphasis was laid on the second clause—on treaty revision—and nothing was said of the third, a fact which was much resented by the Polish Government, Press and people unanimously, and told against

the alliance with France, already a little frayed. The pact was signed in Rome by the four Powers on July 15, but the attitude of Poland remained unaltered.

"AGGRESSOR" DEFINED

While the Economic Conference was in session in London negotiations were proceeding for the conclusion of a pact between the Soviet, on the one side, and on the other Poland, Rumania, Turkey, Estonia, Latvia, Persia and Afghanistan providing an exact definition of an "aggressor" State. Count Raszynski, who had come over from Geneva to represent Poland in these pourparlers, was particularly active in facilitating the contacts of Litvinoff and Titulescu, and much of the success attained was due to him. On July 3 a convention defining aggression was signed by the eight States, seven of which were neighbours of the Soviet. In substance it was identical with the definition of aggression adopted by the Security Committee of the Disarmament Conference, and published in the *Politis Report*, May 24, 1933. The aggressor State was defined to be the first to declare war on another State; invade the territory of another State, even without declaration of war; attack by its land, sea or air forces, even without declaration of war on the territory, vessels or flying machines of another State; support forays by armed bands on another State; or enforce a naval blockade of the coasts or ports of another State. In Warsaw Beck issued a statement expressing his conviction that the pact was a great constructive political act, and a further step towards establishing peaceful relations in Eastern Europe and the Near East; it was pointed out that the convention was open to Finland and the other neighbours of the Soviet who had not signed it; at the moment Finland was absorbed in a general election, but she adhered to the pact on July 12. On September 15 this pact was ratified simultaneously by Moscow and Warsaw, a mark of the good relations existing between the two Governments. It was evident, too, that Polish-Rumanian relations were better again; Jedrzejewicz, on a holiday in Rumania, said, on July 8 in Bucarest, that the pact was of decisive importance for all the south-eastern States of Europe. The general

effect of the pact was to give Poland greater freedom for her policy in other directions—for instance, Germany.

DANZIG AGREEMENTS

Poland's relations with Danzig showed marked improvement. It was not to be doubted that the Free City Government was acting on instructions from Berlin, and this, in its turn, indicated that Hitler was keeping to the spirit of the May understanding, though a decision of the Hague Court on July 29 rejected a German complaint that Poland had carried out in Pomorze and Poznania her Agrarian Reform Acts to the disadvantage of German proprietors and the profit of her own nationals, Poland proving that there had been no discrimination, as alleged, in these provinces, the law having been carried out there precisely as in other parts of the country. Early in July Rauschning, on an official visit to Warsaw, said that the geographical situation of the Free City, as well as the treaties, demanded the collaboration of Danzig with Poland, and realizing this the Free City Government desired direct conversations with the Polish Government for the elimination of disputes, instead of pursuing them at Geneva. Poland accepted the suggestion, and conversations proceeded to such good purpose in July that on August 5 two agreements were signed, and a third and a fourth on September 18. In brief, these treaties regulated the use of the port of Danzig by the Poles and acknowledged the rights of Polish citizens in the Free City, while Poland bound herself to share her trade and commerce equally between Danzig and Gdynia "in the measure of the possible." Technical details were worked out in the September agreements. Jedrzejewicz, on September 22, returned Rauschning's visit to Warsaw by going to Danzig, where they indulged in mutual congratulations.

NEW CONSTITUTION

With the skies abroad more serene for her than for a long time past, Poland turned her attention to home problems. Her Government went on resolutely with its policy of deflation, and was busy studying how best the Budget deficit was to be met—by

Treasury Bills or a National Loan or both. A big step forward was taken respecting a new Constitution. On August 2, Stanislas Car, the Vice-President of the Seym and *rapporteur-général* on the project of the revision of the Constitution, produced and elucidated his own scheme of revision before the deputies and senators of the Government Block, who were also members of the Seym and Senate Constitutional Commissions. Four days later Slawek, addressing the 12th Congress of the Legionaries, devoted almost his entire speech to Car's planned revision of the Constitution. The changes contemplated were much on the old Pilsudski lines: increase of the powers of the President so as to enable him to govern the country by decrees; increase of the powers of the Senate to an equality with those of the Seym; and a substantial alteration of the manner of its election, which hitherto had been of candidates by the suffrages of all citizens above 30 years of age, but was now to be effected by a limited suffrage electing only men holding the two national orders of the Virtuti Militari and the Independence Cross as to two-thirds, the remaining one-third being nominated by the President direct. The Senate, said Slawek, would consist of the élite of the nation, and no nation could expect to live unless it possessed an élite; what better élite for Poland than those who had struggled for the independence of their fatherland? The Seym was to remain a lower House elected by universal suffrage and subject to proportional representation, but it would completely lose its old supremacy. The two cardinal features of the proposed Constitution were the making of the President into a "real leader of full responsibility," as Slawek put it, and the recognition of a sort of aristocracy, composed of the élite, from which the Senate was to be drawn.

On September 5 a presidential decree, published two days afterwards, authorized the issue of a ten years' 6 per cent internal loan for 120 million zlotys, for the purpose of meeting the Budget deficit. Known as the "National Loan," it was over-subscribed, 350 million zlotys being offered, and the Government accepted the whole of this sum. The success of the loan was regarded as proof that the Polish people approved the economic policy of the Government, but a certain amount of pressure was employed

to procure subscriptions from the official class and from the industries. The proceeds of the loan furnished the means for balancing the Budget during the closing months of 1933 and the whole of 1934. The Government was able in 1933 to begin issuing Treasury Bills, owing to an increasing liquidity of the Polish capital market and a cessation of the decline in the national revenue. A revival of confidence could be inferred from the signing of a contract between the Ministry of Communications and British companies for the electrification of the Warsaw railways, the sum involved being about two million pounds sterling, covered by a loan at 6½ per cent from London guaranteed by the Polish Treasury.

POLAND AND FRANCE

On the invitation of the French Government Beck paid an official visit to Paris on September 20–21, and received a flattering welcome. He had a lengthy conversation with Paul-Boncour, at the close of which the latter statesman published a *communiqué*; it said that the two Foreign Ministers had discussed the general situation and the subjects of special interest to their own countries, with the result that they found their views alike on the political stabilization of Europe, as well as on her economic restoration; after a reference to the necessity for promoting effectively and quickly a more rational economic organization of the Danube States, it went on to particularize:

The two Ministers "congratulate themselves on the happy influences actively at work in the whole of Eastern Europe, and especially in the relations of Poland and Russia by the conclusion of pacts of non-aggression and the protocols attached to them, and also the improvement in the relations of Poland and the Free City of Danzig, as the outcome of recent negotiations."

"They regard with satisfaction the progress made in the international relations of the whole of that region of Europe in which Poland has direct interests."

"The two Ministers, at the end of their cordial and friendly conversation, marked their desire to maintain and develop a close and constant contact between their two Governments on all occasions and especially during the approaching international meetings."

Next, Beck had an hour's talk with Daladier, the Prime Minister.

On the following day the Polish Foreign Minister went on to Geneva. Everything had been done that could be done to impress him most favourably with the attitude of France to Poland and the permanence of their alliance. But the facts were the facts. Since 1921 when the alliance was signed the general situation in Europe had changed to the disadvantage of France inasmuch as Poland was now in a much stronger position relatively, and felt she could stand on her own feet without being helped by France to do so. She was never unmindful of what France had done for her in the first years of her restoration as a State, though she had to pay a stiffish price for it, and felt she was treated rather as a dependent—which in a sense was true, as she had looked to France to defend her much more than that she should defend France. Locarno, praised by Skrzynski in its day and accepted by Poland, had always been regarded by many Poles as detrimental to their country's interests, and as time went on more and more Poles came to hold that view because, while the Franco-German frontiers were guaranteed by England and Italy, no similar guarantee was given for the intangibility of the Polish-German frontier. Locarno was in effect an admission by France that she would not defend that frontier against an attack by Germany—what value, then, was to be put on the Franco-Polish alliance? Again, there was the notorious mutability of French politics to be reckoned with. Poland realized that she could count only on herself, and when France began to show a decided coolness towards her she took a line of her own, as was manifested by her opposition to the French plan in the Disarmament Conference and to the Four-Power Pact. But with Hitler in power, Austria in peril, and fear of Germany growing, France did not want the alliance with Poland to be weakened. Hence the invitation to Beck and the welcome he received, with the congratulations to Poland in the *communiqué* which, while it referred to Danzig, said nothing about the Polish-German agreement of May 2, though it must have been discussed by the two Ministers.

Shortly after his arrival at Geneva for the League Assembly, which opened on September 25, Beck had a conversation with Neurath and Goebbels of a distinctly friendly character, and

on October 5 the Polish Foreign Minister, in an interview published in a German paper, said that in the interest of peace it was right and proper for States which were neighbours to normalize their relations; he hoped that Germany and Poland would soon regulate, in a spirit of mutual esteem and confidence, the questions of a practical kind that arose from their being neighbours—particularly economic problems, largely agrarian, affecting both countries. The significance of this statement was almost lost sight of shortly afterwards by an event which threw the world into the throes of a fresh international crisis: the withdrawal of Germany from the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference on October 14, because she could get from neither the "equality" on which she was set. What appeared a sudden change, but had been on the tapis for some time, was the replacement of Wysocki by Joseph Lipski as Polish Minister at Berlin. Presenting his credentials on October 18 to President Hindenburg, Lipski said that all his efforts would be directed to the development and perfecting of Polish-German relations in accordance with the principles expressed by Chancellor Hitler in the May conversation and *communiqué*: work within the framework of existing treaties and discussion without passion of their common interests. Hindenburg's response indicated a *friedlichen Ausgleich* of the interests of their two States. The comparatively small amount of comment on this audience in the Press, even in Poland, indicated that public opinion was still obsessed by Germany's withdrawal from Geneva, otherwise it might well have caused a sensation. Naturally it occasioned remark in France, but nothing at all approaching its profound importance as showing that Poland was determined to establish good relations with Germany, whatever the attitude of France.

PARLIAMENT IN SESSION

The Polish Parliament re-assembled in the late autumn in somewhat better heart than it had been in when it adjourned six months before. The situation abroad was disturbing, but might have been worse, and the success of the National Loan was encouraging in the financial and economic domain at home. On November 6,

at the opening of the session, Jedrzejewicz reviewed the position of affairs, and at the start of his speech made the point that Poland stood the economic crisis better than a number of other countries who might have been expected to surpass her. The Government was resolved to maintain the zloty and balance the Budget. Zawadzki, who followed, put the Budget for 1934-35 at 2,118 million zlotys for Revenue and 2,165 millions for Expenditure, the deficit to be covered from the National Loan and Treasury Bills. Both the domestic and foreign policy of the Government was criticized by the Opposition in the course of a general discussion that ensued; the Socialists, however, approved the non-aggression pact with the Soviet. A Jewish deputy drew attention to anti-Semite agitation in parts of Poland, Jewish students having been attacked in the schools, but admitted that the Government could not be held responsible for these outbreaks. A German deputy said that his group would vote against the Government, but declared that the German Minority in Poland was loyal to the State, and opposed to any campaign for the revision of the frontiers.

All Poland united on November 11 in celebrating the fifteenth anniversary of the restoration of the State. In the evening of the previous day a monument was unveiled in Warsaw by Moscicki to the memory of fallen members of the *Polska Organizacja Wojskowa* (Polish Military Organization), in the presence of immense enthusiastic crowds; later legionaries and troops marched in procession to the Belvedere, Pilsudski's Warsaw residence, and demonstrated their homage to the Marshal. After his return from a short holiday in Rumania in the autumn Warsaw had seen more of him than usual, and he had been more in the public eye. When Titulescu visited the capital early in October in connexion with the ratification of the London treaty which defined the aggressor, the Marshal received him and talked with him for two hours, Beck and the Rumanian Minister being present. The occasion saw a reaffirmation of the Polish alliance with Rumania. In a Press interview Titulescu spoke of the great impression made on him by Pilsudski—"a figure without an equal." Again, the Marshal had been prominent in the national

celebrations of the anniversary of Jan Sobieski's famous victory over the Turks at Vienna. At Cracow on October 8 these celebrations culminated in a magnificent review by the Marshal of Polish cavalry. On November 11, at Mokotow, Pilsudski reviewed the Warsaw garrison; he wore his old legionary uniform and was acclaimed by many thousands of his people, who adored him as the Hero of Poland. Fifteen years after the State's restoration, of which he had been the principal artisan, he continued to be, indubitably, the Great Man of his nation. He was now about to see the triumph of his foreign policy.

SETTLEMENT WITH HITLER

Lipski, the new Polish Minister to Germany, was received by Hitler on November 15 in Berlin, and discussed with him the relations of their countries to each other, as the *communiqué* published immediately after their meeting stated, the outcome being a declaration that both of their Governments were agreed on direct negotiations for settling their differences. The *communiqué* concluded with an illuminating, if still rather startling, sentence: "Both Governments have resolved, for the strengthening of peace in Europe, to renounce all use of force in their reciprocal relations." Peace in Eastern Europe was the plain meaning of this statement, which to some observers seemed almost revolutionary, yet it had been prepared for by what had taken place during the preceding months. A temporary agreement to end the tariff war that had been going on since 1925 had been reached in mid-October, and doubtless the particular way in which the economic crisis affected both States had not a little to do with their *rapprochement*. This was brought out on November 16 in a newspaper interview by Beck, who, after saying that he attached great importance to the attitude taken by the German Chancellor, who had been informed of the attitude of Poland, went on to declare that what had resulted was specially significant as showing to the German and Polish peoples, "struggling by their daily labour against the economic crisis," that their Governments were ready to protect them from aggression, no matter whence it came. But unquestionably the understanding went

much farther, as was clear afterwards. The news came as a surprise to France, who, however, did not take it at first very seriously; she was again passing through or emerging from one of her frequent Parliamentary crises; but later French comment was unfavourable, and became more marked after Moltke saw Pilsudski in Warsaw on November 27 in a memorable meeting where the Marshal confirmed all that had been done by Lipski in Berlin, and spoke in a pronouncedly conciliatory way to the Minister; officially, however, the French Government approved, as seeing in the Polish-German détente another step in the pacification of Europe. What was not in doubt was that Poland had manifested her position of growing strength as an independent Power; as Saint-Brice said in the *Journal*, "Poland represents a real political force which can respond without fear to advances from Berlin." Though some differences arose with Danzig, its relations with Poland kept on improving as a whole, an impressive sign being a long interview given by Pilsudski to Rauschning in Warsaw on December 11, in the presence of Beck and Papée. Of the Marshal Rauschning said afterwards, "I realized that I had seen a personality who is the living symbol of a resuscitated nation called to accomplish great deeds."

PARLIAMENT AND NEW CONSTITUTION

The close of 1933 was signalized by the presentation to the Seym on December 20 of the draft of the New Constitution by Car, on the lines he had indicated in August, with the support of Slawek. The immediate problem before the Government was how was a Bill for a New Constitution to be passed by the Seym when the Block did not command a two-thirds majority in that chamber. The Bill, with its novel features, was certain to encounter the most vigorous opposition in the Constitutional Commission. In the Senate the Block had the necessary number of votes, but it was the Seym that had the last word, and the opponents of the Pilsudski régime were most numerous and vocal in that House. The economic crisis persisted in formidable and depressing strength, weighing heavily on the whole population. The volume of traffic through Gdynia and Danzig, however, did not fall off,

and a feature of the year was the creation of a free zone in the former port. In 1933 Polish exports fell to 960 million zlotys and imports to 827 million zlotys, but still leaving a favourable balance of 133 millions; goods imported and exported, including transit and entrepôt traffic, at Gdynia and Danzig amounted to upwards of 11,250,000 tons.

CHAPTER XII
POLAND A GREAT STATE
1934-1935

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At the opening of 1934 the international situation remained tense in Europe and in the Far East. With the latter area Poland was not directly concerned; she had a non-aggression treaty with the Soviet, but none the less was, unofficially, in sympathy with Japan rather than Red Russia. In Europe Austria was the "danger spot." The question of Disarmament had in practice become the question of the Rearmament of Germany, to which France continued to be opposed, the farthest she had gone being her adhesion to the proposal that Germany should be permitted to have a conscript army of 200,000 men, a proposal Hitler would not accept. Meanwhile negotiations between Poland and Germany proceeded amicably. Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, was, in his turn, President of the Council of the League when it met at Geneva in the first days of the new year. On January 7 the French paper *Excelsior* published a long interview he gave to its correspondent. Of 1933 Beck said Poland was well pleased with that year regarding both her special interests and their strengthening of world peace. Poland sought positive solutions when suitable opportunities presented themselves. That an effort should be made to create a better atmosphere between Poland and Germany was, he observed, only natural; it was a matter of prime importance; the effort had been made successfully, and the relations of the States to each other had improved—to their mutual satisfaction, though surprisingly, not to the satisfaction of everybody in Europe. France had no reason for fear or suspicion. The Minister then referred to Poland's relations with the Soviet as "excellent." Later, it was announced that Beck was invited to visit Moscow by Litvinoff.

SEYM VOTES NEW CONSTITUTION

When the Parliament resumed after the holidays its most important work was connected with the New Constitution. The Government Block was determined to get an Act ("Law") passed. On January 18 the Constitutional Commission of the Seym adopted by a majority a draft of sixty-three articles entitled "Constitutional Theses." It was an innocent-looking document, and the Opposition, secure, as it thought, in the absence of the necessary two-thirds majority in the Seym for Government action in the case of a New Constitution, attached little significance to it. But its promoters had come in secret to an agreement on the course to be taken to outwit their enemies. The draft was next submitted by the Commission to the Seym itself, and it was foreseen that it would be debated in the House on January 26. When the sitting on that day started Car immediately began a speech; it lasted for an hour and a half; and in expatiating on the merits of the Theses he affirmed they were in keeping with the views and wishes of Pilsudski, of whom he spoke in terms of passionate admiration, not as a dictator, but as a great moral authority. In the discussion that followed the Nationalists' spokesman declared that the draft which had issued from the Block interested neither himself nor his party; and he and his supporters contemptuously quitted the chamber. The Socialists said the sole purpose of the draft was the consolidation of the Pilsudski régime, and therefore they would have nothing to do with it. Representatives of most of the other Opposition parties expressed their disapproval. In the afternoon the discussion was enlivened by a powerful speech by Makowski, of the Block; he denied that the draft contemplated a dictatorship at all—what it really did or would do was to organize the democracy on a proper basis, a true balance being established between the liberty of the individual and the *collectivité*.

After remarks from other deputies, Switalski, the Speaker of the Seym, suspended the sitting at 7 o'clock in the evening. It was resumed in a quarter of an hour, and during the interval the leaders of the Block got ready to spring their mine. Nearly all the deputies present belonged to the Block, only a handful to the Opposition. Rising in his place Car said that seeing that the

Opposition took no interest in the reform of the régime, he proposed that the Seym should adopt the Theses as the draft of a Bill for a New Constitution. Stronski, of the National Party, who happened to be still in the House, protested that the Constitutional Commission had not pronounced on the Theses. Car responded by proposing "swift action" in accordance with a special rule, and the Seym concurred. The speaker said, "We are voting for the Bill for a new Constitution; those in favour of it stand up." Nearly every deputy rose up, and the Speaker next said, "I state that in conformity with article 125 of the Constitution of 1921 the Bill is adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the votes." Thereupon immediately were voted the second and third readings—and the Bill for the New Constitution became an Act, so far as the Seym was concerned, but it had to go up to the Senate in the usual course. No difficulty was to be looked for there; the members of the Block shouted for joy, and then sang "The First Brigade," the famous song of Pilsudski's Legions, so dear to their hearts. Caught napping, the Opposition was furious, and its newspapers loudly asserted that the vote was illegal, but that was precisely what it was not, as the law in the case had been respected. The clever plan of the Block was a complete success. The Bill was sent up to the Senate on March 12, but as Parliament was then about to close, its consideration was postponed till November.

POLISH-GERMAN TEN-YEARS PACT

The day which saw the passing of the New Constitution by the Seym saw also the signature in Berlin of the treaty between Poland and Germany on which negotiations had been proceeding for some time with Lipski on one side and Neurath on the other. By mid-January these reached so advanced a stage that Lipski, going to Warsaw for this specific object, was able on January 19 to place the proposed treaty before Pilsudski, who declared he was satisfied and authorized Lipski to sign it. The document was given its final shape by Makowski and Gauss, the legal advisers respectively of the Polish and German Governments. The treaty was in the form of a Declaration, and it was signed

on January 26. Couched in simple terms it presented no ambiguity and was to be taken at its face-value. It began by stating that the moment had come, in the opinion of the Polish and German Governments, to begin a new phase in the political relations of their countries to each other by the employment of direct communications between their two States; consequently, the two Governments had decided to establish the foundations for the development of these relations.

Taking as the *point de départ* the fact that the maintenance and consolidation of a durable peace between their countries constituted an essential condition for the general peace of Europe, the two Governments declared their decision to abide by the principles of the Pact of Paris—the Briand-Kellogg Pact, August 27, 1928. At the same time they declared that none of the engagements they had severally contracted previously with other States clashed with the pacific development of their reciprocal relations, or contradicted or attacked the present Declaration, which, further, in accordance with international law, was not concerned with questions relating to the internal affairs of either of the two States. Next, the two Governments declared their intention to concert together on all subjects touching their mutual relations. Litigious points, if proved insoluble by direct negotiations, were to be settled, by consent, in some other pacific manner; in any case, recourse to force was definitely renounced. Then, it was remarked that the guarantee of peace created by the Declaration would facilitate the task of the two Governments of finding solutions, based on a just and equitable co-ordination of their interests, of political, economic and cultural questions. It was added that the two Governments were persuaded the result would be to their common benefit and the strengthening of good neighbourly relations, with salutary consequences not only for their two States but for the rest of Europe. The Declaration was to be ratified in Warsaw, to be good for ten years and to be valid thereafter, subject to six months' denunciation by either of the parties.

Unquestionably the pith of this treaty was contained in its renunciation of the use of force for the settlement of any question on which differences existed between the two countries; it was in

fact equivalent to a non-aggression pact. Though well received by most Poles, but not by the Opposition parties, the treaty gave rise to much outside speculation, allegations being made that Germany had been given a free hand in Austria, in the Russian Ukraine, and in the "East" generally, with a share of the spoils to Poland. British comment was a little bewildered, but not unkind. On January 27 Paul-Boncour gave the treaty the blessing of official France, and he emphasized the fact that Poland stood by all her previous agreements—the alliance, Locarno and membership of the League of Nations. But the trend of French popular opinion was sceptical on the whole. In Russia comment was reserved and at most not enthusiastic; Stalin expressed approval, but his newspapers asked where Germany expected to get compensation for giving up the "Corridor" and Silesia—was it in Soviet territory? In the Reichstag on January 30 Hitler made a long and important speech on German policy. He said that Germany had tried to strengthen peace in Eastern Europe by procuring a new and better relationship with Poland. When he had come into power the prospect was that hostility between the Germans and the Poles would harden into a menacing political heritage. The two peoples, however, must reconcile themselves to each other's existence. It had seemed to him necessary to show by example that two nations could take over their differences without giving the task to third parties, and Germany had been fortunate to find in Marshal Pilsudski, who directed Polish policy, a man with similar views. Hitler also welcomed the clarification in Poland's relations with Danzig since the National Socialist Government had been in power. But it was noteworthy that while all the rest of his speech was applauded, that part of it which dealt with Poland elicited no cheers.

Beck, on February 5, said to the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Senate, after a reference to his speech a year before, that Polish foreign policy did not vary in insisting on the supreme value of direct relations. Poland appreciated the League of Nations but Germany, her second big neighbour, stood outside Geneva, the future of which was in any case problematical. Having touched on the subject of the Minorities and the uncertainties surrounding

the Disarmament Conference, as well as on Poland's relations with the Soviet, the Foreign Minister spoke of the radical change in Polish-German relations that had occurred during that past year. Opinion in Europe generally had taken the line that these relations would become worse on Hitler's accession to power, but that had not been the view of the Polish Government, which, on coming into contact with him, with the idea of fully and boldly examining their relations, found he was responsive and willing to create a basis for the establishment of more durable forms of good neighbourhood. The result was the "Declaration of Non-Recourse to Force." This and the non-aggression pact with the Soviet, combined with the pact defining the aggressor, had been achieved without affecting Poland's alliances with France and Rumania. Beck also spoke of Poland's better relations with Danzig. A few days later he left Warsaw for Moscow on an official visit. He was given a cordial reception, and on February 15 a joint *communiqué*, signed by Beck and Litvinoff, was published of the usual congratulatory type, with the addition of a statement that the Polish Minister at Moscow and the Soviet Minister at Warsaw were henceforth to be given the rank of Ambassadors. After Beck's return to Warsaw it was reported in the Press that negotiations were continuing for an extension of the Polish-Soviet non-aggression pact, but were being retarded by the Lithuanian question, the Soviet attitude respecting Vilna not being quite clear. These negotiations, however, were successfully concluded when on May 5 a protocol was signed at Moscow by Litvinoff and Lukasiewicz, the Polish Ambassador, which extended the non-aggression pact to December 31, 1945. This protocol was supplemented by another stating that the Soviet disinterested itself in territorial questions between Poland and Lithuania.

It was not long before the concrete solutions Poland desired began to come out of the Polish-German Declaration of policy after its ratification on February 24 at Warsaw, the documents being signed by Beck and the German Minister, von Moltke. To a journalist Beck remarked: "The Polish-German pact is an example of that constructive work which we oppose to the pessimism which has invaded the international relations of the

world. . . . Our foreign policy is the application to international problems of the realist and constructive thought of Marshal Pilsudski." The first concrete solution to emerge was a trade agreement, signed at Warsaw on March 7, which brought to an end the Customs war that had gone on between the two countries since June 1925. The agreement was not a full commercial treaty—that was to come later—but a protocol doing away with the restrictions and prohibitions both States had put in force during the struggle, and thus freeing their trade and commerce from the fetters which had prevented their free play. Poland obtained the right of free transit for her merchandise in German territory and through the Kiel Canal, while Germany was made equally free of Gdynia and Danzig. It was believed in Warsaw that the effect of the protocol would be an increase of about 30 per cent in the trade between the two countries. A thing that issued from the pact well illustrated its spirit; this was an agreement for the discontinuance of hostile propaganda which had been such a pronounced feature of the frontiers, and its replacement by news and views which would contribute to a better understanding and good will. On February 27 the German and Polish official telegraph agencies published a statement to that effect and endorsed by the chiefs of the *Press Bureaux* of the German and Polish Ministries of Foreign Affairs. It was certainly the case that hostile propaganda virtually ceased afterwards—it had already been dying out, and now became very rare whether in Germany or Poland; this was not remarkable as regarded Germany, as her Press was Government-controlled, but was significant in Poland where the Press was practically free. Still, neither the pact nor other agreements could quite undo the past, as was most evident in the economic sphere. During the Customs war Poland had entered into a number of commercial treaties with foreign countries on the most-favoured-nation basis, and these of course remained in force. Besides, the shifting of the axis of her trade and commerce north-south instead of east-west was bound to make a great difference to Germany. Poland had been successful in finding markets outside Germany, yet the latter had remained her biggest customer,

though only for special lines, and now restrictions were withdrawn, the volume was sure to increase.

During February the general situation in Europe was highly critical, particularly in Central Europe, Nazi attacks and intrigues in Austria creating much uneasiness, which was not lessened by the forcible suppression of the Socialists in Vienna by the Dollfuss Government. The Austrian problem once more became international, as Dollfuss wished to bring the precarious position of his country to the official notice of the League, and the interested Powers thought the moment unsuitable for anything of the kind, because the disarmament negotiations then proceeding were at a delicate stage, with France unyielding on one side and Germany intransigent on the other. However, on February 17 the Austrian situation was clarified when England, France and Italy issued a joint declaration affirming their resolve to preserve the independence of Austria, but none the less she remained a menace to the peace of Europe, though the danger was somewhat mitigated in mid-March by the Rome Protocols which bound Italy, Austria and Hungary to work together for the pacification and economic restoration of the countries of the Danube basin. And during the first months of the year the general situation was worsened by another and very serious illustration of the political instability of France, the Stavisky affair causing riots in Paris, with sanguinary clashes between Royalists and Communists and rapid changes of Cabinets till a National Government was formed by Doumergue, who obtained a vote of confidence in the Chamber by a large majority on February 15. Barthou was Foreign Minister, and took a firm line on the disarmament question, disagreeing in March with the British proposals permitting Germany to rearm. Relations between France and England were strained—so much so that France started an intimate survey of her alliances with Poland and the Little Entente. Towards the end of the month it was announced that Barthou would pay official visits to Prague and Warsaw in April, to be followed later by visits to Belgrade and Bucarest, and there was no possibility of misunderstanding their object.

PARLIAMENT AND PARTIES

The ordinary session of the Parliament was closed by decree of the President on March 16, with consideration of the Bill for the new Constitution by the Senate postponed till the next session, according to the wish, it was said, of Pilsudski, who thought some modification was necessary, or expedient, of the measure as voted by the Seym. Three days before, the revised Budget Estimates for 1934–35, with Revenue put at 2,136 million zlotys and Expenditure at 2,184 millions, were accepted and passed by both Houses. Later in the year the actual Revenue and Expenditure for 1933–34 were published, the former being 1,869 million zlotys and the latter 2,206, with a deficit of 337 million zlotys, the largest during the Pilsudski régime up to that time, and a significant witness of the impoverishment caused by the depression, notwithstanding the prodigious efforts to combat it. The deficit was reduced by 120 millions from the National Loan, and the balance was provided by Treasury Bills. Debates on the Estimates were a regular part of the Parliamentary life of Poland, especially in the Seym, and the Opposition did not fail to make itself heard, but with comparatively slight effect because of the unimpaired strength of the Block. The Nationalists and Socialists remained the strongest of the Opposition parties in Parliament and in the country, but they had lost their old leaders—Dmowski and Daszynski. The latter was in bad health, and the former, if still regarded as chief of the National Democrats, had practically retired from active politics, though now and again he published articles in the Nationalist papers on the questions of the day. While the Nationalists were decidedly opposed to the Pilsudski régime, they were also as decidedly opposed to Socialism, which they denounced as having an “ideology leading to a degeneration of the life of the community, a degeneration whose most striking expression was Bolshevism.” They were not very friendly to the Minorities and took up a strong anti-Jewish attitude, which gained them support from peasants victimized by usurers.

In 1933–34 there were developments and regroupings in the Polish parties. In 1933 the Union of Conservative Organizations came into existence under the leadership of Prince J. Radziwill

and other members of the Right supporting the Pilsudski régime. Its programme included the development of public life on the lines of Christian teaching and morality, with the emphasis on conserving the position of the Catholic Church as *the* Church of the nation; the strengthening of the Executive, reform of the Legislature, and the protection of the Constitution; and the creation of a basis for the normal development of the national economy, with respect for the principle of private property. In practice this Conservative Union co-operated with the Government Block, but kept its own distinct organization. From the Block there emerged a Pilsudskist Legion of Youth (*Legion Młodych*) as from the Nationalist Party had come a similar body in its *Oboz Wielkiej Polski* (Camp of Great Poland), and of course strongly opposed to each other; both were founded in imitation more or less of Hitler's League of Youth in Germany. Towards the end of 1933 clashes were not infrequent between these groups and between the Nationalist Group and Jewish citizens. In the spring of 1934 the O.W.P. Group became the "National Radical Party," with a programme which was palpably based on Hitlerism, yet strongly anti-German. The new party in effect was a revolt of the youth against the older leaders of the Nationalists. Such a split in the ranks of the Nationalists might have been viewed without disfavour by the Pilsudski régime had it not been accompanied with a highly inflammatory programme on the part of the seceders, who organized themselves into a uniformed militia, and gained many adherents among lower middle-class youths and the unemployed. The gray-shirted Polish Nazis soon became an object of suspicion to the Government, and in July it dissolved the organization. The corresponding Pilsudskist Legion of Youth enjoyed at the start the patronage of some leading men of the Block, though its programme was far from acceptable to the Right supporting the régime, since its principles were Radical—they went so far to the Left that they and those who held them were banned by the Church. After a time the members of the Government who had been its patrons withdrew and the organization became more and more Socialist.

TENSION WITH THE CZECHS

Since January 1934 a series of incidents had thrown a sinister light on the relations between Poland and Czechoslovakia. These had been steadily worsening for nearly a year, the cause being the breaking out again of the old controversy over Teschen, though now with a different slant. From 1925 relations between the two States had been good till early in 1933 when this local crisis developed, the Poles in Teschen accusing the Czechs of persistent efforts to denationalize them, and the Czechs accusing the Poles of disloyalty to the Czechoslovak State, and the intention of getting the Polish Government to take by force that part of Teschen which the Poles inhabited, but which had been allocated to Czechoslovakia by the Ambassadors' Conference on July 28, 1920. A tense state of feeling was aroused in both countries which led to provocative acts as well as angry words. On Sunday, March 18, a crowd of students belonging to the Legion of Youth stoned and smashed the windows of the Czechoslovak Legation in Warsaw as a demonstration against the "persecution of the Polish Minority" by the Czechs. The Polish Press published dispatches of the official telegraph agency describing arrests of Polish leaders in Teschen, the closing down of Polish schools, and the prohibition of Polish papers. The *Gazeta Polska* warned the Czechoslovak Government that the entire Polish nation would react against the "policy of exterminating the Polish Minority," and declared that "Poland could not remain indifferent." The Czechoslovak Press was equally bitter, criticized the Polish-German Ten-years Pact as enabling Germany to concentrate against Austria, and even hinted that the pact had something in it or behind it that allowed Poland to take a sharp, bullying attitude toward Czechoslovakia. It was asked why it was that this Polish outburst should occur so soon after the signature of the Ten-years Pact. A deputation of prominent people in the Teschen district protested to the Czechoslovak Minister of the Interior that Polish groups were conspiring against the "integrity" of Czechoslovakia, and in reply were told that her frontiers were "fixed for ever." The trouble broke out again in the last week of March when in retaliation for the arrest of three Poles in Teschen the Polish

Government expelled some twenty Czechs from Poland, and prohibited the sale in Poland of three leading Czech daily papers. The controversy between two of her allies excited apprehension in France, and it was said that one of the aims of Barthou in his visits to the Polish and Czechoslovak capitals was the composing of the quarrel.

BARTHOU IN WARSAW

The French Foreign Minister arrived in Warsaw on April 22 and was warmly saluted by crowds who shouted *Vive la France! Vive l'alliance!* It was not forgotten that some thirteen years before Barthou, then French Minister of War, had outlined the military clauses of the alliance, and subsequently had arrived at an agreement with Pilsudski about their exact terms. At that time Poland, though independent, had scarcely been in a position to consider herself on an equal footing with France. But during the interval she had established herself as a State with a permanent place in the ensemble of Europe—of which there was some doubt in 1921—and her recent non-aggression pacts with the Soviet and with Germany had, by increasing her security, substantially emphasized her significance as a Power to be reckoned with in the international politics of the time. In brief, Poland had become a Great State, and the Polish Press took care to stress that Barthou was received as the representative of an “equal State,” and given just such honours as were accorded the Polish Foreign Minister by Paris; that being understood, Barthou’s welcome was genuinely cordial, for Poland had no desire to terminate the alliance.

In the evening of April 22 he was the guest of honour at a dinner given officially by Beck at the Raczyński Palace, where there was a great reception afterwards of a particularly brilliant kind. At dinner Beck toasted “la grande nation française amie et alliée,” and Barthou spoke of the magnificent development of Poland as “un des plus grands faits de l’Europe contemporaine. . . . Votre resurrection nationale, à laquelle votre illustre Maréchal, dont le nom est légendaire, a donné un mot d’ordre et un exemple, a fait de la Pologne un grand pays, écouté et respecté.” Next morning Barthou received representatives of the Press, and

referring to the Polish-German Ten-years Pact said, "If it serves the cause of peace and contributes to the stability of Europe, the pact will not disturb in the least the relations between France and Poland." The French Government, he declared, did not recognize as fundamental the differences which had arisen between Warsaw and Paris; it did regard Poland as a great and independent Power. The alliance was "intact and indissoluble." After a round of ceremonial visits, Barthou had a conference nearly two hours in length with Pilsudski at the Belvedere, Beck being present. No *communiqué* was published, but doubtless the conversation turned on the Polish-German pact and its relation to the Franco-Polish alliance, as well as on disarmament questions, about which Barthou upheld the point of view of France. It was reported unofficially that the Marshal and the French Foreign Minister reached a complete accord. Barthou spent April 24 in Warsaw, and at a reception at the Institut Français de Varsovie said: "Having conversed with the principal Polish statesmen and with the illustrious Marshal, who is the glory of Poland, I can give you the assurance that the alliance is stronger and more alive than ever." In the evening he left the capital for Cracow, accompanied by Beck, and there they passed most of the next day together sight-seeing. In the afternoon Barthou left for Prague, where on April 27 he said to a gathering of journalists that those were completely mistaken who alleged that the alliance had been chilled by the Ten-years Pact, for the alliance remained in full force.

On the surface at any rate, Barthou's visit was most successful. It had a good Press in Poland, though here and there might be heard a note of reserve. What was certain was that Poland had made her position of independence perfectly clear—no "vassal" was she, no "servitude" hers, and these truths were now to be held as written into the alliance. In France the inspired Press declared that the alliance did remain in all its strength, but the rest of the papers took a more critical line; one went so far as to assert that the change for the worse in Polish-French relations was due to Beck, who was "francophobe"—a charge that was often repeated later, though it entirely overlooked the fact that it was Pilsudski himself who directed Polish foreign policy, and that

Poland had good reasons for being none too sure of French policy, so far as she was concerned. Whether Barthou had said or done anything in Warsaw respecting the Polish-Czechoslovak controversy did not transpire; at all events the tension was not relieved. Perhaps the best comment on the Barthou visit that appeared in England was that given by the *Manchester Guardian*: "Poland remains the ally of the French, but she has reached her majority, and she intends to show that she is no man's ward." That she had reached her majority was indicated in another way when on April 11 she put on the agenda of the League Assembly in September a proposal to convene by April 1935 a conference of all the members of the League, with instructions to frame a general convention for the international protection of Minorities, the idea being that as the existing treaties guaranteed the rights of Minorities in some countries and not in others the remedy was to embody the same undertakings for all the members of the League in a convention insuring international protection for all Minorities of race, language and religion. As a Great State Poland resented that she was the subject of a special Minorities Treaty.

KOZLOWSKI CABINET

After being in office for a year the Jedrzejewicz Cabinet resigned on May 13, but most of its Ministers reappeared in the new Government which was headed by Leon Kozlowski. He had been one of Pilsudski's legionaries and afterwards became a Professor at Lwow University. Since 1930 he had been Minister of Agrarian Reform. The changes in the Government occasioned little excitement; everybody knew that no alteration of policy was implied, but it was understood that the new men would give a fresh stimulus to the fight ceaselessly and strenuously being waged against the economic crisis in industry and agriculture. Pilsudski was Minister of War and Beck Foreign Minister as before, and the continuity of the régime was manifest.

A few days before the changes in the Government the continuity of the foreign policy of Poland had been reaffirmed by an official visit to Bucarest by Beck, in return for Titulescu's visit to Warsaw in October 1933, but it was a good deal more than that. Besides

an audience of King Carol II, Beck had several long conversations with Titulescu on their special interests and the general situation. Their talks must have covered the Polish-German Ten-years Pact and another new feature of the time—the Balkan Pact, signed in February by Rumania, Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece, as well as the Disarmament question, which, more than anything else at the moment, was disturbing Europe. Beck's visit seemed successful, and appeared to show that the difference over the Polish non-aggression pact with the Soviet was forgotten; later, however, other differences were manifest.

Polish foreign policy was concerned, however, much more nearly with North-East than with South-West Europe; a fundamental part of that policy was the permanent establishment of good relations with the Baltic States, which, at this time, were gravely alarmed by the rearmament of Germany. Before 1932 their serious preoccupation had been the Soviet, but that had been dissipated by non-aggression pacts signed in that year and in 1933 with Moscow. Poland had made several attempts at forming a species of defensive Baltic League based on herself, but Lithuania had always been an obstacle to their success because of Vilna. The States in question were Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and of these Estonia was the most friendly to Poland. Therefore when Seljamaa, the Estonian Foreign Minister, visited Warsaw officially on May 23 he received a warm welcome. At a banquet Beck said that the friendship of their two nations had its source in the conviction that the basis of their respective policies was regard for the sovereignty of all independent States and their right to decide freely their own fate, in conformity with their well-understood national needs. Seljamaa spoke of the profound sympathy in the two States which led to their policy of "entente and intimate collaboration." Next day Seljamaa was received by Pilsudski, the subjects discussed being the Soviet, Germany and Lithuania.

Things were stirring in the Baltic States under the influence of the fear of Hitler, who in April had refused to agree to a proposal made by the Soviet that Germany and the Soviet should enter into a pact guaranteeing the independence and territorial inviola-

bility of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Towards the end of May, it looked as if a new situation might be brought about in the Baltic and in a large part of Europe by proposals for what came to be known as the "Eastern Pact," whose promoters and advocates were Litvinoff and Barthou. Litvinoff appeared unexpectedly at Geneva while the Council was in session on May 18, and though at first it was supposed that he had come to talk over the entry of Soviet Russia into the League, it presently leaked out that his real object was to formulate with Barthou a pact of mutual assistance, covering the Soviet, France, Poland, the Baltic States and Czechoslovakia, to which would be added Germany—if she wished. On May 29 the Disarmament Conference reassembled, and almost at once reached a deadlock, Barthou, supported by Litvinoff, definitely rejecting the British point of view, which he regarded as inadequate for ensuring French security. What was now unmistakable was that the Soviet henceforth intended to play a much larger rôle in international affairs than it had done before, an eventuality Poland did not fail to note.

GOEBBELS IN WARSAW

Dr. Goebbels, the German Minister of Propaganda and Enlightenment and the first member of Hitler's Government to appear in Poland, arrived in Warsaw by air on June 13. The visit was unofficial, its occasion being the delivery of a lecture on "The Ideology of National Socialism," on the invitation of the Polish Union of Intellectuals. He had a large audience which included some Cabinet Ministers and foreign diplomats, and for more than an hour he dilated on the revolution in Germany. Later the German Minister gave a dinner and a reception for him, many prominent Poles, including Beck, having been invited. But the attitude of the Polish Press was not particularly friendly, and there was much speculation regarding the possibility of political motives having in reality inspired his visit. Next day Pilsudski received him in the presence of Beck and the German Minister at the Belvedere, but the talk was not lengthy, as the Marshal was indisposed. It was said that Memel was among the subjects touched on, and that Pilsudski made it clear that Poland's

attitude to Lithuania would not be one of indifference to any attack made on that State; nothing official was published.

PIERACKI ASSASSINATED

While the Polish Press and public were still discussing the possible implications of Goebbels' visit after he had returned to Germany, the whole nation was shocked by the assassination of Pieracki in Warsaw on June 15 by a man who succeeded in making good his escape without being identified. As Minister of the Interior, Pieracki, it was known, was on the point of signing an order for the dissolution of the National Radical Party, and at first it was widely supposed that he had fallen a victim to some fanatic belonging to that organization, but it was soon discovered that the assassin was a Ukrainian terrorist, a fact which made the murder all the more revolting as Pieracki favoured a liberal policy towards the Ukrainians, as he showed by his speech in the Seym on January 16, 1932 (p. 296). One of Pilsudski's intimates, he had been a great support to the régime and the Government; he was only 40 when he was killed, and the Marshal felt his death so intensely that he was too overcome to attend the funeral of his friend and follower. On that day the President issued a decree providing that "persons whose activities or conduct cause the belief that they constitute a danger to the maintenance of security and public order may forcibly be detained in places of confinement which are not intended for persons convicted of crime." The "places of confinement" were not otherwise specified, but were understood to be detention or concentration "camps." The police were indefatigable in their pursuit of the assassin, several arrests were made, and the nature of the crime was established, but the murderer himself was not caught—it was thought that he had contrived to get out of the country, and was hiding, probably in Czechoslovakia, where there were a number of Ukrainian political refugees, or in Germany, who, before the Polish-German Ten-years Pact, had befriended Ukrainian agitators. Later, on representations being made by Poland to these and other States, their Governments expelled the Ukrainian terrorist groups.

POLAND AND LITHUANIA

Poland followed with interest the Memel question, which reached an acute stage in the summer of 1934, owing to Nazi intrigues and the imprisonment of more than a hundred Memellanders on a charge of high treason by the Lithuanian Government, but she was interested far more in Lithuania. To Pilsudski, himself of Lithuanian descent, the fate of that little State was matter of great moment; though he was primarily responsible for depriving it of Vilna, and felt thoroughly justified in doing so, he had a certain regard for it; he would have liked a political union of it and Poland on some such terms as those that joined England and Scotland together; but in any case its preservation was a fixed and unalterable point in his policy, and he was anxious to overcome its hostility and establish good neighbourly relations with it. The time seemed opportune, as Lithuania was completely isolated, for she could count no longer on the Soviet and on Germany, hitherto the props of her anti-Polish system. After some preliminary soundings which were not unpromising Pilsudski sent Prystor to Kovno (Kaunas) to try for a reconciliation with Lithuania. As there were practically no diplomatic or other relations between the two States Prystor went informally to Lithuania, but the purpose of his mission was well understood, as was the fact that he was authorized by Pilsudski to offer some compensation for the cessation of the Vilna controversy. Prystor arrived at Kovno on June 18, and immediately got in touch with the Lithuanian authorities, with whom he had conversations extending over two or three days. He returned to Warsaw with good hopes of an accommodation, if not of a definitive settlement, with Lithuania. There was at least the prospect of normal relations being instituted; if they were, no obstacle would be left in the way of a collaboration of Poland with the Baltic States. The outlook was heartening for Pilsudski, but within a few weeks a Franco-Soviet intrigue changed the situation, and Lithuania drew back from the negotiations. The explanation lay in the hardening of the opposition of Poland to the Eastern Pact, an attitude which France and the Soviet deeply resented and led them to make mischief between Lithuania and Poland. When the Poles learned

why it was that the negotiations had been broken off by Lithuania, they were furious, not so much with Lithuania as with France, whom they charged with betraying their interests in a cardinal article of their policy.

THE EASTERN PACT

Barthou, continuing his inquiry into the real value of the French alliances, paid official visits to Bucarest and Belgrade in the latter half of June, and as he made a point of emphasizing the unalterable opposition of France to any territorial revision he received the most enthusiastic of welcomes in Rumania and, though not quite in such overflowing measure, in Yugoslavia, where the opinion held of the Soviet was different from that of Rumania and from that, too, of the third partner in the Little Entente, Czechoslovakia. On the invitation of MacDonald, Barthou went to London, where he arrived on July 8, for the purpose of elucidating French policy, with particular reference to the proposed pact of mutual assistance embracing Russia, Germany, Poland and other States—the Eastern Pact. In the morning of July 9 he discussed the general situation and in the afternoon the Eastern Pact with Simon, Eden and other representatives of the British Government, who gave him a very cordial reception. After the clashes which had taken place at Geneva between him and Simon this might have been surprising, but the way had been prepared for him by Hitler's "blood purge" on June 30, which, if it crushed a plot against him, succeeded in horrifying all the rest of Europe by its cold and callous brutality—in England the effect of the ruthless "executions," without trial, diverted sympathy from Germany to France. But the British Government, determined to make no fresh commitments, did no more than give its moral support to the pact, which was characterized as an "Eastern Locarno"; it did, however, instruct its diplomatic representatives in Berlin and Warsaw to recommend its acceptance; the one feature of the pact on which it specially insisted was that Germany was to be covered by the pact. But it was soon very plain that Germany would have nothing to do with the pact and that the attitude

of Poland was the same. On July 15 the *Gazeta Polska* set forth the view of the Polish Government on the pact:

The situation has not been changed by the benevolent attitude of the British Government, which is more a matter of tactics than fundamental. The long-term non-aggression pacts with Soviet Russia and Germany have already realized for Poland the fundamental and positive element implied in the word "Locarno," and the proposed guarantee pact for Eastern Europe might involve Poland in obligations having no compensation. From the Polish standpoint, therefore, the Eastern Locarno neither simplifies matters nor carries an agreeable sound. The attitude of the Polish Government will remain sympathetic on general principles, but non-committal in a positive sense till further information on various points is obtained, particularly the attitude of Germany.

At first the tone of the German Press was merely critical, but as the days went past it became more and more definitely hostile. France could scarcely have expected anything else, but as she had looked for something entirely different from Poland, she was annoyed and even infuriated by the purely negative reception given to the pact by Warsaw; and as the Polish Press, with few exceptions, supported the line taken by the Government, the French Press replied by violently attacking Poland. The Polish-German Ten-years Pact, Poland's rejection of the Four-Powers Pact, and other matters concerning which Poland had not seen eye to eye with France were adduced as demonstrating that Poland, though by treaty the ally of France and the recipient of French favours in the past, was now to be considered a very doubtful friend. At the Quai d'Orsay it was thought that pressure on Poland might be effective if applied in a quarter about which she was sensitive—Lithuania, with whom she was known to be conducting negotiations for better relations. And hence the French-Soviet intrigue which wrecked these negotiations. The result was that instead of reacting favourably to the Eastern Pact under this pressure from Paris Poland became more anti-French in her outlook, and any chance of her accepting the pact because of France disappeared. Thereupon the French Press proceeded to denounce her as the "veritable ally of Germany." Again rumours flew about that she had a secret agreement with Hitler for the partition of Lithuania and the seizure and occupation of the Russian Ukraine.

During the latter half of July Beck visited Estonia and Latvia officially, and discussed with their respective Foreign Ministers, Seljamaa and Ulmanis (who was also Prime Minister of Latvia), the Eastern Pact, the position in Lithuania and the Memel question—the last had been raised anew by a demand on the part of Germany, addressed to the guarantors—England, France and Italy, Japan being considered to have dropped out—that the Lithuanian Government should be compelled to observe the Statute under which Lithuania held Memel and Memelland. The Polish Foreign Minister got excellent receptions both in Tallinn (Reval) and in Riga; in neither capital was there the slightest suspicion that Poland was the “ally of Germany,” as the French alleged, or he would not have been welcomed as he undoubtedly was. It was while he was on this tour that news came of the attempted Nazi *coup* in Austria which involved the assassination of Dollfuss, an event which could only increase the fear of Germany felt in the Baltic States. They favoured the pact, though before accepting it they wished to have much fuller information about it than they possessed; in any case, they were determined to resist its being imposed on them from outside. Estonia and Latvia assured Beck that they would enter into a Baltic Pact with Lithuania only on condition that the Vilna and Memel questions were categorically withdrawn from its operation. That Poland, despite her opposition to the Eastern Pact, was still on friendly terms with the Soviet was shown by the flattering reception given at Leningrad to the *Burza* and the *Wicher*, two of her warships, when they visited that port in the fourth week of July, and by the equally warm reception accorded about the same time to a Soviet air squadron which had flown to Warsaw.

THE INTERNAL SITUATION

With the Parliament adjourned in March for months, quiet reigned in the domestic politics of Poland, except when broken by such a terrible affair as the assassination of Pieracki or the lawless proceedings of the National Radical Party. After Pieracki's death Kozłowski took temporary charge of the Ministry of the Interior, but on June 30 he handed it over to Zyndram-Kościakowski.

In the economic field the Government maintained its campaign against the crisis by additional efforts to raise the prices of farm produce and to lower those of goods. The harvest of 1934 was rather disappointing, and world prices for grain did not improve; the arrangement to stabilize them which had at last issued from the Wheat Conference of 1933 was afterwards broken by Argentina. In mid-July floods devastated the western part of southern Poland and caused immense losses, the total being put at 250 million zlotys. An emergency relief organization, with headquarters at Cracow, was at once created by the Government, Kozlowski and other Ministers taking an active part in its work, while a central committee was formed at Warsaw to raise funds for the destitute and for reconstruction. An urgent appeal for private contributions was made in the names of Moscicki and Pilsudski. After the floods in Galicia had begun to subside, the Vistula continued to rise till Warsaw itself was threatened, but fortunately was not seriously inundated. During the floods the services of the Army were requisitioned and proved most useful. But the floods were a disaster that could not but bear heavily on the depressed economic situation of the country.

Though Poland had to curtail her expenditure on public works substantially, she found money for the further development of Gdynia, erecting, for instance, a large station-depôt in the harbour of the most up-to-date kind, the railway station for the town itself being nearly two miles from the sea front. The railway mileage of the harbour was also extended. The arrangements made for a more or less equal division of Poland's sea-borne trade with Danzig were carried out. The relations of Poland with the Free City were better than they had been for years, and on August 11 six agreements were signed by the two Governments providing for a restoration of the free exchange of goods between Danzig and Poland. As contemplated originally in the Treaty of Versailles, Danzig now became an integral part of the Customs régime of Poland; the Free City retained its Customs office, but promised to comply faithfully with the Polish regulations. These agreements appeared to give as much satisfaction to Germany as to Poland. President Hindenburg died

on August 2, and Hitler thereafter combined with the Chancellorship he already held the office of President, though he dropped the title and took that of Leader—*Fuehrer*. In the course of the campaign for the plebiscite endorsing this action by the German people, Hitler himself made several speeches in which he said that Germany asked only that her existing frontiers should be maintained, and he referred to the pact with Poland as proof of his peaceful intentions.

POLAND, FRANCE AND THE EASTERN PACT

Internationally the most important occurrence in September was probably the entry of Soviet Russia into the League of Nations, with a permanent seat in the Council. Poland did not object, but desired that the Soviet should sign a Minorities treaty, as Beck said at the meeting of the Council on September 8 which considered the admission of Russia. The Soviet replied that this matter could and should be settled by direct negotiations between it and Poland, in accordance with Articles of the Treaty of Riga by which it covenanted not to interfere with her internal affairs, and this Beck accepted. On the previous day Beck had a conversation with Barthou in which he fully stated the view of the Polish Government respecting the proposal for the Eastern Pact. Poland declined to accept it. Germany issued a statement on September 8 rejecting it because there was no real necessity for the proposed special guarantees of France and Russia, and in any case she preferred bilateral pacts, such as that with Poland. The publication of this led the French to make a strong appeal to Poland to join in the pact; if she refused the inference would be, said the *Temps*, that she was subordinating her policy to that of Germany. But Poland was not to be deflected from the stand she had taken, and on September 27 the Polish Government presented to the French Government a Memorandum on the subject:

After recalling the beneficial change in the Eastern European situation, formerly full of menace to peace, which had taken place during the last two years, the Memorandum stated that the Polish Government, conscious of its responsibility, had, in keeping with its means, contributed to the stabilization of that area, and in that way had served the general interest. Positive results, registered in diplomatic instruments, had been achieved

by the non-aggression pacts between the Soviet and Poland and the Baltic States, now extended to 1945; by the convention defining the aggressor signed in 1933 by the Soviet and eight neighbouring States; and by the Polish-German agreement of February 1934, new relations being established by direct contact.

It was undeniable that the situation in Eastern Europe had changed from one of trouble to one of appeasement and equilibrium, whose maintenance was in the general interest, and the Polish Government regarded this achievement as a satisfactory and sufficient base for political relations in Eastern Europe, but none the less was anxious, as Poland was the friend and ally of France, to meet the wishes of the French Government so far as these could be reconciled with the primordial necessity of preserving the improved situation. The relevant considerations were (1) France did not desire to leave out of the proposed pact any of the States directly interested, and with this Poland agreed, but Germany was left out, and her omission created an entirely new situation which completely modified the French project. And if Germany was included, Poland would ask, in order to maintain the progress already made, the inclusion in the pact of the Polish-German agreement of February 1934: (2) In the pact Poland could not assume obligations of guarantee for States not in normal relations with her (Lithuania): (3) The pact was supposed to cover North-East Europe, yet included Czechoslovakia, which belonged to the Danube area, and Poland could not agree to this till after a study of all the questions it raised for her. The addition of this State automatically raised the question of the relations of the other Danube States to the North-East group. By tradition Poland was favourable to all the Danube States, and she saw a great inconvenience in arbitrarily selecting one for inclusion in the pact.

The overriding consideration in the view of the Polish Government was that all measures must be taken for maintaining the state of security and equilibrium actually existing in North-East Europe, and representing what was essential progress as compared with the very recent past. Obtained after long bilateral negotiations, the present undeniably better situation must be preserved in face of the complexity and uncertain issue of multilateral negotiations. Attached to the maintenance of positive, though limited, results realized in Eastern Europe during the last two years, the Polish Government must confirm the attitude it has taken to the pact.

That attitude was now known well enough. French opinion took the line that the Polish and German Governments were acting in concert, and that the end of the Franco-Polish alliance was in sight. The Polish Press replied in kind, but it did not admit that the alliance was terminated; it stressed once more the position of Poland as an independent Power, and her right to a policy of her own.

POLISH MINORITIES TREATY DENOUNCED

On September 13 Poland gave another illustration of her belief that she was a Great State, and must be treated accordingly, when Beck in the Assembly gave the League notice that Poland would henceforth decline to co-operate with international organizations for the supervision of the carrying out by her of her Minorities Treaty. He said:

Pending the bringing into force of a general and universal system for the protection of Minorities, my Government finds itself compelled to refuse as from to-day, all co-operation with the international organizations in the matter of the supervision of the application by Poland of the system of Minority protection. I need hardly say that the decision of the Polish Government is in no sense directed against the interests of the Minorities. Those interests are and will remain protected by the fundamental laws of Poland, which secure to Minorities of language, race and religion their free development and equality of treatment.

Beck referred to the proposed debate on the protection of Minorities which was intended to take place later during the Assembly, and declared that it was his duty to make clear the position taken by his Government. He reminded the Assembly that for years Poland had pressed for a reform of the incoherent system that obtained, but as nothing had resulted she must take a course of her own. The speech produced a great sensation in the Assembly, some of its members considering that it was equivalent to a declaration of open rebellion against the League. The Warsaw Press described the speech as of historical importance inasmuch as it was a plain statement that it would no longer do to treat Poland as a second-rate Power. Next day Simon, for England, and Barthou, for France, maintained that Poland could not divest herself of a binding treaty by unilateral action; Aloisi, for Italy, concurred, but pointed out that regulations drawn up fifteen years before should be adapted to changing circumstances, and that there was a good deal of sympathy with the Polish Government in its objections to what it regarded as interference in its domestic affairs. Beck made no reply at the meeting, but let it be known that Poland did not intend to recede from the position she had taken up. In an interview with the Jewish National Agency Beck, after pointing out that the rights of the

National Minorities in Poland as defined in the National Minority treaties were embodied as integrally part of the Polish Constitution, said:

Poland cannot suffer any longer a state of affairs that places her under exceptional laws as compared with other European Great Powers. This was the sole reason for my declaration last Thursday (September 13). The counter-declarations made by Sir John Simon, M. Barthou, and the Italian Minister, Signor Aloisi, will not influence Poland in any way to change her attitude.

The *Gazeta Polska* stressed the Polish standpoint:

We can no longer accept the division made between ripe and unripe nations and countries, sovereign and non-sovereign States. We can no longer agree that Poland should be classed among the latter. In essence Poland is not against the Minority guarantees; in fact, we propose that others should accept them. We are ready to be a party to any Minority guarantees to which others will affix their signatures, but only when others have signed those guarantees. We have at heart a problem far more important than the Minority question, namely, the equal treatment of nations and States.

The whole Polish Press wrote in a similar strain, though the *Kuryer Warszawski*, while approving in principle Beck's declaration, suggested that the ground might have been better prepared for it at Geneva. There were hints in some papers that if the League insisted on holding Poland to the existing treaties without their generalization, Poland would be compelled to consider withdrawal from the League.

When, however, on September 21, the Polish resolution, which was presented by Raczyński, and of which notice had been given beforehand, that the Minority Treaties system should be made universal, was discussed in the Political Committee of the Assembly, it was apparent that the Committee as a whole was against it. Summing up, Raczyński said that the Polish Delegation, while impressed by the understanding of the Polish standpoint shown by many countries, saw that the Committee was not unanimous, and therefore it would not press the resolution. But Poland thought, he added, that she was in the right, and she would bring the matter before the League at some other time. In its comment on the position the *Gazeta Polska* said that the

withdrawal of the resolution strengthened, instead of weakened, the determination of the Polish Government to stand firmly by the declaration which had been made by its Foreign Minister.

One of the results of the Polish declaration was a political crisis in Rumania. Titulescu suddenly resigned his post as Rumanian Foreign Minister. He had disapproved of the resolution as he considered it as the thin end of the wedge of a possible revision of treaties, and he resigned when he discovered that he was not receiving the full support of his Government on the issue. But it was Titulescu who triumphed, and presently he was Rumanian Foreign Minister again. What may have been a result of the declaration as indicating another difference between Poland and France, but more probably was caused by France's alarm at what she regarded as the drift of Poland to Germany, was that Barthou became once more active in negotiations for the Eastern Pact. It was indubitably true that Poland and Germany were drawing closer together. On October 6 a series of conferences in which officials of the Press Sections of the Polish and German Foreign Ministries participated was concluded at Warsaw, their purpose having been largely attained—the promotion of the cultural *rapprochement* of the two States. An agreement was reached respecting the revision of school books whose text was no longer in keeping with the changed relations of the two countries to each other; both the Polish and German school histories were to be purged from propaganda. More than that: a preliminary trade agreement, on which trade organizations had been working for months in both countries, and which had been submitted to the two Governments and approved, was completed and initialed. Polish exports were to consist of butter, eggs, geese, and timber, while those of Germany were mainly to be machinery for Polish industries and agriculture.

PARLIAMENT RESUMES

October was shadowed for Poland as elsewhere by the assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia and of Barthou at Marseilles on the ninth of the month. The King was a stranger to the Poles and Barthou was not, but their deaths in such tragic circumstances

drew forth sympathetic messages from Warsaw, where naturally there was much speculation regarding the effect this terrible affair might have on French policy. Doumergue reconstituted his Government, and Laval became Foreign Minister; it was announced there would be no change in the policy of France, though a *rapprochement* with Germany was one of the rumours of the day. On October 19 Goemboes, the Hungarian Prime Minister, arrived in Warsaw as the guest of the Polish Government. The *Gazeta Polska* observed that Polish-Hungarian friendship might "render useful service to the cause of the new configurations of Central Europe," and said that while not directly interested in the affairs of the Danube valley, Poland had always endeavoured to co-operate in relieving tension there. But the majority of the Polish papers did not welcome the visit, which they thought came too close on the Marseilles murders; some journals feared that it might confirm the suspicion that Poland had joined the "German-Hungarian Block" after refusing to accept the Eastern Pact. Pilsudski saw Goemboes in the presence of Beck, and gave the Hungarian Premier to understand that while Poland cherished her age-old connexion with his country, she did not wish to enter into any new political commitments. Goemboes took home with him only a convention for "intellectual co-operation," and the prospect of closer economic relations between Poland and Hungary. France had regarded the visit with dislike, but could find nothing to criticize in its results, which some foreign observers suggested rather indicated that Poland was becoming more reserved in her attitude towards Germany.

A few days before the Parliament resumed Moscicki promulgated several important decrees connected with the struggle against the continuing economic crisis; for instance, the peasants, still heavily burdened with obligations they could not fulfil, were enabled to convert short-term debts into 4½ per cent fifty-year bonds, which their creditors were obliged to accept at par.

On the reassembling of the Parliament the Budget Estimates for 1935-36 were submitted to the Seym on October 31, the Revenue being put at 1,984 million zlotys and the Expenditure at 2,133 millions, with 149 millions deficit. At a meeting of the

Government and its supporting Block early in November Kozlowski maintained that the fight for the lowering of deficits—a form of the struggle against the economic crisis—was being pursued “steadily and obstinately” and with substantial success. The deficit on the 1933–34 year was 337 million zlotys and that on the current year, 1934–35, was probably more than a hundred millions less, while that of the next year, as shown in the Estimates, indicated another very considerable reduction. Kozlowski predicted that a balance would be achieved within a measurably short time; at present, he continued, a balanced Budget could be obtained only by cutting down the salaries of the Government employees or by a curtailment of national services, which meant an impairment both of the cultural level of the country and of its international position; and this the Government thought was unjustifiable. He concluded by saying that the Government adhered to the gold standard, and was determined on keeping the value of the zloty stable. It had been noted that the Estimates included 170 millions for public works—railways, roads, etc.—and for investments in the monopolies of the State so as to render them more profitable; if this sum was taken into account as expenditure on capital, and set against the deficit, it would be seen that the Budget rather more than balanced. But unfortunately the Revenue, it turned out, did not come up to expectations, as was clear as that year ran its course. Still, 1934 saw the bottom of the depression in Poland.

Foreign policy engrossed the Parliament early in the session, a lively attack being made in the Seym by the Opposition on that of the Government, and much was made of the alleged reticence of Beck in his position of Foreign Minister and of the visit of Goemboes. Poland's drift from France toward Germany was deplored, information was desired respecting the differences with Czechoslovakia, and Beck's declaration at Geneva in September regarding the Minority treaties was questioned, a Ukrainian deputy stating that the Ukrainian Minority would continue to bring its grievances before the League. The Socialists said they could not understand why relations with France had cooled and had become so cordial with Germany, and the spokes-

man of the Peasant Party declared that the alliance with France must remain the corner-stone of Polish policy, a statement which elicited applause from the Conservatives of the Government Block. Beck made no official reply at the moment, but it was impossible not to see that one of the reasons which weighed with Pilsudski was again in evidence—the instability of the French parliamentary system. Doumergue was forced to resign, and a new Government with Flandin as Prime Minister came into power, Laval continuing as Foreign Minister, on November 9. The good relations existing between Poland and Germany were emphasized on November 14 when, as the result of the elevation of the Polish Legation in Berlin to the rank of an Embassy, Lipski was received by Hitler and presented his credentials as Ambassador, Neurath being present at the ceremony. The speeches on both sides were marked by great cordiality.

Lipski spoke of the steady, friendly development of the relations of the two countries since the signing of their Ten-years Pact, and the benefits both drew from it. In his reply Hitler alluded to the special importance which had to be given to the Polish-German *rapprochement* in view of the numerous difficulties in the political situation of Europe, and he went on to say that the results hitherto achieved from the pact must strengthen "our determination to continue along the path taken to deepen co-operation more and more in the various spheres of our relations, and so found in mutual respect and understanding a lasting relationship as of friend and neighbour between Germany and Poland." The "difficulties in the political situation of Europe" were the questions of the Saar, Danzig, once more in a ferment over local elections, Memel, and the Yugoslav-Hungarian controversy that had arisen out of the murder of King Alexander; tension was still manifest all over the Continent. The speeches of Hitler and Lipski were given great prominence in the German Press as also in that of Poland, where they had a decided effect. Thus the Polish Association of the Defenders of the Western Frontier, with over half a million members all sworn to defend Poland against German aggression, resolved that, because of the pact, it should become merely a cultural and social organization, and it decided to remove

its headquarters from Poznan, where it had been situated for some fifteen years, to Warsaw, because it was farther from the frontier. Even more remarkable was a decision of the German Youth Party in Polish Upper Silesia to pass a resolution of loyalty to Poland which stated that the fate of the Germans of Poland was indissolubly connected with that of the State in which they lived; this resolution was passed amid cries of "Heil Pilsudski!" as well as "Heil Hitler!" As against all that, the Nationalist Press warned Poland not to be misled into interpreting a temporary peace into something eternal.

Laval, for France, replied on November 26 in a Note of some length to the confidential memorandum, presented to Barthou by Beck at Geneva on September 27, which stated the objections of Poland to the Eastern Pact. The Note was couched in the most friendly terms, and the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued immediately after its receipt a statement to the effect that the Polish Government would consider it in the same friendly spirit, in accordance with the alliance between France and Poland. But it was clear soon afterwards that, whatever were the concessions made to the Polish point of view by France, Poland stood by her policy of bilateral pacts and remained opposed to the Eastern Pact. At the same time, however, the Note did produce a less stiff attitude toward France in Warsaw, though among other things it did nothing to remove one of Poland's major objections to the pact—the possibility of Russian or German troops crossing Polish territory in the event of war between the Soviet and Germany. Though the existence of a military agreement between France and the Soviet was officially denied by Paris, a certain incredulity regarding this *démenti* prevailed in other quarters and made the Poles uneasy. In the Chamber, Laval, on November 30, said that France would enter into no bilateral pacts, but stood by the principle of collective security; on December 6, however, Laval and Litvinoff signed at Geneva an agreement that neither France nor the Soviet would have negotiations with other Powers which might prejudice the conclusion of the Eastern Pact—neither State, it was meant, would enter into negotiations with Germany without the knowledge of the other; the possible

implications did not escape the notice of the Polish Government or people. In the French Senate Laval said on December 18, that he had given a number of explanations to Poland regarding the pact which should leave no doubt in her mind that every consideration was accorded to her legitimate preoccupations. Laval read out the text of the agreement with the Soviet which, it was seen, provided for the close diplomatic collaboration of its signatories; a step towards a military alliance. The attitude of Poland to the Eastern Pact underwent no change.

Towards the end of the year Beck paid private visits to Denmark and Sweden, with whose statesmen he discussed the problems of the Baltic Sea. The Scandinavian group of States stood outside the Eastern Pact and their more direct interest was in the maintenance of the freedom of that sea, which was also a fundamental interest of Poland, and enough to bring them together. Doubtless the bearings of the Polish-German Ten-years Pact on that question were fully considered, and Beck was able to satisfy them that the pact signified no change in Poland's Baltic policy, which was identical with their own. A growing Swedish trade with Gdynia also facilitated good relations.

Poland's trade relations with England which had been affected by the bacon "quota" that had come into force in November 1932 were under review during 1934; negotiations between the two countries commenced in June of that year, and were continued, with intervals, to February 27, 1935, the result being an Anglo-Polish Commercial Treaty, in operation on March 14. A coal agreement was signed in December 1934. For 1934 Polish exports to the United Kingdom amounted to £7,438,308, and imports from the United Kingdom to £4,262,614, the balance in favour of Poland being £3,175,694. By opening more markets in Poland to British enterprise the general effect of the commercial treaty was an increase of British imports into Poland, her favourable balance being reduced in 1935 by about a million pounds. Poland's total imports in 1934 were valued at 797,824,000 zlotys and exports at 975,660,000 zlotys, leaving an "active" trade balance of 178 millions.

Political thought in Poland centred at the beginning of 1935 on the Eastern Pact and on Franco-Polish relations. Marshal Pilsudski had been rather seriously ill; his health was another subject of anxiety. On New Year's Day an article, signed by Miedzinski, one of the leaders of the Government Block, appeared in the *Gazeta Polska* pointing out that the Eastern Pact, in addition to checking the development of relations between Poland and the Soviet, had introduced a seriously discordant note in Franco-Polish relations, and he appealed for a better understanding between Poland and France. But he did not indicate a change in the Government's negative attitude to the pact. A few days before, an exchange of letters between the Polish and French sections of the Interallied Federation of Former Combatants ("Fidac") made clear the relations of Poland to France and Germany. Gorècki, the head of the Polish section, started the correspondence, because he found at the Fidac reunion in London some weeks previously much misapprehension among the French and other delegates respecting Polish policy. His main point was that while the Ten-years Pact with Germany had *normalized* Poland's relations with her, and secured economic benefits for both, it meant nothing beyond a correct and neighbourly attitude to Germany, and was not inimical to the Franco-Polish alliance, which was the foundation of Polish foreign policy. In January, however, France was interested far more in her relations with Italy than with Poland, Laval's visit to Rome and the treaty signed by him and Mussolini on January 7 being regarded as of overriding significance. After their years of conflicting policies the entente thus established between France and Italy was an important contribution to the peace of Europe, but unluckily the treaty contained in itself the seeds of trouble concerning Abyssinia, as events soon showed. What was manifest was that France and Italy had combined against Germany, and Poland duly noted the fact.

Of more immediate interest was the official visit to Warsaw early in January of Greiser, who had succeeded Rauschning

as President of the Danzig Government. On the whole, Rauschning had worked in well with the Poles; his successor was of a more pronounced Nazi type, but on this occasion he made a point of stating that it was his desire and that of his Government to maintain close co-operation with Warsaw. Pilsudski received him, as also did Moscicki, but both Kozlowski and Beck took advantage of the opportunity to remind him that many of the promises made by Danzig had not been fulfilled, and to suggest that his friendly speeches should be followed up by suitable actions. The truth, of course, was that the Danzig Government looked to Berlin rather than Warsaw, and as far as was possible in the circumstances fought against Polish interests, despite agreements and even the Ten-years Pact. Greiser, however, protested that the Free City was loyal to its engagements—a protest which met with scepticism on the part of the Polish Press.

Irredentist activity in Memel and Memelland was no new thing, but by 1935 Nazi influence had so penetrated the entire territory that the Lithuanian Government was seriously alarmed that Hitler would intervene, the pretext being the trial in Kovno of 126 Memellanders, Germans or of German origin, accused of high treason. The trial began in mid-December 1934, and as it was believed throughout Germany that many of the prisoners had been starved and tortured into giving false evidence, the case was taken up and followed with rising excitement by the German Press. In January 1935 England advised moderation in Kovno and Berlin, but with little effect. Nazi forces in East Prussia were reported to await the signal from Berlin to invade Memel. It was intimated once more, however, that Pilsudski would stand by Lithuania, and again there was a prospect of better relations between her and Poland.

SENATE VOTES NEW CONSTITUTION

When the Parliament resumed in January both Houses were occupied with Polish domestic affairs, the Seym with discussions of the Budget and incidentally with the economic crisis, and the Senate with debates on the Bill creating the new Constitution

which had been sent up by the Seym nearly a year before. As the Government had more than a two-thirds majority in the Upper House, the passing of the Bill was assured, and on January 18 the Senate adopted it, with some modifications, by 74 votes to 24. The two most important of these amendments were concerned with the powers to be given to the President and with the composition of the Senate itself. As the measure was passed by the Seym the President had the right to issue decrees, which, however, had to be countersigned by the Prime Minister and the head of the Department of State concerned, but the Senate's amendment authorized the President to issue decrees independently, with full force of law. The Senate thus increased the power of the President in the way Pilsudski desired. As regarded its composition the Senate rejected the proposal restricting membership in the first Senate to the "Elite" made up of men possessing military decorations, and it dissented from the proposal that its members should be chosen by a species of electoral college drawn from certain privileged groups. The Senate's provisions in these respects were that one-third of the number of Senators were to be appointed by the President and the remaining two-thirds elected according to a separate law which was to regulate elections to the Senate, establish the number of Senators, the method of nomination, and indicate the classes of persons who had the right to elect and to be elected. In the Bill sent up by the Seym the number of Senators was put at 120, but the Senate decided not to specify a figure. After being passed, as amended, the Bill was sent back to the Seym. Comment in the Polish Press followed party lines, those papers supporting the Bill being upholders of or in sympathy with the Government Block, and those against it being the various organs of the Opposition, but there was nothing fresh in the views or arguments set forth by either side—they were the same as were expressed months and months before. The bulk of the population, realizing that the new Constitution was a foregone conclusion, was passive rather than apathetic or indifferent.

Some modification of the status of Upper Silesia was contemplated by the Government. Since 1922 that section of the country

had its own small Seym of 48 deputies at Katowice, and enjoyed a considerable measure of autonomy.

POLAND AND THE LEAGUE

With the question of the Saar settled and safely out of the way, interest in the international situation, which was slightly less tense, centred in the meeting in mid-January of the League Council at Geneva. The Italo-Abyssinian dispute was just beginning to look serious, but Poland was not concerned with it. What did concern her directly at this particular Council was a Minorities question which gave her the opportunity of emphasizing her attitude towards Minorities taken up in September 1934, when she announced that she would disregard her own Minorities Treaty unless and until obligations similar to those it imposed were universalized. On January 18 Komarnicki, her resident representative at Geneva, withdrew from a public session of the Council when a Minority petition came up for consideration, and returned only after discussion of it ceased. Later, he abstained from voting on the Council's decision to ask the Hague Court for an advisory opinion on another Minority matter. These actions of his were plain intimations to the League that Poland had not changed her decision respecting Minorities. But for Poland quite as, or even more, important were the discussions that went on in the background of this meeting of the Council on the Eastern Pact and on the Franco-Soviet understanding. The British Government had arrived at the conclusion that with the Saar difficulty overcome the time was propitious for another move for disarmament and the pacification of Europe, and it had been arranged that Flandin and Laval should visit London shortly with a view to negotiations with Germany. Laval was at this meeting of the Council at Geneva—and so were Beck and Litvinoff, and they were in frequent contact. Laval tried very hard to get Beck to accept the Eastern Pact, but failing in this he turned to Litvinoff, who, supported by the Little Entente and Turkey, pressed him to come to an agreement with the Soviet. Beck said he would refer Laval's arguments for the pact to his Government or, in other words, to Pilsudski. On January 19,

Laval told Beck that Poland must make up her mind one way or the other without further delay, and that if she persisted in rejecting the pact he would formulate a pact without her, but with the Soviet and Czechoslovakia, in unison with France, as its subscribers. And on January 21 the French Ambassador at Warsaw presented a Note to that effect to the Polish Government, and asked for a prompt reply.

During the meeting of the Council there were signs that the attitude of Hitler to the general situation had hardened. His tremendous success in the Saar as seen in the plebiscite intoxicated some of his most prominent followers into proclaiming again the pan-German expansionist programme, with its threat to Danzig, the "Corridor," Polish Silesia and so forth. At the Council Lester, the League's High Commissioner for the Free City, said that owing to the excessive Nazism of Danzig he was seriously apprehensive of developments which would be fatal to its international status. Polish interests were protected, however, by the Ten-years Pact with Hitler, who so far had been absolutely loyal to it. Memel was a more anxious question, for Lithuania was involved, and a fresh wave of angry and aggressive agitation was storming through the entire German Press. Memel looked like replacing the Saar in the list of immediate Nazi objectives. Germany scarcely seemed in the mood to consider disarmament—which was one of the aims of the Flandin-Laval visit to London.

GOERING IN WARSAW

On January 26 the German Press celebrated with effusion the first anniversary of the Polish-German Ten-years Pact. Hitler seized the opportunity to grant an interview to the Berlin correspondent of the *Gazeta Polska*, which that paper reproduced with a flourish. After stating that the racial teaching of Nazism rejected the denationalizing of foreign peoples living on Germany's frontiers, Hitler said, in the interview, that he would not repeat the mistakes made in past centuries, and the reconstitution of the relations between the German and the Polish peoples was an instance of his point of view. Success had been achieved in correcting the erroneous idea that an enmity had always existed between

the two peoples like a sort of hereditary burden, and must continue for ever. Beck, in a statement published in the *Volksischer Boebachter*, said that January 26, 1934, was a turning-point in the shaping of neighbourly relations between Poland and the German Reich, and that since then their relations were based on mutual understanding and respect for each other's achievements.

Virtually simultaneous with those utterances was the visit to Poland of General Goering, ostensibly as a guest at a hunting party given by Moscicki, the scene being the Bialowieza forest, the largest forest in the country and famous for game. It was easy to conclude that the occasion served for intimate political conversations. Goering, accompanied by Lipski, arrived at Warsaw on January 27, and later he motored to the forest, where he joined the President. Goering returned to Warsaw on January 31, and had an hour's talk with Pilsudski. In the Polish Press comment was divided on the purpose of the visit, the Opposition papers stressing the continued importance of the Franco-Polish alliance despite the Ten-years Pact with Germany. In the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Seym on February 1, Beck offered a general exposition of Polish foreign policy which attracted great attention, coming when it did, both at home and abroad. Referring to the pact with Germany, he spoke of the "great good-will the German Government was manifesting towards Poland." He reproached the Western Powers, chiefly France, for signing the Locarno Treaties, because they had ignored the vital interests of Poland by differentiating between the eastern and western frontiers of Germany, no guarantee being provided for the eastern side; this was one reason why Poland must have regard to co-operation with her neighbour. He welcomed the Franco-Italian pact concluded at Rome as making for peace—Poland's interest in the Danube valley, he said, was economic rather than political. He spoke in friendly terms of the Soviet, Rumania, Hungary and the Baltic States, but made no allusion to Czechoslovakia, with whom relations remained unpleasant over Teschen, and to Lithuania—it had been rumoured in Warsaw that Pilsudski had again dissented from the German standpoint respecting

Memel when talking with Goering. In the course of his speech Beck said that the pact with Germany did not affect in any way Poland's alliances. He rebuked those who were dissatisfied with the Government's foreign policy, and added that "Whether our policy is liked abroad or not, it is our own Polish policy."

From the visit to London of Flandin and Laval there issued an Anglo-French Agreement, which was explained and commented on in the London Declaration of February 3; among other things it stated that the "general settlement" contemplated as the corollary of the lightening of the restriction of German armaments would make provision for the organization of security in Europe, particularly by pacts freely negotiated between all the interested parties and assuring mutual assistance in Eastern Europe. But *The Times* was right when it wrote in an editorial of February 6 that there were many knotty points which had to be disentangled before Europe could reach the "general settlement"—and it instanced the fact that Poland was known to be averse from the Eastern Pact and preferred, like Germany, separate bilateral pacts of non-aggression. Poland, like Germany, continued her opposition to that pact. Negotiations went on between London, Paris and Berlin for a time, and some progress was made, but eventually they were held up in March.

PARLIAMENT AND BUDGET

After considerable debate in the Seym and Senate the Budget for 1935-36, as revised, was voted on February 14, with the Revenue put at 2,016 million zlotys and the Expenditure at 2,168 millions, the deficit being 152 millions or three millions more than the original estimate. But in March 1936 it was seen Revenue fell short of expectations by 60 millions, and Expenditure was larger, the deficit being nearly 250 millions. Later in the year the actual Revenue and Expenditure for 1934-35 were published at 2,115 million zlotys and 2,176 million zlotys, respectively, with a deficit of 61 millions, but included in the receipts was the sum of 175 millions from the National Loan of 1933; the shortage was covered by Treasury Bills. It was pointed out by Gorecki in his *Poland and her Economic Develop-*

ment that the reduction of expenditure during the financial year—the Budget year 1934–35—as compared with the year 1929–30 amounted to no less than 27 per cent. The struggle against the economic crisis was being maintained, and it was at least encouraging that the actual Revenue and Expenditure were much nearer the Estimates than was the case for the year before. In a speech in the Senate on February 27 Kozlowski dealt with the financial and economic situation of the country, and said the Government had determined to float an Investment (Public Works) Loan, starting with an issue of fifty million zlotys for building roads, and presently a second issue to the same amount for waterways, to be used mainly in the southern part of Poland which had suffered so disastrously from floods in 1934. An index to the depression which the Poles still endured was to be found in a statement that arrears of taxation, much probably irrecoverable, came to 1,300 million zlotys. As a rule the Parliament closed after the passing of the Estimates, but this session was prolonged as the New Constitution Bill had not yet become an Act. Before that came about the Parliament voted special powers to the President to issue decrees having the force of law during the next parliamentary recess.

NEW CONSTITUTION ACT

On Saturday, March 23, 1935—a great day in the history of New Poland—the New Constitution measure, as amended by the Senate, was definitively passed by the Seym by 260 votes to 139, and awaited only the signature of the President to become an Act in operation. The Seym was crowded on the occasion, many diplomats and foreign journalists being amongst those present. Car, the chief artisan of the New Constitution and its protagonist in the Parliament, opened the proceedings by recalling the work done in this connexion for some years, and said that the task was at length accomplished:

“We have fixed,” he said, “the future forms of our State. Our Club (the Government Block) undertook this task with great self-communing. We have consecrated to it all our efforts and our knowledge, nor would we allow ourselves to be turned aside from the road marked out by

Marshal Joseph Pilsudski, the founder of the Polish State and the great builder of Poland."

Car was followed by Slawek, who said that in the New Constitution solutions had been found in conformity with the Polish spirit. Regard had been had to the teaching of the past, with its anarchy and the partitions, but also with its good features. The Constitution of May 3, 1791, came too late to arrest the decline and fall of old Poland, but its basis was sound in that it placed reliance on purely Polish forces, not on foreign. Then he spoke of the failure of the Constitution of 1921, with its limitation of the Executive and the perpetual conflicts of party which enfeebled the State, and prevented real progress. He described Pilsudski's intervention in 1926, and the formation of the Government Block, which placed the good of the State above any other consideration. In 1931 the Block, then headed by Janus Jedrzejewicz, had invited all parties and citizens to assist in examining the proposals for the reform of the Constitution which had been put before the Parliament in the preceding year, but there was no response. The Block had to do all the work itself. The result was the New Constitution, which, Slawek concluded, was what was necessary for Poland in accordance with the Block's best power of choice. Criticisms were made by the Nationalists, Populists, and Socialists. The announcement of the large majority for the Bill was received with tremendous applause by the Block; its labour for five years was at last crowned with success. The Parliament was dissolved on March 28.

In his Preface to the English version of the New Constitution (see Appendix) Car said that when considering the reform of that of 1921 Polish jurists saw two comparatively easy ways in which it could be achieved: the first, to maintain the parliamentary system within its fundamental limits, merely endeavouring to remove its most glaring faults; the second, to follow the model of the totalitarian State. Poland chose neither, but decided to revert to her old State and national traditions of liberty, adapting them to modern needs and reconciling them with the spirit of the present age. Her past historical experiences, however, taught a political realism that obliged her not to forget that only a strong

and authoritative State régime could assure the nation a free untrammelled existence and the State an independent position among other States. "This is the basic thought from which the new structure of Poland issued as the synthesis between the individual liberty of man and the dignity of the authority of the State; it is fully in accordance with the principle of 'a free citizen of a strong State.'" Car noted (1) that the President of Poland was vested, as Chief of the State, with actual prerogatives, and not the "decorative semblance of authority," his rôle being that of supreme arbiter in reconciling the activities of the highest organs of the country, especially those of the Government and the Parliament; (2) that the Government was made far more stable, and therefore in a position to conduct independent activities, as it could no longer be overthrown by "light-minded" opposition; (3) that the Parliament remained important as an organ of the State in legislation and in exercising control of the Government by resolutions of non-confidence; (4) that the Seym continued to be elected on the broad democratic basis of universal, secret, equal, and direct suffrage; and (5) that the Senate was no longer based on universal suffrage, but on the principle that "the rights of a citizen to influence public affairs will be estimated according to the value of his efforts and services for the common good"; and thus the Senate was to be a body of men representing those citizens who had distinguished themselves in work for the community, had shown personal merit by having been decorated, were of a higher education as proved by diplomas, or enjoyed the confidence of their fellow-citizens by being elected to positions on territorial or economic councils. Car summed up:

Amid all the uncrystallized ideas which are so typical of the present epoch, the new Polish Constitution appears as an attempt to solve the complicated problems of State structure by a method, not based on compulsion, but on the conscious collaboration of the citizens of the country in accordance with the classical principle, *Salus reipublicae, suprema lex.*

THIRD SLAWEK CABINET

Immediately after the dissolution of the Parliament the Kozlowski Government resigned, but with Slawek as Prime Minister instead

of Kozlowski it was reconstituted on March 29. No reason was published for the change in the Premiership, but it became known afterwards that the gravity of Pilsudski's illness was the cause; Slawek was the Marshal's closest friend and himself a strong man. The Slawek Government immediately proceeded with the flotation of the Investment Loan, and subscriptions to the amount of 261 million zlotys were received within the next few weeks. A good deal of this money, which was spent on public works, provided employment for many workless people, and tended to relieve the economic situation of the country, still unfortunately greatly strained.

GREAT INTERNATIONAL CRISIS

March 1935 was a month of high international tension chiefly because of the revelation of Hitler's huge rearment programme for Germany. Consequent on the London Declaration of February 3 it had been supposed that some move towards disarmament could be started and an effort was, in fact, made to resuscitate the Disarmament Conference. None the less, the conviction was fairly general that Germany had rearmed to a very considerable extent. On March 4, the British Government published a White Paper which at once aroused tremendous interest all over Europe, because it indicated that England, having disarmed "to the edge of risk" without seeing other States disarm, but on the contrary rearm, had decided to rearm. This big change in policy was attributed to German rearment, but for some weeks before the appearance of the White Paper pourparlers had been proceeding between the British and German Governments concerning an official visit Simon, the British Foreign Secretary, was to pay to Berlin. Hitler's immediate reaction to the White Paper was to put Simon off on the plea of a bad throat—a diplomatic illness which excited derision in certain quarters. But on March 16 Hitler, recovered, proclaimed to the world that Germany would at once restore compulsory conscription and raise the strength of her Army on a peace footing to 36 Divisions—upwards of half a million men. In a long statement he charged the former Allies in the War with being really respon-

sible for this violation of the disarmament clauses of the Versailles Treaty, spoke of French rearmament, and referred to the Soviet's Army of nearly a million men. Henceforth, he said, the honour and security of the Reich would again be entrusted to the power of the German nation itself. Hitler's pronouncement made even a greater sensation than the British White Paper, and most of Europe was thrown into a fever of contagious excitement; the Soviet, the Baltic States, and Poland were disturbed. In Warsaw the Government took the new developments calmly, but it was reported that Pilsudski had sent for the German Ambassador to ask for explanations. The official Press preserved a moderate tone; not so the Opposition papers; the *A.B.C.* actually declared that if Europe was as united as it ought to be, an ultimatum to Germany and military occupation of Berlin would be the proper reply to Hitler's open breaches of the Versailles Treaty; another paper wondered whether the Ten-years Pact had now become a mere scrap of paper, and spoke of the need of closer co-operation with France.

Simon and Eden, as already agreed with Hitler, visited Berlin, and on March 25 began with him an "exploratory" discussion of the situation. The conversation, in which Neurath participated, was spread over two days; the British statesmen returned to London on March 27 in a pessimistic mood, which further increased apprehension in Europe, though no alarming *communiqué* was published. It was understood that Hitler definitely would not consent to the Eastern Pact, and, less definitely, that he had put forward positive, sweeping demands affecting the *status quo*. The German Press, however, said that Hitler had been "moderate," and later it was asserted that his demands were not so excessive as had been supposed. It had been arranged previously that Moscow was to be included in the itinerary of the British Ministers, and the Polish Government had suggested that they might also visit Warsaw.

EDEN IN WARSAW

Simon remained in London, but Eden went on to Moscow, where on March 29 he conferred with Stalin; on April 1 he arrived in

Warsaw; two or three days afterwards he was in Prague. As both the Soviet and Czechoslovakia were committed to the Eastern Pact, and Poland was not, the atmosphere of Warsaw politically differed from that of Moscow and Prague, but nevertheless Eden was given a most cordial reception. He was welcomed at the railway station by Beck on his arrival in the evening. Next morning Eden had a long conversation with Beck, informing him first of the results of the Berlin and Moscow talks, and then discussing with him the position respecting the pact. Having lunched with Moscicki, Eden had tea with Pilsudski, Beck, Szembek, Strang of the British Foreign Office, and Aveling, First Secretary of the British Embassy at Warsaw, being present. The conversation with the Marshal lasted for nearly two hours, and part of it was reminiscent of the War, as Eden had fought in it, while another part was also reminiscent, though in a discursive fashion, but when it came to high politics the attitude of Poland to the pact was seen not to have changed—she would not enter into it, at any rate “in its present form.” Pilsudski made it clear that his policy was one of peace, and that he felt that policy best served by the non-aggression pacts with the Soviet and Germany. The Marshal expressed himself with his usual lucidity, but Eden and the other strangers present could not help noticing how extremely ill he looked—his appearance was that of a dying man. Great care was taken that no hint of this should reach the public in Poland or abroad.

In the evening, Eden was entertained at dinner by Beck, who, in toasting his guest, remarked that in looking over some historical documents concerning the relations of England and Poland he had come across a letter dated March 3, 1568, from King Sigismund Augustus of Poland to Queen Elizabeth of England in which he assured her that in all ports under his jurisdiction her subjects would be on an equal footing with his own: a “proof that friendship between the two countries does not date from to-day,” was the comment of the Polish Foreign Minister, who went on to say that the Polish Government watched with great interest the endeavours of the British Government to find the best means of improving international relations. He hoped that Eden would

carry away impressions and observations which would facilitate those efforts to a practical conclusion, and that the "sense of reality and objectivity which was a tradition of British diplomacy, and the frank and detailed character of the exchange of views which had begun that morning would have some influence on the attainment of that aim." In reply Eden expressed his belief that the exploratory conversations which had been undertaken were of real value in clarifying the European situation, and that this "especially happy occasion" would serve a useful purpose in promoting a closer understanding between their countries. The official *communiqué* stated that the two Ministers agreed that their exchange of views, which were of an informative character, corresponded with the object at which they aimed, and showed the need for the maintenance of a close contact in following the development of the European political situation. Eden left for Prague in the afternoon of April 3. On the previous day it was announced in Warsaw that the Polish Government had invited Laval to stay in that city when on his way to Moscow on an official visit to the Soviet Government that was expected to take place shortly. The French Press, referring to Eden's visit to Warsaw, which they regarded as a failure, looked forward to Laval's visit to bring about some alteration in the attitude of Poland to the pact. In Warsaw itself it was held that the Eden-Beck conversations were not entirely negative, as the questions of Danzig and Memel were gone into, and the Polish point of view in the case of both was placed before the British Minister. The approaching Conference of Stresa, to be held on April 11, must also have figured in the talks, but Memel was again an urgent matter, and the Danzig Elections were near.

MEMEL TREASON TRIAL

German nationalistic feeling in the Baltic region was profoundly excited by Hitler's conscription manifesto of March 16 and his raising the strength of the German Army. Particularly was this true of Memel and Memelland and the controversy with Lithuania associated with that territory, to which the trial of 126 persons accused of high treason gave sharp emphasis. On March 13,

England, France and Italy were moved by the acuity of the situation to remind Lithuania that they were responsible for the fulfilment by her of the Memel Statute, and did not intend to neglect their duty. In Germany a demand arose for a plebiscite, somewhat on the analogy of the Saar, in Memel; a "Memel Song" took the place of the "Saar Song" after the "Hort Wessel Lied" in Nazi gatherings. The trial of the Memellanders, which had begun in December 1934, concluded on March 26, 1935, with the conviction of 95 of the accused; four were sentenced to death for the murder of a Memellander whom they suspected of betraying them to the Lithuanian Government as plotting to seize Memel, and the others to penal servitude for 12 years downwards. All Germany at once was fired with furious indignation, though Hitler himself was silent—not so the Press he controlled, and Lithuania was threatened with dire punishment. On April 1 Simon stated in the House of Commons that England, France and Italy told Lithuania that her attitude towards Memel was incompatible with the Statute, and that she must abide by it. This, too, was the view of the Polish Government, and Lithuania became very reserved once more towards Poland; she showed open hostility by making mass arrests among the Polish Minority on April 4, and enforcing restrictions on papers printed in Polish by that Minority; the efforts for better relations between Poland and Lithuania came to a standstill, nor was a conference held by Beck with the Lithuanian Minister to France in Geneva during the April meeting of the League attended with success.

DANZIG ELECTIONS

Great excitement marked the elections in the Free City for a new Volkstag—Danzig's popular House—on April 7. After the dissolution of the former Volkstag on February 21, a keen campaign was conducted by the Nazis, already omnipotent in the Senate—Danzig's Upper House—with the view to obtain a two-thirds majority which would enable them to demand that the Constitution of the Free City should conform to their wishes. Poland was of course vitally interested, and during the campaign

was much disturbed by various unpleasant incidents, of which her nationals were the victims. Papée, the Polish Commissary-General, lodged sharp protests with the Senate and spoke of carrying them to the League, if not satisfied; he demanded compensation for the persons injured and the damage done to property. The campaign reached its height on the evening of April 6 when Goebbels, who had come from Berlin, addressed an enormous meeting of Nazis in the market. Having described Hitler's power in Germany, Goebbels said that as a result of the Ten-years Pact with Poland there was now no question of frontier revision by force, but Danzig was German and would remain German. He referred with passionate contempt to an open letter written by Rauschning, the first Nazi head of the Danzig Government, whose resignation had been announced some time before; in it Rauschning declared he could not vote for the Nazi ticket, which was a dangerous menace to Danzig; the Nazis had tried to get hold of him, but he made good his escape before the elections. As his own policy had been one of collaboration with the Poles, Goebbels' attack on him was an indirect blow at Poland, who was otherwise left in no uncertainty about the Nazi attitude towards her, for some of the speakers from Berlin were openly hostile. Thus Julius Streicher loudly boasted that the "hour of Danzig's deliverance" would soon arrive. On the other hand, Lechnicki, of the Ministry of Finance, came from Warsaw to assure the Danzig Poles that "so long as the Vistula flowed into the Baltic nothing would change at the mouth of that great river." Despite their intense propaganda, the Nazis did not obtain the desired majority, for which 48 seats were necessary; they had 43, a gain of five over the previous elections, and the other parties, taken together, had 29. It was a rebuff for the Nazis and caused disappointment in Germany. Reviewing the contest and its incidents, the Polish Opposition Press stated that the worthlessness of the Ten-years Pact had been manifested, and even the Government papers admitted that the Nazi campaign had not contributed to an improvement in the relations of Danzig and Poland. There were anti-German demonstrations in the "Corridor," particularly near Gdynia, and throughout April

tension was marked once more on the frontier, but the Polish Government preserved its calm, and its protests to the German Government did not fail to get satisfaction. With the Stresa Conference and the League Council meeting looming ahead Germany had no wish to offend Poland.

STRESA CONFERENCE 1935, AND AFTER

The result of the Stresa Conference, which lasted from April 11 to April 14, was a solemn reaffirmation by England and Italy of their obligations as guarantors of the Locarno Treaty and of their determination to oppose by all practicable means the unilateral repudiation of treaties. With France, these Powers stated their agreement on the desirability of proceeding with negotiations for the Eastern Pact, and on a common line of action at Geneva. Thus was formed by England, France and Italy what came to be called the Stresa Front. The Council of the League, in a special meeting called at the instance of France to indict Germany, opened on April 16 in a public session, after various attempts on the previous day to get unanimity among the delegates had made insufficient progress. Efforts in private to modify the terms of the French resolution were without avail. After Laval had proposed the resolution condemning Germany, and Simon and Aloisi had signified their support, Beck delivered a forcible speech, which gave no sign of how Poland would vote. He said that France had brought forward three different questions: German rearmament, the extension of obligations under the Covenant, and the strengthening of security by additional international agreements. Poland had no remarks to offer on the first problem, as it had been the subject of negotiations, outside the Disarmament Conference, in which she had no part. With respect to the second, the fact was that the authority of the League had been weakened by recent events, and he doubted whether it would be strengthened by drafting new paragraphs. In regard to the third, he had to say that Poland had not troubled the League much about her security. In Eastern Europe the situation had been improved by the conclusion of non-aggression pacts covering Poland,

he Baltic States, and Russia, as well as by the amelioration of Polish-German relations. Opinion in Poland was surprised that the question of Eastern security was again raised, and endeavours in that way might prejudice a state of peace and weaken the neighbourly relations of Poland either west or east. She was thus averse from discussing new schemes, unless convinced that they would not harm her interests or those of Eastern Europe. In sum, Beck's statement deprecated the new "accords" which had been suggested as they might be of a nature to prejudice the state of peace already established. But when the vote was taken next day only Denmark abstained, and the decision was unanimous, Poland voting against Germany with the other 12 delegates; Germany was absent. After the League Council's vote a committee representing 13 States—England, Canada, France, Russia, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Chile, Turkey, Poland, Holland, Yugoslavia and Hungary—was set up to devise economic and financial measures to be applied to any nation which in future repudiated its international obligations. The effect on Germany of the vote was one of angry exasperation. Her Press spoke of the arrogance of the League Council in presuming to make itself the "judge of Germany." On April 20 came Hitler's own response of defiance; he saw in the decision of the Council an attempt at a new special treatment for the Reich, and "consequently rejected it most resolutely." On the same day reports appeared in some French and Russian papers of the existence of a secret treaty, said to have been signed on February 2, 1934, between Poland and Germany, the gist of which was the pooling of their military, economic and financial resources, to repulse all unprovoked aggression and to support each other should one be attacked. But messages from both Warsaw and Berlin immediately denied there was such a treaty; even in Paris the story was disbelief. The Polish Government, as well as the German Government, had always said there was no secret treaty between them at all; the reports were another illustration of tendentious propaganda. From Geneva Beck went for a short holiday to Venice, where he had a friendly talk with Suvich, the Italian Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

FINAL STAGE NEW CONSTITUTION

President Moscicki signed the New Constitution on April 23, its promulgation appearing simultaneously in the official gazette exactly a month after it was voted by the Parliament. The ceremony of the signature of the Act by Moscicki was rendered singularly impressive by its taking place in the presence of all the members of the Government, with the exception of Pilsudski and of Beck who was still abroad, the Speakers of the Seym and Senate, and other personages. A salute of 101 guns from a battery on the Vistula proclaimed the great event to an enormous crowd outside the Zamek, which was suddenly illuminated amid immense cheering; the National Hymn was sung, and then followed the deathless song of Pilsudski's legions, "The First Brigade." After the signature Moscicki gave a dinner to the members of the Government and all those who had taken an active part in elaborating the New Constitution; next came a reception attended by 2,000 notabilities of the country. But a series of Acts governing elections to the Seym and Senate had still to be passed before the New Constitution came into operation, and for these a special meeting of the Parliament was necessary. On May 7 Slawek outlined these Acts: proportional representation was to be abolished; for the Seym the country was to be divided into 100 constituencies, each electing two deputies—200 members, against 444 formerly; the Senate was to have 96 members, against 111 formerly, the President to appoint one-third and the remaining two-thirds to be elected in a special manner, as had already been indicated during the debates on the Bill.

LAVAL IN WARSAW

France and the Soviet signed their Pact of Mutual Assistance on May 2 at Paris, and its terms were said to be formulated within the "framework of the Covenant." It was validated for five years; its provisions included consultation in the event of a threat of aggression, immediate assistance against unprovoked aggression, particularly by a State breaking thereby its pledges under the Covenant, and a bar to any interpretation of it as limiting the duties of the League or the obligations of its members. More vital was the protocol attached to the pact, for it postulated

that the obligation of mutual assistance would remain even if the League Council failed to recommend it; this was something new in treaty-making since the Great War and highly important. The Berlin Press immediately attacked the pact and its protocol, which was described as nothing but a military alliance directed against Germany; the organ of the German Foreign Office said the treaty was in essential contradiction to the true nature of collective security and utterly undermined the ideals of the Covenant.

It was about this time that the Warsaw correspondent of *The Times* suggested that Polish policy was looking more to England than to France or the Soviet to determine the attitude which the rest of Europe should adopt toward Germany, but that as Poland was anxious not to give offence to France, Germany or the Soviet her Government Press had refrained from discussing the Franco-Soviet pact. It was noteworthy, too, that the Baltic States in conference at Kovno in the first week in May were reported to be in accord with the views of the British Government about East European security—collective security covering Germany and Poland as part of the “general settlement” outlined in the Declaration of February 3.

Laval's visit to Warsaw—a break in his journey to Moscow—was set for May 10, but before he left Paris he was informed officially that Pilsudski was too ill to receive him. Part of the French Press instantly jumped to the conclusion that the Marshal's indisposition was diplomatic and advised against Laval's visit being undertaken as likely to be useless. Several Warsaw papers reproached France for concluding the treaty with the Soviet. They said that France and Russia had no common frontier, and that this alone made the pact meaningless and would cause uneasiness in Poland, who could not allow Soviet forces going to the aid of France to cross her territory or even that of the neighbouring Baltic States. However, when Laval arrived in Warsaw on May 10 he was most cordially greeted at the station by Beck—a contrast to the visit of Barthou in the previous year when Beck did not receive him at the station, because Barthou had not received Beck at the station in Paris when the latter officially visited France in 1933. What the Polish Government

expected to hear from Laval was made plain by the *Gazeta Polska* when, commenting on his presence in Warsaw, it said: "We must ask M. Laval to explain to us what are the political intentions and implications of the new pact France signed with Russia on May 2." It was suspected that Laval would sign a secret military treaty in Moscow with the Soviet.

In the evening of May 10 Beck gave a dinner in honour of Laval after they had had an hour's political talk, and the dinner was followed by a great reception, which was attended by Slawek and other prominent Poles, as well as by members of the French colony. Next morning Laval called on Slawek and later on the President, who kept him to lunch; he had also another talk with Beck; Pilsudski sent an apology—his doctors had forbidden him to see anyone. Later in the evening Laval and Beck met and conferred at the French Embassy. An official *communiqué* said their conversation was marked by mutual confidence and sincere understanding; both Ministers had ascertained that their common efforts were directed to the maintenance of peace and security in Europe by the organization of an extensive international collaboration affording all nations the opportunity to participate; the "close solidarity" of the Franco-Polish alliance was at the service of the will to peace. This solidarity was reaffirmed in speeches broadcast by the two Ministers. Laval had declared to Beck that the Franco-Soviet pact was in all respects in conformity with the alliance and with the various pacts Poland had made with her neighbours, and that there was no secret treaty behind it. As regards a multilateral Eastern Pact Beck promised to study that question afresh, but he expressly excepted Lithuania from such a pact, a last Polish effort at reconciliation with that State having just been thwarted by Soviet intrigues. In Paris Laval's visit was considered only a moderate success, but on the whole the Poles were pleased with it; an event, however, supervened suddenly which completely absorbed their minds.

Twelve hours after Laval left Warsaw for Moscow Marshal Pilsudski died, May 12, 1935—by a singular coincidence the anniversary—the ninth—of the *coup d'état* which brought him to power.

CHAPTER XIII
POLAND AFTER PILSUDSKI
1935-1936 (July)

1

MARSHAL PILSUDSKI passed away at the Belvedere on the evening of Sunday, May 12, at a quarter to nine o'clock. Madame Pilsudska and their daughters, Wanda and Jagoda, their only children, stood by his bedside, and his last conscious act was to raise his hand to bless them. He had received the sacraments, and was at peace, after a wonderful life, crowned with success long before its close, but with more than a full measure of storm and strain throughout most of it. He was 67 years of age, and nearly forty of these years had been marked by incessant stresses of body and mind, with all their powers devoted to the recovery of the independence of Poland, and, that aim attained, to the revival and consolidation of her greatness as a State. To the vast majority of the Polish people the news of his death came as a sudden and terrible shock; it was known that he was ill, but only his family, intimate friends, close political associates, some of the chiefs of the Army and a few others were aware that he was dying. It was cancer that carried him off, and he had been suffering from it for months before the end. For some time he refused to seek medical advice and treatment; when Professor Wenckenbach, of Vienna, was called into consultation by the Polish Army doctors in whose hands the Marshal had placed himself in April there was little or nothing that could be done for him. But the public was not informed; the only intimation it was given of the seriousness of his illness was the statement which appeared in the papers on May 9 that he would be unable to receive Laval, but it had not supposed that his death was near, and the unexpectedness of the event added fresh poignancy to its grief and lamentation.

MOSCICKI ON PILSUDSKI

Late in the night of May 12 President Moscicki announced the sad news in a Proclamation "To the Citizens of the Republic":

Marshal Joseph Pilsudski has died.

By the great labour of his life he built up strength in the Nation, by his genius of mind and hard effort of will he resuscitated the State. He led it towards rebirth of its own power, towards emancipation of forces on which the future strength of Poland will be based. For the enormous work that he did it was granted him to see our State as a living creation, capable of life, prepared for life, and our Army covered by the glory of victorious banners.

This man who is the greatest in the whole stretch of our history derived the strength of his spirit from the depths of past history and by super-human effort of thought guessed the paths of the future.

It was not himself that he saw there, for he had long felt that his physical strength was moving towards the end. He sought and trained for independent work people on whom the burden of responsibility was to rest in turn.

He has handed down to the Nation the inheritance of thought caring for the honour and power of the State.

This is his Testament, handed down to us who are living, we are to accept and shoulder.

May mourning and pain deepen in us the understanding of our—of the whole Nation's—responsibility in the face of his spirit and future generations.

Pilsudski's death occurred so suddenly that the Government, though all its members knew that his condition was very grave, was not prepared for it when it came. In the morning the Marshal had seemed better. Slawek called an immediate meeting, but there was some hesitation at the start about what was to be done, some doubt how the country would take the news, and this uncertainty induced a proposal that the institution of a "state of siege"—martial law—should be proclaimed in order to avoid "regrettable incidents," but it was rejected, most of the Ministers holding, quite rightly as it turned out, that, with few exceptions, and these negligible, the mourning for Pilsudski would be universal in Poland and that nothing untoward would happen. As a whole the nation had a high regard for him—many revered and almost worshipped him; most of his opponents respected him. How strong were the respect and regard felt for the Marshal was

illustrated in a curious yet most significant manner by what must have been a unique testimonial. The "King" of the Warsaw underworld issued his command that "nothing was to be touched"—stolen—during the funeral. The population of the Polish capital was more than a million, and it was swollen by hundreds of thousands from all over Poland, come to participate in the national mourning. Thousands more congregated along the route traversed by the funeral cortège from Warsaw to Cracow, on which ancient city a quarter of a million converged. The police had their hands full in maintaining order among those immense throngs of people, and were quite unable to keep their usual watch and ward over the country, yet though crooks and criminals had abundant opportunity, nothing was in fact "touched."

During Pilsudski's illnesses it had been often said that he would leave behind a document, a testament, concerning the policy he wished to be followed after his death. He left a will, but it bore a strictly personal character and was absolutely non-political. Probably he thought that he had set the feet of his people so firmly on the right road by his foreign policy and the establishment of the New Constitution, with a strong Army supporting both, that no written testament was necessary. As Moscicki said in the proclamation, Pilsudski's record was his testament—which every Pole could read for himself. But on the day before the Marshal died he gave two orders, or what amounted to orders, and, significantly, both dealt with the Army. He asked Moscicki to appoint Rydz-Smigly Inspector-General, and Kasprzycki Minister of War, the two posts of primordial importance he himself had occupied ever since 1926. Moscicki at once announced these appointments. The new Inspector-General had held the rank of Army Inspector, and Kasprzycki was Under-Secretary at the War Office—at first he became Acting Minister of War, his definite appointment as Minister coming later. Both were veterans, having fought in the Legions during the Great War and in the 1920 campaign against the Soviet; neither was a politician. With the Army Rydz-Smigly stood next to Pilsudski; in some quarters, however, it had been supposed that the Inspector-Generalship might be entrusted to Sosnkowski, but the Marshal

decided otherwise, and Moscicki concurred. In Pilsudski's view Rydz-Smigly was the man most likely to carry on the Pilsudski tradition as regarded both the Army itself and the vital part it inevitably had to play in maintaining the Pilsudski policy in the internal and still more in the external affairs of Poland.

No mistake was possible respecting the reaction of the Polish nation to the Marshal's death; it was one of the profoundest sorrow; Poland was hushed under the blow which had deprived her of her greatest son. On May 13 the churches throughout the land were filled with the mourning people praying for the repose of the departed. With the exception of the Nationalist and Socialist papers, which limited themselves to mere notices of the death, the whole Polish Press wrote in the most appreciative terms of Pilsudski, many of them, echoing Moscicki, describing him as the greatest Pole that had ever lived. Abroad the news of his death was the topic of the day. Flags at half-mast flew in Berlin, and Hitler sent a telegram of sympathy to Moscicki; the German Press paid generous tributes to Pilsudski, calling him a splendid, whole-souled patriot, a wise and a realist statesman and the father of his people. From Moscow Laval sent a message expressing his deep regret that the illness of the Marshal had prevented him from meeting the "illustrious soldier, who was the personification of the courage, honour and patriotism of the Polish nation." The French Press was appreciative, but with a certain reserve. From England came a telegram from King George to the President stating that he had learned with deep regret of the grievous loss the Polish nation had sustained through the death of Pilsudski, "whose great qualities of leadership, both as soldier and statesman, were so unsparingly devoted to his country's service." In the Senate at Rome Mussolini said the Marshal might be called the creator of Poland—an achievement accomplished first by an "incessant, tenacious and heroic struggle before and during the War, and next after the War, when in 1926 he took possession of the State and finally gave it a form and structure capable of resisting all events both at home and abroad." But every State sent its message of condolence. Soon

it was known that distinguished representatives of many foreign countries would attend the funeral.

PILSUDSKI'S FUNERAL

That meant some delay in arranging a day for the funeral, and meanwhile the Government concerned itself with the ordering of the Marshal's burial, for which he had left some directions. His heart was to be placed at the feet of his mother's remains, which were to be brought from Lithuania to Vilna and buried there together. His brain he gave to the Polish Anatomical Institute in Vilna for study. He asked that the body should be buried in the Wawel Cathedral in Cracow—the Westminster Abbey of Poland—amongst the tombs of some of the kings of Poland and some of her heroes. This sad programme was duly carried out. On May 13 the body was embalmed and lay in state in the Belvedere till May 15 when it was transferred to St. John's Cathedral, amid the homage of thousands gathered in serried ranks along the line of the procession. During the night of May 15 and all next day and night the body lay in state and received the homage of many thousands more. On the morning of May 17 the funeral cortège passed on to Mokotow, the great military camp a few miles from Warsaw, and there, to mournful music, marched detachments from the Polish Army in long defile before the coffin—the Marshal's last review of the magnificent force he had created, nourished and brought to perfection. When the review was over, the coffin was taken by train to Cracow through the night; not the least impressive of all those impressive manifestations of the national mourning was the amazing numbers of people, most of them poor peasants and workers, with their children, who waited hours along the railway from Warsaw to Cracow to see the train, brightly illuminated only in one carriage to tell everybody what special train it was, flash through the dark to its destination. From Cracow station to the Wawel there was another representative procession on May 17; the coffin was placed in the Sobieski crypt of the Cathedral, between the sarcophagi of Kosciuszko and Poniatowski. Moscicki was the orator; he said:

To the royal shades has been brought a new companion in their eternal rest. His head is not decked with a crown, his hand does not bear a sceptre, but in spite of this he has been king of our hearts and the master of our destinies. By the half-secular work of his life he took in possession heart after heart, soul after soul, until he included the whole of Poland with the royal purple mantle of his spirit.

Taking part in the funeral ceremonies in Warsaw and Cracow were delegations from Austria, Germany, Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, France, Finland, England, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, the United States and the League of Nations. The French delegation was headed by Laval, who had returned from Moscow on the evening of May 16, and Marshal Pétain; the German delegation by Goering, with whom were representatives of the German Army, Navy and Air Force; the British by Field-Marshal Lord Cavan; and the Italian by General Grazioli. In the case of the British delegation it was recalled with pleasure in Warsaw that 12 years before Lord Cavan, then Chief of the Imperial General Staff, had visited Poland and reported to the British War Office that the Polish Army had made a profound impression on him. The Poles were also pleased that France had sent Pétain, for whom Pilsudski had a special personal regard. Goering had flown from Berlin to Warsaw on May 17. To avoid any trouble about precedence, the delegations marched in alphabetical order according to the French rendering of the names of their nations; thus, *Allemagne* came first on the list, but without political significance. It was natural, however, that with such outstanding international figures on the scene as Laval and Goering the occasion should lead to political conversations; and Beck had talks with both, and they talked with each other, too. There was something definite to speak about.

That was the signing in Prague on May 16 of the pact of mutual assistance between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet. The treaty was on the lines of the Franco-Soviet pact, purported not to be drawn against any country, and provided for mutual assistance in the event of aggression on either party, but only on condition that the victim of aggression was assisted by France. It was validated for five years, and thereafter indefinitely, subject to a year's denunciation by either party. It was declared to be within



GENERAL RYDZ-SMIGLY

the framework of the League, but in Poland note had already been taken of the fact that a Soviet Air Force mission had spent some time in Czechoslovakia with the object of investigating the prospects of co-operation in military aviation. An announcement had also been made that a regular civilian aeroplane service between Prague and Moscow, by way of Czernowitz in the Bukovina and thus avoiding flight over Polish territory, would be established shortly. This was a sign of the tension existing in Polish-Czechoslovak relations; the strain had not relaxed, but had become intensified, and to many Poles the new pact seemed to suggest a step in the direction of fulfilling what was believed to be the objective of the Czechoslovak Government—to obtain a common frontier with Soviet Russia. In Prague, the pact was described as a "bridge between the West and the East." Unquestionably, it was a remarkably round-about bridge, but it did indicate the possibility of an opening for an attack by Russia on Germany without having to find or force a passage across Poland. Though the pact was represented as another move in the general interests of peace, everybody understood that it was really aimed at Germany, and, if it was of advantage to Czechoslovakia, it was also part and parcel of the policy intended to give additional security to France.

POLISH POLICY UNCHANGED

The question in the minds of Laval and Goering after Pilsudski's death was whether there would be any change in Polish foreign policy, but they were assured by Beck that there would be no break in its continuity, as the Pilsudski policy was the settled policy of Poland. Rumours were current, particularly abroad, that Polish policy was to be more "liberal" than under the Pilsudski régime, but though Pilsudski was no more, the régime remained. This was evident as respected internal policy when on May 20 Slawek placed his Government at the disposition of the President, but was asked by Moscicki to stay in office in order to complete the programme of legislation for bringing the New Constitution into effect. Nor was this all, for Moscicki presided over a conference he had called of the Prime Minister, the new Inspector-

General, and the Foreign Minister—Slawek, Rydz-Smigly, and Beck—for an exchange of views on the situation. This conference was something new; its significance lay in the fact that the President, *qua* President, appeared in it as the veritable Chief of the State contemplated by the New Constitution, and not as an ornamental figurehead, as was more or less the case under the Constitution of 1921. He was now directing policy, not merely giving a rubber-stamp adhesion to it, and his recent orations in Warsaw and Cracow showed that his policy in foreign as well as domestic affairs could be no other than that of Pilsudski. It was impossible to believe that Slawek, Rydz-Smigly, or Beck would seek to depart from that policy. Its central point was the Ten-years Pact with Germany.

On May 21 Hitler made a speech in the Reichstag on the European situation, and said, referring to Poland, that he was prepared to renew the pact with her over and over again; and Warsaw was well satisfied with this statement. Hitler declared he was ready to conclude pacts of non-aggression with all neighbouring States, except Lithuania, because of her oppression of the Memel-landers—it happened that the death sentences passed on the Memel-landers at the Kovno trial were commuted on May 19 by President Smetona. On May 30 the *Gazeta Polska* published an inspired article in which it stated that the Polish Government appreciated the declaration of Hitler, and another by Litvinoff, regarding the great value of the Ten-years Pact and of the Non-aggression pact with the Soviet to their respective countries and to Poland, who would continue to attach the utmost importance to these fundamental pacts. Poland had found bilateral pacts best, and would follow the same method in future. However, it was to be observed that on the previous day Moscicki had given a warm assurance of the validity and vitality of the Franco-Polish alliance when he received Noel, the new French Ambassador, in Warsaw. The plain meaning of all this was that there was no change in Polish foreign policy, which was one of balance between Germany and the Soviet, with the French alliance maintained as before. It was a little unfortunate that French parliamentary instability was once again exhibited at this juncture,

Flandin's Government being defeated over finance on May 30; Bouisson formed a Cabinet on June 1, but it lived precariously for only three or four days, Laval coming into power on June 7, and holding the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the Premiership.

FRESH TROUBLE IN DANZIG

In mid-May Lester, the League's High Commissioner in Danzig, appeared before the Council in Geneva and informed it of the attacks which Greiser, the Nazi President of the Free City, had made on the rights of the Minorities. He spoke of the efforts he had undertaken on behalf of the Minorities, and of the rebuffs from the Danzig Government he himself had received while doing so. Later in the month the Council had before it petitions asking for redress sent in by the Minorities, particularly the Jewish Minority, some time before—one petition had been presented to the Council in December of the previous year, and then the Council had decided to adjourn consideration of the petition on condition that the Danzig Government should enter into negotiations with the protesting party. That Government accepted the condition and soon afterwards violated it. On May 24 the question led to a lively debate in the Council, the upshot of which was that the Council expressed its confidence in Lester, and Grieser responded by disclaiming any intention of reflecting on the League's methods or actions. What came out from the discussion was that whereas the Nazi Danzigers thought that the League's Commissioner should act only as an arbitrator between Poland and Danzig, his functions extended over the working of all the relations of the Free City Government, internal as well as external.

Trouble of a different and even more serious character was experienced in Danzig in connexion with finance early in June. Some obscurity had overhung the Free City Government's finance for a considerable time, and it was freely asserted both in Danzig and outside it that the real position was that the Government was bankrupt, but was kept going by subsidies from Berlin; latterly this assistance, it was stated, had been withdrawn, with the result that the Government was in serious difficulties, and was turning to look for aid to Poland, who was willing to help—

on conditions. On May 2 the Government devalued its gulden currency, establishing it on a new parity with the Polish zloty, the previous parity having been one gulden to about $1\frac{3}{4}$ zlotys. This devaluation made prices of goods rise; the shops were infested by crowds of anxious purchasers; the small savings of the poorer classes were withdrawn from the banks, mostly in exchange for other currencies which were thought to be good, or simply for hoarding. Richer people followed suit, and the Banks were compelled to ration the outflow of deposits, and then to shut their doors. On June 11 it was semi-officially announced in Danzig that the Polish Government and the Bank of Poland were voluntarily assisting the Free City in supporting the rate of the gulden. But this did not mean that Poland intended to guarantee the gold value of the gulden; to put an end to the state of panic that prevailed throughout the Free City and was hurtful to her own interests, she adopted it only as a temporary expedient for relieving the situation. In the Danzig Senate measures were passed for restricting the export of money similar to those in force in Germany, and these drew a sharp protest from Papée, the Polish Commissary-General. Greiser in replying to the protest announced a drastic economy programme, involving the discharge of hundreds of civil servants and State-paid teachers, and cuts in expenditure in various other ways. The Nazis put the blame for the crisis on the Versailles Treaty, the world depression, and the competition of Gdynia, but a very big part of it was undoubtedly due to their own extravagant administration. On June 14 Schacht, the German Minister of Economics and President of the Reichsbank, arrived in Danzig, and told its people that drastic exchange restrictions must be enforced. Beck, coming from Warsaw, had conferred with Papée the day before with a view to supporting Polish business interests, which were disastrously affected by such restrictions, but Poland wished to avoid adding to the embarrassments of the Danzig's Nazi Government, with which she had worked more or less harmoniously for over a year, thanks mainly to the pact with Hitler—and she had to consider him, too, in dealing with the Free City. However, she pointed out that the restrictions were illegal according to the 1921 Agreement, and

on June 18 she sent a special representative from Warsaw to discuss with the Free City Government the safeguarding of Polish interests in Danzig, but nothing came of their meeting. It became necessary for Poland to institute measures of protection—in Danzig they were called "reprisals." Towards the end of June the railway in Danzig, which was owned and controlled by Poland, was ordered by the Polish Ministry of Communications not to sell passenger tickets to Polish stations, except to five named towns, passengers to places farther away having to buy in zlotys supplementary tickets on Polish territory. Further, all payments for goods shipped from Poland to Danzig or from Danzig to Poland were ordered to be made in Poland. The crisis in Danzig deepened. At first the comments of the Polish Press had been studiously moderate, but became more pointed and acrid as the incidence of the restrictions was more keenly felt. As the month closed the situation was eased by some concessions to Poland by the Free City, but was not really resolved.

THE ELECTORAL ACTS

On the domestic side the main feature of June was the completion of the legislation supplementing the New Constitution. Six weeks had been set as the period of mourning for Pilsudski, and they were observed, with an effect of subdued tranquillity over the country. Dr. Benesh passed through Warsaw on June 7 on his way to Moscow, where the instruments of the ratification of the Soviet-Czechoslovak Pact were to be exchanged after his arrival, but the Polish Government refrained from showing him any courtesies during his passage across the country—another indication of the strain in Polish-Czechoslovak relations. Rydz-Smigly announced the appointment of General Stachiewicz as Chief of the General Staff in place of Gasiorowski, who was given command of the 7th Division of the Army. The President summoned the Parliament to meet in special session early in the month for the consideration of three Bills, which had been drafted by the Government Block, for regulating the machinery for (1) the election of the President, (2) the elections to the *Seym*, and (3) the elections to the Senate, in connexion with the New

Constitution. The Block remained in being after the Marshal's death, and was as powerful as before it; the passage of these Bills was in no manner of doubt, but at least opportunities for their discussion were provided. First, however, deputies of the Seym united on June 6 in an act of homage to the memory of Pilsudski, and afterwards acknowledged with gratitude the presence at the funeral of representatives of foreign legislatures. The proceedings in the Senate were similar; Moscicki met on that day 130 eminent persons he had invited to the Zamek for the purpose of considering how best the memory of the Marshal could be perpetuated in a tangible form commensurate with his great services to the nation, and a strong committee was appointed to go into the matter.

The Bill for the election of President was put before the Seym by the Government Block on June 6, and debated in the Constitutional Commission on several days, as were the two other electoral Bills. Objections were raised by the Nationalists, Socialists, Populists, the Christian Democrats, the Christian Populist and Jewish Clubs, and the Ukrainian groups. One of their chief attacks was directed on the alleged insufficiency of the representation accorded to the Seym itself, which was fixed at 208 deputies, two members being allotted to the 104 zone-constituencies into which Poland was to be divided. Under the former Constitution the total number of seats was 444, after being subjected to proportional representation. Podoski, the *rapporteur*, replied that what was now aimed at was quality, not quantity, and he justified the composition of the zone-assemblies which were to designate the candidates—a feature of the Bill dealing with the Seym which was much criticized by the Opposition—by the argument that, as they were made up of persons influential in territorial autonomous institutions and professional organizations, they fully reflected the best opinion of the country. He maintained that this new arrangement was the most suitable for the nation as a whole, though admittedly striking at the party system. "which had been so injurious to the State in the past." A slight modification, however, was made by widening the scope of the professional organizations to include representation of those

of the working classes; this was done at the instance of the Socialist fraction of the Block.

In the full meeting of the Seym on June 25 Car replied generally to the points raised by Rataj, Rybarski, Stronski, Niedzialkowski, and others of the Opposition, which he called the "Old Régime," based on party politics. These, he said, now were barred, as equally was the idea of a totalitarian State; Poland had found a Constitution and electoral methods of her own devising. Having denounced the moral corruption inherent in party politics, he observed that the reduction in the number of the deputies to the Seym, under the Electoral Bill, had striking parallels in other countries. The Socialists wished the number of deputies to be largely increased, but good work did not come out of big agglomerations; and as for the Nationalists, their attitude was negative, their favourite rôle, whereas the Block knew what it wanted done, and how to get done what it wanted, and that in the most satisfactory way. In the result all the Opposition amendments were rejected, and on June 28 the third reading of the Bill for the Seym was adopted by 216 votes to 19. Next, the Bill for the Senate and, then, the Bill for the Presidency were finally passed. The three Bills were sent up to the Senate, which accepted them without alteration on July 5 by 64 votes to 24. Shortly afterwards Moscicki dissolved the Parliament, as it had completed the business for which he had summoned it; and on July 8 the three Electoral Acts were duly promulgated, and came into force.

Thus were the New Constitution and its complementary election laws established—by the action of the Government Block. Two of the Opposition parties—the Nationalists and the Socialists—announced before the Bill was sent up to the Senate that they would put forward not a single candidate for a seat in the new Parliament, and would boycott the elections altogether. In the Seym, which was then still in existence, they had 63 and 21 seats respectively. On July 14 the Populists, who had held 41 seats in the Seym, agreed on a like course at a special congress of the party. The smaller Opposition groups, including the Jewish and Ukrainian Socialists, intimated they would do the same. As against all these dissidents, most of the National Minorities

favoured going to the elections, in the hope of obtaining suitable representation. The President on July 16 set the elections to the Seym for September 8 and to the Senate for September 15.

Under the new electoral system the vote for the Seym was given to about 16½ million out of a total population of upwards of 33 millions, the voting age being 24 and upwards. The vote for the Senate was severely restricted, only about 300,000 persons having that right. The number of Senators was fixed at 96, one-third to be designated by the President, and two-thirds to be elected by the county electoral colleges, composed of the above-mentioned persons, who had all to be 30 years of age and upwards, the eligibility age for senators being placed at 40 and upwards. To Warsaw City and the counties (Voivodships) of Kielce and Lwow were allocated six senatorships each; to the counties of Lodz and Warsaw, five each; to the counties of Cracow, Lublin, Poznan and Volhynia, four each; to the counties of Bialystok, Silesia, Tarnopol and Vilna, three each; and to the counties of Novogrodek, Polesia and Pomorze, two each. The gist of the Act for the election of a President—a rather complicated affair—was that the outgoing President could, if he wished, nominate a candidate, and the “Assembly of Electors” (see Appendix) nominated a candidate; if the President did not nominate anyone, the candidate of the Assembly became automatically elected; but if the President did nominate, a referendum was to be instituted, to be participated in by all citizens, aged 24, who had the vote for the Seym.

BECK IN BERLIN

On the invitation of Hitler Beck paid an official visit to Berlin—it was also a return-visit to Goering's visit to Poland in January, and was otherwise notable as the first official visit paid to Germany by a Polish Minister—on July 3 and 4. He was received at the Friedrichstrasse station on the morning of July 3 by Neurath, the German Foreign Minister, and other high personages. Later in the morning Beck and Lipski called at the German Foreign Office, and then went, with Neurath, to the Chancellery to see Hitler. After introductions were made, Hitler had a two hours'

conversation with Beck, no one else being present. In the afternoon they had another long conversation, but on this occasion Neurath and Lipski were present. In the evening Hitler gave a dinner in Beck's honour, Goering, Goebbels and Ribbentrop being among the guests. On July 4 a *communiqué* was issued:

The two days' visit of the Polish Foreign Minister to Berlin has given the opportunity for a detailed discussion between the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor, the Reich Government and Colonel Beck. In this discussion, which was conducted in a candid manner, the questions specially interesting Germany and Poland and the problems of general European policy came up for consideration, the result being a large unanimity of views.

It was ascertained with satisfaction that the German-Polish Declaration of January 26, 1934, had fully justified itself in all respects, not only in the mutual relationship of the two States, but also as a constructive element in the safeguarding of peace in Europe. In this connexion Colonel Beck pointed out that the Fuehrer's declaration concerning Poland in his speech on May 21, particularly his wish for the permanence of the German-Polish agreement, had met with a strong response in Poland, and that on the Polish side also a sincere desire exists for an ever-greater deepening of friendly neighbouring relations with Germany.

The two Governments, in accordance with the contiguity of the two peoples, will remain in close touch in the future also, and will devote all their strength to the work of European peace.

In his speech on May 21 Hitler's exact words were: "We cherish the hope that it" (the Ten-years Pact) "may continue without interruption and conduce to an ever-deepening sincerity in the mutual relations of our two countries." The Hitler-Beck conversations did not fail to arouse the greatest interest all over Europe, and many, as well as varied, were the comments made on them. It was thought that among the subjects discussed the Baltic had a foremost place—not only regarding Danzig, where the situation remained tense, but also with respect to the Anglo-German naval treaty which had been disclosed shortly before. Then there were such burning topics as the Eastern Pact, the Franco-Soviet and Czechoslovak-Soviet Pacts, and the whole Central-European position, to say nothing of Italy and the Abyssinian embroilie—what, it was asked, was said about them? There could be little doubt Hitler would emphasize the fact that his condemnation three months before at Geneva by the League

had in practice been condoned by the Anglo-German naval agreement, which was the feature of the British White Paper published on June 18, and also would give assurances to Beck that this agreement had not changed the *status quo* in the Baltic, though that was not the opinion generally of either the Baltic or the Scandinavian States. Doubtless Beck would in reply restate the Baltic policy of Poland—the maintenance of the independence of the States on the littoral of that sea, including Lithuania: the policy of Pilsudski. What was still more certain was that Beck would declare that the whole of Polish foreign policy remained the Pilsudski policy, an individualist and realist policy founded on Polish interests, an independent policy now reinforced by the breach in the Stresa Front caused by England and the further breach threatened as an outcome of the Italian-Abyssinian dispute. In Poland Beck was considered to have scored a great success, though the Opposition Press put in the usual *caveat*. In France opinion was not favourable and in some circles was positively antagonistic, the assertion being made once more that Poland was an unreliable ally. The Polish Foreign Minister and Madame Beck left Berlin on the evening of July 4 for a German spa where she was to take the cure. Beck soon returned to Warsaw.

DANZIG CRISIS RESOLVED

During the first week in August the crisis in Danzig came to a head. On July 21 the Polish Government issued an order that no more goods should pass through the Danzig Customs area, but should be cleared only by the Polish Customs bureau. Greiser at once protested in the strongest language, and on July 23 the Danzig Senate stated that the order would ruin Danzig's trade and commerce and empty the port. On August 1, by virtue of plenary powers conferred on him by the Senate, Greiser declared that there had arisen a "state of emergency," and gave orders that the import of pigs, rye, animal products, coal, coke, butter, eggs, fruit and all parcels sent through the post from Germany should be free from payment of Customs duties. The Danzig-German frontier was thus made practically open, and Greiser maintained this was necessary to provide the people of Danzig

with the means of existence. Earlier, however, the Polish Government had offered to supply foodstuffs for Danzig on reasonable credit terms to meet the emergency. Papée, the Polish Commissary-General, handed a strong Note to the Free City Government protesting, in his turn, against the opening of the Danzig-German frontier in violation of the Versailles Treaty and the Danzig Statute. On August 5 Danzig was full of rumours that the Poles were about to close this frontier by force—there had been reports that the Danzig Nazis had decided to mobilize and fight the Poles; the Press of Poland and of the Free City engaged in bitter polemics, and there seemed every prospect of a serious outbreak. But the Polish Government once more preserved its calm; on August 6 it sent a Note to the Danzig Government, but it was moderate in tone, and confined itself in the main to stating that it could not agree that the Free City was entitled to throw open its frontiers for the admission free of duty of goods originating anywhere outside of Poland. Behind this controversy lay the anxious question for Poland; what was the attitude of Hitler? For two or three days the answer appeared to be uncertain, but negotiations were resumed between the Polish Government and that of the Free City, and the presumption was that Berlin had told Danzig that the good neighbourly relations of Germany and Poland must not be disturbed. The atmosphere became conciliatory, and on August 8 an agreement was reached by which the Free City withdrew the decree opening the Danzig-German frontier, and Poland suspended the order forbidding Danzig to collect duties on goods shipped to Poland through the Free City. Beck, who was sailing on August 9 from Gdynia for Finland, took part in the proceedings and confirmed the agreement. The whole incident was rounded off by Greiser's going to Gdynia to see Beck.

BECK VISITS FINLAND

At Helsingfors the Polish Foreign Minister returned the visit which Hackzell, the Finnish Foreign Minister, had paid to Warsaw in May, Beck thus completing his series of Baltic and Scandinavian visits to Estonia, Latvia, Denmark, and Sweden. He was well received in Finland, then watching with close attention the

Comintern Congress in Moscow—as was Poland and other countries. On August 27 the *Gazeta Polska* contained a sharp criticism of the discrepancy between the official policy of the Soviet to friendly States and the policy of the Comintern, which was one of stirring up the peoples of other countries with a view to overthrowing their existing Governments by revolution from within. It was clear that the relations of the Soviet and Poland were not so friendly as in 1934, when Pilsudski had gone so far as to receive the Soviet Ambassador at the Belvedere; their relations remained “correct,” but there was vigilance on both sides, if not suspicion and distrust. The strained attitude of the United States to the Soviet at this time did not go unremarked either in Poland or the Baltic States, and Warsaw’s continued opposition to the Eastern Pact and her dislike of the Franco-Soviet and Czechoslovak-Soviet Pacts, especially the latter, were resented by Moscow, whose Press made no secret of these facts.

THE ELECTIONS, 1935

In mid-July the new electoral machinery was put in motion for the new Seym. Delegates to the assemblies were elected, and these met on August 14 to select the lists of candidates; a fortnight later the presidents of the electoral commissions published in each of the 104 zone-constituencies the list of candidates for that constituency. For the Senate, on August 15, the delegates to the electoral colleges were elected, and on September 15 they met to elect the senators. The elections for the Seym were duly held on September 8, but the abstention from the polls of the Opposition parties made a great difference, less than 47 per cent of the total electorate recording their votes. According to official figures, there voted 7,512,102 out of 16,332,100 on the rolls. At the elections of 1930, 15,791,278 persons had the right to vote, and 11,816,413 exercised it, or nearly 75 per cent, but these were divided up among the parties and groups. On that occasion 5,292,725 votes were cast for the Government Block, and the supporters of the Slawek Government maintained that the 1935 figures, by showing a gain of 2,282,956, indicated a big increase in its strength throughout the country. The Opposition, however,

contested this claim, and said that the Government had in reality been defeated by the "silent" vote. The Nationalists caused disturbances in Poznania and Warsaw county, but as a rule the elections passed off quietly. The full number of deputies was 208, but on two of the lists at Lodz only one name appeared instead of two, and the total number elected was 206—of whom two were women. In Warsaw City Slawek headed the lists with 29,319 votes. The greatest number of votes cast in favour of any candidate fell to a Ukrainian with 210,000 votes. Among the 64 senators duly elected on September 15 was Beck, at the top of the list. The elections went, in fact, as could have been predicted with accuracy before they were held; the Opposition was eliminated, though that was largely by its own choice; it would not be true to say, however, that a majority of the electors boycotted these elections. The *Gazeta Polska* was undoubtedly right in stating that the nation generally regarded the existing régime as stabilized and was content with it, the abstention from the polls to some extent indicating this to be the case, and not being altogether due to hostility to the Government. In the new Seym the Ukrainians had 18 representatives and the Jews four, but none of the other National Minorities were represented. On September 23 Moscicki named 32 senators, two Germans, two Jews, two Ukrainians and three women being included; and the number of senators, 96, was thus completed.

CRISIS AT GENEVA

During the latter part of the summer interest in high politics had swung in Poland as elsewhere away from Germany to the developments attending the dispute between Italy and Abyssinia. All attempts to effect a settlement failed, and on September 4 the matter came before the Council of the League, with Mussolini plainly defiant, but on September 6 the Council created a commission consisting of England, France, Poland, Spain, and Turkey to see what conciliation could accomplish. Beck attended the Council and represented Poland very actively on the above Committee of Five, as it was called, and took part as well in the meetings of the League Assembly, which were also held in

September. The Assembly was addressed on September 11 by Sir Samuel Hoare, British Foreign Secretary in succession to Simon—the speech became famous: Laval, on September 12, and Litvinoff, next day, spoke in support, as did other representatives. The conciliation committee presented its plan on September 18, but four days afterwards it was absolutely rejected by Italy, though Abyssinia had conditionally accepted it. In the meantime, something else had occurred which, while it strengthened the League, gave the whole situation a much more sombre colour, namely, the British Mediterranean Fleet sailed on September 4 from Malta for the Suez Canal, and heavy reinforcements were announced for Malta; it became known that British warships from far and near were being concentrated at Gibraltar and in the Eastern Mediterranean, and that large forces were being got together in Alexandria and Haifa. The stage indeed seemed to be set for war, as Mussolini was moving very considerable forces from Italy into Libya which threatened Egypt and the Sudan, both in the military occupation of the British; he had besides a superiority in the Air arm, which was most formidable. With this threat of war, the situation at Geneva became highly electrical, the fate of the League itself in the balance. In some quarters it was suggested that England, who had taken these measures in the Eastern Mediterranean on her own initiative, without any reference to the League, was acting entirely in her own imperial interests, but this was categorically denied in London, the statement being repeated over and over again that she stood by the Geneva Institution.

In the course of his speech in the League Assembly on September 14 Litvinoff said that the Soviet's non-aggression pacts included a special clause for suspending the pact in cases of aggression committed by one of the parties against a third State, but the Soviet knew of other pacts of non-aggression containing no such clause. "This means," said he, "that a State which has secured its rear or flank by such a pact of non-aggression obtains the facility of attacking third States with impunity. . . . Bilateral pacts of non-aggression may become in this way a means of security of aggression." On September 16 Beck protested

that Litvinoff's remarks compelled him to declare: "In certain phrases of his speech, very explicit in their implication, he (Litvinoff) felt himself compelled to criticize, with manifest prejudice and in a completely arbitrary manner, certain diplomatic conventions or instruments entered into by my Government. Against such conduct I feel constrained to express emphatic reservations. It is obvious that such expressions of opinion are regarded by my Government with indifference. But as the representative of a founder-member of the League, I feel convinced that such a course of conduct is not in accord with the usage ruling in this Assembly and can only prejudice that loyal international understanding which is an indispensable condition of our collaboration." In reply Litvinoff stated that neither Poland nor her policy was mentioned in his speech, and that the attitude of the Soviet was one of friendly relations with Poland, this being one of the essential aims of its policy. A certain Government, he went on, had once more expressed its preference for bilateral pacts, and he had given the views of his own Government—it was understood he was referring to the speech made by Hitler at the special session of the Reichstag at Nuremberg on September 15, and he disclaimed any allusion to Poland.

On September 16 Poland was re-elected in the Assembly of the League to the seat for three years on the Council she had occupied since 1926, the voting being 45 to 7, which compared with 36 for her in 1926 and 41 in 1932, her increased majority signifying her growing power and prestige internationally, but in this case mainly in the Scandinavian States, whose representatives had informed the Polish delegation that though opposed in principle to re-elections, they made an exception of Poland, because of their appreciation of the rôle she played in the League. It was after Poland's re-election that Beck called Litvinoff to order in the Assembly, and the weight of that re-election by so impressive a majority lay behind his observations.

MEMEL AGAIN

A feature of Hitler's speech at Nuremberg was his bitter animadversion on the situation in Memel, which, he declared,

the German people regarded with great anxiety; it would be praiseworthy if the League turned its attention to securing respect for the autonomy of the Memel Territory and made it a reality before events took a form which would one day be regretted on all sides. Such a statement could not but revive interest in the Memel question throughout Europe despite the League crisis, to which, in fact, Hitler's speech added a fresh perplexity, as it contained a plain hint that he might have to take action against Lithuania that would be construed as "aggression." The Memel elections were approaching, and Hitler said that the Lithuanian Government's preparations for them were contemptuous and unjust. But the guarantor Powers had already received assurances from Kovno that the elections would be carried out in accordance with the Memel Statute of 1924, and that a recent modification of the electoral law which the Memellanders thought inimical to them would not be applied in derogation of the Statute. German feeling, however, remained intensely dissatisfied, and a hot campaign against Lithuania was prosecuted by the German Press. There was much speculation concerning the attitude of Poland, especially as Beck had discussed the position of affairs in Memel with Lozoraitis, the Lithuanian Foreign Minister, at Geneva, but with no published outcome. As the elections drew near anxiety in Poland increased. On September 25 the representatives of the guarantor Powers in Geneva conferred with Lozoraitis, and were assured by him that his Government would take no action in contradiction with the Statute; but the outcry in Germany did not stop. Some concessions to the Memellanders were made by Lithuania, and in the event the elections, which lasted two days, September 29-30, passed off without major disturbances and issued in a great victory for the Memellanders, the result, which was not officially announced till mid-October, being 55,716 votes for the German Memellander candidates and 12,925 for the Lithuanian, the party strengths in the Memel Diet being 24 German to 5 Lithuanian representatives, which was the same as in the previous Diet. The trouble was by no means over.

Danzig figured in the League Council on September 23, but

not in connexion with Poland, the questions discussed being related to the internal politics and other affairs of the Free City. Petitions had been sent in from various sections of the Danzigers concerning laws and regulations passed by their Government which were said to be *ultra vires*; certain Danzig officials were alleged to have been unjustly dismissed; the local Democrats and Centrists appealed against things done by the local Nazis. The Council recommended that the Danzig Government should take what measures were necessary to remedy the situation disclosed in the petitions, and should collaborate to better purpose with the League's High Commissioner. Beck, supporting the Council's recommendations, said that the Danzig Government would do well to give greater heed to the advice and more respect to the decisions of the High Commissioner. Greiser, for Danzig, promised amendment. On September 24 the currency dispute between Poland and Danzig was settled by the initialing of a protocol, which provided for full freedom respecting foreign exchange, and contained an assurance by the Danzig Government that foreign exchange against gulden would be made available where required for Polish trade. It was also agreed that deliveries of goods from Poland should be restored to the normal quantity, and that Danzig's currency control should not be discriminatory against Poland. On the same day it was announced in Warsaw that this agreement would soon be followed by a Polish-German commercial treaty which for the first time would recognize the most-favoured-nation principle in trade between Poland and Germany; it was also to arrange for liquidating the trade and transit indebtedness of Germany to Poland, but this presented a serious difficulty, for the amount involved was considerable—many million zlotys of trade balances in favour of Poland were "frozen," and 47 million zlotys of railway dues for passenger and goods traffic across Polish territory remained unpaid, the debtor in this case being the German Government itself, whom the Polish railway administration had for some time been pressing for payment. The claim was not disputed, but Germany put off finding the money on one excuse or another. Poland would have been very glad of the money, for her general financial and

economic situation continued to be depressing. She had representatives on the economic and other committees and sub-committees of the League at Geneva, and on September 23 Zawadzki, her Finance Minister, delivered an address in the Economic Committee, of which he was Chairman, on the economic problems of the day, and spoke frankly of Poland's hard fight with her own financial and economic crisis, which, however, would be won, he maintained, by sustained and patient effort. He urged the stabilization of the exchanges as a help to international recovery.

NEW PARLIAMENT OPENS

President Moscicki had summoned the new Parliament to meet in its first session on October 4—not a regular but an extraordinary session, to take the oath and to make regulations for its work. In the Seym, Slawek, as Prime Minister, read the President's message, which was partly a eulogy of Pilsudski and partly an exhortation to the deputies to be inspired by Pilsudski's example. After it, Slawek stated Moscicki directed that Zeligowski, as the oldest deputy present, should take the chair while the deputies were taking the oath; next came the election of a Speaker, and Car was chosen. In the evening all the deputies and Senators went by train to Cracow to prostrate themselves in homage before the tomb of Pilsudski.

Two days previously Moscicki, as Chief of the State, had another of the small important conferences at the Zamek which had become a main factor in his government of the country. This conference was attended by Slawek, Koscialkowski, Minister of the Interior, Beck, back from Geneva, and Rydz-Smigly; Kwiatkowski, former Minister of Commerce, who was on a visit to the President, was also present. Beck gave an account of what had taken place at Geneva, and described the international situation. Then the conference turned to the consideration of the economic situation of the country—since June several economic conferences had been held, in which Kwiatkowski, with Prystor, had taken a leading part—and Kwiatkowski was asked to formulate a plan which would deal comprehensively with Poland's financial and

economic problems. It was felt, evidently, that however critical the international situation was, attention should be concentrated on Poland's internal affairs, especially now that politics, as such, had been banished under the New Constitution. In his message to the Seym at its opening Moscicki had noted the tremendous change brought about in the possibilities of Parliamentary methods and actions from the absence of factious opposition by warring parties and groups, and the clear field left for serious work for the State. In a statement to the Press Slawek underlined the same ideas, and emphasized the "better manners" that would now characterize discussions in the Parliament, in comparison with those that had obtained in the past. The Seym and the Senate went on with organizing themselves, a business much facilitated by there being no Opposition in either House.

EUROPEAN CRISIS INTENSIFIED

Standing in the full flood of events on the Continent, Poland, however, could not be indifferent to or unaffected by them. In spite of the League, Italy invaded Abyssinia on October 3, the Ethiopian Emperor called the attention of the League to the violation of his territory, and the Council met at Geneva on October 5 to consider the position; it condemned Italy two days afterwards. The Assembly met on October 9 to receive the Council's report, and on that day Beck was in Geneva. Next day the Assembly, by a majority of 50 States to two, excluding Italy and Abyssinia, decided to institute collective measures against Italy, the dissenting States being Austria and Hungary—Albania dissented later. Poland was with the majority, but an article in the *Gazeta Polska*, attacking the League's decisions, and suggesting that England was not so disinterested as she maintained she was, seemed to indicate a certain reserve. The Assembly set up a Co-ordinating Committee on October 10 to plan "sanctions," and this committee, consisting of all League members except Italy, Austria and Hungary, appointed a sub-committee of seventeen, later increased to eighteen—hence the expression, the Co-ordinating Committee of Eighteen—which included Poland. Subsequently various financial

and economic sanctions against Italy were agreed to and put into effect; some of them impinged on Polish interests, as, for instance, on exports of coal. It was rumoured in Warsaw that the Italian Government had appropriated the motor liner *Batory* which was being built at the Monfalcone shipyards for the Gdynia-America Shipping Company, financed by the Polish Government, and was nearing completion. She was sister-ship to the *Pilsudski*, which had already been handed over to the company, and was engaged in the Gdynia-New York service. The contract for both vessels had been made in 1933, and payment for them took the form mainly of Polish coal for the Italian State railways, to the value of about 25 million zlotys. At Geneva the committee which dealt with economic sanctions was informed of these facts by Wszelaki, Economic Adviser of the Polish Foreign Office, who said that, while the Polish Government had clearly told the Council that it would scrupulously fulfil its engagements under Article 16 of the Covenant, it thought an exception should be made regarding the *Batory*, which was in an advanced state of construction, and was expected to be ready within a short time. The Polish Government had already delivered the larger quantity of the coal provided as payment, but if the sanctions were carried out in its case, Poland would have to break the contract, and lose both the ship and what had been paid for her, the result being that Italy would gain an up-to-date vessel at the expense of Poland. The plea succeeded, as did another respecting trade relations with "Fiat," Turin, and Poland got the exemptions. Otherwise, she aligned herself with the rest of the Sanctionist Powers in their attitude to Italy, though it could scarcely be said she was enthusiastic in the matter. While this was her official attitude, the great majority of the Polish people were at first most enthusiastic in support of Abyssinia, not so much, however, because of Abyssinia herself, but because they hoped to see in the triumph of the League against the "aggressor" a precedent by which Article X (dealing with the inviolability of the territorial integrity of a State) would be efficiently established. But, as time went on and the "precedent" became in itself of more and more doubtful value, their view changed.

KOSCIALKOWSKI CABINET

Issuing from the small but important conferences held by the President and the elaboration of a programme for combating the financial and economic crisis, a reconstruction of the Cabinet took place on October 12, Marjan Zyndram-Kosciakowski, who had been Minister of the Interior, and in that capacity had an excellent record in his dealing with the Ukrainians, became Prime Minister instead of Slawek. Sworn in on October 13, the new Government with Kosciakowski included seven of the former Ministers, among them being Kasprzycki and Beck in their old posts. The more prominent new men were Kwiatkowski, who became Vice-Premier and Finance Minister; Gorecki, President of the Bank of National Economy and never in the Government before, was Minister of Industry and Commerce; and Raczkiewicz, who succeeded Kosciakowski as Minister of the Interior. Both Kwiatkowski and Raczkiewicz had been Ministers in previous Cabinets. The composition of the new Government indicated that its chief concern would be finance and economics rather than politics, and it was evident that a leading part would be played by Kwiatkowski, who enjoyed the confidence of Moscicki, and was well known as an industrialist and practical man of affairs with plenty of initiative and energy—Gdynia was to a large extent his creation. It had already been stated in the Press that the chief aims of the reconstructed Government were the real balancing of the Budget and the restoration of equilibrium between industrial and agricultural prices. That there would be no change in Polish foreign policy in general was plain from the reappointment of Beck as Foreign Minister. Kasprzycki, who had been Acting Minister, became Minister of War. On October 15, Kwiatkowski addressed the nation by wireless in reinforcement of a speech the previous day by Kosciakowski; both made it clear that the Government planned not only for, but with, the people of the whole country, and would get into closer contact with them than had been usual for any Government in the past. Kwiatkowski said that there was in their midst a "monstrous enemy called the crisis," which had to be fought and conquered with the same resolution and devotion

as were shown in the struggle for national independence when men gave their lives and fortunes to ensure victory. It was a mistake to expect miracles, but it was equally a mistake to think that the existing financial and economic conditions were a historical necessity or an inescapable fatality, for they could be met and overcome, slowly yet progressively, if the effort was truly national, and all worked whole-heartedly for success. There was to be neither inflation nor doubtful experiments: the Budget must be balanced, and a straight course pursued. As indicating a renewed and more sustained attempt to combat the crisis Kwiatkowski's broadcast created a favourable impression throughout the country.

The Parliament adjourned after completing its organization, but it was called together almost at once in an extraordinary session again by Moscicki. It met on October 24 for the specific purpose of considering a Bill granting special powers to the President to issue decrees till January 15, 1936, on matters pertaining to national finance and economy, with the exception of the stabilized zloty. In presenting the Bill in the Seym Kosciakowski said that the general programme of the Government covered the reorganization of the administration and the abrogation of bureaucratic methods; the readjustment of the collection of tax arrears; the increase of industrial production; the more equitable division of the national income; the abolition of unhealthy elements in existing cartels; the speeding up of the reconstruction of the agrarian system; the balancing of all public Budgets, and the maintenance of the value of the zloty. All were agreed there must be no reduction of expenditure on the Army. The income-tax would be raised, and an extraordinary tax levied on all salaries paid by the State. Kosciakowski concluded with the hope that the sacrifices entailed by these measures, which were admittedly heavy, would be borne by all "in the spirit exemplified by Marshal Pilsudski." A commission of 30 deputies was elected to deal with the Bill, and Kwiatkowski gave then an exhaustive exposition of the Government's plans. Approved and passed back to the full Seym, the Bill was read a second and third times, and adopted on October 29, after an animated debate in which many

members took part. Great regret was expressed that it was necessary to cut salaries already too low and to increase the income-tax. The Senate's commission having likewise approved the Bill, the full Senate adopted it on November 5, the Act being promulgated on November 8 by the President.

Five decrees were immediately issued. The first fixed on a graduated scale the tax on all salaries paid by the Government: all salaries of 100 zlotys a month were exempted; on salaries of 101-150 zlotys a month 7 per cent; 150-200, 9; 200-250, 10; 250-500, 11; 500-1000, 14; 1000-2000, 17; above 2000, 25. The second decree reduced the rents of small flats by 15 per cent and of larger by 10 per cent, with compensation to the landlords. The third decree abolished the room tax on small apartments, and cancelled room tax arrears in their case. The fourth decree dealt with the indebtedness of municipalities, and the fifth with modifications of agreements between banks and agrarian debtors. The first decree affected everyone receiving pay from the State—from the President downwards—above 100 zlotys monthly, the total number being about 800,000; it included not only State functionaries, but also members of the judicature, officers of the army and of the police, the teachers in State schools of all kinds, the principal men on the railways, and so on. The trouble was that the official classes had had their salaries cut by previous Governments, and this new decree pressed very heavily on them. Demands were made for a proportionate drop in the cost of living.

DISSOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT BLOCK

On the principle that party politics had been eliminated in Poland by the New Constitution and its corollary, the Parliament elected in September, the existence of the Government Block became an anachronism, and on October 30 Slawek, at a meeting summoned for the purpose, announced the dissolution of the Block. He declared that its mission was successfully accomplished, and there was no longer any need for it. Slawek, reviewing the seven years of its history, said it had started and carried on its activities to develop a form of government according to the ideas of Pilsudski, which had now been realized. It had not been

an easy job, for the Block contained men of different views, and this fact had led to some mistakes being committed. The Block, further, contained, as any large body was bound to contain, some members of doubtful value, but stern disciplinary measures had been put in force when anything objectionable had been discovered. Replying to an enthusiastic vote of thanks for his leadership and a hint that it was possible he might be called on to resume it, Slawek stated that he was satisfied that the régime under the new Constitution had a character of permanence, and that all would be well with Poland.

STRAINED RELATIONS WITH CZECHS

The Czechoslovak Government proclaimed on November 5 a "state of emergency" in the town and district of Teschen—this was equivalent to martial law, and indicated only too clearly to what a height of tension the strife between the Poles in that area and the Czechs had attained. It had begun in the previous year (p. 352), and had continued almost without intermission, with feeling growing more and more bitter on both sides of the frontier. In Poland it was held that the Czechoslovak Government pursued a policy of Czechifying the Teschen Poles by discriminating against them as regarded schools, teachers, churches, clergy, official appointments of various kinds, and employment in the mining industry—a policy of intimidation and persecution which these Poles could escape only by becoming de-Polonized. The Czechs repelled these accusations, and besides charged Poland with promoting irredentist sentiment and action in Teschen. In September 1935 the Polish Press reported that the Czechoslovak Government had transferred eight regiments to the sections where the Poles were in a majority in the district, and that many arrests had been made. In October the *exequatur* was withdrawn from the Polish consul at Morawska-Ostrava, the centre of the mining area in Czech Teschen; he was accused by the Czechs of fomenting irredentism. On October 18 the Polish Government in reprisal withdrew the *exequatur* from the Czechoslovak consuls in Cracow and Poznan.

On the very day of the proclamation by the Czechoslovak

Government of the state of emergency in Teschen, Benesh, in a speech in the Parliament at Prague on foreign affairs, emphasized the seriousness of the situation in that area, and between Czechoslovakia and Poland, and said that, failing settlement by direct negotiation, Czechoslovakia was prepared to submit the whole matter to independent international inquiry, and would abide by the decision of a neutral court; at the same time, she was ready to defend her territorial integrity with all her power; she desired the most friendly relations with Poland, but the conduct of the Poles frustrated all efforts that conduced to that end. An official Polish comment on Benesh's remarks contrasted his fair words with the actions of his Government in Teschen, and described his offer to refer the dispute to a neutral tribunal as a "tactical manœuvre intended to create an impression of good will," but in effect it "shelved the problem." In any case, the comment went on, "the arbitration persistently suggested by Benesh cannot be applied to a problem already clearly defined by both parties in the agreement concluded on April 23, 1925"—the Polish-Czechoslovak treaty of conciliation and arbitration. It was asserted that by endeavouring systematically to de-Polonize 100,000 Poles in Teschen, Czechoslovakia was failing to implement her obligations under the agreement. However, the Czechoslovak Government cancelled the state of emergency on December 6, but the tension was scarcely reduced. Behind this controversy lay the Czech dislike of the Polish-German Ten-years Pact, which was said in Prague to amount to an alliance between Poland and Germany, and the Polish dislike of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Pact.

TRADE RELATIONS WITH GERMANY

Interest in the general European situation during November was dominated by the Italo-Abyssinian war, with the imposition of certain sanctions by the League, and apart from that struggle there was a relatively quiet time in international politics. Poland was digesting the first stages in the development of the financial and economic programme of the Government, and otherwise attending to her own affairs. Among these was the signing at

Warsaw on November 4 of the trade agreement, on the basis of the most-favoured-nation clause, between her and Germany which had been under negotiation for some time. Validated for one year, beginning on November 20, but prolonged automatically subject to notice by one party or the other, this treaty gave preferences to such Polish exports as pigs, butter, cheese, timber, and geese in exchange for chemicals, textiles, metal goods, machinery, and other manufactured articles. One of the great difficulties in the way of concluding the treaty had been the clearing arrangements for payment, but this was overcome by appointing two special agencies, one in Warsaw and the other in Berlin, for effecting the transfer, a clause being inserted in the treaty enabling either party to suggest any change in the working of the transfer arrangements that would be advantageous, or less disadvantageous, to one or other of them. What was noteworthy about this treaty was that it was the first signed by Poland which set up these payment clearances. At this time a number of British industrialists were on a visit to Poland—one of the results of the Polish-British commercial treaty concluded earlier in the year—and it was feared that the new Polish-German treaty would tell against the increase of trade between England and Poland which these industrialists were anxious to bring about, but they themselves were of a different opinion. Polish economists recognized the importance of trade with England, which took some 23 per cent of Poland's exports, and they gave the British visitors every possible help. In the event British exports did not suffer.

Poland celebrated the seventeenth anniversary of the restored State on November 11 with the usual rejoicings. Rydz-Smigly occupied the reviewing stand during the annual Independence Day parade in Warsaw as Inspector-General of the Army. Everyone thought of the years when Pilsudski had stood there and returned the salutes of his troops, eyeing them keenly as they passed by; his absence now was emphasized by the mound of immortelles on the spot where his coffin had rested in May, and it was past that mound that the soldiers now carried their colours. The Polish Press was full of reminiscences of the Marshal and of comparisons between 1918 and 1935. In the former year,

said the *Gazeta Polska*, the nation was faced by enormous difficulties, uncertainty, hunger, and danger, but Pilsudski was there with his mysterious power of overcoming the impossible. Now the Poles had to solve their problems themselves. "Nobody will gaze for us in the cold eyes of fate with unafraid look, nobody will answer for us.... But the ideals of Pilsudski must be followed and served: Never to sacrifice to-morrow for to-day, reality for fiction, justice for success, honesty for power, truth for applause, conviction for privilege—to fight only for a cause, not for influence, for ideas and not for words." Other papers spoke of 1935 as a time of the maturing and formation of "new shapes of actuality" for Poland rendered difficult and oppressive by the struggle with the economic crisis, but facts must be faced boldly.

UKRAINIANS' TRIAL

The trial of the accomplices of the man who murdered Pieracki, the Minister of the Interior, in Warsaw in 1934 (p. 358) was begun in the Warsaw Tribunal on November 18. The murderer himself was known, but was in hiding abroad—George Maciejko, a member of the terrorist Ukrainian National Organization—"O.U.N." He was only 20, and worked in an engraving establishment in Lwow, where in May 1934 he was ordered by Bandera, a chief of the Organization, to go to Warsaw to kill the Minister. As far back as November 1933, Pieracki's movements had been kept under observation by two other members of the O.U.N. Everything came off according to plan. After Maciejko had shot the Minister he fled from Warsaw to Lwow, where he remained concealed till the end of June and through the whole of July, while he was being hunted for everywhere by the police. On August 5 he contrived to cross the frontier into Czechoslovakia, where he took refuge. He had got clean away, but the police, after months of investigation, succeeded in arresting his accomplices and other Ukrainian terrorists connected in one way or another with the murder. The indictment of the accused filled 250 typewritten pages, and named 144 witnesses and experts. The prisoners, 12 in number, had already undergone preliminary examinations, and their depositions been placed on record. A feature

of the indictment was an assertion that Lithuania had subsidized the Ukrainian terrorist organization and assisted it by providing false passports, but the Lithuanian Government immediately published a categorical denial of these charges—it was not accepted, however, in Warsaw. The trial, which attracted attention abroad as well as at home, was spread over several weeks, disclosed the activities of the terrorists generally, and of the accomplices of the murderer particularly, in Poland, and otherwise was highly sensational.

Anti-Jewish demonstrations with rioting led to the closing of the Universities of Warsaw and Lwow during the third week of November. Such disturbances among the students were not new, and they were easily traced to a political source. Thus, the *Gazeta Polska*, while indignant at the savagery shown, said that as the attacks on the Jews were instigated by Nationalists, and led by professional roughs, the actual students were not so much to blame as were those who biased their young minds. The *Kurjer Polski* saw part of the explanation of these affairs in the increasing anti-Semitism of Germany reacting excitingly on Polish anti-Semites, but it also saw the main cause of them in the Polish political party hostile to the Jews. A few days later four people were killed and several injured at Kielce when the police fired into a crowd of anti-Semitic demonstrators who refused to give heed to warning shots. The Nationalists in this locality had been active in anti-Jewish disturbances for some days, and the extreme measures taken by the police fulfilled the warning given by the Government that such violence on the part of Nationalist students and others would not be tolerated. Warsaw University was reopened on December 3, its rector having appealed to the students to maintain order. In the Press it was underlined that much of the mischief was due to the failure of the university authorities—not only in Warsaw—to take efficient steps to check disorders from the start. In December there was trouble again.

PARLIAMENT REOPENS

After its two short extraordinary sessions for specific purposes, the Parliament reopened on December 5 for the consideration

of the Budget for 1936-37. This Budget involved in its scope the measures taken with inflexible resolution by the Government for overcoming the financial and economic crisis. Under the Full Powers Act decrees dealing with the situation, in addition to those issued immediately after the Act came into force, had been promulgated, the most important being a decree on November 27 amending previous legislation in the matter of cartels or trusts. The Minister of Industry and Commerce—Gorecki—was empowered to dissolve any trust whose existence was held inimical to the general welfare by being economically harmful, especially by its artificially high prices. Thirty of these trusts were at once dissolved by the Government; some of the remaining trusts, of which there were about 200, had been induced to lower their prices without legal compulsion; by the end of the year 93 trusts were dissolved, and in consequence a reduction in the prices of coal, oil, sugar, and other articles took place. Although the international situation continued strained, as was apparent in the first half of December from the failure of the Hoare-Laval plan for ending the Italo-Abyssinian war, and Polish relations with Lithuania and Czechoslovakia were certainly no better, if the position in Danzig and Memel was easier, the vast bulk of the Polish people was more deeply concerned with the Government's campaign against the crisis, and not a few of those who had been opposed to it, as a whole or in part, were coming round to believe in it. The Government took great pains to explain and justify its programme, Kosciakowski, Kwiatkowski, and Gorecki losing no opportunity, by speeches, broadcasts and communications to the Press, of placing everything before the public, and enlisting its sympathetic co-operation.

The draft of the Budget for 1936-37 laid before the Parliament by the Government put the Revenue at 2,237 million zlotys and the Expenditure at exactly 50 millions less—for some years the first time that a deficit was not anticipated in the Estimates. The total Budget figures were higher than those for the current fiscal year, but this was because they included various accounts, such as the Work Fund established to ameliorate unemployment, which had not appeared in previous Budgets. In a speech of three

hours' length Kwiatkowski, at the reopening of the Seym, reviewed the situation in considerable detail once more. He declared that at last all the forces of the nation were mobilized for the fight against the crisis, and he had no doubt that, as this was the case, the fight would be won. He gave some interesting particulars of what the Government had so far done in fresh taxation and in the reduction, as a set-off, in the cost of living. He stated that the special tax on salaries (which had been modified in a downward direction after its first publication) would bring in approximately 166 million zlotys, and the increases in the income-tax about 60 millions. On the other hand, besides various general reductions, for instance, in railway tariffs amounting to 80 million zlotys, and in prices charged by State undertakings, the reductions in the cost of living were itemized, the largest item being the reduction in trust prices amounting to 110 million zlotys, and, next, the reduction in rents, placed at 40 millions. Having given these figures Kwiatkowski said the Government proposed to curtail the participation of the Government in State undertakings which could be worked better by private capital; to reform the entire tax structure; to lighten the burdens on agriculture; and to reassure foreign as well as Polish capital. The Seym debated the Budget in a general way on December 6, and a commission of 30 deputies was elected to study the Budget and report to the full Seym. The Speaker reminded the commission that its work had to be completed by February 10, as, according to the Constitution, the Seym must pass the Budget within 90 days after the receipt of the draft from the Government. A Foreign Affairs Commission of 21 deputies was also elected by the Seym. Among other things a Bill was introduced for making the Belvedere Palace, the Warsaw residence of Pilsudski, into a national Pilsudski museum. It had already been announced in the Press that the Government had completed the draft of an amnesty on a large scale in commemoration of the New Constitution.

Press comment on the Budget was on the whole favourable to the Government, though exceptions were taken respecting some of its details. The general feeling of the community was that something drastic had to be done, was being done by the Govern-

ment and had to be accepted. One of the encouraging features of the news of the day was the fine example of President Moscicki in voluntarily surrendering 5,000 zlotys a month of his salary, originally 50,000 zlotys monthly, but already heavily reduced by the special tax on all salaries paid by the Government, the total reduction coming to one-third of his former official income.

On December 17 the Seym in full session passed a resolution transforming the Belvedere into a national memorial of the Marshal under the name, "Joseph Pilsudski Museum." At the same meeting, the Seym, after a speech from Michalowski, Minister of Justice, voted the Government's amnesty proposal, and it was passed into law by the Parliament three days later. Under this Act the Polish gaols were, early in January 1936, emptied of some 27,000 prisoners. Criminal sentences up to six months and political sentences up to two years were remitted, the latter step releasing about 3,000 political prisoners. Higher criminal sentences were reduced. But the "heavy" political offenders and Witos and two others who fled the country did not benefit, a fact which naturally excited resentment in the ranks of the Opposition. Though a parliamentary Opposition no longer existed in the ordinary sense of the term, outside the Parliament the Opposition parties and groups still actively made themselves felt in the national life, and were highly critical at their meetings and in their Press of the Government. Thus, at a meeting of the Populists in Warsaw early in December, and attended by 400 delegates from all parts of the country, the Government was fiercely attacked, and Witos, still an exile in Czechoslovakia, was elected as their leader. Inside the Parliament itself there was seen a tendency among the deputies to form regional or other groups, such as an agrarian group, to look after particularist interests, but they rather lacked organization. On December 17 the Seym, after a lively discussion, also voted the ratification of the new commercial treaty with Germany. In the following week the Senate adopted the Amnesty Bill, and it was duly promulgated.

Up to the end of 1935 the Government continued to present a solid front.

THE GENEVA CRISIS

On December 5 Lester, League High Commissioner at Danzig, paid a visit to Warsaw of an official character—the first he had made during his term of office. He stayed for several days, was received by President Moscicki, and discussed with Beck the position of affairs in the Free City, where the Nazis had suffered some checks, but still controlled its Government. After Lester left Warsaw Beck went to Geneva to attend the Council meeting dealing with the Hoare-Laval plan for peace between Italy and Abyssinia. An article in the *Gazeta Polska* expressed the attitude of the Polish Government—the plan might or might not be good, but the manner in which it had been made was objectionable, inasmuch as it was the work of one or two Powers' secret bargaining. Said the article: "Either you allow the Geneva apparatus to decide and act on a basis of mutuality, or you tolerate the secret bargaining of a few Powers behind the back of the League. If this secret bargaining is to be tolerated, it cannot be expected of Poland that she should participate in sanctions at all." Poland was afraid that this secret bargaining of the Great Powers might lead to a revival of the Four-Power Pact which she always opposed. But the dramatic course of events culminating in the dropping of the plan by the British Government and the resignation of Hoare, the British Foreign Secretary, completely altered the situation, and presented Beck with no occasion for stating what Poland thought of the whole affair. That, however, in its essence, had already been done by Komarnicki, the Polish resident representative at Geneva, who had said that it was for the Council in its totality, and not for this or that Great Power or a combination of them, to settle the question. The Small Powers applauded such a statement, for most of them felt that the Great Powers took too much on themselves at Geneva.

Poland continued to fulfil her obligations to the League concerning the financial and economic sanctions imposed on Italy, but at considerable cost to her trade and commerce. For 1935 Polish exports came to 925 million zlotys in value, and imports to 860 millions, the favourable balance being 65 millions against 176 millions for the previous year. The heaviest drop occurred

during the first half of 1935, temporarily becoming an adverse balance during May and April; the second half of the year saw an improvement despite the effect of the sanctions. The diminution of exports was mainly attributable to the increasing stringency of import regulations in various countries. During 1935 there was an increase in the sea-borne trade of Poland. The combined turnover of Polish ports amounted to nearly 13 million tons, of which upwards of seven and a half millions fell to Gdynia, the port showing itself more and more to be one of the great national institutions of the country. The town had enlarged its boundaries by taking in the nearby villages, and its population had grown to 80,000.

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President Moscicki, replying at a reception he held on New Year's Day, 1936, to an address from Cardinal Marmaggi, the doyen of the Diplomatic Corps, said that Poland was and would always be dominated by Pilsudski, who had forged her *raison d'état*, free from abstract doctrines but based on certain immutable principles. At the moment Moscicki was speaking there was a short breathing space in the European crisis following the failure of the Hoare-Laval plan. The Parliament resumed on January 8, and the Seym Commission proceeded to discuss the Budget in detail, but the foreign situation could not be long ignored. On January 9 attention was called disconcertingly in Poland to a resolution passed by the Supreme Council of the League of Poles in Germany, an organization representing upwards of a million Poles living within the Reich, stating that notwithstanding the Ten-years Pact relations between Germany and the Polish Minority had become worse, and protesting to Hitler himself against the steps taken to Germanize it, despite official promises that Germanization activities would be stopped. On January 14 the Polish Government, under a new decree, intimated it would take such retaliatory steps as it might think necessary to defend the interests of the Polish State and Polish citizens in international relations. The decree was in the first place aimed at countries

with exchange restrictions, but, next, its application was political, and had Germany especially in view.

UKRAINIANS' TRIAL ENDED

Amid great excitement the trial of the 12 Ukrainians charged with complicity in the murder of Pieracki ended on January 13, all of them being found guilty, not only with respect to their part in the murder, but also with criminal conspiracy as members of the Ukrainian Nationalist Organization for the separation of Eastern Galicia from Poland. One of the sensations of the trial was the evidence that Konwalec, the chief of the Organization, had a passport which had been issued by the Lithuanian Government, on the strength of which he was permitted to enter Switzerland, though later the Swiss Government ordered him to leave the country. Bandera and Lebed were sentenced to death, as was also a bomb manufacturer of Lwow, but by the provisions of amnesty—which applied to all crimes committed before November 11, 1935—these sentences meant life sentences. Two others were given life sentences, and the rest of the sentences were from fifteen to seven years. All lodged an appeal, which was permitted. In the trial it came out that the Organization had been carrying on its terrorist campaign for more than twelve years, and that behind it was another organization, the Ukrainian Military Organization, which had been directed from Berlin before Hitler's advent to power. The Ukrainian representatives in the Seym and Senate dissociated themselves absolutely from these organizations, one deputy stating that in Poland under the Constitution the Ukrainians had equal rights with the Poles, and in any case were infinitely better off than the Ukrainians under the Soviet on the other side of the frontier.

BECK ON POLISH FOREIGN POLICY

An extremely important *exposé* of the foreign policy of Poland was given by Beck on January 15 in the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Seym—his first since the death of Pilsudski. Beginning with the Italo-Abyssinian war, in which he said Poland had no immediate interest, but was closely connected with Italy by

tradition, he noted that the British Government had played the largest part at Geneva. He stressed the good relations between Poland and England, both at Geneva and in economic matters. Poland had taken part in imposing certain sanctions. He did not judge the League, he continued, whether good or bad, but as long as it was recognized by a majority of the nations Poland was committed as much as, but not more than, the others. In these unrestful days Poland would do nothing to weaken it, and the outcome of the Italo-Abyssinian conflict might be the establishment of a precedent, but precedents were not lasting, and sometimes were contradictory. Turning from Geneva to Poland's policy elsewhere, the Foreign Minister spoke of her non-aggression pact with the Soviet as having encouraged other of its neighbours to sign similar pacts; her Pact with Germany had been pronounced by world opinion as one of the most practical steps towards peace in Europe. In making these agreements Poland had taken particular care that they did not conflict with her French and Rumanian alliances. Owing to the League's lack of universality, regional agreements had come to the front—perhaps they were good, but Poland must make clear what she considered to be her interests, and that she would not accept any ready-made formulas. "Whoever desires our co-operation," said Beck, "must first come to an understanding with us." Speaking next of Lithuania, the Foreign Minister said that a painful impression had been left by the trial of the Ukrainians connected with the murder of Pieracki. "Should I," he declared, "after a detailed examination of the case ascertain that the Lithuanian Government is still taking part persistently in financing terrorist activity in Poland, as was done by a former member of the Lithuanian Government, we shall have to recognize Lithuania as an element dangerous to peace." The Minister referred to was Zaunius, a former Foreign Minister of Lithuania, who was stated during the trial to have paid when in office a good deal of money and given false passports to the Ukrainian agitators. Beck concluded his speech by saying that the treatment of Poles in Czechoslovakia had long disturbed public opinion in Poland. Diplomatic correspondence had been carried on with the Prague

Government, and in it the point emphasized was that relations between Poland and Czechoslovakia would depend on the answer to the question how Poles were being treated by the latter. In this case no diplomatic evasion was possible, and he appealed once more to Prague to see that the rights of the Polish Minority were respected.

Next day the speech was discussed in the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Seym by various deputies, the points touched on being the position of Polish Minorities abroad, Polish-German, Polish-Lithuanian, and Polish-Czech relations, and the situation in Danzig. In reply Beck said *via-d-vis* Czechoslovakia that the Polish Government proposed that, instead of the procedure suggested by the Czechoslovak Government, that Government should look into the dispute, and try to deal with the state of fact, without long Notes or foreign arbitration. Concerning Danzig, the situation was certainly much better than it used to be. Relations with France were good, as had been demonstrated recently at Geneva. But he was not optimistic respecting an improvement of Polish relations with Lithuania. The speech of January 15 made a good impression abroad, but met with some criticism at home, principally on account of its brevity, several matters not being even mentioned. The reactions of Czechoslovakia and Lithuania were what might be guessed without difficulty.

CONTINUED FIGHT AGAINST THE ECONOMIC CRISIS

The expiry of the Full Powers Act on January 15 led to the promulgation before that date of a number of decrees in further relief of the financial and economic crisis by additional reduction of taxes, by credits for building small houses, by easings in the repayment of obligations by agricultural co-operatives, and other measures. In all 40 decrees, regulating various branches of financial and economic life, were issued during the period covered by the Act. One of the most important concerned the conversion of State internal loans, the object being to put the service of these loans on a sound basis, by lowering the rate of interest and extending their redemption to more distant dates. The total of these loans amounted to upwards of 1,300 million

zlotys, and the decree applied to about one-third of it, or approximately one-fourth of the whole of the internal debt of the State. The bonds of the loans converted were to be exchanged against bonds of a new 4 per cent Consolidated Loan, running for 45 years, and carrying some special advantages, their coupons, for example, being exempted from all State and local government taxation, and the bonds with their coupons up to 5,000 zlotys excepted from distress. Prosecuting its campaign the Government decided to appoint a special commission to investigate commercial enterprises, banks, and Government institutions engaged in commerce, and to report on the effect of these concerns on the Budget and the national economy generally. Kwiatkowski publicly declared that the State's activities in the business field would have to undergo a thorough revision.

DEATH OF KING GEORGE OF ENGLAND

As Polish policy was always friendly to England, the death of her King George V, which occurred on January 20, was sincerely regretted in Poland. To represent the country at the funeral the President appointed Sosnkowski, as Ambassador Extraordinary, accompanied by Skirmunt, ex-Ambassador at London, Admiral Unrug, and two military men. On January 25 the Seym met in full session, and Car, its Speaker, announced officially the King's death, while all the deputies stood in respectful silence. On its arrival in London the Polish delegation was received with due honours in the name of King Edward VIII, the new sovereign, and by the Foreign Office, visited Westminster Abbey in which the late King lay in state, was present at the dinner given by King Edward to the foreign delegations, walked in the funeral procession on January 28, and witnessed the burial at Windsor. The political conversations which took place in London were participated in by Raczyński, the Polish Ambassador. Beck was at Geneva, attending a League Council meeting, when King George died.

DANZIG AND THE LEAGUE

Though Poland was not directly involved in the Danzig question which was discussed by the Council at Geneva in January, she

had a perennial interest in the government of the Free City. At the last meeting of the Council Greiser, the President of the Danzig Senate, had been told to furnish the Council with a report on the measures taken to remedy the situation disclosed by the petitions sent in by various parties and individuals to the effect that their rights were interfered with by the Danzig authorities. Lester, the League's High Commissioner, had condemned the Nazi régime in the Free City, in a report to the Council dated January 8. The *Danziger Vorposten*, the official paper of the Danzig Government, denied the right of the League to intervene in the internal affairs of the Free City. In his report Lester said that 1935 saw an immense development of the policy of creating a *de facto* Nazi community in Danzig, and his own efforts had failed to prevent the application of an anti-constitutional policy in a steadily increasing measure. Freedom of the Press had been infringed, and it was evident that the Danzig Government was guided respecting internal questions by ideas and policy applicable to the German Reich. On January 22 Greiser elaborated in the Council the point of view of the Danzig Government, and his tone was rather truculent, but two days afterwards he turned completely round, and solemnly agreed to respect both the spirit and letter of the Danzig Constitution. It was said that this *volte face* was caused by a threat of the Council to annul as illegal the elections under which the Nazis had gained control in 1935; but more probably it was due to the good offices of Beck behind the scenes. In the course of the meeting Eden, as *rappoiteur*, had expressed doubts of the good faith of the Danzig Government. Beck, who followed Eden, said this was another occasion when Poland was not brought before the Council concerning a Danzig dispute, with Poland on the other side, but was in itself an evidence of the normalization of their relations which had obtained for some time, with obvious benefit to both. The Danzig Government ought to have the same good relations with the League; and the Council could not admit any debate respecting the guarantee of the League given to Danzig. Afterwards Eden suggested significantly that in the future the Council "might count more particularly on the assistance of Poland, who had special interests

in the Free City." At Geneva there was an idea that Danzig's defiance of the League had been rather assisted by a certain lukewarmness on the part of Poland. From Geneva Beck went on to Berlin; on January 26 he saw Neurath, and discussed with him what had been done at the Council regarding Danzig. In Berlin it was thought that it was largely due to the efforts and tact of the Polish Foreign Minister that the Free City was spared the humiliation of having a commission of the League sent to examine its affairs. Also in Berlin on that day, the second anniversary of the Ten-years Pact, the German Press published many articles stressing the significance of the pact; in Poland most papers commented favourably on the pact; but on the whole it was noticeable that there was much less enthusiasm for it than was displayed on the previous anniversary.

Two days afterwards Schacht, touring the Upper Silesian industrial area, made a speech in Breslau which referred to the "wrong done to Germany by the Versailles *Diktat* in breaking up economically interdependent industries." He called the division of Upper Silesia and the granting of part of it to Poland an "act of sheer madness," and this statement so disquieted the Polish Government that it ordered Lipski, Polish Ambassador at Berlin, to lodge a protest. In Germany an attempt was made to suppress those parts of Schacht's speech giving umbrage to the Poles, but the mischief could not be undone in that way, and the Polish Press was outspoken in its comment. What further increased the acidity in the tone of these papers was the continued non-payment by Germany of the money due for the transit-traffic of passengers and goods across the "Corridor." The debt had been accumulating for about a year; the amount had reached nearly 70 million zlotys, and it was constantly growing. Miedzinski, during the debate in the Senate on the Budget, had characterized this debt as practically a "forced loan" at Poland's expense. A Polish official *communiqué* of January 31 stated that in conformity with the Paris Convention which, among other things, regulated the traffic between Germany and East Prussia, notice had been given to Germany that this traffic would be curtailed from February 7, unless the debt was settled. Beck said in the Senate

that he had received assurances from Berlin that proposals would soon be made for wiping it out and for more regular payments in future, but these assurances were not immediately fulfilled, and the curtailment went into effect, though negotiations were not broken off. To lessen the pressure of the reduction in the railway services, Germany started a steamboat service to East Prussia. On February 10, the sixteenth anniversary of the day when Poland occupied her small stretch of the Baltic coast, Gdynia celebrated the occasion with a fête and a speech by Kwiatkowski, who underlined the vital importance to Poland of her free access to the sea, and at the same time made it perfectly clear that she was by no means disposed to accept in silence the view expressed by Schacht concerning Upper Silesia. Kwiatkowski, after eulogizing the enterprise which had turned an almost barren bit of coast into a magnificently-equipped sea port, with a large population, declared that Gdynia, the "Corridor," and Polish Silesia represented the principal nerve of Poland's economic system, and as that was the case, she must exert herself to the utmost to defend that nerve from being cut, as that would mean nothing less than a paralysis of her entire national economy. It had been announced, however, in the Press that Goering was about to pay another of his politico-hunting visits to Poland, and that the matters in dispute would be arranged satisfactorily. All this presented the Polish Opposition papers with an opportunity of attacking the Government for its failure to get the railway debt settled and also to obtain redress of the grievances of Polish traders who had several hundred million zlotys "frozen" in Germany. The Government held on its way, though there were rumours that it was not free from dissensions.

Although under the new system party politics had no place in the Parliament, the Government continued to be attacked by the Opposition Press, both from the Right and the Left. *Nowe Drogi* (New Paths), the organ of a new party formed by Filipowicz, a former Ambassador at Washington, made its appearance towards the end of January. The group called itself the Polish Radical Party; its programme was anti-deflationary and it advocated a reform of the Electoral Acts. It was anti-Semitic, and thus had

contacts with the Nationalists, but it did not gain many adherents, and was comparatively unimportant. Perhaps of greater significance was a meeting held in February, at Morges, in Switzerland, attended by Paderewski, Witos, Korfanty and General Joseph Haller, as indicating some fresh political combination under the Populist leader, though he was still an exile from his country.

BUDGET ADOPTED

The Budget Commission of the Seym continued to discuss the Estimates very thoroughly, Ministry after Ministry having to justify its proposed expenditure. The statement made by Kasprzycki, the War Minister, was specially notable inasmuch as he said he was convinced that in the atmosphere created by general arming it would soon be indispensable for Poland to find further means for strengthening her defence (though she was already spending more than a third of her whole annual income on the Army). In mid-February the Government, by both Kwiatkowski and the Premier, said that while the Budget proper would be balanced out of the Revenue, there would be raised outside it a loan of 200 million zlotys for public works, necessary in themselves and helpful in reducing unemployment. But the Seym was not occupied by the Budget alone at this time. In the second week of February there had been a recurrence of the anti-Semitic rioting in Warsaw and elsewhere in the country, and this led Koscialkowski on February 17 to denounce these anti-Jewish excesses cloaked under the name of Nationalism; he declared that the first duty of the State was the protection of its citizens without reference to their religion or nationality. Unconnected with these riots was another illustration of the perennial Jewish question in Poland. Earlier in the month Madame Prystor, herself a deputy and the wife of the former Prime Minister, now Speaker of the Senate, introduced in the Seym a Bill for the abolition of the Polish custom of slaughtering all animals, except pigs, in accordance with the Jewish rite, which, it was alleged, caused needless cruelty. But the slaughtering and handling was a profitable Jewish monopoly; the Jewish opposition to the

Bill was, however, based on religious rather than on economic grounds, and was very pronounced.

In his speech of February 17 Koscielski discussed at some length the progress made in the fight against the crisis. He said that the first stage of the Government's programme had been completed with the balancing of the Budget. Turning to participation by the Government in industry, commerce and finance, he stated that this matter was being investigated in order to decide what the State should properly do and what should be reserved for private initiative and free from State competition. Regarding agriculture he said that efforts would be made to find funds for increasing the productivity of the farms. Branching out to the Ukrainian problem, he stated that there was a return to normal relations between the Poles and the Ukrainian Minority. Respecting foreign policy he declared that the lines of Pilsudski's policy were the abiding guides for the country. Towards the close of February the Seym unanimously adopted the Budget, and later, in March, it was passed by the Senate with the Revenue at 2,221 million zlotys and the Expenditure at 85,000 zlotys less than that sum. At the end of the session of the Seym, Full Powers were voted to the Government, through the President, until the opening of the next extraordinary session or up to June 1, 1936, to issue financial and economic decrees as might be necessary. The Parliament also passed into law Madame Prystor's Bill limiting the ritual slaughter of cattle. The Bill, however, had been amended by the Government to permit this slaughter in Jewish communities, the rest of the Polish population being freed, after January 1, 1937, from the necessity of eating meat prepared in the Jewish way.

THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS

The slight assuagement in January of the international crisis passed away in February, the beginning of which was marked by the hurried political journeyings of some of the prominent statesmen of Europe, intent on the maintenance of peace, still precarious, and the preservation of the League of Nations. In France the resignation of Laval, forced by the Radical Socialist element in

his Cabinet, and the coming into office of a new Government under Sarraut at the end of January, did not tend to improve the general situation—it was more to the Left than its predecessor, though with Flandin as Foreign Minister it retained a conservative tinge. The great question before France was concerned with the ratification of the Franco-Soviet Mutual Assistance Pact; it was ratified by the *Chambre* on February 27, chiefly on the ground of the Soviet's formidable military strength becoming ancillary to that of France. Poland's attitude to the pact was not favourable; before its ratification by France the Polish official position was rather one of indifference and detachment, but after its ratification opinion in Poland became solidified against it. In condemning it the Government and Opposition papers were for once united. The French were warned that the pact would encourage the growth of Communism among them and bring internal disruption; they were asked whether the proceeds of the loan they were giving to the Soviet would be used for the fortification of the western borders of Russia against Poland, the ally of France. Germany was openly hostile to the pact, and declared more and more strongly that it was not in harmony with the Locarno Treaty. England was apparently in favour of the pact, though the considerable number of the British people who distrusted the Soviet had to be taken into account. It was in these circumstances that Goering paid his second visit to Poland.

GOERING'S SECOND VISIT

The German Air Minister arrived at Warsaw on February 19 and his visit extended to February 23. By an unfortunate coincidence his trip took place at the very time some seventy members of the Nazi Workers party were arrested in Katowice and adjacent localities in Polish Upper Silesia, following on a police raid on the offices of the party, which it was discovered was carrying on illegal irredentist activities in connexion with the Nazis in German Upper Silesia, particularly with the Hitler Youth organization. The Polish Press urged the Government to take energetic measures to suppress the spirit of Nazism in Poland. After Goering's descent at the station in Warsaw, where he was

welcomed by Beck, and ceremonial visits to President Moscicki and the Premier, and in the afternoon a long talk with Beck, he went by train to the Bialowieza forest. A fortnight or so before Grieser, head of the Danzig Government, had been at Bialowieza as a guest in a hunting party. After Goering's return to Berlin, the visit was described as having cleared the air between Poland and Germany; it was said he had apologized for Schacht's *gaffe* about Upper Silesia; but exact information was lacking, though it was understood that he had suggested a means of dealing with the railway transit debt. The general opinion in Poland was that Goering's visit had not had the same success as his former one.

As February was closing a prospect opened of better relations between Poland and Czechoslovakia. When Slavik, the new Czechoslovak Minister at Warsaw, presented, on February 28, his credentials to Moscicki, he said that the "common aims of our two nations throughout history, their neighbourly relations, their reciprocal interests, and the mutual dependence of their liberties" should bring the two States more closely together. The President replied that he would support all Slavik's efforts to introduce goodwill and sincerity into the relations of their countries to each other. The more the new Minister came to know Poland, her living forces and all the elements that went to form her as a State and decided her importance, the more would he realize the clearness and the rightness of her foreign policy, and thus be able to contribute to a better understanding between their two peoples, added the President. But comment on the President's words was somewhat restrained in Prague.

BECK VISITS BRUSSELS

The Polish Foreign Minister arrived in Brussels on March 1 for an official visit arranged some time before. He was received at the Gare du Nord by M. van Zeeland, the Belgian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, the Polish Minister at Brussels and other notabilities, while immense crowds of Belgians, among whom were many representatives of the Polish colony, gave him an enthusiastic greeting. In the afternoon of March 2 the Polish

Foreign Minister and van Zeeland signed a commercial treaty between their respective States, and then had a long conversation on the general international situation, the parts played by the two countries being thoroughly discussed and an identity of views established. On March 3 Laroche, formerly French Ambassador at Warsaw and now at Brussels, visited Beck, who next day had an audience of King Leopold III, which lasted an hour. Pointing to a star he was wearing, the King recalled that ten years before, when he was heir to the throne, he had been decorated with the Polish Order for Valour by Beck, who at that time represented, by Marshal Pilsudski's wish, the Polish Army with the High Command of the Belgian Army. Before leaving Brussels on March 5 for Warsaw, Beck gave an address to the Press in which he declared that Poland, without infringing her previous engagements to her allies, had sought above everything to regulate her relations with her two big neighbours, Soviet Russia and Germany. "The agreements," said the Minister, "that had been concluded with them had the effect of creating on the Polish frontiers a state of non-aggression and political stability which, in view of the importance of the three subscribers, decided the pacification of international relations in Eastern Europe, and rendered very appreciable service to the cause of peace in Europe."

WARSAW ECONOMIC CONFERENCE, 1936

In close connexion with the Government's fight against the crisis an Economic Conference, with Kwiatkowski in the Chair, and participated in by 300 men of business and officials, held in Warsaw closed on March 2, after sitting for three days in the greatest economic discussion ever known in the country. Its object was to arrive at definite conclusions which would lead to a comprehensive plan of action. Committees were appointed on (1) Banking and Finance, (2) Taxation and Public Charges, (3) Foreign and Domestic Trade, and (4) Private Initiative and the State. The first reported that interest rates should be lowered and competition between the State and the private banks eliminated; the second, that taxation and public charges must be reduced as their height was prejudicial to business; the third,

that domestic raw materials should be protected by tariffs and the imports of needed raw materials facilitated by lowering tariffs; and the fourth, that the Government should leave the open capital market to private business, that new private investments should be encouraged by being free from taxation, and that State undertakings should not be exempted from taxation. But no general plan emerged; the Government promised to consider the drawing up of one.

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS AGAIN ACUTE

Some stir was caused throughout Europe by the publication of a White Paper dated March 3 setting forth the British Government's rearmament programme. At Geneva on the same day Flandin's inspiration led to the issue by the Committee of Thirteen of an appeal to Italy and Abyssinia for the immediate opening of negotiations with a view to peace. It was while the reply of Italy was awaited that the whole international crisis suddenly became acute once more, on March 7, by Hitler's repudiation of the relevant parts of the Versailles and Locarno Treaties and the reoccupation of the Demilitarized Zone of the Rhineland by German troops without notice. The reaction of France to this unilateral course of Hitler was instantaneous and decided. The reoccupation was denounced as "brutal aggression," and the demand was made that France and the other Locarno signatories—England, Italy and Belgium—should take action against Germany. It was a grave moment in the history of Europe. France sounded her allies, including Poland, and all replied that they would honour their obligations under the various treaties of alliance. But it was soon discovered that the British Government, while not indifferent to the breaches of the Versailles and Locarno Treaties, advised against any strong measures towards Germany, because it was inclined to attach a good deal of importance to the peace plan Hitler had unfolded, seeing in his proposals a basis for discussion respecting the general peace, and being impressed with his statement that Germany was ready to return to the League of Nations, if they were adopted. *The Times* came out with an article insisting that here was a big opportunity for the rebuilding

of Europe. The bulk of the British public, imbued for years with pacifist sentiment, was anything but warlike, and the opinion was expressed that Hitler had done nothing so very reprehensible in reoccupying what after all was German territory. In face of the British attitude strong action against Hitler was impossible, and it was soon clear enough that his *coup de force* was a resounding success.

LEAGUE COUNCIL, LONDON

On March 9, the Polish Government gave positive assurances to France that in case of an attack by Germany the Polish Army would support France. The *Gazeta Polska* carried an article on its front page to the same effect, and all Poland was of the same mind. But the negative policy of England in this highly critical time brought doubts, and when Beck left Warsaw for London on March 12 to attend a meeting of the Council of the League which it had been decided to hold there, he was charged by his Government to adopt a conciliatory tone, and to avoid supporting drastic measures against Germany. On March 14, the Locarno non-German Powers unanimously decided that the reoccupation by Germany of the demilitarized zone was a violation of the treaty. The Council of the League met on March 14, and invited Germany to attend the Council during the following week. Beck arrived in London on the same day, was greeted by the members of the Polish Embassy, and in the evening had a conference with Munch, the Danish Minister. Next day he conversed with van Zeeland, the Belgian Premier, and later in the morning had a long talk with Flandin; in the afternoon he went to the Foreign Office where he had a conversation with Eden, and in the evening was, with other members of the Council, Mr. Baldwin's guest at dinner. On March 17 Beck had another talk with van Zeeland before the sitting of the Council, and next day at the public meeting of the Council he delivered a speech clarifying the attitude of Poland to the Locarno pacts, her obligations and the general situation.

The Polish Foreign Minister recalled that the Locarno pacts had evoked no special sympathy in Poland, for, by giving special

guarantees for stability on the Rhine, they had left the impression of consigning Eastern Europe to a state of precarious security. But the French and Polish Governments had found it possible to preserve the Franco-Polish alliance within the Locarno pacts by a treaty of mutual guarantee, and the alliance remained in force. The declarations exchanged between Germany and Poland in January 1934 re-established a normal situation and relations of mutual respect between the two countries. The German Chancellor's recent speeches showed Germany's desire to keep the obligations she had contracted toward Poland. The Franco-Soviet Pact in no way modified the rights and obligations of Poland resulting from her previous engagements. The Polish-Soviet treaty of non-aggression and the London protocol defining aggression had manifested Poland's desire to consolidate peace and security in Eastern Europe, and maintain good neighbourly relations with her eastern neighbour. Polish opinion attached great importance to the strengthening of mutual relations between the Locarno Powers, as this was essential for European security. But this condition could not be realized unless the principle was observed—the principle to which Poland attached the greatest significance—that the interests of any country, independent of its importance, could not be made the subject of international negotiations without the participation of the country concerned. The last part of the Minister's speech emphasized the cardinal principle of Polish policy, "Nothing done about us without us," and its extension to cover other States, "Nothing done about them without them,"—all States must decide for themselves. The *Gazeta Polska* supplemented Beck's statement by declaring that peace was indivisible and war in Europe could not now be localized. With peace indivisible, the methods of organizing it should also be indivisible. The Locarno Treaty was a denial of this principle, because it tried to give special protection to the Western Powers, while ignoring the countries of Eastern Europe. The same conception was embodied in the Four-Power Pact. This created confidence but without contributing to security. Locarno was a mistake and to revive it would be another mistake. The rôle of Poland should not be confined to registering

disapproval of the violation by Germany of the Versailles and Locarno Treaties. The League must find a way to avoid repeating past mistakes.

On March 19 the Council, after hearing von Ribbentrop, found that Germany had infringed the treaties by reoccupying the Rhineland. The Locarno non-German Powers drafted their proposals to Germany, and gave them to Ribbentrop. These were published in a White Paper, dated March 20, by the British Government. In Warsaw great dissatisfaction was expressed with them when submitted to the League Council by way of resolution; it was pointed out that all the members of the League were asked to condemn Germany's violation of the treaties, yet the Great Powers were now arrogating to themselves the revision of treaties with Germany in such a way as to meet in part German aspirations. It was said that the authors of the resolution were inspired by the Four-Power Pact, and that their action was tantamount to a "Great Power dictatorship over the League." Some Polish papers urged the Polish Government to mobilize the smaller Powers against the dangerous overlordship of the Big Ones, who made the League a "mere comedy," as the *Kurjer Warszawski* called it.

The views of the Polish Press represented the impressions made by dispatches from London giving an account of what occurred in the private session of the Council on March 19 when its members were informed only two hours before the meeting of the agreement reached by the four Locarno Powers and were expected to accept it right away. It transpired that at the meeting Beck, supported by other members of the Council, protested against this procedure, and declared that such methods were intolerable. Time must be given for the consideration of the extremely important problems involving nothing less than the future political organization of Europe. Touching the agreement itself Beck stated that Poland must take an attitude of reserve towards it, and in this Beck was followed by the other members apart from the representatives of the Locarno Powers who were practically isolated. After a lively discussion, participated in by Grandi for Italy and Eden for England, Beck proposed that the Council should meet on

March 23 to hear an exposition of the agreement made by the Locarno Powers. On March 21 Beck received Ribbentrop and Zarine, the Latvian Minister; in the afternoon he visited Munch, the Danish Minister, and later had a long conversation with Paul-Boncour in which he made Poland's point of view very clear. The Council did not meet on March 23, but it did so next day in private, and came to the conclusion to adjourn, after adopting a resolution, as the result of an exchange of views in which Beck took part, to the effect that as the proposals of the Locarno Powers were still under consideration by the various Governments concerned, further action by the Council should remain in abeyance till the upshot was made known. It was obvious that the "Revolt of the Neutrals," as the action of the non-Locarno members of the Council was sometimes described, had at least manifested their determination to have a voice in international affairs, and not to be just the echo of the Great Powers. On March 24 Ribbentrop returned to London from Berlin with a partial reply, which French opinion characterized as a manœuvre; in the British Parliament Eden appealed to Germany for a constructive contribution towards a settlement, and Neville Chamberlain made it evident that the British Government did not intend Germany to conclude that she had a free hand in Eastern and Central Europe, a statement emphasized by Eden in a farewell conversation Beck had with him before leaving London on March 26 for Warsaw. During this visit the Polish Foreign Minister was received in audience by King Edward VIII, had daily meetings with Eden, and conversed with Baldwin, Neville Chamberlain, Lord Halifax, Ramsay MacDonald, Sir Austen Chamberlain, Winston Churchill and other British leaders, on whom he impressed the strict independence of Polish foreign policy. He returned to Warsaw on March 28.

PILSUDSKI'S NAME-DAY AND THE POLISH ARMY

On St. Joseph's Day (March 19), the name-day of Pilsudski, it had been an annual custom for the Poles and particularly the officers of the Army to render homage to the Marshal. On St. Joseph's Day, 1936, President Moscicki broadcast a memorial tribute to

the nation. He recalled how Pilsudski, when a prisoner in Magdeburg, had spent many hours meditating on the kind of government Poland should have when the State was restored and power came into his hands. It was a difficult matter, but in the end he chose a method of which, said Moscicki, one found in history an example in no other State; there was only one personality of historical importance who had voluntarily circumscribed his power—Pilsudski. He decided to assure to the citizens of Poland their part in the government, because he did not believe that dictatorial methods of government could educate the nation, help on its evolution or its internal cohesion. He looked into the future when he could not take part in what was going on and judge the results of his work; everything he did was always seen by him from the angle of the future of the nation. After referring to Pilsudski's iron strength of character and the success of his foreign policy, Moscicki said that the Marshal was not only the organizer and educator of the Polish Army, but also a Commander-in-Chief of genius, as his victories in 1920 demonstrated—they assured the independence of Poland, and at the same time exercised a decisive influence on the fate of Europe. Pilsudski worked for the Army to the last moments of his life, and he left a legacy of a military organism so strong and so penetrated with ardour that it was the pride of the whole nation and an object of admiration abroad.

In an Order of the Day Rydz-Smigly reminded the soldiers of Poland that when they paid homage to Pilsudski on former St. Joseph Days they were at the same time paying homage to the grandeur and dignity of their country "so exceptionally and magnificently personified by the Marshal." The Army had been his greatest love and pride, and in return it must be the greatest love and pride of its soldiers. An army was the surest guarantee of the grandeur of a State. "You must have the ambition to be an army exceptional and magnificent," said Rydz-Smigly; "penetrated by that ambition in your daily life as soldiers, you will pay most worthily the debt of gratitude due to the Marshal for glory and victory, and the flag will become the infallible sign to guide the whole nation in its conceptions of the State." Rydz-Smigly had told the people of Poznania when celebrating in the

winter their liberation in 1919 from German tyranny, "It is the sword that decides the fate of nations," the very words which had once been in the mouth of Pilsudski, years before the State was restored, and he was purposing to regain its independence, in whatever way possible, in the future. Sikorski in the *Czas* said it was urgent for Poland to strengthen her own means of security, and there was talk of floating a Defence Loan.

Though the financial and economic campaign of the Government was beginning to give some favourable results, a feeling of depression persisted not only among the peasantry but among the working classes, and manifested itself in strikes in the towns, as in Lodz, for higher wages; these affairs were not attended with disturbances of any importance. On March 23, however, the local Socialists in Cracow proclaimed a general strike, and in the morning of that day held a meeting, for which they had the authorization of the Voievoda. About 3,000 were present, and the proceedings opened calmly enough. Before the close it was proposed by some agitators to form a procession to go through the streets, though this had been forbidden. The procession started and came into collision with the police, at whom shots were fired; the police replied, and six people were killed and twenty-five wounded. More than thirty police were injured, none fatally. Many arrests were made. The trouble had begun the day before when strikers occupying a factory (a "stay-in" strike) were forcibly ejected by the police, and the meeting was called to protest against this action. Discussing in the Seym the unfortunate issue of the day, Raczkiewicz, Minister of the Interior, put the blame on Communist elements. Immediately after the tragic incidents the organizers of the meeting of protest proved they had nothing to do with them. On March 30, sixty Communists were arrested and their books, pamphlets and other material for propaganda were confiscated by the Government.

LATVIAN MINISTER IN WARSAW

As the month was closing Warsaw received an official visit from William Munters, Secretary-General of the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Riga, a visit to which the Polish Government

attached great importance. He was no stranger in Warsaw, and now returned the visit made by Beck to Riga in the previous year. He saw President Moscicki and had long conversations with Beck. At a dinner Beck said that Poland had never been indifferent to the fate of the neighbouring State of Latvia, which she desired to see always free and independent. Poland was joined to Latvia by a common frontier and by both States having frontages on the Baltic, the only sea to which they had access—a fact, Beck remarked, which gave them mutual interests and a reason for their collaboration. Besides the geographical ties, there existed certain political ideas they also shared, such as the belief in the principle that for international peace and stability no question affecting any State could be settled without its consent. Munters emphasized the adherence of Latvia to the principle Beck enunciated. The task before them was the strengthening of the peace structure in Eastern Europe. To a Press gathering Munters mentioned, as very important, a conversation with Rydz-Smigly, the chief of the Polish Army, which was united, he said, with the Latvian Army by many memories of the past. Before leaving Poland the Latvian Minister spent a day in Cracow, where he placed a wreath on the tomb of Pilsudski.

FRESH PHASES OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS

The German reply, dated March 31, to the proposals of the other Locarno Powers gave the German peace plan in detail, but it did not hold up the General Staff conversations in progress between England, France, and Belgium. Hitler's plan provoked much discussion throughout Europe and adverse criticism in France. Comment in Poland was rather mixed awaiting the publication of the French counter-plan. Two other features of the general situation arrested attention: the resumption of conscription in Austria, despite the relevant peace treaty; and the total defeat of the Emperor of Abyssinia's army, which brought into view the conquest of Ethiopia by Italy, notwithstanding the League of Nations and its sanctions. The Italian victories disquieted the Little Entente as well as the Balkan Entente, the latter being

troubled besides by a new Italo-Albanian Treaty which it considered marked the capitulation of Albania to Italy. It was quite plain that the general situation was no better; rearming went on everywhere. In Poland the President issued a decree establishing a National Defence Fund independent of the Budget, and the Government contributed to the fund by authorizing the sale for it of certain State properties which had been administered by the Army. Meanwhile the slight strain in Polish-German relations caused by the piling up of the unpaid transit dues on the railways across the "Corridor" by Germany had been relieved by an agreement on her part to discharge the debt by monthly instalments in foreign exchange or in other ways.

Relying to the German peace plan, France on April 8 circulated a Memorandum and a "plan for the organization of peace," including a proposal to set up a European Commission by the League for establishing regional pacts in Europe. The reaction to the French peace plan was not favourable in Poland, except in some quarters not in sympathy with the foreign policy of the Government. The general feeling was that while the plan was not devoid of good points, it was not, when taken as a whole, sound and constructive; it betrayed a lack of knowledge of Eastern Europe, and would have been greatly improved had there been consultation by France with her friends who understood the real situation in that area. France was reminded that a workable peace system had been constituted, not without great labour, in that region, and that there was no sense in supposing that the breakdown of Locarno which was disturbing Western Europe was equally disturbing Eastern Europe, as it was doing nothing of the kind. A much better course would be the consolidation of the existing international agreements; it was inevitable that the new plan would conflict with such treaties as those for the Polish alliances with France and Rumania, and the non-aggression pacts with the Soviet and Germany. In such circumstances Poland could not approve the plan, even as a basis of discussion; there was far too much in it that savoured of the greatly disliked Eastern Pact. On April 9 the British Government issued a Blue Book (Cmd. 5143) disclosing the efforts of the British

and French Governments from June 1934 to March 1936, to negotiate an Eastern Pact, as well as a Western Air Pact. In the beginning Germany declared she was ready to enter an Eastern Pact, but in August Hitler was of another mind, though he did not declare himself openly, but put off its consideration. A month or two later it was evident that he would reject it. In the meantime, Poland had definitely declined to accept it, for the reasons which were put forward by Beck to Barthou at Geneva on September 7, 1934, and afterwards were embodied in the Polish Memorandum of September 27 (p. 364). This Memorandum, however, did not appear in the Blue Book; if it had, Poland's opposition to the Eastern Pact would have been seen as sealing the fate of the pact.

On April 13 the Committee of Thirteen, but in effect the Council, at Geneva debated the Italo-Abyssinian question. The divergence of the views of the British and the French was immediately apparent; France sought to negative the additional sanctions on Italy, proposed by England, and to enforce sanctions against Germany for reoccupying the Demilitarized Zone—a plan which England declined to support. Geneva then turned to whatever prospect remained of negotiations for a settlement of the war in Africa, and in Paris there was some talk about the reconstruction of the Stresa front. In Poland the *Gazeta Polska* spoke of the difficult position of France in having to decide whether she would uphold sanctions to the fullest extent, or abstain and risk the loss of England's help against Germany; in the latter case France could not count on any great assistance from Italy, for Italy would be occupied for a considerable period in settling Abyssinia, and during that time Germany would complete her fortification of the Rhineland. Most of the other Polish papers asked whether England would close the Suez Canal against Italy, or, if not, what other steps would be taken to maintain sanctions, and their view was that if England did not stand firm, there would never be another chance for her to do so. These expressions of opinion on the foreign situation were coupled with discussions of developments in the internal affairs of Poland, which were of more direct interest.

RIOTING AT LWOW

That progress had been made in the Government's fight for the financial rehabilitation of Poland was demonstrated when in the second week of April it was announced that the Revenue for March had exceeded the Expenditure by 600,000 zlotys. For March of the previous year the Expenditure was greater than the Revenue by more than 19 million zlotys. The change was encouraging. The economic situation, however, still remained unfavourable, and unrest continued among the working classes, large numbers of whom were unemployed, and among the peasantry, an unfortunate state of things which emissaries of the Third International did not fail to exploit successfully in such an atmosphere. In March, the strike at Cracow and another at Czestochowa, both with many casualties, had suggested what was going on subterraneously and coming to the surface, but as strikes were no more uncommon in Poland than in other countries, they did not arouse public opinion, at any rate to the political rather than the social aspect of these affairs—which was intelligible enough, for all had experience of the depression. But nobody could mistake the meaning of the grave rioting which took place at Lwow on April 16. The trouble began in connexion with the funeral of a man called Kozak, shot a few days before when the unemployed attacked the labour bureau in that city. A Socialist committee of the local trade unions had arranged with the police for a funeral procession and the route it was to take. The committee pledged itself to keep order, but at the last moment the procession turned off the agreed route, and instead of making for the cemetery as arranged, went into the centre of the town and marched thence to another cemetery. Rioting began with the change of route; windows were broken and shops looted by the mob. Striving to maintain order the police were fired on and stoned by crowds of the unemployed, roughs, and Communists. The police could do nothing but return the fire, or they would have all been killed. For some hours Lwow looked as if it was in the hands of a revolutionary mass, but order was restored, after many of the rioters had been shot down—sixteen of them were killed and at least fifty severely wounded. An official account attributed the excesses

to Communists working among the unemployed, and the Government ordered an investigation. Such unhappy affairs as the serious rioting at Lwow drew general attention to the sickness in the body politic, as well as economic, from which Poland was suffering, caused by her thousands of unemployed all open to the evil influences of the Communists, who had no lack of funds from Moscow. All this led to some falling off of confidence in the strength of the Government, which rumour represented as divided in policy. The disorders in the western part of the country, mostly directed against the Jews, had also a serious effect. Though the Government did everything to protect the Jews, the Jewish bourgeoisie started a flight from the zloty, while the younger and poorer Jews were pushed towards the extreme Left elements. The Press urged the Government to get on with an intensive development of its programme of public works. Some papers said that deflation had gone far enough, if not too far, that Lwow must be taken as a warning, and the fight against unemployment be waged with better results. A point stressed was that the Socialist Party had proved itself incompetent to control the masses. Many Communists were arrested at Lwow for participating in the rioting; throughout the country numerous arrests of Communists were made as precautionary measures.

NORWEGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER IN WARSAW

Halvdan Koht, Foreign Minister of Norway, arrived in Warsaw on April 1, and spent two days in the capital, where he had an audience of the President, a meeting with the Prime Minister, and conversations with Beck. As representing a Scandinavian State he was well received by Poland, who desired the most friendly relations with the Scandinavian group, which, it was stressed, had made known its intention to vote at Geneva, at the last election, for another three-years' term for her on the Council. Besides, Scandinavia had supported Beck at the recent Council meeting in London, on the ground that decisions of the Great Powers must not prejudice in any way the interests of the Small Powers. At a dinner offered the visitor, the Polish Foreign Minister spoke of the great traditions of the sea associated with Norway from the

days of the Vikings onwards, and referred to the growth of the young Navy and marine of Poland as a connecting link. The Polish Press followed suit, and the Norwegian Press rejoiced, its leading daily observing that friendly relations between Poland and the Scandinavian-Baltic groups had a genuine political value.

KOSCIAŁKOWSKI IN BUDAPEST

It had been arranged that the Polish Prime Minister should leave Warsaw on April 18 for Budapest to return the visit of Goemboes in October 1934, but Kosciałkowski was prevented from starting on that date by illness. The postponement gave rise to reports of a Cabinet crisis which seemed to have some substance, as an issue of the *Gazeta Polska* was suppressed which was understood to have attacked the Government policy for not being firm enough. On April 21 Moscicki discussed the economic situation as disclosed by the Lwow riot and the flight from the zloty with Kosciałkowski, Kwiatkowski, Beck, and Koc, President of the Bank of Poland, Rydz-Smigly also being present. Kosciałkowski afterwards left for Budapest, arriving there on April 23, and being given a flattering welcome. During a three days' visit, the Polish Premier was received in audience by Admiral Horthy, the Regent of Hungary, and had conversations with Goemboes and other Hungarians of eminence. At a dinner in his honour Kosciałkowski spoke of the traditional friendship which existed between the Poles and the Hungarians, and the strong wish of Poland to preserve it. Regarding policy he said that Poland believed in the consolidation of Europe, but was firmly attached to the principle that this consolidation could only be realized when all European States, no matter which, were agreed that no question could be discussed, much less decided, without the participation of the State affected. He was careful, however, to say nothing about Revision. Four instruments were signed by him and Goemboes: a protocol in supplement of the Hungaro-Polish commercial treaty of 1925; a consular convention; a tourist agreement; and a convention for facilitating legal proceedings, including extradition. Kosciałkowski returned to Warsaw on April 27.

GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF GOLD AND EXCHANGE

The outcome of the President's consultations with Ministers and others on April 21 was a decree, dated April 27, coupled with an executive decree of the Finance Minister, introducing, for the first time since the stabilization of the zloty on a gold basis in 1927, regulations for the control of gold and foreign exchange throughout Poland. Accompanying the decrees was a *communiqué* stating that this control had become necessary because of the hoarding and the speculative buying of gold and foreign currencies that had been going on for more than a month, owing to the pressure of events abroad in March—fears aroused by Hitler's Rhine *coup*—and at home in April—the internal disturbances. It was added that the control would not affect the Government's economic programme, which continued to be based on the maintenance of order in monetary affairs and of a balanced Budget. The execution of the decrees was entrusted to a Currency Commission set up at the Bank of Poland, and severe penalties were prescribed for non-compliance with the decrees. At the World Economic Conference at London in 1933, Poland was recognized as one of the countries keeping a free market for foreign exchange, her own currency being quoted internationally at gold parity because genuinely interchangeable for gold or equivalent currencies. And up to the issue of these new decrees she was considered as belonging to the gold countries quite as much as Holland and Switzerland. The decrees put Poland in a different category, and not a few people prophesied that devaluation of the zloty was bound to follow. That something of the nature of Government control was not unexpected was proved by the absence of panic; an official statement that the zloty would be maintained, as before, had an excellent effect.

VAN ZEELAND IN WARSAW

The Belgian Premier and Foreign Minister arrived in Warsaw towards the close of April to return the visit of the Polish Foreign Minister to Brussels early in March. Beck met van Zeeland at the station and greeted him cordially. On March 27 the visitor

called on Koscielski, just come from Budapest, and in the evening was his guest at dinner. The Polish Premier recalled how, before the Great War, Poles had been students at Ghent and Liége, and extolled the heroism of the Belgians in that war. He referred with satisfaction to the commercial treaty recently concluded between their countries and its benefits for both. Belgium, like Poland, was a constructive factor in international affairs. In reply van Zeeland expressed his faith in the future of Poland, "gloriously reconstructed." He spoke hopefully of an improvement in the general economic situation, despite dark clouds in the political sky. Poland had lessons in her patriotism, tenacity, and optimism for Belgium; all these great qualities had been incarnated in Pilsudski—"that exceptional personality." In a meeting with the representatives of the Press he referred to Beck's conversations with him at Geneva and elsewhere as "direct, without circumlocutions or euphemisms," and what would be expected from the Minister of a country whose policy was inspired by realities, as had long been the policy of Belgium. Both the Belgian and the Polish Press commented on the great success of the visit; the tone of the French was a little reserved, but at the moment France was interested most of all in her general elections then being held. Their result, in a swing over to the Left, with a stronger Communist colouring, gave concern to Poland, as she was afraid that the position of France in the international arena would be weakened by fresh instances of her political instability, such as in the past had had a prejudicial effect on their relations. Polish opinion inclined to the view that the Communist gains in the elections were largely an outcome of the Franco-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance, and it contrasted French instability and British hesitations with the bold decisions of Germany and Italy.

POLAND'S INTERNAL SITUATION

Contrary to some expectations excited by the Lwow and other disturbing affairs, May Day, with its Labour demonstrations, passed quietly throughout Poland, though larger numbers took part in the processions than usual. As the *Kurjer Poranny* observed,

"The working world celebrated the holiday in an atmosphere of tranquillity and seriousness." The Socialist *Robotnik* drew attention to the fact that in all the processions of the workers there reigned a sincere solidarity, which was of national significance. Here and there some slight trouble occurred, but the workers themselves dealt quickly and efficiently with the disturbing elements. The general peacefulness of May Day was not without its influence on the whole internal situation. The celebration of the national fête of the Third of May awoke the old enthusiasm. At Katowice on that day, too, Rydz-Smigly delivered an intensely patriotic speech, the occasion being the fifteenth anniversary of the insurrection in Silesia in 1921, and his audience was composed of its veterans. He said that at the moment Poland did not appeal to them to shoulder their rifles, as she was not in present need, but the necessity might arise. "We do not wish to make war; we want to live in peace and to hold peacefully what is ours," he continued, "but none the less we must remember that we must be strong, and that if war is waged against us it will be dangerous and full of menace. We know well that the temperature of friendships and enmities in international life depends directly on the strength of the State that is the object of such sentiments. Poland must be a strong and powerful State; we must make good all that was lost during the long years of slavery. . . . In the development of our strength and power we desire to follow the road we ourselves have chosen; nobody may dictate to us how we shall conduct ourselves in order to be happy—we know that prescriptions from strangers aim at benefiting those strangers, but we are working for the welfare of our own country. Let those who are working for strangers and are in their pay not count on chance or impunity—and the same must be said to those riding on the wild horses of chaos for the sake of their own ambitions and interests. . . . As for us, we must devote all our strongest efforts to Poland in order to be justly proud of her, even as you, veterans, are proud of your effort in 1921." The general's speech, with its warning to possible disturbers of peace in Poland, was broadcast all over the country, and was reproduced in most newspapers.

Supplementing the control of foreign exchange established by the decree promulgated on April 27, the President issued on May 8 a decree for the complete control by the Government of the foreign trade of Poland and Danzig, to be exercised by a Foreign Trade Council. At the same time the Minister of Commerce published a set of regulations for implementing the measure, and Antony Roman, the Polish Minister at Stockholm, and previously Economic Adviser in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was recalled to Warsaw, and appointed Under-Secretary of State for the specific purpose of dealing with economic matters. The main point of this new policy was that all imports would in future require a licence, unless otherwise provided for under existing agreements. The grant of such a licence meant that it carried the right to acquire the foreign exchange needed to pay for the import, and its refusal indicated that the necessary foreign exchange was not available. An official announcement stated that the change in policy was intended not so much to achieve a highly favourable balance of trade as to extend its total volume. One of the results of these new departures was the resignation of Koc, the President of the Bank of Poland, an advocate of the gold standard and deflation, who had been advanced to that position two or three months before in place of Wróblewski, whose ideas were less rigid. Koc thought the restrictions respecting the currency were likely to do more harm than good. Meanwhile Germany's foreign exchange difficulties, which had led to the non-payment of transit fares and dues on the railways across Polish territory to and from East Prussia, brought about further negotiations between the Polish and German Governments, with the result that all traffic was concentrated on the two lines crossing the "Corridor" where narrowest. An outcome of the decree of May 8 was that Poland notified France of her intention to abrogate the commercial treaty which had been in force between them for twelve years, and to propose a new one of a more up-to-date character—an indication of Poland's determination to cancel all commercial treaties of an obsolete type, and to substitute bilateral trade agreements.

THE FATE OF THE LEAGUE?

The sudden and unexpected termination of the war in Abyssinia, followed by Mussolini's announcement in Rome on May 9 that Abyssinia had been placed under the sovereignty of Italy, and the title of Emperor of Abyssinia assumed by King Victor Emmanuel, brought matters to a focus at Geneva, when the Council of the League met on May 11. It was obvious that the League, which had been unable to prevent the war or to save Abyssinia from conquest and annexation, was being very severely tested, and that its fate was once more in the balance. During the preceding week conferences had been held of the Baltic States, the Little Entente, and the Balkan Entente, and all of them had pronounced for the League, as had also the "neutral" States at a meeting on May 9 at Geneva. But the Council, Beck being among the delegates present, met only to adjourn to June 15, on the ground that further time was necessary to permit its members to consider the "situation created by the grave new steps taken by the Italian Government." The sanctions in force were, however, not countermanded, and the entire Italian delegation left Geneva by the express command of Mussolini. On the same day the representatives of the Locarno non-German Powers at Geneva met and adjourned, because the German Memorandum was still being elucidated, Hitler's reply to the *questionnaire* submitted by England not having yet come to hand.

MAY 12, 1936

The anniversary of Marshal Pilsudski's death was kept by all Poland as a solemn day of remembrance and mourning, special services being held in the churches and flags half-masted on public buildings and innumerable private houses. A year before, the heart of Pilsudski, in accordance with his wish that it should be buried at the feet of his mother, had been placed in a silver urn and taken to Vilna, where reposed her coffin recovered from a Lithuanian cemetery by the courtesy of the Lithuanian Government. President Moscicki, the Cabinet, members of the Parliament, and the chiefs of the Army, together with great multitudes of people, assisted at the burial of the Marshal's heart in the Rossa

cemetery in Vilna, the mausoleum bearing the inscription "Matki Serce Syna"—The Mother and the Heart of her Son. Supported by Moscicki, Rydz-Smigly, and Sosnkowski, Madame Pilsudska handed the silver urn to her daughter Wanda, who placed it at the feet of her grandmother. A salute of 101 guns announced that Pilsudski's last wish had been fulfilled. There followed three minutes' silence, observed not only in Vilna but throughout the land—and then Moscicki delivered a touching address, in which he recalled the Marshal's own tribute to his mother:

When I am in conflict with myself, when all are against me, when circumstances are apparently hostile to my projects, then I ask myself how my mother would have ordered her action in such a conjunction; I act in conformity with what I consider would be her will, and pay no attention to anything else.

SKLADKOWSKI CABINET

Not altogether unexpectedly, a reconstruction of the Government took place on May 15; the Koscialkowski Cabinet resigned; another was formed, with General Felician Slawoj-Skladkowski as Prime Minister, and sworn in almost immediately—an indication that there was no sudden crisis, and that the change had been considered and prepared for. In the new Government Koscialkowski became Minister of Labour; and Antony Roman, Minister of Industry and Commerce, in the room of Gorecki—Roman had been appointed Under-Secretary for Economic Affairs at the Foreign Office only the week before. Beck was Foreign Minister again, and the other members of the former Cabinet were back at their posts. Skladkowski had been Under-Secretary for War and Chief of the Finance of the Army Administration; he was Minister of the Interior from 1926 to 1931, and now combined the Ministry of the Interior with the Premiership. The Koscialkowski Cabinet was charged with the balancing of the Budget and the augmentation of the Revenue, and it had accomplished both aims, not without having to overcome serious difficulties, not the least of which was the circulation of rumours of the instability of the general régime and the unrest prevailing in parts of the country, as evidenced by the riots at Cracow and Lwow.

There had been in fact a certain deterioration of the Government's authority and, at the same time, a vigorous renewal of the activities of the Opposition parties, especially of the Nationalists. The Skladkowski Government meant a tightening up of all the forces of the régime on the Pilsudskist side. There was another compelling reason for the change in the Government. The European situation continued to be highly critical, and the nations were incessantly adding to their armaments; to ensure her security Poland would have to do the same. As Rydz-Smigly, who was behind President Moscicki in the reconstruction of the Cabinet, said, "Poland must be strong." The nation loved the Army; in these circumstances it was deemed well to have a soldier at the head of the Government.

NATIONAL DEFENCE

Addressing the annual Congress of the Association of Legionaries in Warsaw on May 24, Rydz-Smigly delivered a speech which was described by some Polish papers as the most remarkable since the last public utterance of Pilsudski himself. The Congress differed from former congresses of the legionaries inasmuch as the association now included the old regimental Pilsudski clubs, which had been very influential and had provided, and still provided, many Cabinet Ministers and other leading figures in politics. The union of these clubs with the main body of the legionaries had been ordered by Rydz-Smigly, who placed at the head of the association Koc, who had resigned the Governorship of the Bank of Poland shortly before. In his speech Rydz-Smigly said he did not wish soldiers to participate in politics; "if the need arose," said he, "for the Army to take a hand in politics, I shall see to it myself." This was highly significant, for a decree had just been promulgated which subordinated the Minister of War to the Inspector-General of the Army, the post occupied by Rydz-Smigly. He went on to state that the defence of Poland overrode every other aim, but it was not to be viewed from the standpoint only of armaments, for it should be the means of achieving a higher unity of the national life and a greater devotion to its cause. He said: "Look at our frontiers east and west, and

contrast what you see on our side of them and on the farther side. I shall not speak of statistics, natural wealth, armaments, or give you other figures. I wish to speak of but one thing in which we undoubtedly can equal our neighbours, namely, the organization and direction of our human will." The *mot d'ordre* for all, and above everything, was the defence of the country, and he compared that effort to pulling on a strong chain, for which as many hands as possible were needed—all hands, indeed—to raise Poland higher, even if their backs were breaking! "You," he continued, "whose hands are strong and well-trained, must seize that chain first, but others must stand beside you, and you must try to get to help you all who are strong and wish to place that strength at the service of the country." It was not enough for the legionaries to rest on the laurels of the past, as if there was no more work for them to do; they must look to the present and the existing situation. The speech of the Inspector-General, the real head of the Army, with its clear call for unity of effort on the part of the whole Polish people, had an excellent Press, the general feeling being that Rydz-Smigly, speaking with all the authority of his position, had given a splendid lead to the nation.

BECK IN BELGRADE

The Polish Foreign Minister arrived in Belgrade on May 27 on an official visit—a return visit for that of Marinkovitch, the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, in 1931. Beck's visit extended over two days, and he was paid every possible attention, both by the Yugoslav Government and Prince Paul, the Regent of Yugoslavia. At a dinner of honour given by Stoyadinovitch, Prime Minister as well as Foreign Minister, to Beck on May 27, the Yugoslav statesman declared that his country shared the point of view of Poland respecting the principle that no decision affecting a State could be taken by other States unless in consultation and agreement with that State. Replying, Beck said that Poland had strong affinities with Yugoslavia, because both countries had the same ardent patriotism, determination to be independent, and zeal for the national ideals. The European situation was difficult, and there might be great transformations in the structure of the

Continent, but Poland, like Yugoslavia, was not anxious to take a big initiative—it was impossible to foresee what would follow such initiatives. Poland believed in maintaining good relations with her neighbours, and in doing so felt she was contributing to the general peace. As a result of geography their two countries held different views on some points, but regarding the general situation they were in agreement. On May 28 a joint *communiqué* was published stating that the two Ministers had discussed the international situation and Polish-Yugoslav collaboration respecting it on the basis of equality and international solidarity, with proper consideration for their individual interests. Beck's visit to Belgrade attracted great interest and much comment throughout Central Europe, particularly in the two other Little Entente States, in whose Press opinion was divided concerning its "real object."

THE OUTLOOK

The Parliament met in extraordinary session on June 4, and the proceedings in the Seym opened with a particularly striking speech by Skladkowski, the new Prime Minister. After stating that he had taken the Premiership at the command of the President and of Rydz-Smigly, he said that the Government would not orient itself to the extreme Left or to the extreme Right. The former struggled for the independence of the country and fought the Bolsheviks in 1920, but now was making non-aggression pacts with the Communists; the latter, who once had Tsarist Russia as its ideal, now concentrated on browbeating the Jews. The Government, however, considered it right that everyone in Poland should feel himself secure. The Government's policy was the *raison d'état* of Poland—the good of Poland, according to the ideas of Rydz-Smigly as expressed in a recent speech, in which he defined that *raison d'état* at present as the defence of Poland in the largest acceptation of the word; defence not solely against enemies outside, but "a defence of Poland in ourselves, in such a way as to cause to surge within us the faculties and forces which will assure the defence of the country. . . . We must create a union of disciplined and strong men with one and the same aim."

He said it was no use for people to dwell on what they had done in 1914 or in 1918, as affording proofs of discipline and patriotism, for what was now needed was understanding of what had to be done in 1936. The proposed union, its importance, influence and the results of its work would depend on the efforts of all men of good will in Poland, and most of all on the Parliament and the manner in which it put the matter before the people. Partisan attacks on the Parliament were as unjustified and ineffective as were attacks on the policy of Pilsudski in the past and on that of the President who maintained the tradition of that Genius of the Nation. Members of the Opposition who had fled the country to escape well-merited punishment for their acts now threatened to return—let them do so, and justice would take its course.

Having made this reference to Witos and his friends abroad, Skladkowski said the Government and the Parliament remained calm, for public opinion would judge them by what they did and not by the declarations of such adversaries. Rydz-Smigly had given the *mot d'ordre*—the defence of Poland. Of what kind of Poland? And with what forces? They must not forget that most of them came from the cottages and the little huts of hard-working people, and it was to those people they must look—to the masses, above all, the peasantry, as well as the workers, the artisans and the “intellectuals of labour.” Even the poorest man had an ideal of life, and possibility of work must be made for him. Where there was even only a little work and no famine there was no Communism in Poland; work killed Communism, but famine spread it.

“Our essential task,” continued Skladkowski, “is to find work for all who are without it, to fight against and conquer unemployment. That is our programme, and it is already in train. For it I ask full powers, not that I am fond of power, and they will not be used unless it is absolutely necessary, as in cases where speed in action is essential for success.” In conclusion he observed that the political situation was better than it might be thought; it was still inspired by Pilsudski, who had given them a Chief in Rydz-Smigly, to whom they must give themselves as they had given themselves to Pilsudski. Rydz-Smigly’s outlook was Pilsudski’s.

“THE ESSENTIAL TASK”

Skladkowski said that the essential task of the Government was to conquer unemployment in Poland; it was also its most immediate business. During the continuance of the extraordinary session of the Parliament consideration of this problem was the great preoccupation, and on June 10 Kwiatkowski announced a four-year plan for its solution. The plan was sketched only in broad outline, but its main features involved the expenditure of 1,800 millions of zlotys, spread over 1936–1940, on railways, roads, bridges, canals, and on other public works, and the employment, as soon as possible, of 200,000 workers, with further increases of personnel so that unemployment would be practically extinguished by 1940. In the first year of the plan, starting from July 1936, 340 million zlotys were to be spent; in 1940 the amount would rise to nearly 600 million zlotys. The necessary funds were to be provided by the financial institutions of the country—to the extent of 600 million zlotys; by the Work Fund—150 to 200 million zlotys; by State enterprises, such as the railways, 400 million zlotys; by the credit of the State itself, 300 to 400 million zlotys; and by an internal loan, to be floated during the second half of the period, of 300 million zlotys. The Finance Minister said his plan was quite a modest one really, based on the actual possibilities of the country and well within the scope of existing credit organizations, without any risky or radical experiments. The plan might be thought too limited or not speedy enough, but, he declared, it was a real step forward, which might lead to a larger and more ambitious programme in the future. In his preliminary remarks, Kwiatkowski noted that there was already an increase in the consumption of commodities and an improvement in business throughout Poland, as was shown, for instance, in the consumption of sugar—84,000 tons in the first quarter of the year against 66,000 tons in the same quarter of 1935. Touching currency control, now necessary in defence of the national interest, he said that impartial observers must admit that Poland had maintained the free movement of funds to the last possible moment. Press comment on the plan was divided but on balance

favourable, with confidence expressed in its relieving economic distress and calming political unrest.

The Government took a farther step in the same direction by deciding to suspend, for some time, the transfer abroad of sums due to countries holding Government bonds and other securities. For seven or eight years the gold reserves of the Bank of Poland had been falling; in June 1936, they amounted to 380 million zlotys, which the Government considered inadequate to meet foreign debt obligations and at the same time provide for carrying the plan and the rest of its programme to assured success. The decision was difficult; however explained, the suspension of payments was "default," with probably unfortunate consequences, but on the other hand, there was the overriding fact that the continuance of these payments meant the total defeat of the plan and the ruin of the country—with nothing in the end for foreign or other creditors. The United States, with which Poland had always a large unfavourable trade balance, was first informed of the decision, and Polish bonds fell heavily in New York and London. Towards the end of June the Polish Treasury issued a statement giving the reasons for the suspension. In the past, it was pointed out, an active balance of trade—maintained, however, by constant sacrifices—remittances from Polish emigrants, and new foreign loans—which had been very expensive—had helped Poland to meet her obligations. The position had changed; the surplus of Polish exports over imports had become barely sufficient for immediate needs—only three to four million zlotys a month; Polish emigrants were returning from abroad, usually without money; and foreign loans were unobtainable. The only way of meeting the claims of foreign creditors meant parting with the gold reserves of the Bank of Poland and the depreciation of the zloty—to defend them the outflow of gold had to be stopped, at least temporarily. It was added that the discontinuance of payments to creditors permitted a saving of 100 million zlotys a year, but that the Treasury would not really save that sum, for it would be paid to the creditors through "blocked" accounts opened for that purpose by the Bank of Poland, and, besides, foreign creditors were free to dispose within

Poland of the sums due to them—for example, by purchasing goods or otherwise. Settlements made abroad would depend on whether the trade balance was for or against Poland; it was this that underlay the Treasury's statement. The default, of course, caused wide remark, but the consensus of foreign opinion was that Poland had stood out against it as long as she possibly could, and was now taking the right course in safeguarding her position at home, a proceeding which, after all, was in the interest of the foreign creditors themselves.

DANZIG DEFIES THE LEAGUE

When in June the British Government decided to drop sanctions the international crisis over the Italo-Abyssinian War quickly lost its intensity; though it was not definitely resolved, its upshot was sufficiently plain; the League had suffered complete and perhaps irreparable defeat. Poland was the first country to make the categorical announcement to Italy of her dissociation from the sanctions policy of the League. Though the Geneva Institution tried to save its face, and there was nothing handsome about its surrender to the realities of the situation, the sanctions had to be done away with. There was much talk of the reform of the League and modifications of the Covenant, but the fact was patent that Geneva had lost out in the struggle with Mussolini and was discredited; most if not all of the authority it had possessed was gone. This fact, even before the sanctions were dropped, had striking repercussion in Danzig. In 1935 the Nazi Government of the Free City had attempted to change the Constitution by obtaining a two-thirds majority in the elections, but in this it failed; in effect the attempt was an attack on the League and on its representative, Lester, the High Commissioner. In the last week of June 1936, a three days' visit to the port of the *Leipzig*, a German cruiser, gave the Danzig Nazis another opportunity, of which they promptly availed themselves, of showing their hatred of the League and its representative. The customary call of the captain of a foreign warship on the High Commissioner was deliberately omitted, and this was followed by the publication of an article in the local Nazi organ by Foerster, the regional

leader, sharply criticizing Lester and the League. The German Government indicated its approval, the Warsaw Press of all shades protested that whatever happened to Lester or the League in the Free City, Poland must maintain her rights, and a first-class crisis seemed to be in view. Greiser, President of Danzig, appeared at Geneva, justified Foerster, and treated the League with scorn and derision. Meanwhile the Polish Government had made it perfectly clear that it reserved all Poland's rights—and Beck told Greiser at Geneva that this was the case, but to do the Danzig Nazi leaders justice they had expressly stated that they were not attacking Poland, with whom they knew Hitler himself was on friendly terms, but Lester and the League. The Council had to content itself with handing over the whole affair to Poland, in whose hands were the foreign affairs of the Free City, under its Constitution and Statute.

RYDZ-SMIGLY AS PILSUDSKI'S SUCCESSOR

After sitting for a month the Parliament voted the special powers the Government had asked, and then was closed. Meanwhile the trial at Katowice of members of the Nazi Workers Party arrested in February for high treason and others subsequently imprisoned on the same charge terminated on June 20. Two of the leaders committed suicide. Of the 119 left for trial 86 were found guilty, and received sentences ranging from ten years to eighteen months, with loss of citizenship, in most cases, for ten years. What made this affair notable was that those condemned were Poles, not Germans, and this illustrated the fact that Hitlerism was not without its direct influence, at least in Polish Silesia, on the national life, just as was the case with Bolshevik influence, through the Comintern, in other parts of the country. But a far more important indication of political cross currents in Poland was a Populist demonstration, in which 150,000 peasants took part, on June 29, at Novosielce, in Eastern Galicia. This vast concourse had come together ostensibly in honour of the memory of Michael Pyrz, the village peasant headman who in bygone days had heroically defended the place against the Tartars; but it was organized by the People's Party, with which Witos was indentified. Rydz-

Smigly was present, and was handed petitions seeking changes in the Electoral Law and the Constitution, with the dissolution of the Parliament and a modification of the régime, as well as an amnesty for the Populist leaders, Witos particularly. Rydz-Smigly consented to receive the petitions. This action, coupled with his presence on this occasion, could not but show the great political significance attached to his position as Chief of the Army, as was already clearly suggested by his speeches on May 3 and 24, the former for external and the latter for internal application.

This was made perfectly plain to the nation when on July 16 Skladkowski, the Prime Minister, issued a circular to the Cabinet Ministers and the Provincial Governors announcing that, by the desire of the President, Rydz-Smigly was designated, in accordance with Pilsudski's will, the "first defender of the country and the first collaborator of the President," and as such was to be considered and honoured as the "first citizen of the land after the President." An official commentary accompanying the circular said that a state of things actually in existence, and originating in the Marshal's last spoken wish, was now to be recognized as binding on all holding Government posts. It was added that as the geographical and political position of Poland, as well as the teaching of her past history, demanded from the nation intense alertness and foresight regarding her defence, the man who had charge of the forces which were to keep her from harm occupied a unique position in her eyes. Thus, the mantle of Pilsudski, now dead a year, was publicly placed on Rydz-Smigly by Moscicki. One of the first acts of the General was the holding of a long conversation with the Minister of Agriculture in presence of the Prime Minister; it was obvious that the thoughts of Rydz-Smigly were with the peasants and their rehabilitation one of the great aims to be pursued and pressed, if the country was to be equal to its task. In any case, a fresh period in the history of Poland had begun.

A P P E N D I X

NEW CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND (TRANSLATED BY THE POLISH COMMISSION FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW CO-OPERATION)

I. THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND

ART. 1

- (1) The Polish State is the common weal of all its citizens.
- (2) Resuscitated by the efforts and sacrifices of its worthiest sons it is to be bequeathed as a historic heritage from generation to generation.
- (3) It is the duty of each generation to increase the power and authority of the State by its own efforts.
- (4) For the fulfilment of this duty each generation is responsible to posterity with its honour and good name.

ART. 2

- (1) The President of the Republic stands at the head of the State.
- (2) The responsibility before God and history for the destinies of the State rests on him.
- (3) His supreme duty is to care for the welfare of the State, for its readiness to meet attack and for its position among the nations of the world.
- (4) The one and indivisible authority of the State is united in his person.

ART. 3

- (1) The organs of the State subordinate to the President are the Government, the Seym, the Senate, the Armed Forces, the Courts of Justice, the State Control.
- (2) Their supreme task is to serve the Republic.

ART. 4

- (1) The life of the community rests upon and forms itself within the framework of the State.
- (2) The State assures free development of community life and, when public welfare requires this, directs and co-ordinates its conditions.
- (3) The State shall establish a territorial and economic self-government for participation in the accomplishment of the tasks of collective life

ART. 5

- (1) The creativeness of every individual citizen is the lever of collective life.
- (2) The State assures its citizens the possibility of developing their personal capabilities, as also liberty of conscience, speech, and assembly.
- (3) The limit of these liberties is the common good.

ART. 6

It is the duty of the citizens to be loyal to the State and faithfully to discharge obligations imposed upon them by it.

ART. 7

- (1) The rights of a citizen to influence public affairs will be estimated according to the value of his efforts and services for the common good.
- (2) These rights cannot be restricted by origin, religion, sex, or nationality.

ART. 8

- (1) Labour is the basis for the development and power of the Republic.
- (2) The State extends protection over labour and supervises its conditions.

ART. 9

The State aims at uniting all its citizens in harmonious co-operation for the common good.

ART. 10

- (1) No activity shall be counter to the aims of the State, as expressed in its laws.
- (2) In case of resistance the State applies means of compulsion.

THE POLAND OF PILSUDSKI

II. THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC

ART. 11

The President of the Republic as a superordinate factor of the State co-ordinates the activities of the supreme organs of State.

ART. 12

The President of the Republic: (a) appoints at his own discretion the Prime Minister and on his recommendation nominates the other Ministers; (b) convenes and dissolves the Diet (Seym) and Senate; (c) opens, adjourns and closes sessions of the Seym and Senate; (d) is the Supreme Head of the Armed Forces, (e) represents the State abroad, receives representatives of foreign States and sends out representatives of the Polish State; (f) decides on war and peace; (g) concludes and ratifies treaties with other States; (h) nominates State officials whose appointment is reserved to him.

ART. 13

(1) The President of the Republic enjoys personal rights constituting his prerogatives.

(2) These prerogatives include: (a) the designation of one of the candidates for the Presidency of the Republic and the calling of a referendum; (b) the appointment of his successor in time of war; (c) the nomination and dismissal of the Prime Minister, the First President of the Supreme Court and the President of the Supreme Board of Control; (d) the appointment and dismissal of the Commander-in-Chief and of the Inspector-General of the Armed Forces; (e) the nomination of the judges of the Tribunal of State; (f) the nomination of the Senators receiving their mandate by the President's selection; (g) the appointment and dismissal of the Director and officials of the President's Household; (h) the dissolution of the Seym and Senate before the expiration of their term; (i) impeachment of members of the Government before the Tribunal of State; (j) application of the right of pardon.

ART. 14

(1) The official acts of the President of the Republic require for their validity the countersignature of the Prime Minister and of the competent Minister.

(2) For official acts arising out of the President's prerogatives countersignature is not necessary.

ART. 15

(1) The President of the Republic is not responsible for his official acts.

(2) For actions not connected with the discharge of his duties the President of the Republic cannot be arraigned during the term of his office.

ART. 16

(1) The election of the President of the Republic takes place as follows:

(2) A candidate for Presidency is chosen by the Assembly of Electors.

(3) The retiring President of the Republic has the right to propose another candidate.

(4) If the retiring President of the Republic avails himself of this right, the new President of the Republic shall be chosen by a referendum from between two candidates: the one elected by the Assembly of Electors and the one proposed by the retiring President of the Republic.

(5) If the retiring President of the Republic declares, that he does not intend to use his right to propose a candidate, or if within seven days after the choice made by the Assembly of Electors he does not propose another candidate and does not call a referendum, the candidate of the Assembly of Electors shall be considered elected as the President of the Republic.

ART. 17

(1) The Assembly of Electors consists of the Speaker (Marshal) of the Senate as chairman, the Speaker (Marshal) of the Seym as vice-chairman, the Prime Minister, the First-President of the Supreme Court, the Inspector-General of the Armed Forces and 75 Electors chosen from among the worthiest citizens two-thirds of whom are chosen by the Seym and one-third by the Senate.

(2) The mandates of the Electors lapse by force of the law itself on the day the newly elected President of the Republic assumes office.

ART. 18

(1) The Assembly of Electors is convened by the President of the Republic not later than fifteen days before the expiration of his term of office.

(2) Three days before the date of the session of the Assembly, the Seym and Senate shall meet separately, on the invitation of their Speakers, for the election of the Electors.

(3) If the Seym and Senate are dissolved and the result of the new elections to the Legislative Chambers is not yet announced—the choice of the Electors shall be made by the deputies and senators who composed the preceding Seym and Senate.

ART. 19

(1) The President of the Republic before assuming office takes the following oath: Conscious of my responsibility before God and history for the destinies of the State, I swear as President of the Republic, before God Almighty united in the Holy Trinity, to defend the sovereign rights of the State, to guard its dignity, to apply the Constitution, to administer equal justice to all the citizens, to avert evil and danger from the State and to regard solicitous care for the welfare of the State as my supreme duty. So help me God and His Son's Holy Passion. Amen.

(2) The Act of Oath shall be signed by the newly elected President of the Republic and by the officials present.

ART. 20

(1) The term of office of the President of the Republic lasts seven years counting from the day on which he assumes office.

(2) This term shall be extended by the time necessary for the electoral procedure to be concluded in case a referendum for the election of a new President of the Republic should be called.

ART. 21

If the President of the Republic dies before his seven-year term of office expires, or if he resigns his office, the Speaker of the Senate shall immediately summon the Assembly of Electors, so that they may select a candidate for the Presidency; in the event that he proposes another candidate himself, he shall call a referendum.

ART. 22

(1) Should the President of the Republic be permanently unable to execute his functions, the Speaker of the Senate shall summon a joint session of the Legislative Chambers in order to decide whether the office of President is to be considered as vacant.

(2) The resolution recognizing the office as vacant passes by a three-fifths majority of the statutory number of the members of the combined Chambers.

(3) Should the above resolution be passed, the Speaker of the Senate shall immediately summon the Assembly of Electors.

ART. 23

While the office of the President of the Republic is vacant, the Speaker of the Senate exercises the functions of the President in his place, and should the Senate be dissolved, the Speaker of the dissolved Senate; he then enjoys all the rights vested in the office of the President of the Republic.

ART. 24

(1) In time of war the term of the President's office shall be prolonged to three months after the conclusion of peace; the President of the Republic shall then by a special act, promulgated in the Official Journal of Laws, appoint his successor, in case the office falls vacant before the conclusion of peace.

(2) Should the President's successor assume office, the term of his office shall last up to the lapse of three months after the conclusion of peace.

III. THE GOVERNMENT

ART. 25

(1) The Government directs the affairs of State which are not reserved for the other organs of authority.

(2) The Government consists of the Prime Minister and the Ministers.

(3) The Prime Minister represents the Government, directs its works, and determines the general principles of State policy.

(4) The Ministers direct their respective departments of State administration, or execute special tasks entrusted to them.

(5) The organization of the Government and in particular, the scope of activity of the Prime Minister and of the Council of Ministers and of the Ministers shall be defined by a decree of the President of the Republic.

ART. 26

For the purpose of passing on matters requiring the decision of all the members of the Government, the Ministers form the Council of Ministers (the Cabinet), with the Prime Minister as chairman.

ART. 27

(1) The Prime Minister, the Council of Ministers, and the Ministers have the right to issue orders for the execution of legislative acts and in reference to such acts

(2) These orders shall not be contrary to the legislative acts and shall be promulgated in the Official Journal of Laws.

ART. 28

The Prime Minister and the Ministers are politically responsible to the President of the Republic and may be dismissed by him at any time.

ART. 29

(1) The Seym, in exercising its right of parliamentary control over the activities of the Government, may demand the resignation of the Cabinet or of a Minister.

(2) It is only during an ordinary session that such a motion can be made; it cannot be voted upon during the same sitting during which it was proposed.

(3) Should the motion pass in the Seym by an ordinary majority vote, and the President of the Republic does not in three days dismiss the Cabinet or the Minister, nor dissolve the Legislative Chambers, the motion shall be examined by the Senate during its nearest session.

(4) Should the Senate vote for the motion which has been passed by the Seym, the President of the Republic shall dismiss the Cabinet or the Minister, unless he dissolves the Seym and the Senate.

ART. 30

(1) Independently of the political responsibility of the Prime Minister and the Ministers to the President of the Republic, and their parliamentary responsibility to the Seym, they are constitutionally responsible before the Tribunal of State for wilfully violating the Constitution or any other legislative act in connexion with their functions.

(2) The right to invoke constitutional responsibility of the Prime Minister or of a Minister is vested in the President of the Republic as also in the Seym and Senate in joint session.

(3) The decision of the combined Chambers to arraign the Prime Minister or a Minister before the Tribunal of State requires a three-fifths majority in the presence of at least one-half of the statutory number of members of the combined Chambers.

IV. THE SEYM

ART. 31

(1) The Seym exercises legislative functions and controls the activities of the Government; the Seym also fixes the budget and imposes charges upon the citizens.

(2) The control over the Government activities is expressed in the right of the Seym: (a) to demand the resignation of the Cabinet or of a Minister; (b) jointly with the Senate, to invoke the constitutional responsibility of the Prime Minister or of a Minister; (c) to file questions before the Cabinet; (d) to approve, each year, the final State accounts and to grant the Government release; (e) to participate in the control over State debts.

(3) The functions of governing the State do not belong to the Seym.

ART. 32

(1) The Seym consists of deputies elected by universal, secret, equal, and direct suffrage.

(2) The term of the Seym lasts five years counting from the day on which it is convened.

(3) The dissolution of the Seym before the expiration of its term, requires a statement of cause.

(4) The President of the Republic issues writs for new elections within thirty days after the dissolution of the Seym.

(5) The voting shall take place not later than sixty days after the issue of the writs.

(6) Members of the Armed Forces belonging to the mobilized parts of the Army or Navy do not participate in the voting.

ART. 33

(1) Every citizen, irrespective of sex, has the right to vote if he has completed 24 years of age prior to the issue of the writs and if he enjoys, in full, his civil and civic rights.

(2) Every citizen, who has the right to vote, has also the right of eligibility, if he has attained the age of thirty.

(3) An Act in respect of elections to the Seym, shall determine the division of the country into constituencies, fix the number of deputies, establish electoral procedure, and shall also define the classes of persons deprived of the right of voting and of the right of eligibility for lack of sufficient moral or intellectual qualities.

ART. 34

(1) The Seym elects, from among its members, a Speaker for the term of its office.

(2) Until the next Seym is constituted, the Speaker retains the prerogatives vested in him for the election of the President of the Republic.

ART. 35

(1) The Seym shall be convened for the first session of a new term not later than within thirty days after the announcement of the result of the elections to the Legislative Chambers.

(2) The ordinary session of the Seym shall be opened every year at the latest in November and cannot be closed before the lapse of four months unless the budget shall have been adopted at an earlier date.

(3) The ordinary session can be adjourned for thirty days.

(4) An adjournment for a longer period, or an additional adjournment, requires the agreement of the Seym.

(5) The recess period caused by an adjournment of the session is not taken into account for the period prescribed by the Constitution for the activities of the Seym.

ART. 36

(1) The President of the Republic may at any time call at his own discretion, an extraordinary session of the Seym; he shall do so within thirty days, on the motion of at least half the statutory number of deputies.

(2) During an extraordinary session the Seym can debate only on matters stated in the President's summons or in the motion of the deputies demanding such a session, and on matters which by laws or rules of procedure require to be dealt with at the nearest session, or which will be considered urgent by the President of the Republic on the motion of the Prime Minister or of the Speaker.

ART. 37

The resolutions of the Seym are adopted by a majority vote in the presence of at least one-third of the statutory number of deputies, unless the Constitution provides otherwise.

ART. 38

(1) The sessions of the Seym are public.

(2) The Seym may enact debates in camera.

(3) The minutes and stenographic records issued on the Speaker's order are the only documentary evidence of the proceedings of the Seym debates.

(4) No one may be held responsible for publishing and disseminating reports of public debates of the Seym if they fully and exactly report these debates.

ART. 39

(1) The deputies take the following oath before accepting their mandate:

Conscious of the duty of loyalty to the Polish State I do vow solemnly and pledge my honour, in my capacity as deputy to the Seym of the Republic, not to cease in work for the welfare of the State and to consider the care for its dignity, unity, and strength as my first duty.

(2) A refusal on the part of a deputy to take the oath or taking the oath with reservation is equivalent to a rejection of the mandate.

ART. 40

The deputies receive remuneration and have the right to use gratuitously the State-owned means of communication within the boundaries of the State.

ART. 41

(1) The deputies enjoy only such assurances of immunity as are necessary for their participation in the work of the Seym.

(2) The deputies are responsible only before the Seym for speeches held in the Seym or for motions, questions, and for improper behaviour during debates.

(3) For actions, however, contrary to the duty of loyalty to the Polish State, or bearing the nature of an indictable offence, a deputy may be arraigned before the Tribunal of State by a resolution of the Seym or on the demand of the Speaker or of the Minister of Justice, and by the verdict of that Tribunal be deprived of his mandate as a deputy.

(4) For infringing the rights of a third person during the deliberations of the Seym a deputy may be obliged to answer before a Court of Justice only with the permission of the Seym.

ART. 42

(1) For activities not connected with their participation in the work of the Seym, deputies are responsible equally with other citizens.

(2) A criminal or administrative prosecution, however, or a disciplinary inquiry instituted against a deputy before or after his receiving his mandate, should on the demand of the Seym be stayed till the expiration of his mandate.

(3) The time during which a criminal prosecution or an disciplinary inquiry has been stayed is not included in the period of limitation.

(4) A deputy who has been detained during a session but not on the ground of a warrant issued by a Court of Justice shall be immediately released on the demand of the Speaker of the Seym.

ART. 43

(1) A deputy may not hold a senatorial mandate.

(2) Offices and posts, the taking of which entails the loss of a deputy's mandate, shall be determined by law.

(3) A deputy is not permitted to conduct activities incompatible with the holding of a mandate, under pain of the consequences envisaged by the law.

ART. 44

(1) A deputy is not permitted in his own or in any other name or on behalf of enterprises, associations, and companies set up for gainful purposes, to acquire or lease State property, to undertake supplies to the Government and to execute public works, or to obtain concessions or any other personal emoluments from the Government.

(2) For the violation of the aforesaid prohibitions deputies shall be arraigned on the demand of the Speaker or of the President of the Supreme Board of Control before the Tribunal of State, and by a verdict of the Tribunal they may be deprived of their mandate as deputies and of the personal emoluments received from the Government.

(3) In pursuance of a resolution of the Committee on Rules of Procedure, passed by a majority of three-fifths, the Speaker of the Seym may allow a deputy in special cases to enter into contractual relations with the Government if this relation is not contrary to accepted usage.

ART. 45

(1) The Prime Minister, the Ministers, and the officials delegated by them have the right to attend the sessions of the Seym and to take the floor regardless of the order of speakers.

(2) The deputies may question the Prime Minister and Ministers on matters within their competence, in the manner prescribed by the rules of procedure.

(3) The Prime Minister or the questioned Minister must answer within forty-five days or give the reasons justifying refusal to give explanations.

V. THE SENATE

ART. 46

(1) The Senate as the second Legislative Chamber examines the budget and the projects of laws passed by the Seym, and it also participates in the exercise of control over State debts.

(2) The Senate also takes part, equally with the Seym, though without the right of initiative, in deciding the following matters: (a) motions demanding this dismissal of the Cabinet or a Minister; (b) bills referred back by the President of the Republic to the Legislative Chambers for reconsideration; (c) amendments of the Constitution; (d) the repeal of measures introducing a state of emergency.

ART. 47

(1) The Senate consists of Senators, one-third of whom are nominated by the President of the Republic and two-thirds by election.

(2) The term of office of the Senate begins and ends at the same time as the term of office of the Seym.

(3) The Senate Election Law shall fix the number of Senators and determine the method of their appointment as also the categories of persons who shall have the right of suffrage and of eligibility.

ART. 48

Arts. 34-45, concerning the Seym, apply respectively to the Senate.

VI. LEGISLATION

ART. 49

(1) Legislative Acts are: (a) laws; (b) decrees of the President of the Republic.

(2) No legislative act may be contrary to the Constitution.

ART. 50

(1) The right of legislative initiative is vested in the Government and the Seym.

(2) Legislative initiative in matters regarding the Budget, the contingent of army-recruits and the ratification of international agreements pertains exclusively to the Government.

(3) The Diet may not without consent of the Government pass a law entailing expenditure for which there is no cover in the budget.

ART. 51

The obtaining of State loans, the disposal or mortgage of State real-estate appraised at a sum of over 100,000 Zlotys, the imposition of taxes and public levies, the introduction of import duties and monopolies, the fixing of the monetary system as also the acceptance of financial guarantees by the Treasury—shall take place only on the strength of a legislative act.

ART. 52

(1) Agreements with other countries: commercial, customs tariff, permanently burdening the State Treasury, containing obligations to impose new burdens upon the citizens or obligations to impose new burdens upon the citizens or evoking change in the frontiers of the State—require before ratification the agreement of the Legislative Chambers expressed in the form of a law.

(2) In cases not permitting delay, the President of the Republic may, on the motion of the Council of Ministers, put provisionally into effect all or some of the clauses of customs-tariff or commercial agreements before their ratification.

ART. 53

(1) Each Bill passed by the Seym shall be submitted to the Senate for consideration.

(2) A resolution of the Senate rejecting or amending a Bill is considered as accepted unless the Seym rejects it by a three-fifths majority.

ART. 54

(1) The President of the Republic shall confirm with his signature the validity of laws passed constitutionally and shall order their promulgation in the Journal of Laws.

(2) The President of the Republic may within thirty days of the receipt of a Bill

refer it back to the Seym with the demand that it be reconsidered, but this can take place not earlier than during the next ordinary session.

(3) If the Legislative Chambers pass the Bill without amendment for a second time by a majority of the statutory number of deputies and senators, the President of the Republic shall order its promulgation after having confirmed the validity of the law with his signature.

ART. 55

(1) The law may authorize the President of the Republic to issue decrees within the period and the scope determined by it; amendments of the Constitution shall not be included in such authorization.

(2) While the Seym is dissolved, the President of the Republic has the right, in case of State necessity, to issue decrees within the limits of State legislation with the exception of: (a) amendments to the Constitution; (b) the laws concerning elections to the Seym and the Senate; (c) the budget; (d) the imposition of taxes and establishment of monopolies; (e) the monetary system; (f) the issue of State loans; (g) the disposal and mortgaging of State real estate valued at a sum over 100,000 zlotys.

(3) Decrees issued in pursuance of provisions of the present article shall be issued on the motion of the Council of Ministers and can be amended or abrogated only by a legislative act.

ART. 56

Decrees concerning the organization of the Government, the Supreme command of the Armed Forces and the organization of State administration may be issued at any time; they can be amended or abrogated only by similar decrees of the President of the Republic.

ART. 57

(1) The Decrees of the President of the Republic have the force of law and shall be published in the Journal of Laws with reference made to their constitutional basis.

(2) Whenever the Constitution or laws require a bill for settlement of a particular legislative question, this matter may also be settled by a decree of the President of the Republic, issued in accordance with the conditions specified by the Constitution.

VII. THE BUDGET

ART. 58

(1) A law annually fixes the budget of the State.

(2) The Government submits budget estimates to the Seym not later than four months before the beginning of the budgetary year.

(3) For the examination of the budget the Seym is allowed a period of ninety days from the presentation of the budget estimates by the Government; the Senate is allowed a period of twenty days after the expiration of the term fixed for the Seym.

(4) For the consideration of amendments proposed by the Senate the Seym is allowed ten days from the expiration of the term fixed for the Senate.

(5) The President of the Republic shall order the promulgation of the budget: (a) in the version proposed by the Legislative Chambers, if the Seym and the Senate have considered the budget within the fixed periods; (b) in the version adopted by the Seym, if the Senate has not considered the budget within the fixed period; (c) in the version proposed by the Senate, if the Seym has not within the fixed period considered the budget or the amendments introduced by the Senate; (d) in the version proposed by the Government if neither the Seym nor the Senate have examined the budget within the allotted periods.

ART. 59

(1) Expenditure not estimated for in the budget cannot be adopted, and if estimated, may not be increased without the agreement of the Government.

(2) The Government may not make any expenditure without the authorization of a statute unless State necessity arises; in such case, the Government shall, on the basis of a decision of the Council of Ministers, make the essential expenditure but must submit to the Seym, within seven days after the decision, the project of a law for the granting of supplementary credits. The decision of the Council of Ministers shall simultaneously be published in the official gazette and shall be notified to the Supreme Board of Control.

ART. 60

- (1) The State cannot remain without a budget
- (2) If, on account of the dissolution of the Legislative Chambers, the budget or at least the provisional estimates are not adopted by the beginning of the new budgetary year—the Government has the right to collect revenues and meet expenses within the limits of the preceding year's budget up to the time of the adoption of the provisional estimates or of the budget, which the Government shall submit to the Seym at its first sitting.
- (3) The aforesaid principle applies analogously in case the Seym rejects the presented project of the budget in its entirety; in such event the Government shall within seven days after such rejection submit to the Seym a new project of the budget or provisional estimates whilst the expenditure made by the Government on the basis of the preceding year's budget cannot exceed in each individual item the expenditure proposed in the rejected budget

VIII THE ARMED FORCES

ART. 61

- (1) The Armed Forces guard the safety and sovereign rights of the Republic.
- (2) All citizens are bound to do military service and to offer services for the defence of the State

ART. 62

- (1) The President of the Republic year by year orders the conscription of army recruits within the limits of the fixed contingent
- (2) A legislative act is necessary for any change in the contingent.

ART. 63

- (1) The President of the Republic issues decrees in his capacity as the supreme Head of the Armed Forces; he will in particular decide by a decree the organization of the chief military authorities fixing the method of countersigning acts issued by him as the supreme Head of the Armed Forces
- (2) The President of the Republic decides on the use of the Armed Forces for the defence of the State.
- (3) In case a Commander-in-Chief is nominated, the right to dispose of the Armed Forces passes to him.
- (4) For acts connected with his command the Commander-in-Chief is responsible to the President of the Republic as to the Supreme Head of the Armed Forces.

IX THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

ART. 64

- (1) The courts administer justice in the name of the Polish Republic
- (2) By the administration of justice the courts safeguard the legal order of the State and shape respect for the law in the community.
- (3) The judges are independent in the discharge of their judicial duties.
- (4) The sentences of the courts may not be changed or annulled by other organs of authorities.
- (5) The courts have no right to examine the validity of legislative acts, duly promulgated.

ART. 65

- (1) The judges are appointed by the President of the Republic, unless the laws provide otherwise.
- (2) The organization of the courts, the independent status of the judges, their rights and duties and salaries shall be defined by laws.

ART. 66

- (1) A judge may be dismissed, suspended, transferred, or pensioned off against his will only on the strength of a court decision and in cases prescribed by law.
- (2) This principle does not apply, when the transfer of a judge or his pensioning off is caused by a change in the organization of the courts, decided by a legislative act.

THE POLAND OF PILSUDSKI

ART. 67

. A judge may not be indicted on a criminal charge without the consent of the competent disciplinary court, or arrested without a warrant, unless he was apprehended in the very act of committing an offence

ART. 68

(1) No law can bar a citizen from seeking redress in the courts of justice for his injury or damages.

(2) Personal liberty, the inviolability of domicile and the secrecy of correspondence are hereby guaranteed.

(3) A law shall define under what conditions the search of a citizen's person or home may be executed or the secrecy of correspondence be infringed.

(4) No one can be deprived of the court of justice to which he is by law subject, nor punished for a deed not prohibited by law before it was committed, nor, too, be detained without a judicial warrant longer than for the term of forty-eight hours.

(5) Extraordinary courts are permissible only in cases foreseen by law.

(6) Laws shall establish the principle that cases in which the penalty has been imposed by an administrative authority, shall on the demand of the defendant be referred to the jurisdiction of the courts.

ART. 69

(1) The President of the Republic is empowered to grant a pardon by an act of mercy or to modify a punishment imposed by a final court decision and to annul the effects of a sentence.

(2) An amnesty requires a legislative act.

ART. 70

(1) There are established: (a) the Supreme Court for criminal and civil suits, (b) the Supreme Administrative Tribunal for deciding the legality of administrative acts, and, (c) the Tribunal of Competence for the purpose of deciding disputes as to competence between the courts and other organs of authority.

(2) The separate organization of military courts, their competence and procedure, and the rights and duties of the members of these courts shall be defined by laws.

ART. 71

(1) For the examination of arraignments of Ministers, senators, and deputies impeached on the basis of their constitutional responsibility a Tribunal of State is convened, composed of the First President of the Supreme Court as the chairman, and of six judges.

(2) The judges of the Tribunal of State and their deputies are appointed for the period of three years by the President of the Republic from a panel of twice the number of judges from the general courts of justice selected in one-half by the Seym and one-half by the Senate, with equal consideration given to the candidates of each of the Legislative Chambers.

X. THE STATE ADMINISTRATION

ART. 72

(1) The State administration is a public service.

(2) The State administration is executed by: (a) the Government administration, (b) the territorial self-government, (c) the economic self-government.

ART. 73

(1) For purposes of general administration the State shall be divided territorially into administrative areas, namely, into voivodships, counties, and urban and rural communes

(2) The division into voivodships requires a legislative act.

(3) Urban communes can under conditions defined by law constitute a county or city voivodship.

ART. 74

The organization of general Government administration and particularly the competence of its organs shall be determined by a decree of the President of the Republic.

ART. 75

(1) In accordance with the division of the State into administrative areas there are established, for purposes of State administration within the scope of local needs, voivodship, county, and communal local-governments.

(2) The local-governments have the right, within the limits defined by law, to issue for their areas measures binding upon confirmation by the competent supervisory authority.

(3) For the execution of special tasks the territorial local-governments can be united in unions.

(4) The law can acknowledge such unions as public-legal entities

(5) The supervision over the activity of local-governments is exercised by the Government through its organs or through the superior organs of local-government.

ART. 76

(1) For particular fields of economic life there shall be established economic self-government consisting of Chambers of agriculture, commerce, and industry, handicrafts, labour, free professions, and other incorporated associations.

(2) By special laws those chambers can be joined in associations and acknowledged as legal entities.

(3) For the consideration of problems relating to the whole of economic life, for the expression of opinion on drafts of economic legislation and for harmonizing the activities in the particular branches of the national economy a Supreme Economic Chamber may be called into being by law.

(4) Supervision over the activities of economic self-government is exercised by the Government through its organs established for that purpose.

XI. THE STATE CONTROL

ART. 77

(1) In order to control the financial activities of the State and of the public-juridical associations, to audit the balance-sheet of State accounts, to move yearly in the Diet the adoption of the auditors' report, the Supreme Board of Control is established; it is based on the principle of the collegiate system and of the independence of its members.

(2) The Supreme Board of Control is independent of the Government.

(3) The President of the Republic appoints and recalls the President of the Supreme Board of Control; on his motion and with his counter-signature the President of the Republic appoints and dismisses the members of its college.

(4) The President of the Supreme Board of Control is responsible for the discharge of his duties according to the principles laid down for the responsibility of Ministers.

XII. STATE OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY

ART. 78

(1) In case of an external menace to the State as also in case of internal disturbances or widespread conspiracy of a treasonable character menacing the order and safety of the State or the safety of its citizens—the Council of Ministers with the consent of the President of the Republic shall declare a state of emergency in the whole territory of the State or in the endangered part.

(2) Such measure shall be submitted to the Seym within seven days after its promulgation.

(3) If the Seym is dissolved the declaration of the state of emergency shall be presented to the newly elected Seym at its first session.

(4) The Seym may demand the annulment of the measure.

(5) Such a motion cannot be voted upon at the same session during which it was presented.

(6) If the Senate supports the decision of the Seym, the Government shall immediately annul the declaration.

(7) The declaration of a state of emergency empowers the Government for the period of this state to suspend civic liberties and to apply the special rights provided for by the State of Emergency Act.

ART. 79

• (1) In case the use of the Armed Forces becomes necessary for the defence of the State the President of the Republic shall declare a state of war in the whole territory or in a part of the State

(2) During a state of war the President of the Republic has the right, without the authorization of the Legislative Chambers, to issue decrees within the scope of State legislation excluding changes of the Constitution; to prolong the term of the Legislative Chambers till the conclusion of peace; to open, adjourn and close the session of the Seym and Senate on dates adapted to the needs of the defence of the State; as also, for the decision of matters falling under the competence of the Legislative Chambers, he has the right to summon the Seym and Senate as a reduced body, formed by these Chambers

(3) During the duration of a state of war the Government enjoys rights provided for by the State of Emergency Act as also special rights determined by the State of War Act.

XIII. AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION

ART. 80

(1) An amendment of the Constitution can be carried out on the initiative: (a) of the President of the Republic, (b) of the Government, or (c) of one quarter of the statutory number of deputies.

(2) The motion made by the President of the Republic can be voted upon only in its entirety and without amendments or with amendments to which the Government, on behalf of the President of the Republic, agrees.

(3) A law amending the Constitution on the initiative of the President of the Republic requires concurrent decisions of the Seym and Senate passed by an ordinary majority vote; if on the initiative of the Government or the Seym—concurrent decisions passed by a majority of the statutory number of deputies and senators.

(4) The President of the Republic may within thirty days after having received the project of a law amending the Constitution refer it back to the Seym with the demand that it be reconsidered, which can take place not earlier than during the subsequent term.

(5) If the Legislative Chambers again pass the project without amendments, the President of the Republic shall after having confirmed the law with his signature promulgate it unless he dissolves the Seym and Senate

XIV. FINAL PROVISIONS

ART. 81

(1) The present Constitution Law enters into force on the day of its promulgation.

(2) At the same time, the Constitution Law of 17 March, 1921 (*Journal of Laws*, No. 44, item 267) is repealed with the amendments introduced by the law of 2 August, 1926, but with articles 99, 109–118 and 120 left in force.

(3) The Constitution Law of 15 July, 1920, containing the statute of organization of the Voivodship of Silesia, with amendments introduced by various Laws, remains in force with the provision that art. 44 of the Law of 15 July, 1920, is given the following form: "Amendments of this Act requires a State law" and that article 2 of the Law of 8 March, 1921, is repealed.

ANNEXE

The articles of the Constitution of March 17, 1921, maintained in force by the Constitution of 1935, are summarized on pp. 134–5

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- RYDZ-SMIGLY, General Edward (1886-), named Pilsudski's successor by President Moscicki, July, 1936. Born March 11, 1886, at Brzezany, county of Stanislavov; at Gymnasium, Brzezany; Académie des Beaux-Arts, Cracow; took degree in philology at Cracow University; intended career as artist—painter—but put it aside finally to take part in the struggle for independence of Poland, and joined Pilsudski's Riflemen. In August, 1914, he commanded a battalion of the First Brigade of the Legions, and soon became one of Pilsudski's most trusted officers. After Pilsudski's arrest and imprisonment at Magdeburg, Rydz-Smigly, now Colonel, became Chief of the Polish Military Organization; in 1918, after Poland's liberation, Pilsudski gave him, now General of Brigade, the most responsible tasks; in April, 1919, commanding the 1st Division of the Legions, took a leading part in the Vilna campaign, and early in 1920 was in command of the Polish-Latvian forces that drove the Bolsheviks out of Latvia; later in that year he was in command of the army that took Kieff, and when the evacuation of that city was ordered he commanded for a time the forces on the Southern Front, but was compelled to retreat. Some months previously he had been promoted General of Division. He commanded the army of shock troops that Pilsudski had assembled on the Wieprz for his great manoeuvre, which resulted in the total defeat of the Bolsheviks; during the battle Rydz-Smigly led the chief group of attack from the Wieprz to Bialystok, and stopped the Reds on the line of Grodno; he was given command then of the 2nd Polish Army, and played a great part in the Battle of the Niemen, September, 1920. After the Riga peace, he was appointed one of the Inspectors of the Army. During the *coup d'état*, May, 1926, he assisted the Marshal by bringing the Vilna forces to Warsaw in the nick of time. On his death-bed Pilsudski nominated Rydz-Smigly as his successor at the head of the Polish Army, and President Moscicki gave order accordingly after the Marshal's death. As Inspector-General he attended the Presidential conferences, and there was little surprise when the President declared him Pilsudski's successor in the government of the country, 9, 14, 60, 71, 93, 105, 216, 274, 300, 397-8, 402, 418, 426, 451, 453, 458, 461, 464, 465, 466, 468, 472-3. The General styles himself Smigly-Rydz, but popularly, even in Poland, he is known as Rydz-Smigly.
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